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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/Makefile18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/boot.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c47
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c78
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c276
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/header.S18
-rwxr-xr-xarch/x86/boot/install.sh2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/main.c42
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/pm.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/printf.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/setup.ld6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/string.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/string.h1
27 files changed, 337 insertions, 267 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
index 3cece19b7473..9cc0ff6e9067 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/Makefile
@@ -9,19 +9,6 @@
# Changed by many, many contributors over the years.
#
-# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code.
-KASAN_SANITIZE := n
-KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
-KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
-OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
-
-# Kernel does not boot with kcov instrumentation here.
-# One of the problems observed was insertion of __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()
-# callback into middle of per-cpu data enabling code. Thus the callback observed
-# inconsistent state and crashed. We are interested mostly in syscall coverage,
-# so boot code is not interesting anyway.
-KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-
# If you want to preset the SVGA mode, uncomment the next line and
# set SVGA_MODE to whatever number you want.
# Set it to -DSVGA_MODE=NORMAL_VGA if you just want the EGA/VGA mode.
@@ -69,8 +56,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(REALMODE_CFLAGS) -D_SETUP
KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
-GCOV_PROFILE := n
-UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CONFIG_CC_IMPLICIT_FALLTHROUGH)
$(obj)/bzImage: asflags-y := $(SVGA_MODE)
@@ -129,7 +115,7 @@ targets += mtools.conf
# genimage.sh requires bash, but it also has a bunch of other
# external dependencies.
quiet_cmd_genimage = GENIMAGE $3
-cmd_genimage = $(BASH) $(srctree)/$(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \
+ cmd_genimage = $(BASH) $(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \
$(obj)/mtools.conf '$(FDARGS)' $(FDINITRD)
PHONY += bzdisk fdimage fdimage144 fdimage288 hdimage isoimage
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
index 148ba5c5106e..0f24f7ebec9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
@@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ void initregs(struct biosregs *regs);
int strcmp(const char *str1, const char *str2);
int strncmp(const char *cs, const char *ct, size_t count);
size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t maxlen);
-unsigned int atou(const char *s);
unsigned long long simple_strtoull(const char *cp, char **endp, unsigned int base);
size_t strlen(const char *s);
char *strchr(const char *s, int c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 71fc531b95b4..606c74f27459 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -17,15 +17,6 @@
# (see scripts/Makefile.lib size_append)
# compressed vmlinux.bin.all + u32 size of vmlinux.bin.all
-# Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked for early boot code.
-KASAN_SANITIZE := n
-KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
-KMSAN_SANITIZE := n
-OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
-
-# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
-KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-
targets := vmlinux vmlinux.bin vmlinux.bin.gz vmlinux.bin.bz2 vmlinux.bin.lzma \
vmlinux.bin.xz vmlinux.bin.lzo vmlinux.bin.lz4 vmlinux.bin.zst
@@ -34,6 +25,7 @@ targets := vmlinux vmlinux.bin vmlinux.bin.gz vmlinux.bin.bz2 vmlinux.bin.lzma \
# avoid errors with '-march=i386', and future flags may depend on the target to
# be valid.
KBUILD_CFLAGS := -m$(BITS) -O2 $(CLANG_FLAGS)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -std=gnu11
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-aliasing -fPIE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wundef
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
@@ -53,14 +45,12 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wa$(comma)-mrelax-relocations=no)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h
