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-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/fname.c30
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h14
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/hooks.c47
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyring.c11
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keysetup.c11
6 files changed, 64 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index 7b3fc189593a..010f9c0a4c2f 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -74,13 +74,7 @@ struct fscrypt_nokey_name {
static inline bool fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
{
- if (str->len == 1 && str->name[0] == '.')
- return true;
-
- if (str->len == 2 && str->name[0] == '.' && str->name[1] == '.')
- return true;
-
- return false;
+ return is_dot_dotdot(str->name, str->len);
}
/**
@@ -580,11 +574,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_fname_siphash);
* Validate dentries in encrypted directories to make sure we aren't potentially
* caching stale dentries after a key has been added.
*/
-int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct dentry *dir;
int err;
- int valid;
/*
* Plaintext names are always valid, since fscrypt doesn't support
@@ -597,30 +590,21 @@ int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
/*
* No-key name; valid if the directory's key is still unavailable.
*
- * Although fscrypt forbids rename() on no-key names, we still must use
- * dget_parent() here rather than use ->d_parent directly. That's
- * because a corrupted fs image may contain directory hard links, which
- * the VFS handles by moving the directory's dentry tree in the dcache
- * each time ->lookup() finds the directory and it already has a dentry
- * elsewhere. Thus ->d_parent can be changing, and we must safely grab
- * a reference to some ->d_parent to prevent it from being freed.
+ * Note in RCU mode we have to bail if we get here -
+ * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() may block.
*/
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
- dir = dget_parent(dentry);
/*
* Pass allow_unsupported=true, so that files with an unsupported
* encryption policy can be deleted.
*/
- err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(d_inode(dir), true);
- valid = !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(d_inode(dir));
- dput(dir);
-
+ err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, true);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- return valid;
+ return !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_d_revalidate);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 1892356cf924..8371e4e1f596 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -222,16 +222,19 @@ struct fscrypt_inode_info {
struct fscrypt_prepared_key ci_enc_key;
/* True if ci_enc_key should be freed when this struct is freed */
- bool ci_owns_key;
+ u8 ci_owns_key : 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
/*
* True if this inode will use inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of
* the traditional filesystem-layer encryption.
*/
- bool ci_inlinecrypt;
+ u8 ci_inlinecrypt : 1;
#endif
+ /* True if ci_dirhash_key is initialized */
+ u8 ci_dirhash_key_initialized : 1;
+
/*
* log2 of the data unit size (granularity of contents encryption) of
* this file. This is computable from ci_policy and ci_inode but is
@@ -242,6 +245,9 @@ struct fscrypt_inode_info {
/* Cached value: log2 of number of data units per FS block */
u8 ci_data_units_per_block_bits;
+ /* Hashed inode number. Only set for IV_INO_LBLK_32 */
+ u32 ci_hashed_ino;
+
/*
* Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either the
* contents or filenames encryption mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -276,16 +282,12 @@ struct fscrypt_inode_info {
* the plaintext filenames -- currently just casefolded directories.
