diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
66 files changed, 692 insertions, 447 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index 0f295961e773..2cff851ebfd7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -279,6 +279,29 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS endmenu +menu "Hardening of kernel data structures" + +config LIST_HARDENED + bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation" + help + Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines + to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an + immediate access fault. + + If unsure, say N. + +config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION + bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected" + select LIST_HARDENED + help + Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters + data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked + for validity. + + If unsure, say N. + +endmenu + config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null) # Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index db7a51acf9db..bd6a910f6528 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int __aafs_setup_d_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); + inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); inode->i_private = data; if (S_ISDIR(mode)) { inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_dir_inode_operations; @@ -1554,8 +1554,11 @@ void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old, for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) { new->dents[i] = old->dents[i]; - if (new->dents[i]) - new->dents[i]->d_inode->i_mtime = current_time(new->dents[i]->d_inode); + if (new->dents[i]) { + struct inode *inode = d_inode(new->dents[i]); + + inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); + } old->dents[i] = NULL; } } @@ -2540,7 +2543,7 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent) inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO; - inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); + inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_instantiate(dentry, inode); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index c9463bd0307d..108eccc5ada5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) } /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ -static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, +static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { struct aa_label *label; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 694fb7a09962..8b8846073e14 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -86,10 +86,13 @@ void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision) data->revision = revision; if ((data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])) { - d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])->i_mtime = - current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR])); - d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])->i_mtime = - current_time(d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION])); + struct inode *inode; + + inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]); + inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); + + inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]); + inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); } } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index ab5742ab4362..bc0521104197 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ out: * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns * them to the caller. */ -int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, +int cap_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { const struct cred *cred; diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 6c326939750d..3aa75fffa8c9 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); + inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode); inode->i_private = data; if (S_ISDIR(mode)) { inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index ec6e0d789da1..232191ee09e3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING - depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS help If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 6f31ffe23c48..df387de29bfa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY -#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin_and_secondary #else -#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin #endif static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id) @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, } else { if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]); - if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist()) + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && imputed_trust_enabled()) set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]); if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) load_module_cert(keyring[id]); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index a6e19d23e700..fba9ee359bc9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ config EVM_LOAD_X509 This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. A public key can be used to - verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. + verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. The + key must have digitalSignature usage set. config EVM_X509_PATH string "EVM X509 certificate path" diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f8b8c5004fc7..53bd7fec93fa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ struct evm_digest { char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; +int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name); + int evm_init_key(void); int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, @@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, struct evm_digest *data); -int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 0dae649f3740..b1ffd4cc0b44 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -385,10 +385,11 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return rc; } -int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattrs, char *hmac_val) { struct shash_desc *desc; + const struct xattr *xattr; desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); if (IS_ERR(desc)) { @@ -396,7 +397,13 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return PTR_ERR(desc); } - crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); + for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) { + if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name)) + continue; + + crypto_shash_update(desc, xattr->value, xattr->value_len); + } + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val); kfree(desc); return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index c9b6e2a43478..ff9a939dad8e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> @@ -305,7 +306,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name, return found; } -static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) +int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) { return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false); } @@ -866,23 +867,47 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ -int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, - struct xattr *evm_xattr) +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, + int *xattr_count) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr; + bool evm_protected_xattrs = false; int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs) return 0; + /* + * security_inode_init_security() makes sure that the xattrs array is + * contiguous, there is enough space for security.evm, and that there is + * a terminator at the end of the array. + */ + for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) { + if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name)) + evm_protected_xattrs = true; + } + + /* EVM xattr not needed. */ + if (!evm_protected_xattrs) + return 0; + + evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); + /* + * Array terminator (xattr name = NULL) must be the first non-filled + * xattr slot. + */ + WARN_ONCE(evm_xattr != xattr, + "%s: xattrs terminator is not the first non-filled slot\n", + __func__); + xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; - rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 60a511c6b583..ecddc807c536 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -248,18 +248,6 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook to accept such signatures. -config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING - bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING - default y - help - This option requires that all keys added to the .ima - keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. - - This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING - config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)" depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING @@ -270,7 +258,8 @@ config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY help Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or - secondary trusted keyrings. + secondary trusted keyrings. The key must also have the + digitalSignature usage set. Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 491c1aca0b1c..870dde67707b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -458,11 +458,13 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize); rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); - if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) - process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize, - "blacklisted-hash", NONE, - pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0); - } + } else if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED && iint->ima_hash) + rc = is_binary_blacklisted(iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); + + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) + process_buffer_measurement(&nop_mnt_idmap, NULL, digest, digestsize, + "blacklisted-hash", NONE, + pcr, NULL, false, NULL, 0); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c index 9db66fe310d4..138029bfcce1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", #endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) + "appraise func=POLICY_CHECK appraise_type=imasig", +#endif "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", NULL }; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c index 419dc405c831..ad133fe120db 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ out: * Called during kexec_file_load so that IMA can add a segment to the kexec * image for the measurement list for the next kernel. * - * This function assumes that kexec_mutex is held. + * This function assumes that kexec_lock is held. */ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c9b3bd8f1bb9..f69062617754 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; struct ima_rule_opt_list { size_t count; - char *items[]; + char *items[] __counted_by(count); }; /* @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src) kfree(src_copy); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } + opt_list->count = count; /* * strsep() has already replaced all instances of '|' with '\0', @@ -357,7 +358,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src) opt_list->items[i] = cur; cur = strchr(cur, '\0') + 1; } - opt_list->count = count; return opt_list; } @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) IMA_FSNAME | IMA_GID | IMA_EGID | IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS | - IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) return false; break; @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) /* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */ if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST && - !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)) + !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)) return false; /* @@ -1803,11 +1803,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) result = -EINVAL; else - entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST; } else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) { /* Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now */ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) - entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST; else result = -EINVAL; } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) && @@ -1816,18 +1816,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | - IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; + IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST; } else { result = -EINVAL; } break; case Opt_appraise_flag: ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from); - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) && - strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist")) - entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST; - else - result = -EINVAL; break; case Opt_appraise_algos: ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_algos", args[0].from); @@ -2271,8 +2266,6 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity "); - if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) - seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 7167a6e99bdc..d7553c93f5c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -320,13 +320,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); -bool __init trust_moklist(void); +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void); #else static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len) { } -static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void) + +static inline bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void) { return false; } diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c index 8a1124e4d769..13ea17207902 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) { if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist()) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && + imputed_trust_enabled()) return add_to_machine_keyring; else return add_to_platform_keyring; @@ -69,6 +70,22 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) return NULL; } +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return add_to_machine_keyring; + + return NULL; +} + +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return add_to_secondary_keyring; + + return NULL; +} + /* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h index 212d894a8c0c..f92895cc50f6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h @@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); /* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types for CA keys. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_ca_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types for code signing keys. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_code_signing_keys(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. */ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c index e769dcb7ea94..c7c381a9ddaa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.c @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static int __init load_ipl_certs(void) if (!ipl_cert_list_addr) return 0; - /* Copy the certificates to the system keyring */ - ptr = (void *) ipl_cert_list_addr; + /* Copy the certificates to the platform keyring */ + ptr = __va(ipl_cert_list_addr); end = ptr + ipl_cert_list_size; while ((void *) ptr < end) { len = *(unsigned int *) ptr; diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c index 170789dc63d2..c85febca3343 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, u64 *size) static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) { void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *data = NULL; + void *trustedca; + void *moduledb; u64 dsize = 0; u64 offset = 0; int rc = 0; @@ -120,6 +122,38 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) kfree(data); } + data = get_cert_list("trustedcadb", 12, &dsize); + if (!data) { + pr_info("Couldn't get trustedcadb list from firmware\n"); + } else if (IS_ERR(data)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(data); + pr_err("Error reading trustedcadb from firmware: %d\n", rc); + } else { + extract_esl(trustedca, data, dsize, offset); + + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:trustedca", trustedca, dsize, + get_handler_for_ca_keys); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse trustedcadb signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(data); + } + + data = get_cert_list("moduledb", 9, &dsize); + if (!data) { + pr_info("Couldn't get moduledb list from firmware\n"); + } else if (IS_ERR(data)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(data); + pr_err("Error reading moduledb from firmware: %d\n", rc); + } else { + extract_esl(moduledb, data, dsize, offset); + + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:moduledb", moduledb, dsize, + get_handler_for_code_signing_keys); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse moduledb signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(data); + } + return rc; } late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs); diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c index 7aaed7950b6e..a401640a63cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c @@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ #include <linux/efi.h> #include "../integrity.h" -static bool trust_mok; - static __init int machine_keyring_init(void) { int rc; @@ -36,7 +34,8 @@ void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead. */ - if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) + if (rc && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source, data, len, perm); @@ -62,12 +61,14 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void) return false; } -bool __init trust_moklist(void) +static bool __init trust_moklist(void) { static bool initialized; + static bool trust_mok; if (!initialized) { initialized = true; + trust_mok = false; if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys()) trust_mok = true; @@ -75,3 +76,16 @@ bool __init trust_moklist(void) return trust_mok; } + +/* + * Provides platform specific check for trusting imputed keys before loading + * on .machine keyring. UEFI systems enable this trust based on a variable, + * and for other platforms, it is always enabled. + */ +bool __init imputed_trust_enabled(void) +{ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) + return trust_moklist(); + + return true; +} diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 41e9735006d0..8f33cd170e42 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, if (!rka->callout_info) goto error_free_rka; rka->callout_len = callout_len; - strlcpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op)); + strscpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op)); /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index ebae964f7cc9..a9d40456a064 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static int read_trusted_verity_root_digests(unsigned int fd) rc = -ENOMEM; goto err; } + trd->len = len; if (hex2bin(trd->data, d, len)) { kfree(trd); @@ -343,8 +344,6 @@ static int read_trusted_verity_root_digests(unsigned int fd) goto err; } - trd->len = len; - list_add_tail(&trd->node, &dm_verity_loadpin_trusted_root_digests); } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b720424ca37d..23b129d482a7 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> -#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 - /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) @@ -212,6 +210,8 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, + &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); } /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); + init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); /* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -840,7 +841,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. */ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, - const struct cred *to, struct file *file) + const struct cred *to, const struct file *file) { return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); } @@ -893,7 +894,7 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) * * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. */ -int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, +int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) @@ -1139,6 +1140,20 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } /** + * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security + * @fc: new filesystem context + * @reference: dentry reference for submount/remount + * + * Fill out the ->security field for a new fs_context. