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-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/Kconfig110
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 6978140edfa4..c842878f8133 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -670,15 +670,42 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412
config ARM64_WORKAROUND_TRBE_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE
bool
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_2051678
+ bool "Cortex-A510: 2051678: disable Hardware Update of the page table dirty bit"
+ default y
+ help
+ This options adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum ARM64_ERRATUM_2051678.
+ Affected Coretex-A510 might not respect the ordering rules for
+ hardware update of the page table's dirty bit. The workaround
+ is to not enable the feature on affected CPUs.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_2077057
+ bool "Cortex-A510: 2077057: workaround software-step corrupting SPSR_EL2"
+ help
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum 2077057.
+ Affected Cortex-A510 may corrupt SPSR_EL2 when the a step exception is
+ expected, but a Pointer Authentication trap is taken instead. The
+ erratum causes SPSR_EL1 to be copied to SPSR_EL2, which could allow
+ EL1 to cause a return to EL2 with a guest controlled ELR_EL2.
+
+ This can only happen when EL2 is stepping EL1.
+
+ When these conditions occur, the SPSR_EL2 value is unchanged from the
+ previous guest entry, and can be restored from the in-memory copy.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
config ARM64_ERRATUM_2119858
- bool "Cortex-A710: 2119858: workaround TRBE overwriting trace data in FILL mode"
+ bool "Cortex-A710/X2: 2119858: workaround TRBE overwriting trace data in FILL mode"
default y
depends on CORESIGHT_TRBE
select ARM64_WORKAROUND_TRBE_OVERWRITE_FILL_MODE
help
- This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A710 erratum 2119858.
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A710/X2 erratum 2119858.
- Affected Cortex-A710 cores could overwrite up to 3 cache lines of trace
+ Affected Cortex-A710/X2 cores could overwrite up to 3 cache lines of trace
data at the base of the buffer (pointed to by TRBASER_EL1) in FILL mode in
the event of a WRAP event.
@@ -761,14 +788,14 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_2253138
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_2224489
- bool "Cortex-A710: 2224489: workaround TRBE writing to address out-of-range"
+ bool "Cortex-A710/X2: 2224489: workaround TRBE writing to address out-of-range"
depends on CORESIGHT_TRBE
default y
select ARM64_WORKAROUND_TRBE_WRITE_OUT_OF_RANGE
help
- This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A710 erratum 2224489.
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A710/X2 erratum 2224489.
- Affected Cortex-A710 cores might write to an out-of-range address, not reserved
+ Affected Cortex-A710/X2 cores might write to an out-of-range address, not reserved
for TRBE. Under some conditions, the TRBE might generate a write to the next
virtually addressed page following the last page of the TRBE address space
(i.e., the TRBLIMITR_EL1.LIMIT), instead of wrapping around to the base.
@@ -778,6 +805,65 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_2224489
If unsure, say Y.
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_2064142
+ bool "Cortex-A510: 2064142: workaround TRBE register writes while disabled"
+ depends on COMPILE_TEST # Until the CoreSight TRBE driver changes are in
+ default y
+ help
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum 2064142.
+
+ Affected Cortex-A510 core might fail to write into system registers after the
+ TRBE has been disabled. Under some conditions after the TRBE has been disabled
+ writes into TRBE registers TRBLIMITR_EL1, TRBPTR_EL1, TRBBASER_EL1, TRBSR_EL1,
+ and TRBTRG_EL1 will be ignored and will not be effected.
+
+ Work around this in the driver by executing TSB CSYNC and DSB after collection
+ is stopped and before performing a system register write to one of the affected
+ registers.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_2038923
+ bool "Cortex-A510: 2038923: workaround TRBE corruption with enable"
+ depends on COMPILE_TEST # Until the CoreSight TRBE driver changes are in
+ default y
+ help
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum 2038923.
+
+ Affected Cortex-A510 core might cause an inconsistent view on whether trace is
+ prohibited within the CPU. As a result, the trace buffer or trace buffer state
+ might be corrupted. This happens after TRBE buffer has been enabled by setting
+ TRBLIMITR_EL1.E, followed by just a single context synchronization event before
+ execution changes from a context, in which trace is prohibited to one where it
+ isn't, or vice versa. In these mentioned conditions, the view of whether trace
+ is prohibited is inconsistent between parts of the CPU, and the trace buffer or
+ the trace buffer state might be corrupted.
+
+ Work around this in the driver by preventing an inconsistent view of whether the
+ trace is prohibited or not based on TRBLIMITR_EL1.E by immediately following a
+ change to TRBLIMITR_EL1.E with at least one ISB instruction before an ERET, or
+ two ISB instructions if no ERET is to take place.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_1902691
+ bool "Cortex-A510: 1902691: workaround TRBE trace corruption"
+ depends on COMPILE_TEST # Until the CoreSight TRBE driver changes are in
+ default y
+ help
+ This option adds the workaround for ARM Cortex-A510 erratum 1902691.
+
+ Affected Cortex-A510 core might cause trace data corruption, when being written
+ into the memory. Effectively TRBE is broken and hence cannot be used to capture
+ trace data.
+
+ Work around this problem in the driver by just preventing TRBE initialization on
+ affected cpus. The firmware must have disabled the access to TRBE for the kernel
+ on such implementations. This will cover the kernel for any firmware that doesn't
+ do this already.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
default y
@@ -1166,9 +1252,6 @@ config HW_PERF_EVENTS
def_bool y
depends on ARM_PMU
-config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT
- def_bool y
-
# Supported by clang >= 7.0
config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
@@ -1297,6 +1380,15 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
If unsure, say Y.
+config MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ bool "Mitigate Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
+ default y
+ help
+ Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
+ make use of branch history to influence future speculation.
+ When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches
+ or a firmware call overwrites the branch history.
+
config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
default y