-# sev.c indirectly inludes inat-table.h which is generated during
+# sev.c indirectly includes inat-table.h which is generated during
# compilation and stored in $(objtree). Add the directory to the includes so
# that the compiler finds it even with out-of-tree builds (make O=/some/path).
CFLAGS_sev.o += -I$(objtree)/arch/x86/lib/
KBUILD_AFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -D__ASSEMBLY__
-GCOV_PROFILE := n
-UBSAN_SANITIZE :=n
KBUILD_LDFLAGS := -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE)
KBUILD_LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option,--no-ld-generated-unwind-info)
@@ -84,7 +74,7 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -T
hostprogs := mkpiggy
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/tools/include
-sed-voffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [ABCDGRSTVW] \(_text\|__bss_start\|_end\)$$/\#define VO_\2 _AC(0x\1,UL)/p'
+sed-voffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [ABCDGRSTVW] \(_text\|__start_rodata\|__bss_start\|_end\)$$/\#define VO_\2 _AC(0x\1,UL)/p'
quiet_cmd_voffset = VOFFSET $@
cmd_voffset = $(NM) $< | sed -n $(sed-voffset) > $@
@@ -116,9 +106,9 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY) += $(obj)/mem.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o
-vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
+vmlinux-libs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
-$(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE
+$(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) $(vmlinux-libs-y) FORCE
$(call if_changed,ld)
OBJCOPYFLAGS_vmlinux.bin := -R .comment -S
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c
index 18d15d1ce87d..f196b1d1ddf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
#include "../string.h"
#include "efi.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
#include <linux/numa.h>
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c
index c1bb180973ea..e162d7f59cc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include "misc.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
static unsigned long fs;
static inline void set_fs(unsigned long seg)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c
index 6edd034b0b30..f2e50f9758e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include "misc.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
/**
* efi_get_type - Given a pointer to boot_params, determine the type of EFI environment.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.h
index 866c0af8b5b9..b22300970f97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.h
@@ -97,15 +97,6 @@ typedef struct {
u32 tables;
} efi_system_table_32_t;
-/* kexec external ABI */
-struct efi_setup_data {
- u64 fw_vendor;
- u64 __unused;
- u64 tables;
- u64 smbios;
- u64 reserved[8];
-};
-
struct efi_unaccepted_memory {
u32 version;
u32 unit_size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S
index f4e22ef774ab..876fc6d46a13 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
.code64
.text
@@ -49,6 +51,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_64_mixed_mode)
lea efi32_boot_args(%rip), %rdx
mov 0(%rdx), %edi
mov 4(%rdx), %esi
+
+ /* Switch to the firmware's stack */
+ movl efi32_boot_sp(%rip), %esp
+ andl $~7, %esp
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_HANDOVER_PROTOCOL
mov 8(%rdx), %edx // saved bootparams pointer
test %edx, %edx
@@ -144,6 +151,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__efi64_thunk)
SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_stub_entry)
call 1f
1: popl %ecx
+ leal (efi32_boot_args - 1b)(%ecx), %ebx
/* Clear BSS */
xorl %eax, %eax
@@ -158,6 +166,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_stub_entry)
popl %ecx
popl %edx
popl %esi
+ movl %esi, 8(%ebx)
jmp efi32_entry
SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_stub_entry)
#endif
@@ -234,8 +243,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(efi_enter32)
*
* Arguments: %ecx image handle
* %edx EFI system table pointer
- * %esi struct bootparams pointer (or NULL when not using
- * the EFI handover protocol)
*
* Since this is the point of no return for ordinary execution, no registers
* are considered live except for the function parameters. [Note that the EFI
@@ -254,13 +261,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(efi32_entry)
/* Store firmware IDT descriptor */
sidtl (efi32_boot_idt - 1b)(%ebx)
+ /* Store firmware stack pointer */
+ movl %esp, (efi32_boot_sp - 1b)(%ebx)
+
/* Store boot arguments */
leal (efi32_boot_args - 1b)(%ebx), %ebx
movl %ecx, 0(%ebx)
movl %edx, 4(%ebx)
- movl %esi, 8(%ebx)
movb $0x0, 12(%ebx) // efi_is64
+ /*
+ * Allocate some memory for a temporary struct boot_params, which only
+ * needs the minimal pieces that startup_32() relies on.