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *reference) +{ + return call_int_hook(fs_context_submount, 0, fc, reference); +} + +/** * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob * @fc: destination filesystem context * @src_fc: source filesystem context @@ -1591,46 +1606,70 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... - * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name - * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree - * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes - * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then - * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. + * hooks called by the VFS. + * + * The hook function is expected to populate the xattrs array, by calling + * lsm_get_xattr_slot() to retrieve the slots reserved by the security module + * with the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. For each + * slot, the hook function should set ->name to the attribute name suffix + * (e.g. selinux), to allocate ->value (will be freed by the caller) and set it + * to the attribute value, to set ->value_len to the length of the value. If + * the security module does not use security attributes or does not wish to put + * a security attribute on this particular inode, then it should return + * -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. * - * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is - * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. + * Return: Returns 0 if the LSM successfully initialized all of the inode + * security attributes that are required, negative values otherwise. */ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) { - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; - struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; - int ret; + struct security_hook_list *hp; + struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL; + int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - if (!initxattrs) - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, - dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); - memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); - lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, - &lsm_xattr->name, - &lsm_xattr->value, - &lsm_xattr->value_len); - if (ret) + if (!blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count) + return 0; + + if (initxattrs) { + /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2, + sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); + if (!new_xattrs) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + ret = hp->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, + &xattr_count); + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto out; + /* + * As documented in lsm_hooks.h, -EOPNOTSUPP in this context + * means that the LSM is not willing to provide an xattr, not + * that it wants to signal an error. Thus, continue to invoke + * the remaining LSMs. + */ + } + + /* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */ + if (!xattr_count) goto out; - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, + &xattr_count); if (ret) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: - for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) - kfree(xattr->value); + for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) + kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value); + kfree(new_xattrs); return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); @@ -2717,7 +2756,7 @@ int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) /** * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed * @file: file - * @cmd: fnctl command + * @cmd: fcntl command * @arg: command argument * * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from @@ -4396,7 +4435,14 @@ void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); -void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) +/** + * security_sk_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on socket + * @sk: original socket + * @flic: target flow + * + * Set the target flow's secid to socket's secid. + */ +void security_sk_classify_flow(const struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) { call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); } diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index 95a186ec0fcb..d30348fbe0df 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only config SECURITY_SELINUX - bool "NSA SELinux Support" + bool "SELinux Support" depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET select NETWORK_SECMARK default n help - This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). + This selects Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM - bool "NSA SELinux boot parameter" + bool "SELinux boot parameter" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX default n help @@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP - bool "NSA SELinux Development Support" + bool "SELinux Development Support" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX default y help - This enables the development support option of NSA SELinux, + This enables the development support option of SELinux, which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing policies. If unsure, say Y. With this option enabled, the kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing) @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP /sys/fs/selinux/enforce. config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS - bool "NSA SELinux AVC Statistics" + bool "SELinux AVC Statistics" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX default y help @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS tools such as avcstat. config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS - int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size" + int "SELinux sidtab hashtable size" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX range 8 13 default 9 @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS will ensure that lookups times are short and stable. config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE - int "NSA SELinux SID to context string translation cache size" + int "SELinux SID to context string translation cache size" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX default 256 help @@ -68,3 +68,12 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE conversion. Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely. If unsure, keep the default value. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG + bool "SELinux kernel debugging support" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default n + help + This enables debugging code designed to help SELinux kernel + developers, unless you know what this does in the kernel code you + should leave this disabled. diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 1074db66e5ff..32eb67fb3e42 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC). * - * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep __ro_after_init; static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep __ro_after_init; static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init; -static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) +static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); } @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcl static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL; - int hvalue; + u32 hvalue; struct hlist_head *head; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) return NULL; } -static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert) +static int avc_latest_notif_update(u32 seqno, int is_insert) { int ret = 0; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock); @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static void avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node) { struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL; - int hvalue; + u32 hvalue; unsigned long flag; spinlock_t *lock; struct hlist_head *head; @@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data; - u32 av = sad->audited; + u32 av = sad->audited, perm; const char *const *perms; - int i, perm; + u32 i; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); @@ -833,7 +833,8 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid, struct extended_perms_decision *xpd, u32 flags) { - int hvalue, rc = 0; + u32 hvalue; + int rc = 0; unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL; struct hlist_head *head; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d06e350fedee..10350534de6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* - * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module + * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * - * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" +#define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1 + struct selinux_state selinux_state; /* SECMARK reference count */ @@ -224,6 +226,31 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) return tsec->sid; } +static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad, + struct lsm_network_audit *net, + int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family) +{ + ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; + ad->u.net = net; + net->netif = ifindex; + net->sk = sk; + net->family = family; +} + +static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad, + struct lsm_network_audit *net, + struct sock *sk) +{ + __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0); +} + +static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad, + struct lsm_network_audit *net, + int ifindex, u16 family) +{ + __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family); +} + /* * get the objective security ID of a task */ @@ -1125,7 +1152,7 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { - int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); + bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: @@ -1689,7 +1716,7 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL -static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); +static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to @@ -1950,7 +1977,7 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) } /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ -static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) +static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file) { u32 av = 0; @@ -2025,7 +2052,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, - struct file *file) + const struct file *file) { u32 sid = cred_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); @@ -2080,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } -static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, +static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), @@ -2745,6 +2772,27 