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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig.hardening29
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index af4c979b38ee..269967c4fc1b 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
menu "Memory initialization"
-config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
+
choice
prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
- default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+ default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
default INIT_STACK_NONE
help
This option enables initialization of stack variables at
@@ -88,9 +91,9 @@ choice
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
exposures.
- config INIT_STACK_ALL
+ config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
- depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+ depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
help
Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
@@ -98,6 +101,24 @@ choice
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
left uninitialized.
+ Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
+ related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
+ non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big.
+
+ config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
+ bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)"
+ depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+ help
+ Initializes everything on the stack with a zero
+ value. This is intended to eliminate all classes
+ of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+ exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
+ left uninitialized.
+
+ Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings,
+ pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore
+ more suitable as a security mitigation measure.
+
endchoice
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE