| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
The KVM patching callbacks use cpus_have_final_cap() internally within
has_vhe(), and subsequent patches will make it invalid to call
cpus_have_final_cap() before alternatives patching has completed, and
will mean that cpus_have_const_cap() will always fall back to dynamic
checks prior to alternatives patching.
In preparation for said change, this patch modifies the KVM patching
callbacks to use cpus_have_cap() directly. This is not subject to
patching, and will dynamically check the cpu_hwcaps array, which is
functionally equivalent to the existing behaviour.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220912162210.3626215-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
In protected mode, late CPUs are not allowed to boot (enforced by
the PSCI relay). We can thus specialise the read_ctr macro to
always return a pre-computed, sanitised value. Special care is
taken to prevent the use of this custome version outside of
the protected mode.
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Storing a function pointer in hyp now generates relocation information
used at early boot to convert the address to hyp VA. The existing
alternative-based conversion mechanism is therefore obsolete. Remove it
and simplify its users.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105180541.65031-8-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
KVM nVHE code runs under a different VA mapping than the kernel, hence
so far it avoided using absolute addressing because the VA in a constant
pool is relocated by the linker to a kernel VA (see hyp_symbol_addr).
Now the kernel has access to a list of positions that contain a kimg VA
but will be accessed only in hyp execution context. These are generated
by the gen-hyprel build-time tool and stored in .hyp.reloc.
Add early boot pass over the entries and convert the kimg VAs to hyp VAs.
Note that this requires for .hyp* ELF sections to be mapped read-write
at that point.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105180541.65031-6-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
Small cleanup moving declarations of hyp-exported variables to
kvm_host.h and using macros to avoid having to refer to them with
kvm_nvhe_sym() in host.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208142452.87237-5-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
init_hyp_physvirt_offset() computes PA from a kernel VA. Conversion to
kernel linear-map is required first but the code used kvm_ksym_ref() for
this purpose. Under VHE that is a NOP and resulted in a runtime warning.
Replace kvm_ksym_ref with lm_alias.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <qcai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208142452.87237-3-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
kvmarm-master/next
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Add a host-initialized constant to KVM nVHE hyp code for converting
between EL2 linear map virtual addresses and physical addresses.
Also add `__hyp_pa` macro that performs the conversion.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202184122.26046-18-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Directly using the kimage_voffset variable is fine for now, but
will become more problematic as we start distrusting EL1.
Instead, patch the kimage_voffset into the HYP text, ensuring
we don't have to load an untrusted value later on.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
Since ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is really a mitigation for Spectre-v3a,
rename it accordingly for consistency with the v2 and v4 mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-9-will@kernel.org
|
|
The EL2 vectors installed when a guest is running point at one of the
following configurations for a given CPU:
- Straight at __kvm_hyp_vector
- A trampoline containing an SMC sequence to mitigate Spectre-v2 and
then a direct branch to __kvm_hyp_vector
- A dynamically-allocated trampoline which has an indirect branch to
__kvm_hyp_vector
- A dynamically-allocated trampoline containing an SMC sequence to
mitigate Spectre-v2 and then an indirect branch to __kvm_hyp_vector
The indirect branches mean that VA randomization at EL2 isn't trivially
bypassable using Spectre-v3a (where the vector base is readable by the
guest).
Rather than populate these vectors dynamically, configure everything
statically and use an enumerated type to identify the vector "slot"
corresponding to one of the configurations above. This both simplifies
the code, but also makes it much easier to implement at EL2 later on.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[maz: fixed double call to kvm_init_vector_slots() on nVHE]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-8-will@kernel.org
|
|
The hardened hyp vectors are not used on systems running with VHE or CPUs
without the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS capability.
Re-jig the checking logic slightly in kvm_patch_vector_branch() so that
it's a bit clearer what we're looking for. This is purely cosmetic.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-7-will@kernel.org
|
|
Branch predictor hardening of the hyp vectors is partially driven by a
couple of global variables ('__kvm_bp_vect_base' and
'__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot'). However, these are only used within a
single compilation unit, so internalise them there instead.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113113847.21619-5-will@kernel.org
|
|
KVM/arm64 is so far unable to deal with function pointers, as the compiler
will generate the kernel's runtime VA, and not the linear mapping address,
meaning that kern_hyp_va() will give the wrong result.
We so far have been able to use PC-relative addressing, but that's not
always easy to use, and prevents the implementation of things like
the mapping of an index to a pointer.
To allow this, provide a new helper that computes the required
translation from the kernel image to the HYP VA space.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
If there are spare bits in non-VHE hyp VA, KVM unconditionally replaces them
with a random tag chosen at init. Disable this if the kernel is built without
RANDOMIZE_BASE to align with kernel behavior.
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721094445.82184-2-dbrazdil@google.com
|
|
Booting 5.4 on LX2160A reveals that KVM is non-functional:
kvm: Limiting the IPA size due to kernel Virtual Address limit
kvm [1]: IPA Size Limit: 43bits
kvm [1]: IDMAP intersecting with HYP VA, unable to continue
kvm [1]: error initializing Hyp mode: -22
Debugging shows:
kvm [1]: IDMAP page: 81a26000
kvm [1]: HYP VA range: 0:22ffffffff
as RAM is located at:
80000000-fbdfffff : System RAM
2080000000-237fffffff : System RAM
Comparing this with the same kernel on Armada 8040 shows:
kvm: Limiting the IPA size due to kernel Virtual Address limit
kvm [1]: IPA Size Limit: 43bits
kvm [1]: IDMAP page: 2a26000
kvm [1]: HYP VA range: 4800000000:493fffffff
...
kvm [1]: Hyp mode initialized successfully
which indicates that hyp_va_msb is set, and is always set to the
opposite value of the idmap page to avoid the overlap. This does not
happen with the LX2160A.