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } +static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, + struct super_block *reference) +{ + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; + struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; + + opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference); + if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) + opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid; + if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) + opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; + if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) + opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid; + fc->security = opts; + return 0; +} + static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { @@ -2847,11 +2895,11 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, - const char **name, - void **value, size_t *len) + struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; + struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; @@ -2878,16 +2926,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (name) - *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; - - if (value && len) { + if (xattr) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; - *value = context; - *len = clen; + xattr->value = context; + xattr->value_len = clen; + xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; } return 0; @@ -2917,7 +2963,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, struct inode_security_struct *context_isec = selinux_inode(context_inode); if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { - pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized"); + pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized\n"); return -EACCES; } @@ -3762,13 +3808,10 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; - if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && - vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { + if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); - } else if (!vma->vm_file && - ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && - vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || + } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); @@ -4499,14 +4542,12 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->sk = sk; + ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk); return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -4899,12 +4940,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->sk = other; + ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other); err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, @@ -4931,11 +4970,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; + ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk); return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); @@ -4971,13 +5008,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; char *addrp; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net->family = family; + ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family); err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4999,15 +5033,13 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - int err; + int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; char *addrp; - u8 secmark_active; - u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; @@ -5028,10 +5060,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net->family = family; + ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family); err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -5167,12 +5196,12 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); } -static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) { if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; *secid = sksec->sid; } @@ -5201,7 +5230,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ @@ -5237,9 +5266,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk; + ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk); err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); @@ -5470,11 +5497,11 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { - const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec; u32 tsid; - __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); - tsid = __tsec->sid; + tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + tsid = tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); @@ -5584,7 +5611,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; int secmark_active, peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) @@ -5600,10 +5627,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_DROP; ifindex = state->in->ifindex; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net->family = family; + ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family); if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; @@ -5683,7 +5707,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; u8 proto = 0; sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); @@ -5691,10 +5715,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex; - ad.u.net->family = state->pf; + ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf); if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; @@ -5719,7 +5740,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, int ifindex; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net; char *addrp; int secmark_active, peerlbl_active; @@ -5816,10 +5837,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, } ifindex = state->out->ifindex; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; - ad.u.net = &net; - ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net->family = family; + ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family); if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; @@ -5972,8 +5990,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { - int err; - int perms; + u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: @@ -5996,8 +6013,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) return 0; } - err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); - return err; + return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) @@ -6102,8 +6118,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { - int perms; - int err; + u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: @@ -6130,8 +6145,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) return 0; } - err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); - return err; + return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); } static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, @@ -6718,7 +6732,7 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. */ -static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) +static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; struct bpf_prog *prog; @@ -6815,6 +6829,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), + .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -6900,7 +6915,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) */ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void) { - int sid = current_sid(); + u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL); @@ -6939,10 +6954,6 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) * hooks ("allocating" hooks). * * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order. - * - * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat - * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs - * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), @@ -7182,6 +7193,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { /* * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE */ + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts), @@ -7241,6 +7253,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) cred_init_security(); default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); + if (!default_noexec) + pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n"); avc_init(); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 9e055f74daf6..8f0aa66ccb13 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index b9668be7b443..88b139e086c4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Access vector cache interface for the security server. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 2953132408bf..8159fd53c3de 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* - * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module + * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects. * - * Author(s): Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author(s): Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index 2a87fc3702b8..49bbe120d173 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = { "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", - "ioctl_skip_cloexec" + "ioctl_skip_cloexec", }; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 3b605f39e040..a9de89af8fdc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Security server interface. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * */ @@ -148,58 +148,45 @@ static inline bool checkreqprot_get(void) static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]); + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]); + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]); + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]); + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]); + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]); + return READ_ONCE( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); + return READ_ONCE( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) { - struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); + return READ_ONCE( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); } struct selinux_policy_convert_data; @@ -319,9 +306,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, u32 *peer_sid); int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, - char ***classes, int *nclasses); + char ***classes, u32 *nclasses); int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, - char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms); + const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms); int security_get_reject_unknown(void); int security_get_allow_unknown(void); @@ -382,8 +369,8 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status { */ } __packed; -extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing); -extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno); +extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing); +extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno); extern