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Latest commit 853697504de0 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
apparently allowed syzbot to trigger various crashes in TCP stack [1]
I believe this commit only made things easier for syzbot to find
its way into triggering use-after-frees. But really the bugs
could lead to bad TCP behavior or even plain crashes even for
non malicious peers.
I have audited all calls to tcp_rtx_queue_unlink() and
tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free() and made sure tp->highest_sack would be updated
if we are removing from rtx queue the skb that tp->highest_sack points to.
These updates were missing in three locations :
1) tcp_clean_rtx_queue() [This one seems quite serious,
I have no idea why this was not caught earlier]
2) tcp_rtx_queue_purge() [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
3) tcp_send_synack() [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880a488d068 by task ksoftirqd/1/16
CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:134
tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
tcp_try_undo_partial net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2730 [inline]
tcp_fastretrans_alert+0xf74/0x23f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2847
tcp_ack+0x2577/0x5bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3710
tcp_rcv_established+0x6dd/0x1e90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5706
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x619/0x8d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1619
tcp_v4_rcv+0x307f/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2001
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x5a/0x880 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x1db/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:428
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:538
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x113/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5148
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5262
process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6093
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6530 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6598
__do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Allocated by task 10091:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x138/0x740 mm/slab.c:3575
__alloc_skb+0xd5/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:198
alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:1099 [inline]
sk_stream_alloc_skb net/ipv4/tcp.c:875 [inline]
sk_stream_alloc_skb+0x113/0xc90 net/ipv4/tcp.c:852
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xcf9/0x3470 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1282
tcp_sendmsg+0x30/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1432
inet_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
__sys_sendto+0x262/0x380 net/socket.c:1998
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2010 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2006 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2006
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 10095:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694
kfree_skbmem+0x178/0x1c0 net/core/skbuff.c:645
__kfree_skb+0x1e/0x30 net/core/skbuff.c:681
sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2453 [inline]
tcp_recvmsg+0x1252/0x2930 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2166
inet_recvmsg+0x136/0x610 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:886 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:904 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xce/0x110 net/socket.c:900
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ff/0x350 net/socket.c:2055
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2069 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2069
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a488d040
which belongs to the cache skbuff_fclone_cache of size 456
The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of
456-byte region [ffff8880a488d040, ffff8880a488d208)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002922340 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b057000 index:0x0
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00022a5788 ffffea0002624a48 ffff88821b057000
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880a488d040 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880a488cf00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8880a488cf80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8880a488d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880a488d080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880a488d100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 853697504de0 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
Fixes: 50895b9de1d3 ("tcp: highest_sack fix")
Fixes: 737ff314563c ("tcp: use sequence distance to detect reordering")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is a spelling mistake in a printk message. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is a spelling mistake in a pr_warn message. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is a spelling mistake in a IP_VS_ERR_RL message. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is a spelling mistake in a hw_dbg message. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot reported an out-of-bound access in em_nbyte. As initially
analyzed by Eric, this is because em_nbyte sets its own em->datalen
in em_nbyte_change() other than the one specified by user, but this
value gets overwritten later by its caller tcf_em_validate().
We should leave em->datalen untouched to respect their choices.
I audit all the in-tree ematch users, all of those implement
->change() set em->datalen, so we can just avoid setting it twice
in this case.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5af9a90dad568aa9f611@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2f07903a5b05e7f36410@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Finn Thain says:
====================
Fixes for SONIC ethernet driver
Various SONIC driver problems have become apparent over the years,
including tx watchdog timeouts, lost packets and duplicated packets.
The problems are mostly caused by bugs in buffer handling, locking and
(re-)initialization code.
This patch series resolves these problems.
This series has been tested on National Semiconductor hardware (macsonic),
qemu-system-m68k (macsonic) and qemu-system-mips64el (jazzsonic).
The emulated dp8393x device used in QEMU also has bugs.
I have fixed the bugs that I know of in a series of patches at,
https://github.com/fthain/qemu/commits/sonic
Changed since v1:
- Minor revisions as described in commit logs.
- Deferred net-next patches.
Changed since v2:
- Minor revisions as described in commit logs.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Section 5.5.3.2 of the datasheet says,
If FIFO Underrun, Byte Count Mismatch, Excessive Collision, or
Excessive Deferral (if enabled) errors occur, transmission ceases.
In this situation, the chip asserts a TXER interrupt rather than TXDN.