*/
siphash_key_t ci_dirhash_key;
- bool ci_dirhash_key_initialized;
/* The encryption policy used by this inode */
union fscrypt_policy ci_policy;
/* This inode's nonce, copied from the fscrypt_context */
u8 ci_nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
-
- /* Hashed inode number. Only set for IV_INO_LBLK_32 */
- u32 ci_hashed_ino;
};
typedef enum {
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
index 52504dd478d3..d8d5049b8fe1 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
@@ -30,21 +30,41 @@
int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
int err;
- struct dentry *dir;
+ struct dentry *dentry, *dentry_parent;
+ struct inode *inode_parent;
err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
if (err)
return err;
- dir = dget_parent(file_dentry(filp));
- if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(dir)) &&
- !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(d_inode(dir), inode)) {
+ dentry = file_dentry(filp);
+
+ /*
+ * Getting a reference to the parent dentry is needed for the actual
+ * encryption policy comparison, but it's expensive on multi-core
+ * systems. Since this function runs on unencrypted files too, start
+ * with a lightweight RCU-mode check for the parent directory being
+ * unencrypted (in which case it's fine for the child to be either
+ * unencrypted, or encrypted with any policy). Only continue on to the
+ * full policy check if the parent directory is actually encrypted.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ dentry_parent = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
+ inode_parent = d_inode_rcu(dentry_parent);
+ if (inode_parent != NULL && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode_parent)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ dentry_parent = dget_parent(dentry);
+ if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(d_inode(dentry_parent), inode)) {
fscrypt_warn(inode,
"Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)",
- d_inode(dir)->i_ino);
+ d_inode(dentry_parent)->i_ino);
err = -EPERM;
}
- dput(dir);
+ dput(dentry_parent);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open);
@@ -102,11 +122,8 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
if (err && err != -ENOENT)
return err;
- if (fname->is_nokey_name) {
- spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
- dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME;
- spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
- }
+ fscrypt_prepare_dentry(dentry, fname->is_nokey_name);
+
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup);
@@ -131,12 +148,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup);
int fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, true);
+ bool is_nokey_name = (!err && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir));
+
+ fscrypt_prepare_dentry(dentry, is_nokey_name);
- if (!err && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
- spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
- dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME;
- spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
- }
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
index b4002aea7cdb..40de69860dcf 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static bool bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(const struct buffer_head *bh,
const struct inode **inode_ret,
u64 *lblk_num_ret)
{
- struct page *page = bh->b_page;
+ struct folio *folio = bh->b_folio;
const struct address_space *mapping;
const struct inode *inode;
@@ -292,13 +292,13 @@ static bool bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(const struct buffer_head *bh,
* The ext4 journal (jbd2) can submit a buffer_head it directly created
* for a non-pagecache page. fscrypt doesn't care about these.
*/
- mapping = page_mapping(page);
+ mapping = folio_mapping(folio);
if (!mapping)
return false;
inode = mapping->host;
*inode_ret = inode;
- *lblk_num_ret = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits)) +
+ *lblk_num_ret = ((u64)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits)) +
(bh_offset(bh) >> inode->i_blkbits);
return true;
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index 0edf0b58daa7..787e9c8938ba 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@
* information about these ioctls.
*/
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/once.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -74,8 +75,12 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
* that concurrent keyring lookups can no longer find it.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 0);
- key_put(mk->mk_users);
- mk->mk_users = NULL;
+ if (mk->mk_users) {
+ /* Clear the keyring so the quota gets released right away. */
+ keyring_clear(mk->mk_users);
+ key_put(mk->mk_users);
+ mk->mk_users = NULL;
+ }
call_rcu(&mk->mk_rcu_head, fscrypt_free_master_key);
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index d71f7c799e79..b4fe01ea4bd4 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[] = {
.blk_crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
},
[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = {
- .friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
+ .friendly_name = "AES-256-CBC-CTS",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 32,
.security_strength = 32,
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[] = {
.blk_crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC_ESSIV,
},
[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
- .friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
+ .friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC-CTS",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 16,
.security_strength = 16,
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[] = {
.blk_crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SM4_XTS,
},
[FSCRYPT_MODE_SM4_CTS] = {
- .friendly_name = "SM4-CTS-CBC",
+ .friendly_name = "SM4-CBC-CTS",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(sm4))",
.keysize = 16,
.security_strength = 16,
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported)
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() - prepare to create a new inode in a directory
* @dir: a possibly-encrypted directory
- * @inode: the new inode. ->i_mode must be set already.
+ * @inode: the new inode. ->i_mode and ->i_blkbits must be set already.
* ->i_ino doesn't need to be set yet.
* @encrypt_ret: (output) set to %true if the new inode will be encrypted
*
@@ -717,6 +717,9 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
if (IS_ERR(policy))
return PTR_ERR(policy);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_blkbits == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mode == 0))
return -EINVAL;