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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h25
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c235
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c52
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c72
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c2
14 files changed, 363 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9783ebc4e021..be0b95e51df6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1542,7 +1542,6 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS
config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
- select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
def_bool n
config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 393f2bbb5e3a..03acc823838a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -446,5 +446,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 403e83b4adc8..d27e0581b777 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -116,6 +116,30 @@
* Not susceptible to
* TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO BIT(13) /*
+ * Not susceptible to SBDR and SSDP
+ * variants of Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO BIT(14) /*
+ * Not susceptible to FBSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO BIT(15) /*
+ * Not susceptible to PSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR BIT(17) /*
+ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer
+ * even on MDS_NO CPUs.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /*
+ * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]
+ * bit available to control VERW
+ * behavior.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
@@ -133,6 +157,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) /* SRBDS support */
#define RTM_ALLOW BIT(1) /* TSX development mode */
+#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index acbaeaf83b61..da251a5645b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d879a6c93609..74c62cc47a5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -85,6 +87,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
*/
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -117,17 +123,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
- mds_select_mitigation();
- taa_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
- /*
- * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
- * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
- */
- mds_print_mitigation();
-
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -267,14 +266,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- return;
-
- pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -329,7 +320,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -343,7 +334,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
- goto out;
+ return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -375,18 +366,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
- /*
- * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
- * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
- */
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_select_mitigation();
- }
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -411,6 +390,151 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
enum srbds_mitigations {
@@ -478,11 +602,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
@@ -1116,6 +1242,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -1127,14 +1255,17 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
- if (sched_smt_active())
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- else
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
@@ -1179,6 +1310,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
@@ -1781,6 +1922,20 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
@@ -1881,6 +2036,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1932,4 +2090,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c296cb1c0113..4730b0a58f24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1211,18 +1211,42 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -1243,6 +1267,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
return ia32_cap;
}
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1296,12 +1327,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
+ !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
index 5542d8959e11..d1bc5820ea46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
@@ -908,9 +908,9 @@ bool avic_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(enum kvm_apicv_inhibit reason)
BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ) |
BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC) |
BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_BLOCKIRQ) |
- BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV |
+ BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV) |
BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED) |
- BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED));
+ BIT(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_BASE_MODIFIED);
return supported & BIT(reason);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 553dd2317b9c..3a919e49129b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -229,6 +229,9 @@ static const struct {
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
+static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -360,6 +363,60 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
}
+static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+ if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
+ vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
+ /*
+ * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
+ * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
+ * execute VERW.
+ */
+ if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
+}
+
static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
@@ -2252,6 +2309,10 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
+ /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
+ if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -4553,6 +4614,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
+
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
}
static void vmx_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -6772,6 +6835,11 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+ kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+ vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != native_read_cr2())
native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
@@ -6781,6 +6849,8 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
+ vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
guest_state_exit_irqoff();
}
@@ -8214,6 +8284,8 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
return r;
}
+ vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index b98c7e96697a..8d2342ede0c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -348,6 +348,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
/* SGX Launch Control public key hash */
u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4];
+ u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl;
+ bool disable_fb_clear;
struct pt_desc pt_desc;
struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 158b2e135efc..1910e1e78b15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1617,6 +1617,9 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
*/
}
+ /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */
+ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL;
+
return data;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 11350e2fd736..9f27e14e185f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
-#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
@@ -87,9 +86,3 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
}
-
-int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
-{
- return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index e8f7953fda83..f6d038e2cd8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/platform-feature.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -242,6 +243,9 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
size = total_mem * 6 / 100;
size = clamp_val(size, IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE, SZ_1G);
swiotlb_adjust_size(size);
+
+ /* Set restricted memory access for virtio. */
+ platform_set(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS);
}
static unsigned long pg_level_to_pfn(int level, pte_t *kpte, pgprot_t *ret_prot)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
index 517a9d8d8f94..8b71b1dd7639 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
if (xen_pv_domain())
return;
+ xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
init_hvm_pv_info();
reserve_shared_info();
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index f33a4421e7cd..e3297b15701c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
static void __init xen_pv_init_platform(void)
{
+ xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
populate_extra_pte(fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP));
set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, xen_start_info->shared_info);
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-03-22 10:54:54 +0000