But the handler for the TXDN is the only way that the transmit queue
gets restarted. Hence, an aborted transmission can result in a watchdog
timeout.
This problem can be reproduced on congested link, as that can result in
excessive transmitter collisions. Another way to reproduce this is with
a FIFO Underrun, which may be caused by DMA latency.
In event of a TXER interrupt, prevent a watchdog timeout by restarting
transmission.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Section 4.3.1 of the datasheet says,
This bit [TXP] must not be set if a Load CAM operation is in
progress (LCAM is set). The SONIC will lock up if both bits are
set simultaneously.
Testing has shown that the driver sometimes attempts to set LCAM
while TXP is set. Avoid this by waiting for command completion
before and after giving the LCAM command.
After issuing the Load CAM command, poll for !SONIC_CR_LCAM rather than
SONIC_INT_LCD, because the SONIC_CR_TXP bit can't be used until
!SONIC_CR_LCAM.
When in reset mode, take the opportunity to reset the CAM Enable
register.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There are several issues relating to command register usage during
chip initialization.
Firstly, the SONIC sometimes comes out of software reset with the
Start Timer bit set. This gets logged as,
macsonic macsonic eth0: sonic_init: status=24, i=101
Avoid this by giving the Stop Timer command earlier than later.
Secondly, the loop that waits for the Read RRA command to complete has
the break condition inverted. That's why the for loop iterates until
its termination condition. Call the helper for this instead.
Finally, give the Receiver Enable command after clearing interrupts,
not before, to avoid the possibility of losing an interrupt.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make sure the SONIC's DMA engine is idle before altering the transmit
and receive descriptors. Add a helper for this as it will be needed
again.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As soon as the driver is finished with a receive buffer it allocs a new
one and overwrites the corresponding RRA entry with a new buffer pointer.
Problem is, the buffer pointer is split across two word-sized registers.
It can't be updated in one atomic store. So this operation races with the
chip while it stores received packets and advances its RRP register.
This could result in memory corruption by a DMA write.
Avoid this problem by adding buffers only at the location given by the
RWP register, in accordance with the National Semiconductor datasheet.
Re-factor this code into separate functions to calculate a RRA pointer
and to update the RWP.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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After sonic_tx_timeout() calls sonic_init(), it can happen that
sonic_rx() will subsequently encounter a receive descriptor with no
flags set. Remove the comment that says that this can't happen.
When giving a receive descriptor to the SONIC, clear the descriptor
status field. That way, any rx descriptor with flags set can only be
a newly received packet.
Don't process a descriptor without the LPKT bit set. The buffer is
still in use by the SONIC.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The while loop in sonic_rx() traverses the rx descriptor ring. It stops
when it reaches a descriptor that the SONIC has not used. Each iteration
advances the EOL flag so the SONIC can keep using more descriptors.
Therefore, the while loop has no definite termination condition.
The algorithm described in the National Semiconductor literature is quite
different. It consumes descriptors up to the one with its EOL flag set
(which will also have its "in use" flag set). All freed descriptors are
then returned to the ring at once, by adjusting the EOL flags (and link
pointers).
Adopt the algorithm from datasheet as it's simpler, terminates quickly
and avoids a lot of pointless descriptor EOL flag changes.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The SONIC can sometimes advance its rx buffer pointer (RRP register)
without advancing its rx descriptor pointer (CRDA register). As a result
the index of the current rx descriptor may not equal that of the current
rx buffer. The driver mistakenly assumes that they are always equal.
This assumption leads to incorrect packet lengths and possible packet
duplication. Avoid this by calling a new function to locate the buffer
corresponding to a given descriptor.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The tx_aborted_errors statistic should count packets flagged with EXD,
EXC, FU, or BCM bits because those bits denote an aborted transmission.
That corresponds to the bitmask 0x0446, not 0x0642. Use macros for these
constants to avoid mistakes. Better to leave out FIFO Underruns (FU) as
there's a separate counter for that purpose.
Don't lump all these errors in with the general tx_errors counter as
that's used for tx timeout events.
On the rx side, don't count RDE and RBAE interrupts as dropped packets.
These interrupts don't indicate a lost packet, just a lack of resources.
When a lack of resources results in a lost packet, this gets reported
in the rx_missed_errors counter (along with RFO events).
Don't double-count rx_frame_errors and rx_crc_errors.
