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-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig71
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Makefile12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c94
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c25
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c34
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c167
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c43
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c2
11 files changed, 345 insertions, 124 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a90d6d300dbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#
+# Key management configuration
+#
+
+config KEYS
+ bool "Enable access key retention support"
+ help
+ This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
+ access keys in the kernel.
+
+ It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
+ associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
+ support and the like can find them.
+
+ Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
+ a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
+ to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
+ process and thread.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+ tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ help
+ This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+ keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+ generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
+ if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
+ see encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+ tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+ depends on KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+ in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
+ which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
+ 'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
+ Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+ bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
+ can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
+ reading process.
+
+ The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
+ permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
+ Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
+ filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
+
+ Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
+ the resulting table.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index a56f1ffdc64d..504aaa008388 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
# Makefile for key management
#
+#
+# Core
+#
obj-y := \
gc.o \
key.o \
@@ -12,9 +15,12 @@ obj-y := \
request_key.o \
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
+
+#
+# Key types
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 4c48e13448f8..fab4f8dda6c6 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+ case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+ return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index a42b45531aac..61ab7c82ebb1 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
}
/*
+ * Schedule a dead links collection run.
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc_links(void)
+{
+ set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
+ queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
* Some key's cleanup time was met after it expired, so we need to get the
* reaper to go through a cycle finding expired keys.
*/
@@ -79,8 +88,7 @@ static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
{
kenter("");
key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
- set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
- queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work);
+ key_schedule_gc_links();
}
/*
@@ -131,12 +139,12 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
{
struct keyring_list *klist;
- struct key *key;
int loop;
kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+ if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
goto dont_gc;
/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
@@ -148,9 +156,8 @@ static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
loop = klist->nkeys;
smp_rmb();
for (loop--; loop >= 0; loop--) {
- key = klist->keys[loop];
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
- (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+ struct key *key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
+ if (key_is_dead(key, limit))
goto do_gc;
}
@@ -168,38 +175,45 @@ do_gc:
}
/*
- * Garbage collect an unreferenced, detached key
+ * Garbage collect a list of unreferenced, detached keys
*/
-static noinline void key_gc_unused_key(struct key *key)
+static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
{
- key_check(key);
-
- security_key_free(key);
-
- /* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
- spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
- key->user->qnkeys--;
- key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
- spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
- }
+ while (!list_empty(keys)) {
+ struct key *key =
+ list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
+ list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
+
+ kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
+ key_check(key);
+
+ security_key_free(key);
+
+ /* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
+ spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
+ key->user->qnkeys--;
+ key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
+ spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
+ }
- atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
- atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
+ atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+ atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
- key_user_put(key->user);
+ key_user_put(key->user);
- /* now throw away the key memory */
- if (key->type->destroy)
- key->type->destroy(key);
+ /* now throw away the key memory */
+ if (key->type->destroy)
+ key->type->destroy(key);
- kfree(key->description);
+ kfree(key->description);
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
- key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
+ key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
#endif
- kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
+ kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
+ }
}
/*
@@ -211,6 +225,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_key(struct key *key)
*/
static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
{
+ static LIST_HEAD(graveyard);
static u8 gc_state; /* Internal persistent state */
#define KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN 0x01 /* - Need another cycle */
#define KEY_GC_REAPING_LINKS 0x02 /* - We need to reap links */
@@ -316,15 +331,22 @@ maybe_resched:
key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
}
- if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) {
- /* Make sure everyone revalidates their keys if we marked a
- * bunch as being dead and make sure all keyring ex-payloads
- * are destroyed.
+ if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2) ||
+ !list_empty(&graveyard)) {
+ /* Make sure that all pending keyring payload destructions are
+ * fulfilled and that people aren't now looking at dead or
+ * dying keys that they don't have a reference upon or a link
+ * to.
*/
- kdebug("dead sync");
+ kdebug("gc sync");
synchronize_rcu();
}
+ if (!list_empty(&graveyard)) {
+ kdebug("gc keys");
+ key_gc_unused_keys(&graveyard);
+ }
+
if (unlikely(gc_state & (KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1 |
KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2))) {
if (!(gc_state & KEY_GC_FOUND_DEAD_KEY)) {
@@ -359,7 +381,7 @@ found_unreferenced_key:
rb_erase(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
- key_gc_unused_key(key);
+ list_add_tail(&key->graveyard_link, &graveyard);
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN;
goto maybe_resched;
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 65647f825584..f711b094ed41 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
-extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t expiry_at);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at);
+extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void);
extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
@@ -197,6 +198,17 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead.