+ */
+ subl $PARAM_SIZE, %esp
+ movl %esp, %esi
+ movl $PAGE_SIZE, BP_kernel_alignment(%esi)
+ movl $_end - 1b, BP_init_size(%esi)
+ subl $startup_32 - 1b, BP_init_size(%esi)
+
/* Disable paging */
movl %cr0, %eax
btrl $X86_CR0_PG_BIT, %eax
@@ -286,8 +305,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_pe_entry)
movl 8(%ebp), %ecx // image_handle
movl 12(%ebp), %edx // sys_table
- xorl %esi, %esi
- jmp efi32_entry // pass %ecx, %edx, %esi
+ jmp efi32_entry // pass %ecx, %edx
// no other registers remain live
2: popl %edi // restore callee-save registers
@@ -318,5 +336,6 @@ SYM_DATA_END(efi32_boot_idt)
SYM_DATA_LOCAL(efi32_boot_cs, .word 0)
SYM_DATA_LOCAL(efi32_boot_ds, .word 0)
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(efi32_boot_sp, .long 0)
SYM_DATA_LOCAL(efi32_boot_args, .long 0, 0, 0)
SYM_DATA(efi_is64, .byte 1)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index bf4a10a5794f..1dcb794c5479 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -398,6 +398,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
call sev_enable
#endif
+ /* Preserve only the CR4 bits that must be preserved, and clear the rest */
+ movq %cr4, %rax
+ andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_LA57), %eax
+ movq %rax, %cr4
+
/*
* configure_5level_paging() updates the number of paging levels using
* a trampoline in 32-bit addressable memory if the current number does
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index 473ba59b82a8..dfb9c2deb77c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2016 Kees Cook
*/
-/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
-#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/* No MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
#include "error.h"
#include "misc.h"
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int set_clr_page_flags(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
pudp = pud_offset(p4dp, address);
pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, address);
- if (pmd_large(*pmdp))
+ if (pmd_leaf(*pmdp))
ptep = split_large_pmd(info, pmdp, address);
else
ptep = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, address);
@@ -386,3 +386,8 @@ void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
*/
kernel_add_identity_map(address, end);
}
+
+void do_boot_nmi_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ spurious_nmi_count++;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
index 3cdf94b41456..d100284bbef4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
+ set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_NMI, boot_nmi_trap);
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
index 22890e199f5b..4d03c8562f63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
.code64
EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_nmi_trap do_boot_nmi_trap error_code=0
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_stage1_vc do_vc_no_ghcb error_code=1
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index dec961c6d16a..f03d59ea6e40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@
#include "efi.h"
#include <generated/compile.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/uts.h>
-#include <linux/utsname.h>
-#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <generated/utsversion.h>
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -119,13 +115,8 @@ char *skip_spaces(const char *str)
#include "../../../../lib/ctype.c"
#include "../../../../lib/cmdline.c"
-enum parse_mode {
- PARSE_MEMMAP,
- PARSE_EFI,
-};
-
static int
-parse_memmap(char *p, u64 *start, u64 *size, enum parse_mode mode)
+parse_memmap(char *p, u64 *start, u64 *size)
{
char *oldp;
@@ -148,29 +139,11 @@ parse_memmap(char *p, u64 *start, u64 *size, enum parse_mode mode)
*start = memparse(p + 1, &p);
return 0;
case '@':
- if (mode == PARSE_MEMMAP) {
- /*
- * memmap=nn@ss specifies usable region, should
- * be skipped
- */
- *size = 0;
- } else {
- u64 flags;
-
- /*
- * efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:attr the attr specifies
- * flags that might imply a soft-reservation.
- */
- *start = memparse(p + 1, &p);
- if (p && *p == ':') {
- p++;
- if (kstrtoull(p, 0, &flags) < 0)
- *size = 0;
- else if (flags & EFI_MEMORY_SP)
- return 0;
- }
- *size = 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * memmap=nn@ss specifies usable region, should
+ * be skipped
+ */
+ *size = 0;
fallthrough;
default:
/*
@@ -185,7 +158,7 @@ parse_memmap(char *p, u64 *start, u64 *size, enum parse_mode mode)
return -EINVAL;
}
-static void mem_avoid_memmap(enum parse_mode mode, char *str)
+static void mem_avoid_memmap(char *str)
{
static int i;
@@ -200,7 +173,7 @@ static void mem_avoid_memmap(enum parse_mode mode, char *str)
if (k)
*k++ = 0;
- rc = parse_memmap(str, &start, &size, mode);
+ rc = parse_memmap(str, &start, &size);
if (rc < 0)
break;
str = k;
@@ -281,7 +254,7 @@ static void handle_mem_options(void)
break;
if (!strcmp(param, "memmap")) {
- mem_avoid_memmap(PARSE_MEMMAP, val);
+ mem_avoid_memmap(val);
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && strstr(param, "hugepages")) {
parse_gb_huge_pages(param, val);
} else if (!strcmp(param, "mem")) {
@@ -295,8 +268,6 @@ static void handle_mem_options(void)
if (mem_size < mem_limit)
mem_limit = mem_size;
- } else if (!strcmp(param, "efi_fake_mem")) {
- mem_avoid_memmap(PARSE_EFI, val);
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c
index b3c3a4be7471..dbba332e4a12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
/*
* accept_memory() and process_unaccepted_memory() called from EFI stub which
- * runs before decompresser and its early_tdx_detect().
+ * runs before decompressor and its early_tdx_detect().
*
* Enumerate TDX directly from the early users.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index b99e08e6815b..0d37420cad02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
memptr free_mem_ptr;
memptr free_mem_end_ptr;
+int spurious_nmi_count;
static char *vidmem;
static int vidport;
@@ -164,21 +165,34 @@ void __putstr(const char *s)
outb(0xff & (pos >> 1), vidport+1);
}
-void __puthex(unsigned long value)
+static noinline void __putnum(unsigned long value, unsigned int base,
+ int mindig)
{
- char alpha[2] = "0";
- int bits;
+ char buf[8*sizeof(value)+1];
+ char *p;
- for (bits = sizeof(value) * 8 - 4; bits >= 0; bits -= 4) {
- unsigned long digit = (value >> bits) & 0xf;
+ p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ *--p = '\0';
- if (digit < 0xA)
- alpha[0] = '0' + digit;
- else
- alpha[0] = 'a' + (digit - 0xA);
+ while (mindig-- > 0 || value) {
+ unsigned char digit = value % base;
+ digit += (digit >= 10) ? ('a'-10) : '0';
+ *--p = digit;
- __putstr(alpha);
+ value /= base;
}
+
+ __putstr(p);
+}
+
+void __puthex(unsigned long value)
+{
+ __putnum(value, 16, sizeof(value)*2);
+}
+
+void __putdec(unsigned long value)
+{
+ __putnum(value, 10, 1);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_NEED_RELOCS
@@ -330,6 +344,7 @@ static size_t parse_elf(void *output)
return ehdr.e_entry - LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR;
}
+const unsigned long kernel_text_size = VO___start_rodata - VO__text;
const unsigned long kernel_total_size = VO__end - VO__text;
static u8 boot_heap[BOOT_HEAP_SIZE] __aligned(4);
@@ -358,6 +373,32 @@ unsigned long decompress_kernel(unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned long virt_addr,
}
/*
+ * Set the memory encryption xloadflag based on the mem_encrypt= command line
+ * parameter, if provided.
+ */
+static void parse_mem_encrypt(struct setup_header *hdr)
+{
+ int on = cmdline_find_option_bool("mem_encrypt=on");
+ int off = cmdline_find_option_bool("mem_encrypt=off");
+
+ if (on > off)
+ hdr->xloadflags |= XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION;
+}
+
+static void early_sev_detect(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Accessing video memory causes guest termination because
+ * the boot stage2 #VC handler of SEV-ES/SNP guests does not
+ * support MMIO handling and kexec -c adds screen_info to the
+ * boot parameters passed to the kexec kernel, which causes
+ * console output to be dumped to both video and serial.
+ */
+ if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED)
+ lines = cols = 0;
+}
+
+/*
* The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position
* is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel
* image (VO) and the execution environment (.bss, .brk), which makes sure
@@ -387,6 +428,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)
/* Clear flags intended for solely in-kernel use. */
boot_params_ptr->hdr.loadflags &= ~KASLR_FLAG;
+ parse_mem_encrypt(&boot_params_ptr->hdr);
+
sanitize_boot_params(boot_params_ptr);
if (boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_mode == 7) {
@@ -410,6 +453,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)
*/
early_tdx_detect();
+ early_sev_detect();
+
console_init();
/*
@@ -481,7 +526,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)
if (init_unaccepted_memory()) {
debug_putstr("Accepting memory... ");
- accept_memory(__pa(output), __pa(output) + needed_size);
+ accept_memory(__pa(output), needed_size);
}
entry_offset = decompress_kernel(output, virt_addr, error);
@@ -493,10 +538,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output)
/* Disable exception handling before booting the kernel */
cleanup_exception_handling();
- return output + entry_offset;
-}
+ if (spurious_nmi_count) {
+ error_putstr("Spurious early NMIs ignored: ");
+ error_putdec(spurious_nmi_count);
+ error_putstr("\n");
+ }
-void fortify_panic(const char *name)
-{
- error("detected buffer overflow");
+ return output + entry_offset;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index c0d502bd8716..dd8d1a85f671 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -59,12 +59,15 @@ extern char _head[], _end[];
/* misc.c */
extern memptr free_mem_ptr;
extern memptr free_mem_end_ptr;
+extern int spurious_nmi_count;
void *malloc(int size);
void free(void *where);
void __putstr(const char *s);
void __puthex(unsigned long value);
+void __putdec(unsigned long value);
#define error_putstr(__x) __putstr(__x)
#define error_puthex(__x) __puthex(__x)
+#define error_putdec(__x) __putdec(__x)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
@@ -196,6 +199,7 @@ static inline void cleanup_exception_handling(void) { }
/* IDT Entry Points */
void boot_page_fault(void);
+void boot_nmi_trap(void);
void boot_stage1_vc(void);
void boot_stage2_vc(void);
@@ -252,6 +256,6 @@ static inline bool init_unaccepted_memory(void) { return false; }
/* Defined in EFI stub */
extern struct efi_unaccepted_memory *unaccepted_table;
-void accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
+void accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size);
#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_MISC_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
index 51f957b24ba7..d8c5de40669d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include "misc.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
