diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/Kconfig | 53 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/lp.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/mem.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/misc.c | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 39 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/ttyprintk.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/xillybus/xillybus_class.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c | 1 |
10 files changed, 102 insertions, 73 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig index 55f48375e3fe..0b6c03643ddc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig @@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ config TTY_PRINTK The feature is useful to inline user messages with kernel messages. In order to use this feature, you should output user messages - to /dev/ttyprintk or redirect console to this TTY. + to /dev/ttyprintk or redirect console to this TTY, or boot + the kernel with console=ttyprintk. If unsure, say N. @@ -428,28 +429,40 @@ config ADI driver include crash and makedumpfile. config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU - bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG" + bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" + default y depends on ARCH_RANDOM - default n help - Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or - RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy - for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not - something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting - that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate - of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies) - has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's - random number generation facilities. This can also be configured - at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off". + Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's + RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These + random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into + the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not + this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the + they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, + other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this + setting. Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high + quality and non-backdoored random numbers. + + Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe + its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at + boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off". config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER - bool "Trust the bootloader to initialize Linux's CRNG" - help - Some bootloaders can provide entropy to increase the kernel's initial - device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the - booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy - pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that - only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with - "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". + bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed" + default y + help + Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot + environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This + seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input + pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is + enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited + and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of + randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling + this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and + non-backdoored seeds. + + Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or + believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured + at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off". endmenu diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c index e856df7e285c..a6f3a8a2aca6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c @@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ static int probe_common(struct virtio_device *vdev) goto err_find; } + virtio_device_ready(vdev); + /* we always have a pending entropy request */ request_entropy(vi); diff --git a/drivers/char/lp.c b/drivers/char/lp.c index 0e22e3b0a04e..38aad99ebb61 100644 --- a/drivers/char/lp.c +++ b/drivers/char/lp.c @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static struct parport_driver lp_driver = { static int __init lp_init(void) { - int i, err = 0; + int i, err; if (parport_nr[0] == LP_PARPORT_OFF) return 0; diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index cc296f0823bd..84ca98ed1dad 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline bool should_stop_iteration(void) { if (need_resched()) cond_resched(); - return fatal_signal_pending(current); + return signal_pending(current); } /* diff --git a/drivers/char/misc.c b/drivers/char/misc.c index ca5141ed5ef3..cba19bfdc44d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/misc.c +++ b/drivers/char/misc.c @@ -100,17 +100,18 @@ static const struct seq_operations misc_seq_ops = { static int misc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { int minor = iminor(inode); - struct miscdevice *c; + struct miscdevice *c = NULL, *iter; int err = -ENODEV; const struct file_operations *new_fops = NULL; mutex_lock(&misc_mtx); - list_for_each_entry(c, &misc_list, list) { - if (c->minor == minor) { - new_fops = fops_get(c->fops); - break; - } + list_for_each_entry(iter, &misc_list, list) { + if (iter->minor != minor) + continue; + c = iter; + new_fops = fops_get(iter->fops); + break; } if (!new_fops) { @@ -118,11 +119,12 @@ static int misc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) request_module("char-major-%d-%d", MISC_MAJOR, minor); mutex_lock(&misc_mtx); - list_for_each_entry(c, &misc_list, list) { - if (c->minor == minor) { - new_fops = fops_get(c->fops); - break; - } + list_for_each_entry(iter, &misc_list, list) { + if (iter->minor != minor) + continue; + c = iter; + new_fops = fops_get(iter->fops); + break; } if (!new_fops) goto fail; diff --git a/drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c b/drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c index 78baba55a8b5..8fc49b038372 100644 --- a/drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c +++ b/drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c @@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static void rx_ready_async(MGSLPC_INFO *info, int tcd) // BIT7:parity error // BIT6:framing error - if (status & (BIT7 + BIT6)) { + if (status & (BIT7 | BIT6)) { if (status & BIT7) icount->parity++; else @@ -1418,7 +1418,11 @@ static void mgslpc_change_params(MGSLPC_INFO *info, struct tty_struct *tty) info->serial_signals &= ~(SerialSignal_RTS | SerialSignal_DTR); /* byte size and parity */ - + if ((cflag & CSIZE) != CS8) { + cflag &= ~CSIZE; + cflag |= CS7; + tty->termios.c_cflag = cflag; + } info->params.data_bits = tty_get_char_size(cflag); if (cflag & CSTOPB) @@ -1432,10 +1436,8 @@ static void mgslpc_change_params(MGSLPC_INFO *info, struct tty_struct *tty) info->params.parity = ASYNC_PARITY_ODD; else info->params.parity = ASYNC_PARITY_EVEN; -#ifdef CMSPAR if (cflag & CMSPAR) info->params.parity = ASYNC_PARITY_SPACE; -#endif } /* calculate number of jiffies to transmit a full diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b691b9d59503..655e327d425e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (static_key_initialized) + execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); @@ -724,9 +725,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) * **********************************************************************/ -static bool used_arch_random; -static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); -static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); +static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU); +static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER); static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu); @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = random_pm_notifica int __init random_init(const char *command_line) { ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); - unsigned int i, arch_bytes; + unsigned int i, arch_bits; unsigned long entropy; #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) @@ -784,12 +784,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed)); #endif - for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) { entropy = random_get_entropy(); - arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy); + arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8; } _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); } @@ -798,11 +798,18 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line)); add_latent_entropy(); + /* + * If we were initialized by the bootloader before jump labels are + * initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where + * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. + */ + if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY) + crng_set_ready(NULL); + if (crng_ready()) crng_reseed(); else if (trust_cpu) - credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8); - used_arch_random = arch_bytes * 8 >= POOL_READY_BITS; + _credit_init_bits(arch_bits); WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier)); @@ -812,17 +819,6 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line) } /* - * Returns whether arch randomness has been mixed into the initial - * state of the RNG, regardless of whether or not that randomness - * was credited. Knowing this is only good for a very limited set - * of uses, such as early init printk pointer obfuscation. - */ -bool rng_has_arch_random(void) -{ - return used_arch_random; -} - -/* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it. * @@ -865,13 +861,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. */ -void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) +void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { mix_pool_bytes(buf, len); if (trust_bootloader) credit_init_bits(len * 8); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain); diff --git a/drivers/char/ttyprintk.c b/drivers/char/ttyprintk.c index adf941c47506..ed45d04905c2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ttyprintk.c +++ b/drivers/char/ttyprintk.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * of the boot process, for example. */ +#include <linux/console.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/serial.h> #include <linux/tty.h> @@ -163,6 +164,18 @@ static const struct tty_port_operations tpk_port_ops = { static struct tty_driver *ttyprintk_driver; +static struct tty_driver *ttyprintk_console_device(struct console *c, + int *index) +{ + *index = 0; + return ttyprintk_driver; +} + +static struct console ttyprintk_console = { + .name = "ttyprintk", + .device = ttyprintk_console_device, +}; + static int __init ttyprintk_init(void) { int ret; @@ -195,6 +208,8 @@ static int __init ttyprintk_init(void) goto error; } + register_console(&ttyprintk_console); + return 0; error: @@ -205,6 +220,7 @@ error: static void __exit ttyprintk_exit(void) { + unregister_console(&ttyprintk_console); tty_unregister_driver(ttyprintk_driver); tty_driver_kref_put(ttyprintk_driver); tty_port_destroy(&tpk_port.port); diff --git a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillybus_class.c b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillybus_class.c index 5046486011c8..0f238648dcfe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillybus_class.c +++ b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillybus_class.c @@ -174,18 +174,17 @@ void xillybus_cleanup_chrdev(void *private_data, struct device *dev) { int minor; - struct xilly_unit *unit; - bool found = false; + struct xilly_unit *unit = NULL, *iter; mutex_lock(&unit_mutex); - list_for_each_entry(unit, &unit_list, list_entry) - if (unit->private_data == private_data) { - found = true; + list_for_each_entry(iter, &unit_list, list_entry) + if (iter->private_data == private_data) { + unit = iter; break; } - if (!found) { + if (!unit) { dev_err(dev, "Weird bug: Failed to find unit\n"); mutex_unlock(&unit_mutex); return; @@ -216,22 +215,21 @@ int xillybus_find_inode(struct inode *inode, { int minor = iminor(inode); int major = imajor(inode); - struct xilly_unit *unit; - bool found = false; + struct xilly_unit *unit = NULL, *iter; mutex_lock(&unit_mutex); - list_for_each_entry(unit, &unit_list, list_entry) - if (unit->major == major && - minor >= unit->lowest_minor && - minor < (unit->lowest_minor + unit->num_nodes)) { - found = true; + list_for_each_entry(iter, &unit_list, list_entry) + if (iter->major == major && + minor >= iter->lowest_minor && + minor < (iter->lowest_minor + iter->num_nodes)) { + unit = iter; break; } mutex_unlock(&unit_mutex); - if (!found) + if (!unit) return -ENODEV; *private_data = unit->private_data; diff --git a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c index dc3551796e5e..39bcbfd908b4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c +++ b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c @@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ static void cleanup_dev(struct kref *kref) if (xdev->workq) destroy_workqueue(xdev->workq); + usb_put_dev(xdev->udev); kfree(xdev->channels); /* Argument may be NULL, and that's fine */ kfree(xdev); } |