+ */
+static inline bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+{
+ return
+ key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) ||
+ (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
+}
+
+/*
* keyctl() functions
*/
extern long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t, int);
@@ -225,6 +237,7 @@ extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
const struct iovec __user *,
unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
const struct iovec __user *,
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 7e6034793af3..50d96d4e06f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -955,6 +955,28 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_revoke);
/**
+ * key_invalidate - Invalidate a key.
+ * @key: The key to be invalidated.
+ *
+ * Mark a key as being invalidated and have it cleaned up immediately. The key
+ * is ignored by all searches and other operations from this point.
+ */
+void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
+{
+ kenter("%d", key_serial(key));
+
+ key_check(key);
+
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
+ down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags))
+ key_schedule_gc_links();
+ up_write(&key->sem);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
+
+/**
* register_key_type - Register a type of key.
* @ktype: The new key type.
*
@@ -980,6 +1002,8 @@ int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
/* store the type */
list_add(&ktype->link, &key_types_list);
+
+ pr_notice("Key type %s registered\n", ktype->name);
ret = 0;
out:
@@ -1002,6 +1026,7 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
key_gc_keytype(ktype);
+ pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index fb767c6cd99f..ddb3e05bc5fc 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -375,6 +375,37 @@ error:
}
/*
+ * Invalidate a key.
+ *
+ * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work.
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * immediately.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
+{
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ long ret;
+
+ kenter("%d", id);
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+ ret = 0;
+
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+error:
+ kleave(" = %ld", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
* special keyring IDs is used.
*
@@ -1622,6 +1653,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
(unsigned) arg4,
(key_serial_t) arg5);
+ case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+ return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d605f75292e4..7445875f6818 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -25,6 +25,15 @@
(keyring)->payload.subscriptions, \
rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
+#define rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, index, keyring) \
+ (rcu_dereference_protected( \
+ (klist)->keys[index], \
+ rwsem_is_locked((struct rw_semaphore *)&(keyring)->sem)))
+
+#define MAX_KEYRING_LINKS \
+ min_t(size_t, USHRT_MAX - 1, \
+ ((PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct keyring_list)) / sizeof(struct key *)))
+
#define KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA 1UL
/*
@@ -138,6 +147,11 @@ static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *description)
/*
* Clean up a keyring when it is destroyed. Unpublish its name if it had one
* and dispose of its data.
+ *
+ * The garbage collector detects the final key_put(), removes the keyring from
+ * the serial number tree and then does RCU synchronisation before coming here,
+ * so we shouldn't need to worry about code poking around here with the RCU
+ * readlock held by this time.
