summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/selinux
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c204
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c85
6 files changed, 208 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4bca0af4f2af..bfe9a05db3a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -3426,36 +3427,39 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
}
/**
- * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
+ * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
- * @sid: the packet's SID
+ * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
*
* Description:
- * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
- * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
- * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
- * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
- * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
- * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
+ * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
+ * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
+ * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
+ * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
+ * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
+ * peer labels.
*
*/
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
- u16 family,
- u32 *sid)
+static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
{
u32 xfrm_sid;
u32 nlbl_sid;
+ u32 nlbl_type;
selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
- if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
- family,
- (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
- SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
- &nlbl_sid) != 0)
- nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
- *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
+ selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+ family,
+ SECINITSID_NETMSG,
+ &nlbl_type,
+ &nlbl_sid);
+
+ if (security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type,
+ xfrm_sid,
+ sid) != 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return 0;
}
/* socket security operations */
@@ -3521,6 +3525,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
if (sock->sk) {
sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
sksec->sid = isec->sid;
+ sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
}
@@ -3824,104 +3829,114 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct avc_audit_data *ad,
- u16 family, char *addrp)
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+ u16 family,
+ char *addrp)
{
- int err = 0;
- u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
- struct socket *sock;
- u16 sock_class = 0;
- u32 sock_sid = 0;
-
- read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- sock = sk->sk_socket;
- if (sock) {
- struct inode *inode;
- inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- if (inode) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- isec = inode->i_security;
- sock_sid = isec->sid;
- sock_class = isec->sclass;
- }
- }
- read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (!sock_sid)
- goto out;
-
- if (!skb->dev)
- goto out;
+ int err;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 sk_class;
+ u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
+ u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
- err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+ sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+ sk_class = sksec->sclass;
- switch (sock_class) {
+ switch (sk_class) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
break;
-
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
break;
-
case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
break;
-
default:
netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
+ recv_perm = 0;
break;
}
- err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+ err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
- if (recv_perm) {
- u32 port_sid;
+ if (!recv_perm)
+ return 0;
+ err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
+ &port_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
+}
- err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
- sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
- &port_sid);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+ u16 family, char *addrp)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u32 peer_sid;
+ u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+
+ if (selinux_compat_net)
+ err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
+ family, addrp);
+ else
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RECV, ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
- sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+ if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+ SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
+ } else {
+ err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
}
-out:
return err;
}
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u16 family;
- char *addrp;
- int err = 0;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+ u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
+ u32 peer_sid;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ char *addrp;
- family = sk->sk_family;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
- goto out;
+ return 0;
/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -3930,26 +3945,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
ad.u.net.family = family;
-
err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
- if (selinux_compat_net)
- err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, addrp);
- else
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__RECV, &ad);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+ /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
+ * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
+ * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
+ * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+ if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+ return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
+ family, addrp);
- err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
-out:
- return err;
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
}
static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
@@ -4011,7 +4027,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
+ selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
*secid = peer_secid;
@@ -4037,6 +4053,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+ newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
}
@@ -4060,6 +4077,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+ sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
}
@@ -4072,7 +4090,9 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 newsid;
u32 peersid;
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
req->secid = sksec->sid;
req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -4110,7 +4130,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
+ selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 272769a1cb96..c8c05a6f298c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 base_sid,
+ u32 *type,
u32 *sid);
void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock);
@@ -89,8 +90,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(
static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 base_sid,
+ u32 *type,
u32 *sid)
{
+ *type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE;
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 95fb5ec17354..c6c2bb4ebacc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
struct sock *sk; /* back pointer to sk object */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
enum { /* NetLabel state */
NLBL_UNSET = 0,
NLBL_REQUIRE,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a22de9771806..9347e2daa8d4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid);
+
int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index f4bcbf12a4c9..b54d28fd3b5d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
* lock as other threads could have access to ssec */
rcu_read_lock();
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family);
- newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -146,6 +145,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
* @skb: the packet
* @family: protocol family
* @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes
+ * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
* @sid: the SID
*
* Description:
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 base_sid,
+ u32 *type,
u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr);
} else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ *type = secattr.type;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
return rc;
@@ -194,13 +196,10 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
u32 nlbl_peer_sid;
- sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
rcu_read_lock();
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
@@ -238,11 +237,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
-
rcu_read_lock();
if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8ee04a424df7..7f0ee1b91e1d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2054,6 +2054,91 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ * | function return | @sid
+ * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
+ * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+ struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+ /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+ * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+ * single or absent peer SID/label */
+ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+ * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+ * is present */
+ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+ * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+ * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+ if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ nlbl_sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_slowpath;
+ }
+ xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+ if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ xfrm_sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_slowpath;
+ }
+ rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+
+out_slowpath:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ if (rc == 0)
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ else
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct class_datum *datum = d;