diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 49 |
3 files changed, 33 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c index c59265146e9c..f1827257ef0e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c @@ -3677,8 +3677,11 @@ static void cleanup_smi_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf) void ipmi_unregister_smi(struct ipmi_smi *intf) { struct ipmi_smi_watcher *w; - int intf_num = intf->intf_num, index; + int intf_num, index; + if (!intf) + return; + intf_num = intf->intf_num; mutex_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); intf->intf_num = -1; intf->in_shutdown = true; @@ -4518,6 +4521,8 @@ return_unspecified: } else /* The message was sent, start the timer. */ intf_start_seq_timer(intf, msg->msgid); + requeue = 0; + goto out; } else if (((msg->rsp[0] >> 2) != ((msg->data[0] >> 2) | 1)) || (msg->rsp[1] != msg->data[1])) { /* diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c index 64dedb3ef8ec..5604a810fb3d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c @@ -2220,10 +2220,7 @@ static void cleanup_one_si(struct smi_info *smi_info) return; list_del(&smi_info->link); - - if (smi_info->intf) - ipmi_unregister_smi(smi_info->intf); - + ipmi_unregister_smi(smi_info->intf); kfree(smi_info); } diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e15063d61460..4c9adb4f3d5d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -318,6 +318,13 @@ static void crng_reseed(bool force) * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. + * + * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old + * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out + * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy. + * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is + * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so + * that this function overwrites it before returning. */ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], @@ -523,8 +530,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { - ssize_t ret = 0; - size_t len; + size_t len, left, ret = 0; u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS]; u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -543,37 +549,40 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) * the user directly. */ if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) { - ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes; + ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes); goto out_zero_chacha; } - do { + for (;;) { chacha20_block(chacha_state, output); if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) ++chacha_state[13]; len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); - if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; + left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len); + if (left) { + ret += len - left; break; } - nbytes -= len; buf += len; ret += len; + nbytes -= len; + if (!nbytes) + break; BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); - if (!(ret % PAGE_SIZE) && nbytes) { + if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) { if (signal_pending(current)) break; cond_resched(); } - } while (nbytes); + } memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output)); out_zero_chacha: memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); - return ret; + return ret ? ret : -EFAULT; } /* @@ -1016,7 +1025,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size) { - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(); unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; if (crng_init == 0 && size) @@ -1047,8 +1056,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state { */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - unsigned long flags, now = jiffies; + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags; long delta, delta2, delta3; spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); @@ -1337,8 +1345,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 }; - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - unsigned long now = jiffies; + unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies; struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); unsigned int new_count; @@ -1351,16 +1358,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); - if (sizeof(cycles) == 8) + if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq; - else { + irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; + } else { irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq; irq_data.u32[1] = now; - } - - if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) - irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; - else { irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); } @@ -1407,7 +1410,7 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t) static void try_to_generate_entropy(void) { struct { - cycles_t cycles; + unsigned long cycles; struct timer_list timer; } stack; |