summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/kernel/seccomp.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c11
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 8ad7a293255a..15f47fc11d13 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -356,14 +356,14 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
/*
- * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * Make sure SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
* filter) is set.
*/
smp_mb__before_atomic();
/* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
- set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
+ set_task_syscall_work(task, SECCOMP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
- security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
- CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+ !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
@@ -929,7 +928,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
/*
* Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
- * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
+ * been seen after SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP was seen.
*/
rmb();