void selinux_complete_init(void); extern struct path selinux_null; extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val); diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index adbe9bea2d26..43a0d3594b72 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex) static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns, int ifindex) { - int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex); + u32 idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex); struct sel_netif *netif; list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list) @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns, */ static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif) { - int idx; + u32 idx; if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX) return -ENOSPC; diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 528f5186e912..8f182800e412 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (!netlbl_enabled()) { + *type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE; *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 2ee7b4ed43ef..8ff670cf1ee5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize) { - int i, err = -EINVAL; + unsigned int i; + int err = -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < tabsize/sizeof(struct nlmsg_perm); i++) if (nlmsg_type == tab[i].nlmsg_type) { diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index bad1f6b685fd..6fa640263216 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb) static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct super_block *sb) { struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info; - int i; + unsigned int i; if (fsi) { for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++) @@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { char *page = NULL; ssize_t length; - int old_value, new_value; + int scan_value; + bool old_value, new_value; if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; @@ -152,10 +153,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return PTR_ERR(page); length = -EINVAL; - if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) + if (sscanf(page, "%d", &scan_value) != 1) goto out; - new_value = !!new_value; + new_value = !!scan_value; old_value = enforcing_enabled(); if (new_value != old_value) { @@ -1074,8 +1075,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) u32 sid, *sids = NULL; ssize_t length; char *newcon; - int i, rc; - u32 len, nsids; + int rc; + u32 i, len, nsids; length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER, @@ -1191,13 +1192,13 @@ out: return length; } -static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode) +static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode) { struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb); if (ret) { ret->i_mode = mode; - ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = current_time(ret); + ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(ret); } return ret; } @@ -1612,7 +1613,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) { struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb; struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info; - int i; + unsigned int i; static const struct tree_descr files[] = { { "cache_threshold", &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR }, @@ -1648,7 +1649,7 @@ static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir) { struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb; struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info; - int i; + unsigned int i; static const struct tree_descr files[] = { { "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO }, }; @@ -1699,7 +1700,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = { static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) { - int i; + unsigned int i; for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { struct inode *inode; @@ -1797,7 +1798,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, char *objclass, int classvalue, struct dentry *dir) { - int i, rc, nperms; + u32 i, nperms; + int rc; char **perms; rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms); @@ -1867,8 +1869,8 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, struct dentry *class_dir, unsigned long *last_class_ino) { - - int rc, nclasses, i; + u32 i, nclasses; + int rc; char **classes; rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 6766edc0fe68..86d98a8e291b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the access vector table type. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com> @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init; /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the * public domain. */ -static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask) +static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask) { static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51; static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593; @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask) } static struct avtab_node* -avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue, +avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, u32 hvalue, struct avtab_node *prev, const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum) { @@ -106,11 +106,11 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue, static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum) { - int hvalue; + u32 hvalue; struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode; u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD); - if (!h || !h->nslot) + if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX) return -EINVAL; hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask); @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum) { - int hvalue; + u32 hvalue; struct avtab_node *prev, *cur; u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD); - if (!h || !h->nslot) + if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX) return NULL; hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask); for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; @@ -180,45 +180,13 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum); } -struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key) -{ - int hvalue; - struct avtab_node *cur; - u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD); - - if (!h || !h->nslot) - return NULL; - - hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask); - for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; - cur = cur->next) { - if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type && - key->target_type == cur->key.target_type && - key->target_class == cur->key.target_class && - (specified & cur->key.specified)) - return &cur->datum; - - if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type) - break; - if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type && - key->target_type < cur->key.target_type) - break; - if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type && - key->target_type == cur->key.target_type && - key->target_class < cur->key.target_class) - break; - } - - return NULL; -} - /* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node() */ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key) { - int hvalue; + u32 hvalue; struct avtab_node *cur; u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD); @@ -248,7 +216,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, } struct avtab_node* -avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified) +avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified) { struct avtab_node *cur; @@ -278,7 +246,7 @@ avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified) void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h) { - int i; + u32 i; struct avtab_node *cur, *temp; if (!h) @@ -354,9 +322,10 @@ int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig) return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot); } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag) { - int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len; + u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len; unsigned long long chain2_len_sum; struct avtab_node *cur; @@ -375,7 +344,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag) if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; - chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len; + chain2_len_sum += (unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len; } } @@ -384,6 +353,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag) tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len, chain2_len_sum); } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */ static const uint16_t spec_order[] = { AVTAB_ALLOWED, @@ -404,13 +374,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, { __le16 buf16[4]; u16 enabled; - u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers; + u32 items, items2, val, i; struct avtab_key key; struct avtab_datum datum; struct avtab_extended_perms xperms; __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)]; - int i, rc; - unsigned set; + int rc; + unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers; memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key)); memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum)); @@ -646,7 +616,7 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp) int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp) { - unsigned int i; + u32 i; int rc = 0; struct avtab_node *cur; __le32 buf[1]; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h index d6742fd9c560..3c3904bf02b0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * table is used to represent the type enforcement * tables. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com> @@ -90,9 +90,15 @@ struct avtab { void avtab_init(struct avtab *h); int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32); int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig); -struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *k); void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag); +#else +static inline void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag) +{ +} +#endif struct policydb; int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, @@ -111,7 +117,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key); -struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified); +struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified); #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index b156c181c3c1..81ff676f209a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k, * cond_te_avtab. */ if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) { - if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) { + if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_avtab, k)) { pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k, } } } else { - if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) { + if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) { pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n"); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 4e563be9ef5f..f76eb3128ad5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * process from labeling an object with a different user * identity. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ #define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index aed704b8c642..1f59468c0759 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ * security server and can be changed without affecting * clients of the security server. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_ #define _SS_CONTEXT_H_ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index d31b87be9a1e..77875ad355f7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index e5b57dc3fc53..e3c807cfad90 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within * the total bitmap. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_ #define _SS_EBITMAP_H_ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 3fb8f9026e9b..ac5cdddfbf78 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the hash table type. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, return 0; } - +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) { u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len; @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) info->slots_used = slots_used; info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len; } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig, int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new, @@ -137,7 +138,8 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig, void *args) { struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail; - int i, rc; + u32 i; + int rc; memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new)); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h index 043a773bf0b7..f9713b56d3d0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are * provided by the creator of the table. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_ #define _SS_HASHTAB_H_ @@ -142,7 +142,13 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig, int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args), void *args); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info); +#else +static inline void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) +{ +} +#endif #endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 99571b19d4a9..cd38f5913b63 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context) len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { - int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens; + u32 index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens; len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1)); /* categories */ @@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol, char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr; struct level_datum *levdatum; struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum; - int l, rc, i; + u32 i; + int l, rc; char *rangep[2]; if (!pol->mls_enabled) { @@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct level_datum *levdatum; struct cat_datum *catdatum; struct ebitmap_node *node; - int l, i; + u32 i; + int l; if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled) return 0; @@ -495,7 +497,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, struct range_trans rtr; struct mls_range *r; struct class_datum *cladatum; - int default_range = 0; + char default_range = 0; if (!p->mls_enabled) return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 15cacde0ff61..107681dd1824 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 7d48d5e52233..f492cf148891 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 31b08b34c722..2d528f699a22 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the policy database. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ #include "mls.h" #include "services.h" -#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = { "common prefixes", "classes", @@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = { #endif struct policydb_compat_info { - int version; - int sym_num; - int ocon_num; + unsigned int version; + unsigned int sym_num; + unsigned int ocon_num; }; /* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */ @@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { }, }; -static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) +static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version) { - int i; + unsigned int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) { if (policydb_compat[i].version == version) @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static int role_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) return 0; } -static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i) +static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i) { if (!c) return; @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = { cat_index, }; -#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name) { struct hashtab_info info; @@ -701,7 +701,10 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s) static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name) { } -#endif +static inline void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */ /* * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays @@ -725,10 +728,8 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p) pr_debug("SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n", p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel); -#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules"); symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab); -#endif p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim, sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct), @@ -781,7 +782,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) { struct ocontext *c, *ctmp; struct genfs *g, *gtmp; - int i; + u32 i; struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL; for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) { @@ -1127,8 +1128,8 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) char *key = NULL; struct common_datum *comdatum; __le32 buf[4]; - u32 len, nel; - int i, rc; + u32 i, len, nel; + int rc; comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!comdatum) @@ -1193,13 +1194,13 @@ static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp) static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node **nodep, - int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp) + u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp) { struct constraint_node *c, *lc; struct constraint_expr *e, *le; __le32 buf[3]; - u32 nexpr; - int rc, i, j, depth; + u32 i, j, nexpr; + int rc, depth; lc = NULL; for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) { @@ -1291,8 +1292,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) char *key = NULL; struct class_datum *cladatum; __le32 buf[6]; - u32 len, len2, ncons, nel; - int i, rc; + u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel; + int rc; cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!cladatum) @@ -1385,7 +1386,8 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) { char *key = NULL; struct role_datum *role; - int rc, to_read = 2; + int rc; + unsigned int to_read = 2; __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; @@ -1441,7 +1443,8 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) { char *key = NULL; struct type_datum *typdatum; - int rc, to_read = 3; + int rc; + unsigned int to_read = 3; __le32 buf[4]; u32 len; @@ -1515,7 +1518,8 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) { char *key = NULL; struct user_datum *usrdatum; - int rc, to_read = 2; + int rc; + unsigned int to_read = 2; __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; @@ -1569,7 +1573,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) __le32 buf[2]; u32 len; - levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC); + levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!levdatum) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1580,12 +1584,12 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); - rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len); + rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len); if (rc) goto bad; rc = -ENOMEM; - levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC); + levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_KERNEL); if (!levdatum->level) goto bad; @@ -1610,7 +1614,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; - catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC); + catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!catdatum) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1622,7 +1626,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); - rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len); + rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -1656,11 +1660,11 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) upper = user = datum; while (upper->bounds) { struct ebitmap_node *node; - unsigned long bit; + u32 bit; if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) { pr_err("SELinux: user %s: " - "too deep or looped boundary", + "too deep or looped boundary\n", (char *) key); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1692,7 +1696,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) upper = role = datum; while (upper->bounds) { struct ebitmap_node *node; - unsigned long bit; + u32 bit; if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) { pr_err("SELinux: role %s: " @@ -1739,7 +1743,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) if (upper->attribute) { pr_err("SELinux: type %s: " - "bounded by attribute %s", + "bounded by attribute %s\n", (char *) key, sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1)); return -EINVAL; @@ -1807,9 +1811,9 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { struct range_trans *rt = NULL; struct mls_range *r = NULL; - int i, rc; + int rc; __le32 buf[2]; - u32 nel; + u32 