*/
static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
{
@@ -154,11 +168,10 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
}
- klist = rcu_dereference_check(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
- atomic_read(&keyring->usage) == 0);
+ klist = rcu_access_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
if (klist) {
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
- key_put(klist->keys[loop]);
+ key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
kfree(klist);
}
}
@@ -214,7 +227,8 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
ret = -EFAULT;
for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
- key = klist->keys[loop];
+ key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
+ keyring);
tmp = sizeof(key_serial_t);
if (tmp > buflen)
@@ -309,6 +323,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
bool no_state_check)
{
struct {
+ /* Need a separate keylist pointer for RCU purposes */
+ struct key *keyring;
struct keyring_list *keylist;
int kix;
} stack[KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH];
@@ -366,13 +382,17 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
/* otherwise, the top keyring must not be revoked, expired, or
* negatively instantiated if we are to search it */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
- if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
+ if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) ||
(keyring->expiry && now.tv_sec >= keyring->expiry))
goto error_2;
/* start processing a new keyring */
descend:
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+ kflags = keyring->flags;
+ if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
goto not_this_keyring;
keylist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
@@ -383,16 +403,17 @@ descend:
nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
smp_rmb();
for (kix = 0; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
- key = keylist->keys[kix];
+ key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
kflags = key->flags;
/* ignore keys not of this type */
if (key->type != type)
continue;
- /* skip revoked keys and expired keys */
+ /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
if (!no_state_check) {
- if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
+ if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
continue;
if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
@@ -426,7 +447,7 @@ ascend:
nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
smp_rmb();
for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
- key = keylist->keys[kix];
+ key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
if (key->type != &key_type_keyring)
continue;
@@ -441,6 +462,7 @@ ascend:
continue;
/* stack the current position */
+ stack[sp].keyring = keyring;
stack[sp].keylist = keylist;
stack[sp].kix = kix;
sp++;
@@ -456,6 +478,7 @@ not_this_keyring:
if (sp > 0) {
/* resume the processing of a keyring higher up in the tree */
sp--;
+ keyring = stack[sp].keyring;
keylist = stack[sp].keylist;
kix = stack[sp].kix + 1;
goto ascend;
@@ -467,6 +490,10 @@ not_this_keyring:
/* we found a viable match */
found:
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+ key->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
+ keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
+ while (sp > 0)
+ stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = now.tv_sec;
key_check(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, possessed);
error_2:
@@ -531,14 +558,14 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
nkeys = klist->nkeys;
smp_rmb();
for (loop = 0; loop < nkeys ; loop++) {
- key = klist->keys[loop];
-
+ key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
if (key->type == ktype &&
(!key->type->match ||
key->type->match(key, description)) &&
key_permission(make_key_ref(key, possessed),
perm) == 0 &&
- !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)
+ !(key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
)
goto found;
}
@@ -549,6 +576,8 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
found:
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+ keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
+ current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
rcu_read_unlock();
return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
}
@@ -602,6 +631,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
+ keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
goto out;
}
}
@@ -654,7 +684,7 @@ ascend:
nkeys = keylist->nkeys;
smp_rmb();
for (; kix < nkeys; kix++) {
- key = keylist->keys[kix];
+ key = rcu_dereference(keylist->keys[kix]);
if (key == A)
goto cycle_detected;
@@ -711,7 +741,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
if (klist->delkey != USHRT_MAX)
- key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
+ key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey]));
kfree(klist);
}
@@ -725,8 +755,9 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
unsigned long prealloc;
unsigned max;
+ time_t lowest_lru;
size_t size;
- int loop, ret;
+ int loop, lru, ret;
kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description);
@@ -747,31 +778,39 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
+ lru = -1;
if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
+ lowest_lru = TIME_T_MAX;
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
- if (klist->keys[loop]->type == type &&
- strcmp(klist->keys[loop]->description,
- description) == 0
- ) {
- /* found a match - we'll replace this one with
- * the new key */
- size = sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys;
- size += sizeof(*klist);
- BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
-
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- nklist = kmemdup(klist, size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!nklist)
- goto error_sem;
-
- /* note replacement slot */
- klist->delkey = nklist->delkey = loop;
- prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist;
+ struct key *key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop,
+ keyring);
+ if (key->type == type &&
+ strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) {
+ /* Found a match - we'll replace the link with
+ * one to the new key. We record the slot
+ * position.
