diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 155 |
1 files changed, 117 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8d7ee40e2748..25b14ee0e26d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -28,9 +28,11 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) +#define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) #include <linux/bpf_types.h> #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE +#undef BPF_LINK_TYPE }; /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program @@ -168,6 +170,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { int insn_idx; int prev_insn_idx; struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; + /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ + u32 log_pos; }; #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 @@ -283,6 +287,18 @@ void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, log->ubuf = NULL; } +static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) +{ + char zero = 0; + + if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) + return; + + log->len_used = new_pos; + if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) + log->ubuf = NULL; +} + /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program @@ -382,7 +398,8 @@ static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL || - type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; + type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || + type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; } static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) @@ -413,11 +430,30 @@ static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release; } -static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) { return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || - func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp; + func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem; +} + +static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + const struct bpf_map *map) +{ + enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; + + if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || + func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp) + return true; + + if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && + (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || + map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) + return true; + + return false; } static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) @@ -448,6 +484,7 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", + [PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL] = "ptr_or_null_", }; static char slot_type_char[] = { @@ -508,7 +545,7 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); } else { - if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) + if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf_id)); verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t)) @@ -846,7 +883,7 @@ static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifi } static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, - int *insn_idx) + int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) { struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; @@ -860,6 +897,8 @@ static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, if (err) return err; } + if (pop_log) + bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); if (insn_idx) *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; if (prev_insn_idx) @@ -887,6 +926,7 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; elem->next = env->head; + elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; env->head = elem; env->stack_size++; err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); @@ -915,7 +955,7 @@ err: free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); env->cur_state = NULL; /* pop all elements and return */ - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL)); + while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); return NULL; } @@ -1255,7 +1295,7 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; reg->frameno = 0; - reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->allow_ptr_leaks; + reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable; __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); } @@ -1387,8 +1427,9 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) continue; - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { - verbose(env, "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only\n"); + if (!env->bpf_capable) { + verbose(env, + "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); return -EPERM; } ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1); @@ -1922,8 +1963,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, bool new_marks = false; int i, err; - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) - /* backtracking is root only for now */ + if (!env->bpf_capable) return 0; func = st->frame[st->curframe]; @@ -2101,6 +2141,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: return true; default: return false; @@ -2170,7 +2211,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_const(reg) && - !register_is_null(reg) && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of @@ -2196,7 +2237,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EINVAL; } - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { bool sanitize = false; if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && @@ -2621,7 +2662,7 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, */ *reg_type = info.reg_type; - if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) + if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || *reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) *btf_id = info.btf_id; else env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; @@ -3205,7 +3246,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn * a sub-register. */ regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; - if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) + if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || + reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; } regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; @@ -3390,7 +3432,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, * Spectre masking for stack ALU. * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). */ - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); @@ -3452,6 +3494,11 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, *stype = STACK_MISC; goto mark; } + + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) + goto mark; + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) { __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); @@ -3915,7 +3962,8 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && - func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) + func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) goto error; break; case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: @@ -3923,7 +3971,8 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && - func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) + func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) goto error; break; case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: @@ -4093,7 +4142,7 @@ static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) /* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire * another refcounted ptr. */ - if (is_acquire_function(func_id) && count) + if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count) return false; /* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment, @@ -4388,10 +4437,10 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, - meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array); + !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, - meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array); + !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); return 0; } @@ -4606,7 +4655,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) { /* For release_reference() */ regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; - } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id)) { + } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); if (id < 0) @@ -4760,7 +4809,7 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn) { - return env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; + return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; } static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, @@ -5070,7 +5119,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. */ - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " @@ -5611,7 +5660,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); - bool src_known, dst_known; + bool src_known; s64 smin_val, smax_val; u64 umin_val, umax_val; s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; @@ -5633,7 +5682,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (alu32) { src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); - dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); if ((src_known && (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { @@ -5645,7 +5693,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } else { src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); - dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); if ((src_known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { @@ -6517,12 +6564,16 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, if (is_null) { reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { - if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) { + const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; + + if (map->inner_map_meta) { reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; - reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta; - } else if (reg->map_ptr->map_type == - BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { + reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; + } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; + } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || + map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { + reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; } else { reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; } @@ -6532,6 +6583,8 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; + } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { + reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; } if (is_null) { /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point @@ -7067,6 +7120,7 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: range = tnum_const(0); break; + case BPF_TRACE_ITER: case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: return 0; @@ -7206,7 +7260,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; return 1; } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { - if (loop_ok && env->allow_ptr_leaks) + if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) return 0; verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); @@ -8315,7 +8369,7 @@ next: if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) + if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) return push_jmp_history(env, cur); if (!add_new_state) @@ -8402,6 +8456,7 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: return false; default: return true; @@ -8428,6 +8483,7 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { + bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; struct bpf_reg_state *regs; @@ -8704,7 +8760,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) process_bpf_exit: update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, - &env->insn_idx); + &env->insn_idx, pop_log); if (err < 0) { if (err != -ENOENT) return err; @@ -9974,7 +10030,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; - if (env->allow_ptr_leaks && !expect_blinding && + if (env->bpf_capable && !expect_blinding && prog->jit_requested && !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && @@ -10227,6 +10283,7 @@ static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) { + bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); struct bpf_verifier_state *state; struct bpf_reg_state *regs; int ret, i; @@ -10289,7 +10346,9 @@ out: free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); env->cur_state = NULL; } - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL)); + while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); + if (!ret && pop_log) + bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); free_states(env); if (ret) /* clean aux data in case subprog was rejected */ @@ -10454,6 +10513,7 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->linked_prog; u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; + struct btf_func_model fmodel; int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; struct bpf_trampoline *tr; const struct btf_type *t; @@ -10595,6 +10655,22 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) prog->aux->attach_func_proto = t; prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; return 0; + case BPF_TRACE_ITER: + if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { + verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", + btf_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); + if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) + return -EINVAL; + prog->aux->attach_func_name = tname; + prog->aux->attach_func_proto = t; + if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, btf, t, + tname, &fmodel); + return ret; default: if (!prog_extension) return -EINVAL; @@ -10698,7 +10774,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; env->prog = *prog; env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; - is_priv = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + is_priv = bpf_capable(); if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); @@ -10739,7 +10815,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) env->strict_alignment = false; - env->allow_ptr_leaks = is_priv; + env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); + env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); + env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); + env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); if (is_priv) env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 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