Don't use the general rx_errors counter for events that already have
special counters.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The driver accesses descriptor memory which is simultaneously accessed by
the chip, so the compiler must not be allowed to re-order CPU accesses.
sonic_buf_get() used 'volatile' to prevent that. sonic_buf_put() should
have done so too but was overlooked.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The chip can change a packet's descriptor status flags at any time.
However, an active interrupt flag gets cleared rather late. This
allows a race condition that could theoretically lose an interrupt.
Fix this by clearing asserted interrupt flags immediately.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The netif_stop_queue() call in sonic_send_packet() races with the
netif_wake_queue() call in sonic_interrupt(). This causes issues
like "NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (macsonic): transmit queue 0 timed out".
Fix this by disabling interrupts when accessing tx_skb[] and next_tx.
Update a comment to clarify the synchronization properties.
Fixes: efcce839360f ("[PATCH] macsonic/jazzsonic network drivers update")
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As the only 10G PHY interface type defined at the moment the code
was developed was XGMII, although the PHY interface mode used was
not XGMII, XGMII was used in the code to denote 10G. This patch
renames the 10G interface mode to remove the ambiguity.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Madalin Bucur says:
====================
net: fsl/fman: address erratum A011043
This addresses a HW erratum on some QorIQ DPAA devices.
MDIO reads to internal PCS registers may result in having
the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit set, even when there is no
error and read data (MDIO_DATA[MDIO_DATA]) is correct.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
When the issue was present, one could see such errors
during boot:
mdio_bus ffe4e5000: Error while reading PHY0 reg at 3.3
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When fsl,erratum-a011043 is set, adjust for erratum A011043:
MDIO reads to internal PCS registers may result in having
the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit set, even when there is no
error and read data (MDIO_DATA[MDIO_DATA]) is correct.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add fsl,erratum-a011043 to internal MDIO buses.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add an entry for erratum A011043: the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER]
bit may be falsely set when reading internal PCS registers.
MDIO reads to internal PCS registers may result in having
the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit set, even when there is no
error and read data (MDIO_DATA[MDIO_DATA]) is correct.
Software may get false read error when reading internal
PCS registers through MDIO. As a workaround, all internal
MDIO accesses should ignore the MDIO_CFG[MDIO_RD_ER] bit.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Driver while collecting firmware dump takes longer time to
collect/process some of the firmware dump entries/memories.
Bigger capture masks makes it worse as it results in larger
amount of data being collected and results in CPU soft lockup.
Place cond_resched() in some of the driver flows that are
expectedly time consuming to relinquish the CPU to avoid CPU
soft lockup panic.
Signed-off-by: Shahed Shaikh <shshaikh@marvell.com>
Tested-by: Yonggen Xu <Yonggen.Xu@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When submitting v2 of "fou: Support binding FoU socket" (1713cb37bf67),
I accidentally sent the wrong version of the patch and one fix was
missing. In the initial version of the patch, as well as the version 2
that I submitted, I incorrectly used ".type" for the two V6-attributes.
The correct is to use ".len".
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 1713cb37bf67 ("fou: Support binding FoU socket")
Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers
Kalle Valo says:
====================
wireless-drivers fixes for v5.5
Second set of fixes for v5.5. There are quite a few patches,
especially on iwlwifi, due to me being on a long break. Libertas also
has a security fix and mt76 a build fix.
iwlwifi
* don't send the PPAG command when PPAG is disabled, since it can cause problems
* a few fixes for a HW bug
* a fix for RS offload;
* a fix for 3168 devices where the NVM tables where the wrong tables were being read
* fix a couple of potential memory leaks in TXQ code
* disable L0S states in all hardware since our hardware doesn't
officially support them anymore (and older versions of the hardware
had instability in these states)
* remove lar_disable parameter since it has been causing issues for
some people who erroneously disable it
* force the debug monitor HW to stop also when debug is disabled,
since it sometimes stays on and prevents low system power states
* don't send IWL_MVM_RXQ_NSSN_SYNC notification due to DMA problems
libertas
* fix two buffer overflows
mt76
* build fix related to CONFIG_MT76_LEDS
* fix off by one in bitrates handling
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
If both IFF_NAPI_FRAGS mode and XDP are enabled, and the XDP program
consumes the skb, we need to clear the napi.skb (or risk
a use-after-free) and release the mutex (or risk a deadlock)
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.5.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.0/455 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/455:
#0: ffff888098f6e748 (&tfile->napi_mutex){+.+.}, at: tun_get_user+0x1604/0x3fc0 drivers/net/tun.c:1835
Fixes: 90e33d459407 ("tun: enable napi_gro_frags() for TUN/TAP driver")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
During reload (or module unload), the router block is de-initialized.
