summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c31
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index bbc85637e18b..8a9db7dfca7e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int i, ret;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
return -EPERM;
- ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
+ ret = kstrtouint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -80,12 +81,12 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if
- * keys are loaded.
+ /*
+ * Don't allow a request to enable metadata writes if
+ * an HMAC key is loaded.
*/
if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
- ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
- !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
+ (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0)
return -EPERM;
if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
@@ -138,8 +139,12 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
if (rc)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
- list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list)
+ list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ if (!xattr->enabled)
+ continue;
+
size += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+ }
temp = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp) {
@@ -148,6 +153,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
}
list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ if (!xattr->enabled)
+ continue;
+
sprintf(temp + offset, "%s\n", xattr->name);
offset += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
}
@@ -189,7 +197,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
- if (!ab)
+ if (!ab && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUDIT))
return -ENOMEM;
xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -198,6 +206,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
+ xattr->enabled = true;
xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) {
err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name);
@@ -244,6 +253,10 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
err = -EEXIST;
+ if (!tmp->enabled) {
+ tmp->enabled = true;
+ err = count;
+ }
mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
@@ -255,7 +268,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
audit_log_end(ab);
return count;
out:
- audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", err);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", (err < 0) ? err : 0);
audit_log_end(ab);
if (xattr) {
kfree(xattr->name);