Further debugging shows vabits_actual = 39, kva_msb = 38 on LX2160A and
kva_msb = 33 on Armada 8040. Looking at the bit layout of the HYP VA,
there is still one bit available for hyp_va_msb. Set this bit
appropriately. This allows KVM to be functional on the LX2160A, but
without any HYP VA randomisation:
kvm: Limiting the IPA size due to kernel Virtual Address limit
kvm [1]: IPA Size Limit: 43bits
kvm [1]: IDMAP page: 81a24000
kvm [1]: HYP VA range: 4000000000:62ffffffff
...
kvm [1]: Hyp mode initialized successfully
Fixes: ed57cac83e05 ("arm64: KVM: Introduce EL2 VA randomisation")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
[maz: small additional cleanups, preserved case where the tag
is legitimately 0 and we can just use the mask, Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/E1ilAiY-0000MA-RG@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk
|
|
compute_layout() is invoked as part of an alternative fixup under
stop_machine(). This function invokes get_random_long() which acquires a
sleeping lock on -RT which can not be acquired in this context.
Rename compute_layout() to kvm_compute_layout() and invoke it before
stop_machine() applies the alternatives. Add a __init prefix to
kvm_compute_layout() because the caller has it, too (and so the code can be
discarded after boot).
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
In order to support 52-bit kernel addresses detectable at boot time, one
needs to know the actual VA_BITS detected. A new variable vabits_actual
is introduced in this commit and employed for the KVM hypervisor layout,
KASAN, fault handling and phys-to/from-virt translation where there
would normally be compile time constants.
In order to maintain performance in phys_to_virt, another variable
physvirt_offset is introduced.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
|
The EL2 vector hardening feature causes KVM to generate vectors for
each type of CPU present in the system. The generated sequences already
do some of the early guest-exit work (i.e. saving registers). To avoid
duplication the generated vectors branch to the original vector just
after the preamble. This size is hard coded.
Adding new instructions to the HYP vector causes strange side effects,
which are difficult to debug as the affected code is patched in at
runtime.
Add KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE to tell kvm_patch_vector_branch() how big
the preamble is. The valid_vect macro can then validate this at
build time.
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org
licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
We're now ready to map our vectors in weird and wonderful locations.
On enabling ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, a vector slot gets allocated
if this hasn't been already done via ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
and gets mapped outside of the normal RAM region, next to the
idmap.
That way, being able to obtain VBAR_EL2 doesn't reveal the mapping
of the rest of the hypervisor code.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
So far, the branch from the vector slots to the main vectors can at
most be 4GB from the main vectors (the reach of ADRP), and this
distance is known at compile time. If we were to remap the slots
to an unrelated VA, things would break badly.
A way to achieve VA independence would be to load the absolute
address of the vectors (__kvm_hyp_vector), either using a constant
pool or a series of movs, followed by an indirect branch.
This patches implements the latter solution, using another instance
of a patching callback. Note that since we have to save a register
pair on the stack, we branch to the *second* instruction in the
vectors in order to compensate for it. This also results in having
to adjust this balance in the invalid vector entry point.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
The main idea behind randomising the EL2 VA is that we usually have
a few spare bits between the most significant bit of the VA mask
and the most significant bit of the linear mapping.
Those bits could be a bunch of zeroes, and could be useful
to move things around a bit. Of course, the more memory you have,
the less randomisation you get...
Alternatively, these bits could be the result of KASLR, in which
case they are already random. But it would be nice to have a
*different* randomization, just to make the job of a potential
attacker a bit more difficult.
Inserting these random bits is a bit involved. We don't have a spare
register (short of rewriting all the kern_hyp_va call sites), and
the immediate we want to insert is too random to be used with the
ORR instruction. The best option I could come up with is the following
sequence:
and x0, x0, #va_mask
ror x0, x0, #first_random_bit
add x0, x0, #(random & 0xfff)
add x0, x0, #(random >> 12), lsl #12
ror x0, x0, #(63 - first_random_bit)
making it a fairly long sequence, but one that a decent CPU should
be able to execute without breaking a sweat. It is of course NOPed
out on VHE. The last 4 instructions can also be turned into NOPs
if it appears that there is no free bits to use.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
As we're moving towards a much more dynamic way to compute our
HYP VA, let's express the mask in a slightly different way.
Instead of comparing the idmap position to the "low" VA mask,
we directly compute the mask by taking into account the idmap's
(VA_BIT-1) bit.
No functionnal change.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
So far, we're using a complicated sequence of alternatives to
patch the kernel/hyp VA mask on non-VHE, and NOP out the
masking altogether when on VHE.
The newly introduced dynamic patching gives us the opportunity
to simplify that code by patching a single instruction with
the correct mask (instead of the mind bending cumulative masking
we have at the moment) or even a single NOP on VHE. This also
adds some initial code that will allow the patching callback
to switch to a more complex patching.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