Among other things, this results in the removal of a default multicast
route from each active virtual router (VRF). These default routes are
configured during initialization to trap packets to the CPU. In
Spectrum-2, unlike Spectrum-1, multicast routes are implemented using
ACL rules.
Since the router block is de-initialized before the ACL block, it is
possible that the ACL rules corresponding to the default routes are
deleted while being accessed by the ACL delayed work that queries rules'
activity from the device. This can result in a rare use-after-free [1].
Fix this by protecting the rules list accessed by the delayed work with
a lock. We cannot use a spinlock as the activity read operation is
blocking.
[1]
[ 123.331662] ==================================================================
[ 123.339920] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x330/0x3b0
[ 123.349381] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881f3bb4520 by task kworker/0:2/78
[ 123.357080]
[ 123.358773] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-custom-33108-gf5df95d3ef41 #2209
[ 123.368898] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700C/VMOD0008, BIOS 5.11 10/10/2018
[ 123.378456] Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work
[ 123.385970] Call Trace:
[ 123.388734] dump_stack+0xc6/0x11e
[ 123.392568] print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x340
[ 123.403236] __kasan_report.cold.8+0x76/0xb1
[ 123.414884] kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 123.418716] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_activity_update_work+0x330/0x3b0
[ 123.444034] process_one_work+0xb06/0x19a0
[ 123.453731] worker_thread+0x91/0xe90
[ 123.467348] kthread+0x348/0x410
[ 123.476847] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 123.480863]
[ 123.482545] Allocated by task 73:
[ 123.486273] save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 123.490000] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xc1/0xd0
[ 123.495379] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_create+0xa7/0x230
[ 123.500566] mlxsw_sp2_mr_tcam_route_create+0xf6/0x3e0
[ 123.506334] mlxsw_sp_mr_tcam_route_create+0x5b4/0x820
[ 123.512102] mlxsw_sp_mr_table_create+0x3b5/0x690
[ 123.517389] mlxsw_sp_vr_get+0x289/0x4d0
[ 123.521797] mlxsw_sp_fib_node_get+0xa2/0x990
[ 123.526692] mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event_work+0x54c/0x2d60
[ 123.532752] process_one_work+0xb06/0x19a0
[ 123.537352] worker_thread+0x91/0xe90
[ 123.541471] kthread+0x348/0x410
[ 123.545103] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[ 123.549113]
[ 123.550795] Freed by task 518:
[ 123.554231] save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 123.557958] __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
[ 123.562556] kfree+0xd7/0x3a0
[ 123.565895] mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_destroy+0x63/0xd0
[ 123.571081] mlxsw_sp2_mr_tcam_route_destroy+0xd5/0x130
[ 123.576946] mlxsw_sp_mr_tcam_route_destroy+0xba/0x260
[ 123.582714] mlxsw_sp_mr_table_destroy+0x1ab/0x290
[ 123.588091] mlxsw_sp_vr_put+0x1db/0x350
[ 123.592496] mlxsw_sp_fib_node_put+0x298/0x4c0
[ 123.597486] mlxsw_sp_vr_fib_flush+0x15b/0x360
[ 123.602476] mlxsw_sp_router_fib_flush+0xba/0x470
[ 123.607756] mlxsw_sp_vrs_fini+0xaa/0x120
[ 123.612260] mlxsw_sp_router_fini+0x137/0x384
[ 123.617152] mlxsw_sp_fini+0x30a/0x4a0
[ 123.621374] mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister+0x159/0x600
[ 123.627435] mlxsw_devlink_core_bus_device_reload_down+0x7e/0xb0
[ 123.634176] devlink_reload+0xb4/0x380
[ 123.638391] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x610/0x700
[ 123.643382] genl_rcv_msg+0x6a8/0xdc0
[ 123.647497] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3a0
[ 123.651904] genl_rcv+0x29/0x40
[ 123.655436] netlink_unicast+0x4d4/0x700
[ 123.659843] netlink_sendmsg+0x7c0/0xc70
[ 123.664251] __sys_sendto+0x265/0x3c0
[ 123.668367] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe2/0x1b0
[ 123.672773] do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x530
[ 123.676892] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 123.682552]
[ 123.684238] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881f3bb4500
[ 123.684238] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
[ 123.698261] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[ 123.698261] 128-byte region [ffff8881f3bb4500, ffff8881f3bb4580)
[ 123.711303] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 123.716682] page:ffffea0007ceed00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888236403500 index:0x0
[ 123.725958] raw: 0200000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888236403500
[ 123.734646] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 123.743315] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 123.749562]
[ 123.751241] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 123.756620] ffff8881f3bb4400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 123.764716] ffff8881f3bb4480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 123.772812] >ffff8881f3bb4500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 123.780904] ^
[ 123.785697] ffff8881f3bb4580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 123.793793] ffff8881f3bb4600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 123.801883] ==================================================================
Fixes: cf7221a4f5a5 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add Multicast routing support for Spectrum-2")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Hayes Wang says:
====================
r8152: serial fixes
v3:
1. Fix the typos for patch #5 and #6.
2. Modify the commit message of patch #9.
v2:
For patch #2, move declaring the variable "ocp_data".
v1:
These patches are used to fix some issues for RTL8153.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When enabling this, the device would wait an internal signal which
wouldn't be triggered. Then, the device couldn't enter P3 mode, so
the power consumption is increased.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Avoid the MCU to clear the lanwake after suspending. It may cause the
WOL fail. Disable LANWAKE_CLR_EN before suspending. Besides,enable it
and reset the lanwake status when resuming or initializing.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
For certain platforms, it causes USB reset periodically.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
For RTL8153B with QFN32, disable test IO. Otherwise, it may cause
abnormal behavior for the device randomly.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
PLA MCU clock speed down could only be enabled when tx/rx are disabled.
Otherwise, the packet loss may occur.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Enable U2P3 may miss zero packet for bulk-in.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Initailization would reset runtime suspend by tp->saved_wolopts, so
the tp->saved_wolopts should be set before initializing.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When linking ON, the patch of flow control has to be reset. This
makes sure the patch works normally.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fix the runtime resume doesn't work normally for linking change.
1. Reset the settings and status of runtime suspend.
2. Sync the linking status.
3. Poll the linking change.
Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
A malicious user could use RAW sockets and fool
GTP using them as standard SOCK_DGRAM UDP sockets.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in udp_tunnel_encap_enable include/net/udp_tunnel.h:174 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x45e/0x6f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:85
CPU: 0 PID: 11262 Comm: syz-executor613 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
udp_tunnel_encap_enable include/net/udp_tunnel.h:174 [inline]
setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x45e/0x6f0 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:85
gtp_encap_enable_socket+0x37f/0x5a0 drivers/net/gtp.c:827
gtp_encap_enable drivers/net/gtp.c:844 [inline]
gtp_newlink+0xfb/0x1e50 drivers/net/gtp.c:666
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3305 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x2973/0x3920 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1153/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5424
netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x441359
Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fff1cd0ac28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441359
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006cb018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004020d0
R13: 0000000000402160 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags+0x3c/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144
kmsan_internal_alloc_meta_for_pages mm/kmsan/kmsan_shadow.c:307 [inline]
kmsan_alloc_page+0x12a/0x310 mm/kmsan/kmsan_shadow.c:336
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x57f2/0x5f60 mm/page_alloc.c:4800
alloc_pages_current+0x67d/0x990 mm/mempolicy.c:2207
alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:534 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x111/0x12f0 mm/slub.c:1511
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1656 [inline]
new_slab+0x2bc/0x1130 mm/slub.c:1722
new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2473 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x1533/0x1f30 mm/slub.c:2624
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2664 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2738 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2783 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0xb23/0xd70 mm/slub.c:2788
sk_prot_alloc+0xf2/0x620 net/core/sock.c:1597
sk_alloc+0xf0/0xbe0 net/core/sock.c:1657
inet_create+0x7c7/0x1370 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:321
__sock_create+0x8eb/0xf00 net/socket.c:1420
sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x1a1/0x600 net/socket.c:1513
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline]
__se_sys_socket+0x8d/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520
__x64_sys_socket+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:1520
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira <pablo@netfilter.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
rtnl_create_link() needs to apply dev->min_mtu and dev->max_mtu
checks that we apply in do_setlink()
Otherwise malicious users can crash the kernel, for example after
an integer overflow :
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
Write of size 32 at addr ffff88819f20b9c0 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x134/0x1a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
memset+0x24/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:108
