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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c4
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c14
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c85
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c37
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c4
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c18
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/util.c29
19 files changed, 135 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 7b0e13ce7dc7..f919ebd042fd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
stack = NULL;
break;
}
- /* fall through - to X_NAME */
+ fallthrough; /* to X_NAME */
case AA_X_NAME:
if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
/* released by caller */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 30c246a9d440..fa49b81eb54c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -292,13 +292,13 @@ void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms)
switch (AUDIT_MODE(profile)) {
case AUDIT_ALL:
perms->audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case AUDIT_NOQUIET:
perms->quiet = 0;
break;
case AUDIT_QUIET:
perms->audit = 0;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED:
perms->quiet = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
break;
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 43ab0ad45c1b..04375df52fc9 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -354,7 +354,8 @@ static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
{
struct dev_exception_item *ex;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list,
+ lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex)) {
if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR))
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index cfa4127d0518..b86a4a8f61ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -99,14 +99,22 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks));
pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo];
- if (hdr->hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_256 ||
- hdr->hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_512) {
+ switch (hdr->hash_algo) {
+ case HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_256:
+ case HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_512:
/* EC-RDSA and Streebog should go together. */
pks.pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
pks.encoding = "raw";
- } else {
+ break;
+ case HASH_ALGO_SM3_256:
+ /* SM2 and SM3 should go together. */
+ pks.pkey_algo = "sm2";
+ pks.encoding = "raw";
+ break;
+ default:
pks.pkey_algo = "rsa";
pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
+ break;
}
pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
pks.digest_size = datalen;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 372d16382960..b8848f53c8cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
hash_start = 1;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
/* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */
if (try_modsig)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */
cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 07f033634b27..b4de33074b37 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1279,12 +1279,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case Opt_uid_gt:
case Opt_euid_gt:
entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case Opt_uid_lt:
case Opt_euid_lt:
if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case Opt_uid_eq:
case Opt_euid_eq:
uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
@@ -1313,11 +1313,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_fowner_gt:
entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case Opt_fowner_lt:
if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case Opt_fowner_eq:
ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
entry->fowner_op);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 41a5f435b793..c022ee9e2a4e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
/* skip ':' and '\0' */
buf_ptr += 2;
buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
case DATA_FMT_HEX:
if (!buflen)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 253fb9a7fc98..ee4b4c666854 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -66,6 +66,65 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
}
/*
+ * load_moklist_certs() - Load MokList certs
+ *
+ * Load the certs contained in the UEFI MokListRT database into the
+ * platform trusted keyring.
+ *
+ * This routine checks the EFI MOK config table first. If and only if
+ * that fails, this routine uses the MokListRT ordinary UEFI variable.
+ *
+ * Return: Status
+ */
+static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
+{
+ struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry;
+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ void *mok;
+ unsigned long moksize;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* First try to load certs from the EFI MOKvar config table.
+ * It's not an error if the MOKvar config table doesn't exist
+ * or the MokListRT entry is not found in it.
+ */
+ mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListRT");
+ if (mokvar_entry) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
+ mokvar_entry->data,
+ mokvar_entry->data_size,
+ get_handler_for_db);
+ /* All done if that worked. */
+ if (!rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures from EFI MOKvar config table: %d\n",
+ rc);
+ }
+
+ /* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error
+ * if we can't get it.
+ */
+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
+ if (mok) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
+ mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+ kfree(mok);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_uefi_certs() - Load certs from UEFI sources
+ *
* Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted
* keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
* keyring.
@@ -73,17 +132,16 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
{
efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
- efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
- void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
- unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
return false;
- /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
- * an error if we can't get them.
+ /* Get db and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't an error
+ * if we can't get them.
*/
if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
@@ -102,20 +160,6 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
}
}
- mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
- if (!mok) {
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
- pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
- else
- pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
- } else {
- rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
- mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
- if (rc)
- pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
- kfree(mok);
- }
-
dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
if (!dbx) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
@@ -131,6 +175,9 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(dbx);
}
+ /* Load the MokListRT certs */
+ rc = load_moklist_certs();
+
return rc;
}
late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 6ee9d8f6a4a5..1545efdca562 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -12,39 +12,6 @@
#include "internal.h"
/*
- * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and
- * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
- *
- * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
- * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
- *
- * If successful, 0 will be returned.
- */
-static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
- key_serial_t id,
- const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
- unsigned ioc,
- key_serial_t ringid)
-{
- struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
- struct iov_iter from;
- long ret;
-
- if (!_payload_iov)
- ioc = 0;
-
- ret = compat_import_iovec(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
- ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov,
- &from);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
-
- ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
- kfree(iov);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
*/
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
@@ -114,8 +81,8 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
- return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
- arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4,
+ arg5);
case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 338a526cbfa5..9b9cf3b6fcbb 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -262,11 +262,6 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
const struct iovec __user *,
unsigned, key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t);
-
-struct iov_iter;
-extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
- struct iov_iter *,
- key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id,
const char __user *_type,
const char __user *_restriction);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 9febd37a168f..e26bbccda7cc 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
*
* If successful, 0 will be returned.