i, nel; if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) return 0; @@ -2005,6 +2009,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (!datum) goto out; + datum->next = NULL; *dst = datum; /* ebitmap_read() will at least init the bitmap */ @@ -2017,7 +2022,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp) goto out; datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - datum->next = NULL; dst = &datum->next; } @@ -2055,9 +2059,9 @@ out: static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { - u32 nel; + u32 nel, i; __le32 buf[1]; - int rc, i; + int rc; if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS) return 0; @@ -2096,8 +2100,8 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { - int i, j, rc; - u32 nel, nel2, len, len2; + int rc; + u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2; __le32 buf[1]; struct ocontext *l, *c; struct ocontext *newc = NULL; @@ -2210,8 +2214,9 @@ out: static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp) { - int i, j, rc; - u32 nel, len; + int rc; + unsigned int i; + u32 j, nel, len; __be64 prefixbuf[1]; __le32 buf[3]; struct ocontext *l, *c; @@ -2402,9 +2407,9 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) struct role_allow *ra, *lra; struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL; struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL; - int i, j, rc; + int rc; __le32 buf[4]; - u32 len, nprim, nel, perm; + u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm; char *policydb_str; const struct policydb_compat_info *info; @@ -3255,7 +3260,8 @@ static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = { static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info, void *fp) { - unsigned int i, j, rc; + unsigned int i, j; + int rc; size_t nel, len; __be64 prefixbuf[1]; __le32 buf[3]; @@ -3604,10 +3610,10 @@ static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) */ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { - unsigned int i, num_syms; + unsigned int num_syms; int rc; __le32 buf[4]; - u32 config; + u32 config, i; size_t len; const struct policydb_compat_info *info; @@ -3648,7 +3654,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers); if (!info) { pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy " - "version %d", p->policyvers); + "version %d\n", p->policyvers); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 74b63ed1173f..b97cda489753 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the * configuration data for the security policy. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ /* @@ -366,9 +366,12 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes) return 0; } -static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp) +static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct policy_file *fp) { - size_t len = bytes * num; + size_t len; + + if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len))) + return -EINVAL; if (len > fp->len) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 78946b71c1c1..1eeffc66ea7d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the security services. * - * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> @@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, struct selinux_map *out_map) { u16 i, j; - unsigned k; bool print_unknown_handle = false; /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */ @@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, while (map[j].name) { const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j; + u16 k; /* An empty class string skips ahead */ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) { @@ -207,22 +207,22 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map, for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i]) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; } avd->allowed = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i]) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; avd->auditallow = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i]) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; } /* * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map, * should audit that denial */ for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++) - result |= 1<<i; + result |= (u32)1<<i; avd->auditdeny = result; } } @@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) struct sidtab *sidtab; struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry; struct type_datum *type; - int index; + u32 index; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized()) @@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, return -ENOMEM; if (!selinux_initialized()) { - int i; + u32 i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i]; @@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb, static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, - u32 specified, + u16 specified, const char *objname, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) @@ -1706,8 +1706,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext; struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry; struct avtab_key avkey; - struct avtab_datum *avdatum; - struct avtab_node *node; + struct avtab_node *avnode, *node; u16 tclass; int rc = 0; bool sock; @@ -1815,22 +1814,22 @@ retry: avkey.target_type = tcontext->type; avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = specified; - avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); + avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */ - if (!avdatum) { + if (!avnode) { node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey); for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) { if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) { - avdatum = &node->datum; + avnode = node; break; } } } - if (avdatum) { + if (avnode) { /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */ - newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data; + newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data; } /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */ @@ -2822,7 +2821,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, { struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab; - int len; u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; struct ocontext *c; @@ -2844,7 +2842,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, return -ENOENT; for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) { - len = strlen(c->u.name); + size_t len = strlen(c->u.name); if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) && (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0)) break; @@ -3332,7 +3330,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct class_datum *datum = d; char *name = k, **classes = args; - int value = datum->value - 1; + u32 value = datum->value - 1; classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!classes[value]) @@ -3342,7 +3340,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) } int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, - char ***classes, int *nclasses) + char ***classes, u32 *nclasses) { struct policydb *policydb; int rc; @@ -3358,7 +3356,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes); if (rc) { - int i; + u32 i; + for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++) kfree((*classes)[i]); kfree(*classes); @@ -3372,7 +3371,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct perm_datum *datum = d; char *name = k, **perms = args; - int value = datum->value - 1; + u32 value = datum->value - 1; perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!perms[value]) @@ -3382,10 +3381,11 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) } int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, - char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) + const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms) { struct policydb *policydb; - int rc, i; + u32 i; + int rc; struct class_datum *match; policydb = &policy->policydb; @@ -3600,7 +3600,7 @@ err: /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) { - int i; + u32 i; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index 8a9b85f44b66..d24b0a3d198e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the security services. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_ #define _SS_SERVICES_H_ @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ /* Mapping for a single class */ struct selinux_mapping { u16 value; /* policy value for class */ - unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */ + u16 num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */ u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */ }; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 38d25173aebd..d8ead463b8df 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the SID table type. * - * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com> * * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index 72810a080e77..22258201cd14 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. * - * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com> * * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c index c42a6648a07d..43d7f0319ccd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * Implementation of the symbol table type. * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/string.h> @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = { .cmp = symcmp, }; -int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size) +int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size) { s->nprim = 0; return hashtab_init(&s->table, size); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h index f2614138d0cd..0a3b5de79a0f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * is arbitrary. The symbol table type is implemented * using the hash table type (hashtab). * - * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> + * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> */ #ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_ #define _SS_SYMTAB_H_ @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct symtab { u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */ }; -int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size); +int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size); int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum); void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name); diff --git a/security/selinux/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c index 19ef929a075c..dffca22ce6f7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/status.c +++ b/security/selinux/status.