memset include/linux/string.h:365 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x37b/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:238
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x93/0x590 net/core/skbuff.c:5664
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7ad/0x920 net/core/sock.c:2242
sock_alloc_send_skb+0x32/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2259
mld_newpack+0x1d7/0x7f0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1609
add_grhead.isra.0+0x299/0x370 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1713
add_grec+0x7db/0x10b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:1970 [inline]
mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x3d3/0x950 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2477
call_timer_fn+0x1ac/0x780 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x6c3/0x1790 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
__do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0x19b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a3/0x610 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
Code: 98 6b ea f9 eb 8a cc cc cc cc cc cc e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 44 1c 60 00 f4 c3 66 90 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 34 1c 60 00 fb f4 <c3> cc 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 e8 4e 5d 9a f9 e8 79
RSP: 0018:ffffffff89807ce8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffffffff13266ae RBX: ffffffff8987a1c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffffffff8987aa54
RBP: ffffffff89807d18 R08: ffffffff8987a1c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffffff8a799980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:690
default_idle_call+0x84/0xb0 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x3c8/0x6e0 kernel/sched/idle.c:269
cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:361
rest_init+0x23b/0x371 init/main.c:451
arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x1b
start_kernel+0x904/0x943 init/main.c:784
x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:490
x86_64_start_kernel+0x77/0x7b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:471
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00067c82c0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
raw: 057ffe0000000000 ffffea00067c82c8 ffffea00067c82c8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88819f20b880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88819f20b900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88819f20b980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88819f20ba00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88819f20ba80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Fixes: 61e84623ace3 ("net: centralize net_device min/max MTU checking")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The driver for Cisco Aironet 4500 and 4800 series cards (airo.c),
implements AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE in airo_ioctl().
The ioctl handler copies an aironet_ioctl struct from userspace, which
includes a command. Some of the commands are handled in readrids(),
where the user controlled command is converted into a driver-internal
value called "ridcode".
There are two command values, AIROGWEPKTMP and AIROGWEPKNV, which
correspond to ridcode values of RID_WEP_TEMP and RID_WEP_PERM
respectively. These commands both have checks that the user has
CAP_NET_ADMIN, with the comment that "Only super-user can read WEP
keys", otherwise they return -EPERM.
However there is another command value, AIRORRID, that lets the user
specify the ridcode value directly, with no other checks. This means
the user can bypass the CAP_NET_ADMIN check on AIROGWEPKTMP and
AIROGWEPKNV.
Fix it by moving the CAP_NET_ADMIN check out of the command handling
and instead do it later based on the ridcode. That way regardless of
whether the ridcode is set via AIROGWEPKTMP or AIROGWEPKNV, or passed
in using AIRORID, we always do the CAP_NET_ADMIN check.
Found by Ilja by code inspection, not tested as I don't have the
required hardware.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The driver for Cisco Aironet 4500 and 4800 series cards (airo.c),
implements AIROOLDIOCTL/SIOCDEVPRIVATE in airo_ioctl().
The ioctl handler copies an aironet_ioctl struct from userspace, which
includes a command and a length. Some of the commands are handled in
readrids(), which kmalloc()'s a buffer of RIDSIZE (2048) bytes.
That buffer is then passed to PC4500_readrid(), which has two cases.
The else case does some setup and then reads up to RIDSIZE bytes from
the hardware into the kmalloc()'ed buffer.
Here len == RIDSIZE, pBuf is the kmalloc()'ed buffer:
// read the rid length field
bap_read(ai, pBuf, 2, BAP1);
// length for remaining part of rid
len = min(len, (int)le16_to_cpu(*(__le16*)pBuf)) - 2;
...
// read remainder of the rid
rc = bap_read(ai, ((__le16*)pBuf)+1, len, BAP1);
PC4500_readrid() then returns to readrids() which does:
len = comp->len;
if (copy_to_user(comp->data, iobuf, min(len, (int)RIDSIZE))) {
Where comp->len is the user controlled length field.
So if the "rid length field" returned by the hardware is < 2048, and
the user requests 2048 bytes in comp->len, we will leak the previous
contents of the kmalloc()'ed buffer to userspace.
Fix it by kzalloc()'ing the buffer.