+ */
+ klist->delkey = loop;
+ prealloc = 0;
goto done;
}
+ if (key->last_used_at < lowest_lru) {
+ lowest_lru = key->last_used_at;
+ lru = loop;
+ }
}
}
+ /* If the keyring is full then do an LRU discard */
+ if (klist &&
+ klist->nkeys == klist->maxkeys &&
+ klist->maxkeys >= MAX_KEYRING_LINKS) {
+ kdebug("LRU discard %d\n", lru);
+ klist->delkey = lru;
+ prealloc = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
/* check that we aren't going to overrun the user's quota */
ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
@@ -780,20 +819,19 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
- nklist = NULL;
+ klist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
prealloc = KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
} else {
/* grow the key list */
max = 4;
- if (klist)
+ if (klist) {
max += klist->maxkeys;
+ if (max > MAX_KEYRING_LINKS)
+ max = MAX_KEYRING_LINKS;
+ BUG_ON(max <= klist->maxkeys);
+ }
- ret = -ENFILE;
- if (max > USHRT_MAX - 1)
- goto error_quota;
size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
- if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
- goto error_quota;
ret = -ENOMEM;
nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -813,10 +851,10 @@ int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
}
/* add the key into the new space */
- nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = NULL;
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], NULL);
+ prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist | KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
}
- prealloc = (unsigned long)nklist | KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA;
done:
*_prealloc = prealloc;
kleave(" = 0");
@@ -862,6 +900,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
unsigned long *_prealloc)
{
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
+ struct key *discard;
nklist = (struct keyring_list *)(*_prealloc & ~KEY_LINK_FIXQUOTA);
*_prealloc = 0;
@@ -871,14 +910,16 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+ keyring->last_used_at = key->last_used_at =
+ current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
/* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly
* allocated list we can fill */
if (nklist) {
- kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
+ kdebug("reissue %hu/%hu/%hu",
nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys);
- nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = key;
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(nklist->keys[nklist->delkey], key);
rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
@@ -889,9 +930,23 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
}
+ } else if (klist->delkey < klist->nkeys) {
+ kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
+ klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+
+ discard = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ klist->keys[klist->delkey],
+ rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
+ /* The garbage collector will take care of RCU
+ * synchronisation */
+ key_put(discard);
} else {
/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
- klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
+ kdebug("append %hu/%hu/%hu",
+ klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(klist->keys[klist->delkey], key);
smp_wmb();
klist->nkeys++;
}
@@ -998,7 +1053,7 @@ int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
if (klist) {
/* search the keyring for the key */
for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++)
- if (klist->keys[loop] == key)
+ if (rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]) == key)
goto key_is_present;
}
@@ -1061,7 +1116,7 @@ static void keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
klist = container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
- key_put(klist->keys[loop]);
+ key_put(rcu_access_pointer(klist->keys[loop]));
kfree(klist);
}
@@ -1128,15 +1183,6 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
}
/*
- * Determine whether a key is dead.
- */
-static bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
-{
- return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
- (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
-}
-
-/*
* Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring, replacing the old list with
* a new one with the pointers all shuffled down.
*
@@ -1161,7 +1207,8 @@ void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
keep = 0;
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
- if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit))
+ if (!key_is_dead(rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring),
+ limit))
keep++;
if (keep == klist->nkeys)
@@ -1182,11 +1229,11 @@ void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
*/
keep = 0;
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
- key = klist->keys[loop];
+ key = rcu_deref_link_locked(klist, loop, keyring);
if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
if (keep >= max)
goto discard_new;
- new->keys[keep++] = key_get(key);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(new->keys[keep++], key_get(key));
}
}
new->nkeys = keep;
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 5442900d2929..0b4d019e027d 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -88,32 +88,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
* key_validate - Validate a key.
* @key: The key to be validated.
*
- * Check that a key is valid, returning 0 if the key is okay, -EKEYREVOKED if
- * the key's type has been removed or if the key has been revoked or
- * -EKEYEXPIRED if the key has expired.
+ * Check that a key is valid, returning 0 if the key is okay, -ENOKEY if the
+ * key is invalidated, -EKEYREVOKED if the key's type has been removed or if
+ * the key has been revoked or -EKEYEXPIRED if the key has expired.
*/
-int key_validate(struct key *key)
+int key_validate(const struct key *key)
{
- struct timespec now;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (key) {
- /* check it's still accessible */
- ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) ||
- test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags))
- goto error;
-
- /* check it hasn't expired */
- ret = 0;
- if (key->expiry) {
- now = current_kernel_time();
- if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
- ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
- }
+ unsigned long flags = key->flags;
+
+ if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ /* check it's still accessible */
+ if (flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
+ (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))
+ return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+ /* check it hasn't expired */
+ if (key->expiry) {
+ struct timespec now = current_kernel_time();
+ if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+ return -EKEYEXPIRED;
}
-error:
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_validate);
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 49bbc97943ad..30d1ddfd9cef 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
(test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
- seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
+ seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
+ showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
atomic_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 447fb7618ff3..d71056db7b67 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -732,6 +732,8 @@ try_again:
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
+ key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+
error:
put_cred(cred);
return key_ref;