*/
-long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
struct iov_iter *from,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 7e0232db1707..1fe8b934f656 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ key_ref_t search_cred_keyrings_rcu(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index e1b9f1a80676..2da4404276f0 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -295,26 +295,26 @@ static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
}
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->thread_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = key_get(cred->session_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
ret = look_up_user_keyrings(NULL, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ca901025802a..a340986aa92e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3606,26 +3606,20 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
switch (cmd) {
case FIONREAD:
- /* fall through */
case FIBMAP:
- /* fall through */
case FIGETBSZ:
- /* fall through */
case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
- /* fall through */
case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
break;
case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
- /* fall through */
case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
break;
/* sys_ioctl() checks */
case FIONBIO:
- /* fall through */
case FIOASYNC:
error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
break;
@@ -3783,7 +3777,7 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
break;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case F_SETOWN:
case F_SETSIG:
case F_GETFL:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 408d306895f8..d338962fb0c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
scontext, tcontext);
}
- /* Fallthrough */
+ fallthrough;
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if ((tclass == p->process_class) || sock)
/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
@@ -546,8 +546,6 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
-
- /* fall through */
}
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index db2d455b80a8..5c90b9fa4d40 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3380,7 +3380,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
* to set mount options simulate setting the
* superblock default.
*/
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
/*
* This isn't an understood special case.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index c16b8c1b03e7..4bee32bfe16d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_print_condition(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
tomoyo_set_space(head);
tomoyo_set_string(head, cond->transit->name);
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 1:
{
const u16 condc = cond->condc;
@@ -1345,12 +1345,12 @@ static bool tomoyo_print_condition(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
}
}
head->r.cond_step++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 2:
if (!tomoyo_flush(head))
break;
head->r.cond_step++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 3:
if (cond->grant_log != TOMOYO_GRANTLOG_AUTO)
tomoyo_io_printf(head, " grant_log=%s",
@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ static void tomoyo_read_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_dif[i]);
head->r.index = 0;
head->r.step++;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 1:
while (head->r.index < TOMOYO_MAX_ACL_GROUPS) {
i = head->r.index++;
@@ -1652,14 +1652,14 @@ static void tomoyo_read_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
head->r.index = 0;
head->r.step++;
tomoyo_set_lf(head);
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 2:
if (!tomoyo_read_domain2(head, &domain->acl_info_list))
return;
head->r.step++;
if (!tomoyo_set_lf(head))
return;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case 3:
head->r.step = 0;
if (head->r.print_this_domain_only)
@@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@ int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
/* Check max_learning_entry parameter. */
if (tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(r))
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
return 0;
}
@@ -2710,13 +2710,13 @@ ssize_t tomoyo_write_control(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
if (tomoyo_select_domain(head, cp0))
continue;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
if (!strcmp(cp0, "select transition_only")) {
head->r.print_transition_related_only = true;
continue;
}
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
default:
if (!tomoyo_manager()) {
error = -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 86f7d1b90212..051f7297877c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path1,
case TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK:
if (!d_is_dir(path1->dentry))
break;
- /* fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT:
tomoyo_add_slash(&buf1);
tomoyo_add_slash(&buf2);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index eba0b3395851..a40abb0b91ee 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ char *tomoyo_read_token(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
return pos;
}
+static bool tomoyo_correct_path2(const char *filename, const size_t len);
+
/**
* tomoyo_get_domainname - Read a domainname from a line.
*
@@ -157,10 +159,10 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_domainname
char *pos = start;
while (*pos) {
- if (*pos++ != ' ' || *pos++ == '/')
+ if (*pos++ != ' ' ||
+ tomoyo_correct_path2(pos, strchrnul(pos, ' ') - pos))
continue;
- pos -= 2;
- *pos++ = '\0';
+ *(pos - 1) = '\0';
break;
}
param->data = pos;
@@ -514,6 +516,22 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string)
}
/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_path2 - Check whether the given pathname follows the naming rules.
+ *
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ * @len: Length of @filename.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_correct_path2(const char *filename, const size_t len)
+{
+ const char *cp1 = memchr(filename, '/', len);
+ const char *cp2 = memchr(filename, '.', len);
+
+ return cp1 && (!cp2 || (cp1 < cp2)) && tomoyo_correct_word2(filename, len);
+}
+
+/**
* tomoyo_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
*
* @filename: The pathname to check.
@@ -523,7 +541,7 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string)
*/
bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename)
{
- return *filename == '/' && tomoyo_correct_word(filename);
+ return tomoyo_correct_path2(filename, strlen(filename));
}
/**
@@ -545,8 +563,7 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname)
if (!cp)
break;
- if (*domainname != '/' ||
- !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname))
+ if (!tomoyo_correct_path2(domainname, cp - domainname))
return false;
domainname = cp + 1;
}
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-06-03 15:25:32 +0000