diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/algif_aead.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/algif_aead.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 42493b4d8ce4..35bfa283748d 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage. Filling up + * the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * @@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } /* - * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not - * yet been processed. + * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been + * processed. */ used = ctx->used; /* - * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is - * also present in sendmsg/sendpage. The checks in sendpage/sendmsg - * shall provide an information to the data sender that something is - * wrong, but they are irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. - * We need this check here too in case user space decides to not honor - * the error message in sendmsg/sendpage and still call recvmsg. This - * check here protects the kernel integrity. + * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also + * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an + * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are + * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. We need this check + * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message + * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the + * kernel integrity. */ if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk)) return -EINVAL; @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, */ /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ - rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg; + rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl; if (ctx->enc) { /* @@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag */ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, + processed); if (err) goto free; af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0); @@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, + outlen); if (err) goto free; @@ -267,10 +269,10 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (usedpages) { /* RX SGL present */ struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl; + struct scatterlist *sg = sgl_prev->sgt.sgl; - sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1); - sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1, - areq->tsgl); + sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1); + sg_chain(sg, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, areq->tsgl); } else /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */ rsgl_src = areq->tsgl; @@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /* Initialize the crypto operation */ aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv); aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); |