#include <asm/e820/types.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include "pgtable.h"
@@ -106,6 +108,7 @@ asmlinkage void configure_5level_paging(struct boot_params *bp, void *pgtable)
bool l5_required = false;
/* Initialize boot_params. Required for cmdline_find_option_bool(). */
+ sanitize_boot_params(bp);
boot_params_ptr = bp;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index 454acd7a2daf..bb55934c1cee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include "misc.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)
#undef __init
#define __init
+#undef __head
+#define __head
+
#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED
/* Basic instruction decoding support needed */
@@ -123,7 +127,35 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)
#include "../../lib/insn.c"
/* Include code for early handlers */
-#include "../../kernel/sev-shared.c"
+#include "../../coco/sev/shared.c"
+
+static struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void)
+{
+ return boot_svsm_caa;
+}
+
+static u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
+{
+ return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
+}
+
+static int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (boot_ghcb)
+ ghcb = boot_ghcb;
+ else
+ ghcb = NULL;
+
+ do {
+ ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
+ : svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
+ } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+
+ return ret;
+}
bool sev_snp_enabled(void)
{
@@ -141,8 +173,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
* If private -> shared then invalidate the page before requesting the
* state change in the RMP table.
*/
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 0))
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
+ if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
+ pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, false);
/* Issue VMGEXIT to change the page state in RMP table. */
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
@@ -157,8 +189,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
* Now that page state is changed in the RMP table, validate it so that it is
* consistent with the RMP entry.
*/
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
+ if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
+ pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, true);
}
void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr)
@@ -252,6 +284,16 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
error("SEV-ES CPU Features missing.");
/*
+ * This denotes whether to use the GHCB MSR protocol or the GHCB
+ * shared page to perform a GHCB request. Since the GHCB page is
+ * being changed to encrypted, it can't be used to perform GHCB
+ * requests. Clear the boot_ghcb variable so that the GHCB MSR
+ * protocol is used to change the GHCB page over to an encrypted
+ * page.
+ */
+ boot_ghcb = NULL;
+
+ /*
* GHCB Page must be flushed from the cache and mapped encrypted again.
* Otherwise the running kernel will see strange cache effects when
* trying to use that page.
@@ -304,6 +346,10 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
if (result != ES_OK)
goto finish;
+ result = vc_check_opcode_bytes(&ctxt, exit_code);
+ if (result != ES_OK)
+ goto finish;
+
switch (exit_code) {
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
@@ -327,26 +373,6 @@ finish:
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
}
-static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
-{
- u64 attrs;
- int err;
-
- /*
- * RMPADJUST modifies RMP permissions of a lesser-privileged (numerically
- * higher) privilege level. Here, clear the VMPL1 permission mask of the
- * GHCB page. If the guest is not running at VMPL0, this will fail.
- *
- * If the guest is running at VMPL0, it will succeed. Even if that operation
- * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux
- * SNP guests are supported only on VMPL0 so VMPL1 or higher permission masks
- * changing is a don't-care.
- */
- attrs = 1;
- if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs))
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
-}
-
/*
* SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ is the mask of SNP features that will need
* guest side implementation for proper functioning of the guest. If any
@@ -365,7 +391,7 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMPL_SSS | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMGEXIT_PARAM | \
- MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROTECTION | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
@@ -375,7 +401,8 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
* by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
* guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
*/
-#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP
+#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
{
@@ -405,6 +432,92 @@ void snp_check_features(void)
}
}
+/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
+ unsigned int cfg_table_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
+ cfg_table_len,
+ EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
+ * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
+ * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
+ *
+ * - via an entry in the EFI config table
+ * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
+ *
+ * Scan for the blob in that order.