Found by Ilja by code inspection, not tested as I don't have the
required hardware.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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phylink and phylib are interconnected. It makes sense for phylib and
phy driver patches to be also reviewed by the phylink maintainer.
So add Russell King as a designed reviewer of phylib.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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in the same manner as commit d0f418516022 ("net, ip_tunnel: fix
namespaces move"), fix namespace moving as it was broken since commit
8d79266bc48c ("ip6_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPv6 tunnel"), but for
ipv6 this time; there is no reason to keep it for ip6_tunnel.
Fixes: 8d79266bc48c ("ip6_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPv6 tunnel")
Signed-off-by: William Dauchy <w.dauchy@criteo.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sysbot found another issue in tc_new_tfilter().
We probably should use @name which contains the sanitized
version of TCA_KIND.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:608 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in string+0x522/0x690 lib/vsprintf.c:689
CPU: 1 PID: 10753 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:608 [inline]
string+0x522/0x690 lib/vsprintf.c:689
vsnprintf+0x207d/0x31b0 lib/vsprintf.c:2574
__request_module+0x2ad/0x11c0 kernel/kmod.c:143
tcf_proto_lookup_ops+0x241/0x720 net/sched/cls_api.c:139
tcf_proto_create net/sched/cls_api.c:262 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x2a4e/0x5010 net/sched/cls_api.c:2058
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xcb7/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5415
netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45b349
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f88b3948c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f88b39496d4 RCX: 000000000045b349
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bfc8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000099f R14: 00000000004cb163 R15: 000000000075bfd4
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2774 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4382
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:209
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1174 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x7d3/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 6f96c3c6904c ("net_sched: fix backward compatibility for TCA_KIND")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 0d4a6608f68c7532dcbfec2ea1150c9761767d03.
Williem reported that after commit 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk
free even if the rx sk queue is empty") the memory allocated by
an almost idle system with many UDP sockets can grow a lot.
For stable kernel keep the solution as simple as possible and revert
the offending commit.
Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk free even if the rx sk queue is empty")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Commit 323ebb61e32b ("net: use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL
skbs") introduces batching of GRO_NORMAL packets in napi_frags_finish,
and commit 6570bc79c0df ("net: core: use listified Rx for GRO_NORMAL in
napi_gro_receive()") adds the same to napi_skb_finish. However,
dev_gro_receive (that is called just before napi_{frags,skb}_finish) can
also pass skbs to the networking stack: e.g., when the GRO session is
flushed, napi_gro_complete is called, which passes pp directly to
netif_receive_skb_internal, skipping napi->rx_list. It means that the
packet stored in pp will be handled by the stack earlier than the
packets that arrived before, but are still waiting in napi->rx_list. It
leads to TCP reorderings that can be observed in the TCPOFOQueue counter
in netstat.
This commit fixes the reordering issue by making napi_gro_complete also
use napi->rx_list, so that all packets going through GRO will keep their
order. In order to keep napi_gro_flush working properly, gro_normal_list
calls are moved after the flush to clear napi->rx_list.
iwlwifi calls napi_gro_flush directly and does the same thing that is
done by gro_normal_list, so the same change is applied there:
napi_gro_flush is moved to be before the flush of napi->rx_list.
A few other drivers also use napi_gro_flush (brocade/bna/bnad.c,
cortina/gemini.c, hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c). The first two also use
napi_complete_done afterwards, which performs the gro_normal_list flush,
so they are fine. The latter calls napi_gro_receive right after
napi_gro_flush, so it can end up with non-empty napi->rx_list anyway.
Fixes: 323ebb61e32b ("net: use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL skbs")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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write_wakeup can happen in parallel with close/hangup where tty->disc_data
is set to NULL and the netdevice is freed thus also freeing
disc_data. write_wakeup accesses disc_data so we must prevent close from
freeing the netdev while write_wakeup has a non-NULL view of
tty->disc_data.
We also need to make sure that accesses to disc_data are atomic. Which can
all be done with RCU.
This problem was found by Syzkaller on SLCAN, but the same issue is
reproducible with the SLIP line discipline using an LTP test based on the
Syzkaller reproducer.
A fix which didn't use RCU was posted by Hillf Danton.
Fixes: 661f7fda21b1 ("slip: Fix deadlock in write_wakeup")
Fixes: a8e83b17536a ("slcan: Port write_wakeup deadlock fix from slip")
Reported-by: syzbot+017e491ae13c0068598a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Tyler Hall <tylerwhall@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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