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void) * * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode. */ -void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) +void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing) { struct selinux_kernel_status *status; @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) status->sequence++; smp_wmb(); - status->enforcing = enforcing; + status->enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; smp_wmb(); status->sequence++; @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current * setting of deny_unknown. */ -void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno) +void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno) { struct selinux_kernel_status *status; diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 1fca42c4d0ae..95fcd2d3433e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* - * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module + * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations. * diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index aa15ff56ed6e..041688e5a77a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ struct task_smack { #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ #define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */ -#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */ +#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted (unused) */ #define SMK_INODE_IMPURE 0x08 /* involved in an impure transaction */ /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6e270cf3fd30..65130a791f57 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -52,6 +52,15 @@ #define SMK_RECEIVING 1 #define SMK_SENDING 2 +/* + * Smack uses multiple xattrs. + * SMACK64 - for access control, + * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization, + * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT, + * Must be set explicitly - SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP + */ +#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 2 + #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock); static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); @@ -615,6 +624,56 @@ out_opt_err: } /** + * smack_fs_context_submount - Initialise security data for a filesystem context + * @fc: The filesystem context. + * @reference: reference superblock + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, + struct super_block *reference) +{ + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx; + struct inode_smack *isp; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + fc->security = ctx; + + sbsp = smack_superblock(reference); + isp = smack_inode(reference->s_root->d_inode); + + if (sbsp->smk_default) { + ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fsdefault) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (sbsp->smk_floor) { + ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fsfloor) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (sbsp->smk_hat) { + ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fshat) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) { + if (sbsp->smk_root) { + ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->fstransmute) + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication * @fc: The new filesystem context. * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated. @@ -923,27 +982,23 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) * @inode: the newly created inode * @dir: containing directory object * @qstr: unused - * @name: where to put the attribute name - * @value: where to put the attribute value - * @len: where to put the length of the attribute + * @xattrs: where to put the attributes + * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated) * * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory */ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, - void **value, size_t *len) + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count) { struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred()); - struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode); struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp); struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); + struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); int may; - if (name) - *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX; - - if (value && len) { + if (xattr) { /* * If equal, transmuting already occurred in * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again. @@ -964,6 +1019,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) || (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) { + struct xattr *xattr_transmute; + /* * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as() * should have overridden the current cred, so the @@ -972,14 +1029,26 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, */ if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) isp = dsp; - issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED; + xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, + xattr_count); + if (xattr_transmute) { + xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE, + GFP_NOFS); + if (!xattr_transmute->value) + return -ENOMEM; + + xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE; + xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE; + } } - *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS); - if (*value == NULL) + xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS); + if (!xattr->value) return -ENOMEM; - *len = strlen(isp->smk_known); + xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known); + xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX; } return 0; @@ -3518,20 +3587,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * If there is a transmute attribute on the * directory mark the inode. */ - if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) { - isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED; - rc = __vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, dp, inode, - XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, - TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE, - 0); - } else { - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode, - XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr, - TRANS_TRUE_SIZE); - if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE, - TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) - rc = -EINVAL; - } + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE); + if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE, + TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) + rc = -EINVAL; if (rc >= 0) transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; } @@ -4869,6 +4930,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), + .lbs_xattr_count = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, }; static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { @@ -4876,6 +4938,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, smack_fs_context_submount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param), diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 5590eaad241b..e22aad7604e8 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label; * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based) * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT labels must match, but can be overriden with * CAP_SYS_PTRACE - * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN lables must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect + * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN labels must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect */ int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT; @@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen); - if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM) + if (ret != 1 || catlen < 0 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM) goto out; if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT && diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index 969d4aa6fd55..57ee70ae50f2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root; * * Returns nothing. */ +__printf(3, 4) static void tomoyo_addprintf(char *buffer, int len, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index a539b2cbb5c4..0e8e2e959aef 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find); char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str); char *tomoyo_encode2(const char *str, int str_len); char *tomoyo_init_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt, - va_list args); + va_list args) __printf(3, 0); char *tomoyo_read_token(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param); char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(const struct path *path); char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname); @@ -1037,8 +1037,6 @@ struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *tomoyo_assign_namespace (const char *domainname); struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile(const struct tomoyo_policy_namespace *ns, const u8 profile); -unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const u8 index); u8 tomoyo_parse_ulong(unsigned long *result, char **str); void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size); void __init tomoyo_load_builtin_policy(void); @@ -1067,7 +1065,7 @@ void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function); void tomoyo_write_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...) __printf(2, 3); void tomoyo_write_log2(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, int len, const char *fmt, - va_list args); + va_list args) __printf(3, 0); /********** External variable definitions. **********/ diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index ac20c0bdff9d..90b53500a236 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -784,13 +784,12 @@ retry: if (!strcmp(domainname, "parent")) { char *cp; - strncpy(ee->tmp, old_domain->domainname->name, - TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1); + strscpy(ee->tmp, old_domain->domainname->name, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE); cp = strrchr(ee->tmp, ' '); if (cp) *cp = '\0'; } else if (*domainname == '<') - strncpy(ee->tmp, domainname, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1); + strscpy(ee->tmp, domainname, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE); else snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "%s %s", old_domain->domainname->name, domainname); |