+ */
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
+ if (cc_info)
+ goto found_cc_info;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
+ if (!cc_info)
+ return NULL;
+
+found_cc_info:
+ if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
+
+ return cc_info;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
+ * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
+ */
+static bool early_snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
+
+ if (!bp)
+ return false;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
+ if (!cc_info)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
+ * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
+ * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
+ * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
+ * more details.
+ */
+ setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
+
+ /*
+ * Record the SVSM Calling Area (CA) address if the guest is not
+ * running at VMPL0. The CA will be used to communicate with the
+ * SVSM and request its services.
+ */
+ svsm_setup_ca(cc_info);
+
+ /*
+ * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
+ * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
+ * phase.
+ */
+ bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities
*
@@ -455,7 +568,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
/*
- * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
+ * Do an initial SEV capability check before early_snp_init() which
* loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
* without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
*
@@ -470,7 +583,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
* Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
* against CPUID/MSR values later.
*/
- snp = snp_init(bp);
+ snp = early_snp_init(bp);
/* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */
@@ -498,10 +611,32 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
* features.
*/
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) {
- if (!(get_hv_features() & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP))
+ u64 hv_features;
+ int ret;
+
+ hv_features = get_hv_features();
+ if (!(hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
- enforce_vmpl0();
+ /*
+ * Enforce running at VMPL0 or with an SVSM.
+ *
+ * Use RMPADJUST (see the rmpadjust() function for a description of
+ * what the instruction does) to update the VMPL1 permissions of a
+ * page. If the guest is running at VMPL0, this will succeed. If the
+ * guest is running at any other VMPL, this will fail. Linux SNP guests
+ * only ever run at a single VMPL level so permission mask changes of a
+ * lesser-privileged VMPL are a don't-care.
+ */
+ ret = rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Running at VMPL0 is not required if an SVSM is present and the hypervisor
+ * supports the required SVSM GHCB events.
+ */
+ if (ret &&
+ !(snp_vmpl && (hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL)))
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
}
if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
@@ -527,85 +662,6 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void)
return m.q;
}
-/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
-static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
- unsigned int cfg_table_len;
- int ret;
-
- ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
- if (ret)
- return NULL;
-
- return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
- cfg_table_len,
- EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
- * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
- * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
- *
- * - via an entry in the EFI config table
- * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
- *
- * Scan for the blob in that order.
- */
-static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
- if (cc_info)
- goto found_cc_info;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
- if (!cc_info)
- return NULL;
-
-found_cc_info:
- if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
-
- return cc_info;
-}
-
-/*
- * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
- * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
- */
-bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
-
- if (!bp)
- return false;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
- if (!cc_info)
- return false;
-
- /*
- * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
- * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
- * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
- * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
- * more details.
- */
- setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
-
- /*
- * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
- * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
- * phase.
- */
- bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
-
- return true;
-}
-
void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt)
{
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c b/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c
index fed8d13ce252..0aae4d4ed615 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int check_knl_erratum(void)
*/
if (!is_intel() ||
cpu.family != 6 ||
- cpu.model != INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL)
+ cpu.model != 0x57 /*INTEL_XEON_PHI_KNL*/)
return 0;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/header.S b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
index b2771710ed98..b5c79f43359b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
@@ -106,17 +106,12 @@ extra_header_fields:
.word 0 # MinorSubsystemVersion
.long 0 # Win32VersionValue
- .long setup_size + ZO__end + pecompat_vsize
- # SizeOfImage
+ .long setup_size + ZO__end # SizeOfImage
.long salign # SizeOfHeaders
.long 0 # CheckSum
.word IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION # Subsystem (EFI application)
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES
.word IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT # DllCharacteristics
-#else
- .word 0 # DllCharacteristics
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
.long 0 # SizeOfStackReserve
.long 0 # SizeOfStackCommit
@@ -143,7 +138,7 @@ section_table:
.ascii ".setup"
.byte 0
.byte 0
- .long setup_size - salign # VirtualSize
+ .long pecompat_fstart - salign # VirtualSize
.long salign # VirtualAddress
.long pecompat_fstart - salign # SizeOfRawData
.long salign # PointerToRawData
@@ -156,8 +151,8 @@ section_table:
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED
.asciz ".compat"
- .long 8 # VirtualSize
- .long setup_size + ZO__end # VirtualAddress
+ .long pecompat_fsize # VirtualSize
+ .long pecompat_fstart # VirtualAddress
.long pecompat_fsize # SizeOfRawData
.long pecompat_fstart # PointerToRawData
@@ -172,17 +167,16 @@ section_table:
* modes this image supports.
*/
.pushsection ".pecompat", "a", @progbits
- .balign falign
- .set pecompat_vsize, salign
+ .balign salign
.globl pecompat_fstart
pecompat_fstart:
.byte 0x1 # Version
.byte 8 # Size
.word IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 # PE machine type
.long setup_size + ZO_efi32_pe_entry # Entrypoint
+ .byte 0x0 # Sentinel
.popsection
#else
- .set pecompat_vsize, 0
.set pecompat_fstart, setup_size
#endif
.ascii ".text"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/install.sh b/arch/x86/boot/install.sh
index 0849f4b42745..93784abcd66d 100755
--- a/arch/x86/boot/install.sh
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/install.sh
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
# $3 - kernel map file
# $4 - default install path (blank if root directory)
+set -e
+
if [ -f $4/vmlinuz ]; then
mv $4/vmlinuz $4/vmlinuz.old
fi
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/main.c b/arch/x86/boot/main.c
index c4ea5258ab55..9d0fea18d3c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/main.c
@@ -27,34 +27,32 @@ char *heap_end = _end; /* Default end of heap = no heap */
* screws up the old-style command line protocol, adjust by
* filling in the new-style command line pointer instead.
*/
-
static void copy_boot_params(void)
{
struct old_cmdline {
u16 cl_magic;
u16 cl_offset;
};
- const struct old_cmdline * const oldcmd =
- absolute_pointer(OLD_CL_ADDRESS);
+ const struct old_cmdline * const oldcmd = absolute_pointer(OLD_CL_ADDRESS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(boot_params) != 4096);
memcpy(&boot_params.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
- if (!boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr &&
- oldcmd->cl_magic == OLD_CL_MAGIC) {
- /* Old-style command line protocol. */
+ if (!boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr && oldcmd->cl_magic == OLD_CL_MAGIC) {
+ /* Old-style command line protocol */
u16 cmdline_seg;
- /* Figure out if the command line falls in the region
- of memory that an old kernel would have copied up
- to 0x90000... */
+ /*
+ * Figure out if the command line falls in the region
+ * of memory that an old kernel would have copied up
+ * to 0x90000...
+ */
if (oldcmd->cl_offset < boot_params.hdr.setup_move_size)
cmdline_seg = ds();
else
cmdline_seg = 0x9000;
- boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr =
- (cmdline_seg << 4) + oldcmd->cl_offset;
+ boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr = (cmdline_seg << 4) + oldcmd->cl_offset;
}
}
@@ -66,6 +64,7 @@ static void copy_boot_params(void)
static void keyboard_init(void)
{
struct biosregs ireg, oreg;
+
initregs(&ireg);
ireg.ah = 0x02; /* Get keyboard status */
@@ -83,8 +82,10 @@ static void query_ist(void)
{
struct biosregs ireg, oreg;
- /* Some older BIOSes apparently crash on this call, so filter
- it from machines too old to have SpeedStep at all. */
+ /*
+ * Some older BIOSes apparently crash on this call, so filter
+ * it from machines too old to have SpeedStep at all.
