diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/linux/landlock.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 175 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h index 25c8d7677539..d9d0cb827117 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ * * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation */ #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H @@ -12,31 +13,44 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /** - * struct landlock_ruleset_attr - Ruleset definition + * struct landlock_ruleset_attr - Ruleset definition. * - * Argument of sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). This structure can grow in - * future versions. + * Argument of sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). + * + * This structure defines a set of *handled access rights*, a set of actions on + * different object types, which should be denied by default when the ruleset is + * enacted. Vice versa, access rights that are not specifically listed here are + * not going to be denied by this ruleset when it is enacted. + * + * For historical reasons, the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right is always denied + * by default, even when its bit is not set in @handled_access_fs. In order to + * add new rules with this access right, the bit must still be set explicitly + * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_). + * + * The explicit listing of *handled access rights* is required for backwards + * compatibility reasons. In most use cases, processes that use Landlock will + * *handle* a wide range or all access rights that they know about at build time + * (and that they have tested with a kernel that supported them all). + * + * This structure can grow in future Landlock versions. */ struct landlock_ruleset_attr { /** - * @handled_access_fs: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Filesystem flags`_) - * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no - * rule explicitly allow them: it is a deny-by-default list that should - * contain as much Landlock access rights as possible. Indeed, all - * Landlock filesystem access rights that are not part of - * handled_access_fs are allowed. This is needed for backward - * compatibility reasons. One exception is the - * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right, which is always implicitly - * handled, but must still be explicitly handled to add new rules with - * this access right. + * @handled_access_fs: Bitmask of handled filesystem actions + * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_). */ __u64 handled_access_fs; /** - * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Network flags`_) - * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no - * rule explicitly allow them. + * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of handled network actions (cf. `Network + * flags`_). */ __u64 handled_access_net; + /** + * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_) + * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside + * resources (e.g. IPCs). + */ + __u64 scoped; }; /* @@ -44,9 +58,43 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr { * * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION: Get the highest supported Landlock ABI * version. + * - %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA: Get a bitmask of fixed issues. */ /* clang-format off */ #define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION (1U << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_ERRATA (1U << 1) +/* clang-format on */ + +/* + * sys_landlock_restrict_self() flags: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF: Do not create any log related to the + * enforced restrictions. This should only be set by tools launching unknown + * or untrusted programs (e.g. a sandbox tool, container runtime, system + * service manager). Because programs sandboxing themselves should fix any + * denied access, they should not set this flag to be aware of potential + * issues reported by system's logs (i.e. audit). + * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON: Explicitly ask to continue + * logging denied access requests even after an :manpage:`execve(2)` call. + * This flag should only be set if all the programs than can legitimately be + * executed will not try to request a denied access (which could spam audit + * logs). + * - %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF: Do not create any log related + * to the enforced restrictions coming from future nested domains created by + * the caller or its descendants. This should only be set according to a + * runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded) by programs launching other + * unknown or untrusted programs that may create their own Landlock domains + * and spam logs. The main use case is for container runtimes to enable users + * to mute buggy sandboxed programs for a specific container image. Other use + * cases include sandboxer tools and init systems. Unlike + * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF, + * %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF does not impact the requested + * restriction (if any) but only the future nested domains. + */ +/* clang-format off */ +#define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF (1U << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON (1U << 1) +#define LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF (1U << 2) /* clang-format on */ /** @@ -97,20 +145,21 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { */ struct landlock_net_port_attr { /** - * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access network for a port + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed network actions for a port * (cf. `Network flags`_). */ __u64 allowed_access; /** * @port: Network port in host endianness. * - * It should be noted that port 0 passed to :manpage:`bind(2)` will - * bind to an available port from a specific port range. This can be - * configured thanks to the ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` - * sysctl (also used for IPv6). A Landlock rule with port 0 and the - * ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` right means that requesting to bind - * on port 0 is allowed and it will automatically translate to binding - * on the related port range. + * It should be noted that port 0 passed to :manpage:`bind(2)` will bind + * to an available port from the ephemeral port range. This can be + * configured with the ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` sysctl + * (also used for IPv6). + * + * A Landlock rule with port 0 and the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` + * right means that requesting to bind on port 0 is allowed and it will + * automatically translate to binding on the related port range. */ __u64 port; }; @@ -128,22 +177,23 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { * files and directories. Files or directories opened before the sandboxing * are not subject to these restrictions. * - * A file can only receive these access rights: + * The following access rights apply only to files: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. - * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that - * you might additionally need the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right in order - * to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using ``O_TRUNC`` or - * :manpage:`creat(2)`. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. When + * opening files for writing, you will often additionally need the + * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right. In many cases, these system calls + * truncate existing files when overwriting them (e.g., :manpage:`creat(2)`). * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`, * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with - * ``O_TRUNC``. Whether an opened file can be truncated with - * :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the - * same way as read and write permissions are checked during - * :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and - * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the - * third version of the Landlock ABI. + * ``O_TRUNC``. This access right is available since the third version of the + * Landlock ABI. + * + * Whether an opened file can be truncated with :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` or used + * with `ioctl(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the same way as + * read and write permissions are checked during :manpage:`open(2)` using + * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. * * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the @@ -198,13 +248,33 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { * If multiple requirements are not met, the ``EACCES`` error code takes * precedence over ``EXDEV``. * + * The following access right applies both to files and directories: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV: Invoke :manpage:`ioctl(2)` commands on an opened + * character or block device. + * + * This access right applies to all `ioctl(2)` commands implemented by device + * drivers. However, the following common IOCTL commands continue to be + * invokable independent of the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right: + * + * * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptors (``FIOCLEX``, ``FIONCLEX``), + * * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptions (``FIONBIO``, ``FIOASYNC``), + * * IOCTL commands targeting file systems (``FIFREEZE``, ``FITHAW``, + * ``FIGETBSZ``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSUUID``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH``) + * * Some IOCTL commands which do not make sense when used with devices, but + * whose implementations are safe and return the right error codes + * (``FS_IOC_FIEMAP``, ``FICLONE``, ``FICLONERANGE``, ``FIDEDUPERANGE``) + * + * This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock + * ABI. + * * .. warning:: * * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, * :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, * :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, - * :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. + * :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. */ /* clang-format off */ @@ -223,6 +293,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV (1ULL << 15) /* clang-format on */ /** @@ -232,9 +303,11 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network - * actions. This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4. + * actions. + * + * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 4. * - * TCP sockets with allowed actions: + * The following access rights apply to TCP port numbers: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to @@ -244,4 +317,30 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) /* clang-format on */ + +/** + * DOC: scope + * + * Scope flags + * ~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * These flags enable to isolate a sandboxed process from a set of IPC actions. + * Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain to forbid + * connections to resources outside the domain. + * + * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6. + * + * Scopes: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process from + * connecting to an abstract UNIX socket created by a process outside the + * related Landlock domain (e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process). + * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL: Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal + * to another process outside the domain. + */ +/* clang-format off */ +#define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (1ULL << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL (1ULL << 1) +/* clang-format on*/ + #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ |