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-rw-r--r--kernel/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/core.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/syscall.c35
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c21
-rw-r--r--kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c48
-rw-r--r--kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config1
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/core.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c3
-rw-r--r--kernel/irq/matrix.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/rt.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/topology.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/stackleak.c132
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c16
-rw-r--r--kernel/time/time.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/blktrace.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace_printk.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace_probe.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c12
19 files changed, 218 insertions, 78 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 7a63d567fdb5..7343b3a9bff0 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomem.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE) += memremap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RSEQ) += rseq.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
+KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n
+
$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
targets += config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 6377225b2082..1a796e0799ec 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -553,7 +553,6 @@ bool is_bpf_text_address(unsigned long addr)
int bpf_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type,
char *sym)
{
- unsigned long symbol_start, symbol_end;
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
unsigned int it = 0;
int ret = -ERANGE;
@@ -566,10 +565,9 @@ int bpf_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type,
if (it++ != symnum)
continue;
- bpf_get_prog_addr_region(aux->prog, &symbol_start, &symbol_end);
bpf_get_prog_name(aux->prog, sym);
- *value = symbol_start;
+ *value = (unsigned long)aux->prog->bpf_func;
*type = BPF_SYM_ELF_TYPE;
ret = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index ccb93277aae2..cf5040fd5434 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -2078,6 +2078,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
info.jited_prog_len = 0;
info.xlated_prog_len = 0;
info.nr_jited_ksyms = 0;
+ info.nr_jited_func_lens = 0;
goto done;
}
@@ -2158,11 +2159,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
}
ulen = info.nr_jited_ksyms;
- info.nr_jited_ksyms = prog->aux->func_cnt;
+ info.nr_jited_ksyms = prog->aux->func_cnt ? : 1;
if (info.nr_jited_ksyms && ulen) {
if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) {
+ unsigned long ksym_addr;
u64 __user *user_ksyms;
- ulong ksym_addr;
u32 i;
/* copy the address of the kernel symbol
@@ -2170,10 +2171,17 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
*/
ulen = min_t(u32, info.nr_jited_ksyms, ulen);
user_ksyms = u64_to_user_ptr(info.jited_ksyms);
- for (i = 0; i < ulen; i++) {
- ksym_addr = (ulong) prog->aux->func[i]->bpf_func;
- ksym_addr &= PAGE_MASK;
- if (put_user((u64) ksym_addr, &user_ksyms[i]))
+ if (prog->aux->func_cnt) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulen; i++) {
+ ksym_addr = (unsigned long)
+ prog->aux->func[i]->bpf_func;
+ if (put_user((u64) ksym_addr,
+ &user_ksyms[i]))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ksym_addr = (unsigned long) prog->bpf_func;
+ if (put_user((u64) ksym_addr, &user_ksyms[0]))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
@@ -2182,7 +2190,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
}
ulen = info.nr_jited_func_lens;
- info.nr_jited_func_lens = prog->aux->func_cnt;
+ info.nr_jited_func_lens = prog->aux->func_cnt ? : 1;
if (info.nr_jited_func_lens && ulen) {
if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) {
u32 __user *user_lens;
@@ -2191,9 +2199,16 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog,
/* copy the JITed image lengths for each function */
ulen = min_t(u32, info.nr_jited_func_lens, ulen);
user_lens = u64_to_user_ptr(info.jited_func_lens);
- for (i = 0; i < ulen; i++) {
- func_len = prog->aux->func[i]->jited_len;
- if (put_user(func_len, &user_lens[i]))
+ if (prog->aux->func_cnt) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ulen; i++) {
+ func_len =
+ prog->aux->func[i]->jited_len;
+ if (put_user(func_len, &user_lens[i]))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ func_len = prog->jited_len;
+ if (put_user(func_len, &user_lens[0]))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 171a2c88e77d..1971ca325fb4 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2852,10 +2852,6 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
- if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
- regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
- else
- regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
@@ -2868,7 +2864,12 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
- regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
+ if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
+ } else {
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
+ }
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
if (id < 0)
@@ -3046,7 +3047,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
- dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
+ dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
@@ -3076,10 +3077,11 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
+ dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
- dst_reg->range = 0;
+ dst_reg->raw = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
@@ -3108,7 +3110,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
- dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
+ dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
@@ -3134,11 +3136,12 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
+ dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
if (smin_val < 0)
- dst_reg->range = 0;
+ dst_reg->raw = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index 8b79318810ad..6aaf5dd5383b 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_tryget_css(struct cgroup *cgrp,
}
/**
- * cgroup_e_css_by_mask - obtain a cgroup's effective css for the specified ss
+ * cgroup_e_css - obtain a cgroup's effective css for the specified subsystem
* @cgrp: the cgroup of interest
* @ss: the subsystem of interest (%NULL returns @cgrp->self)
*
@@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_tryget_css(struct cgroup *cgrp,
* enabled. If @ss is associated with the hierarchy @cgrp is on, this
* function is guaranteed to return non-NULL css.
*/
-static struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_e_css_by_mask(struct cgroup *cgrp,
- struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
+static struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_e_css(struct cgroup *cgrp,
+ struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex);
@@ -524,35 +524,6 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_e_css_by_mask(struct cgroup *cgrp,
}
/**
- * cgroup_e_css - obtain a cgroup's effective css for the specified subsystem
- * @cgrp: the cgroup of interest
- * @ss: the subsystem of interest
- *
- * Find and get the effective css of @cgrp for @ss. The effective css is
- * defined as the matching css of the nearest ancestor including self which
- * has @ss enabled. If @ss is not mounted on the hierarchy @cgrp is on,
- * the root css is returned, so this function always returns a valid css.
- *
- * The returned css is not guaranteed to be online, and therefore it is the
- * callers responsiblity to tryget a reference for it.
- */
-struct cgroup_subsys_state *cgroup_e_css(struct cgroup *cgrp,
- struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
-{
- struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
-
- do {
- css = cgroup_css(cgrp, ss);
-
- if (css)
- return css;
- cgrp = cgroup_parent(cgrp);
- } while (cgrp);
-
- return init_css_set.subsys[ss->id];
-}
-
-/**
* cgroup_get_e_css - get a cgroup's effective css for the specified subsystem
* @cgrp: the cgroup of interest
* @ss: the subsystem of interest
@@ -634,11 +605,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_css);
*
* Should be called under cgroup_[tree_]mutex.
*/
-#define for_each_e_css(css, ssid, cgrp) \
- for ((ssid) = 0; (ssid) < CGROUP_SUBSYS_COUNT; (ssid)++) \
- if (!((css) = cgroup_e_css_by_mask(cgrp, \
- cgroup_subsys[(ssid)]))) \
- ; \
+#define for_each_e_css(css, ssid, cgrp) \
+ for ((ssid) = 0; (ssid) < CGROUP_SUBSYS_COUNT; (ssid)++) \
+ if (!((css) = cgroup_e_css(cgrp, cgroup_subsys[(ssid)]))) \
+ ; \
else
/**
@@ -1037,7 +1007,7 @@ static struct css_set *find_existing_css_set(struct css_set *old_cset,
* @ss is in this hierarchy, so we want the
* effective css from @cgrp.
*/
- template[i] = cgroup_e_css_by_mask(cgrp, ss);
+ template[i] = cgroup_e_css(cgrp, ss);
} else {
/*
* @ss is not in this hierarchy, so we don't want
@@ -3054,7 +3024,7 @@ static int cgroup_apply_control(struct cgroup *cgrp)
return ret;
/*
- * At this point, cgroup_e_css_by_mask() results reflect the new csses
+ * At this point, cgroup_e_css() results reflect the new csses
* making the following cgroup_update_dfl_csses() properly update
* css associations of all tasks in the subtree.
*/
diff --git a/kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config b/kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config
index 108fecc20fc1..208481d91090 100644
--- a/kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config
+++ b/kernel/configs/kvm_guest.config
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y
CONFIG_KVM_GUEST=y
CONFIG_S390_GUEST=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO=y
+CONFIG_VIRTIO_MENU=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_CONSOLE=y
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 8c490130c4fb..84530ab358c3 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_event(struct perf_event *event)
/*
* Do not update time when cgroup is not active
*/
- if (cgroup_is_descendant(cgrp->css.cgroup, event->cgrp->css.cgroup))
+ if (cgroup_is_descendant(cgrp->css.cgroup, event->cgrp->css.cgroup))
__update_cgrp_time(event->cgrp);
}
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 8f82a3bdcb8f..07cddff89c7b 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <linux/kcov.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/stackleak.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -1926,6 +1927,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
+ stackleak_task_init(p);
+
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children);
if (IS_ERR(pid)) {
diff --git a/kernel/irq/matrix.c b/kernel/irq/matrix.c
index 6e6d467f3dec..1f0985adf193 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/matrix.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/matrix.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
-#define IRQ_MATRIX_SIZE (BITS_TO_LONGS(IRQ_MATRIX_BITS) * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define IRQ_MATRIX_SIZE (BITS_TO_LONGS(IRQ_MATRIX_BITS))
struct cpumap {
unsigned int available;
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index c6a3b6851372..35cf0ad29718 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kexec_internal.h"
diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c
index 2e2955a8cf8f..a21ea6021929 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ pick_next_task_rt(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf)
/*
* We may dequeue prev's rt_rq in put_prev_task().
- * So, we update time before rt_nr_running check.
+ * So, we update time before rt_queued check.
*/
if (prev->sched_class == &rt_sched_class)
update_curr_rt(rq);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/topology.c b/kernel/sched/topology.c
index 9d74371e4aad..8d7f15ba5916 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/topology.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/topology.c
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ void sched_init_numa(void)
int level = 0;
int i, j, k;
- sched_domains_numa_distance = kzalloc(sizeof(int) * nr_node_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sched_domains_numa_distance = kzalloc(sizeof(int) * (nr_node_ids + 1), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sched_domains_numa_distance)
return;
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e42892926244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
+ * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
+ * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
+ *
+ * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
+ *
+ * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
+ * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
+
+int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+ int prev_state = state;
+
+ table->data = &state;
+ table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ state = !!state;
+ if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (state)
+ static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
+
+ pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
+ state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
+#else
+#define skip_erasing() false
+#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
+
+asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
+{
+ /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
+ unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
+ unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
+ unsigned int poison_count = 0;
+ const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ if (skip_erasing())
+ return;
+
+ /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
+ if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
+ kstack_ptr = boundary;
+
+ /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
+ while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
+ if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+ poison_count++;
+ else
+ poison_count = 0;
+
+ kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
+ * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
+ */
+ if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
+ kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
+ current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
+ * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
+ * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
+ */
+ if (on_thread_stack())
+ boundary = current_stack_pointer;
+ else
+ boundary = current_top_of_stack();
+
+ while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
+ *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
+ kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
+ }
+
+ /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
+ current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
+}
+
+void __used stackleak_track_stack(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * N.B. stackleak_erase() fills the kernel stack with the poison value,
+ * which has the register width. That code assumes that the value
+ * of 'lowest_stack' is aligned on the register width boundary.
+ *
+ * That is true for x86 and x86_64 because of the kernel stack
+ * alignment on these platforms (for details, see 'cc_stack_align' in
+ * arch/x86/Makefile). Take care of that when you port STACKLEAK to
+ * new platforms.
+ */
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+ /*
+ * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
+ * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
+ * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
+
+ if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
+ sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
+ sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+ current->lowest_stack = sp;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index cc02050fd0c4..5fc724e4e454 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -91,7 +90,9 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG
#include <scsi/sg.h>
#endif
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+#include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#endif
@@ -1233,6 +1234,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
+ {
+ .procname = "stack_erasing",
+ .data = NULL,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+#endif
{ }
};
diff --git a/kernel/time/time.c b/kernel/time/time.c
index e3a7f7fd3abc..ad204cf6d001 100644
--- a/kernel/time/time.c
+++ b/kernel/time/time.c
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int get_timespec64(struct timespec64 *ts,
ts->tv_sec = kts.tv_sec;
/* Zero out the padding for 32 bit systems or in compat mode */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT_TIME) && (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) || in_compat_syscall()))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT_TIME) && in_compat_syscall())
kts.tv_nsec &= 0xFFFFFFFFUL;
ts->tv_nsec = kts.tv_nsec;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
index fac0ddf8a8e2..2868d85f1fb1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c
@@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ blk_trace_bio_get_cgid(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio)
if (!bt || !(blk_tracer_flags.val & TRACE_BLK_OPT_CGROUP))
return NULL;
- if (!bio->bi_blkg)
+ if (!bio->bi_css)
return NULL;
- return cgroup_get_kernfs_id(bio_blkcg(bio)->css.cgroup);
+ return cgroup_get_kernfs_id(bio->bi_css->cgroup);
}
#else
static union kernfs_node_id *
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
index b0875b327f5c..c3fd849d4a8f 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int module_trace_bprintk_format_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
* section, then we need to read the link list pointers. The trick is
* we pass the address of the string to the seq function just like
* we do for the kernel core formats. To get back the structure that
- * holds the format, we simply use containerof() and then go to the
+ * holds the format, we simply use container_of() and then go to the
* next format in the list.
*/
static const char **
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
index 3ef15a6683c0..bd30e9398d2a 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ int traceprobe_update_arg(struct probe_arg *arg)
if (code[1].op != FETCH_OP_IMM)
return -EINVAL;
- tmp = strpbrk("+-", code->data);
+ tmp = strpbrk(code->data, "+-");
if (tmp)
c = *tmp;
ret = traceprobe_split_symbol_offset(code->data,
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index e5222b5fb4fe..923414a246e9 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -974,10 +974,6 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
goto out;
- ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
-
ret = -EPERM;
/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
* kernel global id space.
@@ -1004,6 +1000,14 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
e->lower_first = lower_first;
}
+ /*
+ * If we want to use binary search for lookup, this clones the extent
+ * array and sorts both copies.
+ */
+ ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
/* Install the map */
if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) {
memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-05-17 20:42:40 +0000