+ */
if (cpu.level < 6)
return;
@@ -119,17 +120,13 @@ static void init_heap(void)
char *stack_end;
if (boot_params.hdr.loadflags & CAN_USE_HEAP) {
- asm("leal %P1(%%esp),%0"
- : "=r" (stack_end) : "i" (-STACK_SIZE));
-
- heap_end = (char *)
- ((size_t)boot_params.hdr.heap_end_ptr + 0x200);
+ stack_end = (char *) (current_stack_pointer - STACK_SIZE);
+ heap_end = (char *) ((size_t)boot_params.hdr.heap_end_ptr + 0x200);
if (heap_end > stack_end)
heap_end = stack_end;
} else {
/* Boot protocol 2.00 only, no heap available */
- puts("WARNING: Ancient bootloader, some functionality "
- "may be limited!\n");
+ puts("WARNING: Ancient bootloader, some functionality may be limited!\n");
}
}
@@ -150,12 +147,11 @@ void main(void)
/* Make sure we have all the proper CPU support */
if (validate_cpu()) {
- puts("Unable to boot - please use a kernel appropriate "
- "for your CPU.\n");
+ puts("Unable to boot - please use a kernel appropriate for your CPU.\n");
die();
}
- /* Tell the BIOS what CPU mode we intend to run in. */
+ /* Tell the BIOS what CPU mode we intend to run in */
set_bios_mode();
/* Detect memory layout */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/pm.c b/arch/x86/boot/pm.c
index 40031a614712..5941f930f6c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/pm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/pm.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
*/
#include "boot.h"
+#include <asm/desc_defs.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
/*
@@ -67,13 +68,13 @@ static void setup_gdt(void)
being 8-byte unaligned. Intel recommends 16 byte alignment. */
static const u64 boot_gdt[] __attribute__((aligned(16))) = {
/* CS: code, read/execute, 4 GB, base 0 */
- [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS] = GDT_ENTRY(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS] = GDT_ENTRY(DESC_CODE32, 0, 0xfffff),
/* DS: data, read/write, 4 GB, base 0 */
- [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_DS] = GDT_ENTRY(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_DS] = GDT_ENTRY(DESC_DATA32, 0, 0xfffff),
/* TSS: 32-bit tss, 104 bytes, base 4096 */
/* We only have a TSS here to keep Intel VT happy;
we don't actually use it for anything. */
- [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_TSS] = GDT_ENTRY(0x0089, 4096, 103),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_TSS] = GDT_ENTRY(DESC_TSS32, 4096, 103),
};
/* Xen HVM incorrectly stores a pointer to the gdt_ptr, instead
of the gdt_ptr contents. Thus, make it static so it will
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/printf.c b/arch/x86/boot/printf.c
index 1237beeb9540..51dc14b714f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/printf.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/printf.c
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *fmt, va_list args)
case 'x':
flags |= SMALL;
+ fallthrough;
case 'X':
base = 16;
break;
@@ -253,6 +254,8 @@ int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *fmt, va_list args)
case 'd':
case 'i':
flags |= SIGN;
+ break;
+
case 'u':
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
index 83bb7efad8ae..3a2d1360abb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/setup.ld
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ SECTIONS
.text : { *(.text .text.*) }
.text32 : { *(.text32) }
+ .pecompat : { *(.pecompat) }
+ PROVIDE(pecompat_fsize = setup_size - pecompat_fstart);
+
. = ALIGN(16);
.rodata : { *(.rodata*) }
@@ -36,9 +39,6 @@ SECTIONS
. = ALIGN(16);
.data : { *(.data*) }
- .pecompat : { *(.pecompat) }
- PROVIDE(pecompat_fsize = setup_size - pecompat_fstart);
-
.signature : {
setup_sig = .;
LONG(0x5a5aaa55)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/string.c b/arch/x86/boot/string.c
index 1c8541ae3b3a..84f7a883ce1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/string.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/string.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int strcmp(const char *str1, const char *str2)
{
const unsigned char *s1 = (const unsigned char *)str1;
const unsigned char *s2 = (const unsigned char *)str2;
- int delta = 0;
+ int delta;
while (*s1 || *s2) {
delta = *s1 - *s2;
@@ -88,14 +88,6 @@ size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t maxlen)
return (es - s);
}
-unsigned int atou(const char *s)
-{
- unsigned int i = 0;
- while (isdigit(*s))
- i = i * 10 + (*s++ - '0');
- return i;
-}
-
/* Works only for digits and letters, but small and fast */
#define TOLOWER(x) ((x) | 0x20)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/string.h b/arch/x86/boot/string.h
index e5d2c6b8c2f1..a5b05ebc037d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/string.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/string.h
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ extern size_t strlen(const char *s);
extern char *strstr(const char *s1, const char *s2);
extern char *strchr(const char *s, int c);
extern size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t maxlen);
-extern unsigned int atou(const char *s);
extern unsigned long long simple_strtoull(const char *cp, char **endp,
unsigned int base);
long simple_strtol(const char *cp, char **endp, unsigned int base);