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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
virtualization enablement
- Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
(in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware
- Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1
of the protocol
- FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
and exception routing
- New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under
KVM
- Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor
- Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX
- Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates
LoongArch:
- Add paravirt steal time support
- Add support for KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET
- Add perf kvm-stat support for loongarch
RISC-V:
- Redirect AMO load/store access fault traps to guest
- perf kvm stat support
- Use guest files for IMSIC virtualization, when available
s390:
- Assortment of tiny fixes which are not time critical
x86:
- Fixes for Xen emulation
- Add a global struct to consolidate tracking of host values, e.g.
EFER
- Add KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS to allow configuring the
effective APIC bus frequency, because TDX
- Print the name of the APICv/AVIC inhibits in the relevant
tracepoint
- Clean up KVM's handling of vendor specific emulation to
consistently act on "compatible with Intel/AMD", versus checking
for a specific vendor
- Drop MTRR virtualization, and instead always honor guest PAT on
CPUs that support self-snoop
- Update to the newfangled Intel CPU FMS infrastructure
- Don't advertise IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL as an MSR-to-be-saved, as
it reads '0' and writes from userspace are ignored
- Misc cleanups
x86 - MMU:
- Small cleanups, renames and refactoring extracted from the upcoming
Intel TDX support
- Don't allocate kvm_mmu_page.shadowed_translation for shadow pages
that can't hold leafs SPTEs
- Unconditionally drop mmu_lock when allocating TDP MMU page tables
for eager page splitting, to avoid stalling vCPUs when splitting
huge pages
- Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE
that is non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a
broken state because the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, it's
all but dangerous to let more MMU changes happen afterwards
x86 - AMD:
- Make per-CPU save_area allocations NUMA-aware
- Force sev_es_host_save_area() to be inlined to avoid calling into
an instrumentable function from noinstr code
- Base support for running SEV-SNP guests. API-wise, this includes a
new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type, encrypting/measure the initial image into
guest memory, and finalizing it before launching it. Internally,
there are some gmem/mmu hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated
pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges
This includes basic support for attestation guest requests, enough
to say that KVM supports the GHCB 2.0 specification
There is no support yet for loading into the firmware those signing
keys to be used for attestation requests, and therefore no need yet
for the host to provide certificate data for those keys.
To support fetching certificate data from userspace, a new KVM exit
type will be needed to handle fetching the certificate from
userspace.
An attempt to define a new KVM_EXIT_COCO / KVM_EXIT_COCO_REQ_CERTS
exit type to handle this was introduced in v1 of this patchset, but
is still being discussed by community, so for now this patchset
only implements a stub version of SNP Extended Guest Requests that
does not provide certificate data
x86 - Intel:
- Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware
- Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested
pending posted interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing
HLT in L2 (with HLT-exiting disable by L1)
- KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch
emulation
Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are
triggered when emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support
userspace MMIO during complex (multi-step) emulation
Silently ignoring the exit request can result in the
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to userspace
for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed
See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write
exits if emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's
limitations with respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator
flows
Generic:
- Rename the AS_UNMOVABLE flag that was introduced for KVM to
AS_INACCESSIBLE, because the special casing needed by these pages
is not due to just unmovability (and in fact they are only
unmovable because the CPU cannot access them)
- New ioctl to populate the KVM page tables in advance, which is
useful to mitigate KVM page faults during guest boot or after live
migration. The code will also be used by TDX, but (probably) not
through the ioctl
- Enable halt poll shrinking by default, as Intel found it to be a
clear win
- Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM to avoid having to
synchronize SRCU when creating a split IRQCHIP on x86
- Rework the sched_in/out() paths to replace kvm_arch_sched_in() with
a flag that arch code can use for hooking both sched_in() and
sched_out()
- Take the vCPU @id as an "unsigned long" instead of "u32" to avoid
truncating a bogus value from userspace, e.g. to help userspace
detect bugs
- Mark a vCPU as preempted if and only if it's scheduled out while in
the KVM_RUN loop, e.g. to avoid marking it preempted and thus
writing guest memory when retrieving guest state during live
migration blackout
Selftests:
- Remove dead code in the memslot modification stress test
- Treat "branch instructions retired" as supported on all AMD Family
17h+ CPUs
- Print the guest pseudo-RNG seed only when it changes, to avoid
spamming the log for tests that create lots of VMs
- Make the PMU counters test less flaky when counting LLC cache
misses by doing CLFLUSH{OPT} in every loop iteration"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
KVM: x86/pmu: Add kvm_pmu_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_pmu_ops
KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
KVM: x86: Replace static_call_cond() with static_call()
KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
x86/sev: Move sev_guest.h into common SEV header
KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch emulation
KVM: x86/mmu: Clean up make_huge_page_split_spte() definition and intro
KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM tries to split a !hugepage SPTE
KVM: selftests: x86: Add test for KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()
KVM: x86/mmu: Make kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() return mapped level
KVM: x86/mmu: Account pf_{fixed,emulate,spurious} in callers of "do page fault"
KVM: x86/mmu: Bump pf_taken stat only in the "real" page fault handler
KVM: Add KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory
KVM: Document KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl
mm, virt: merge AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE
perf kvm: Add kvm-stat for loongarch64
LoongArch: KVM: Add PV steal time support in guest side
...
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To allow execution at a level other than VMPL0, an SVSM must be present.
Allow the SEV-SNP guest to continue booting if an SVSM is detected and
the hypervisor supports the SVSM feature as indicated in the GHCB
hypervisor features bitmap.
[ bp: Massage a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ce7cf281cce1d0cba88f3f576687ef75dc3c953.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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The SVSM Calling Area (CA) is used to communicate between Linux and the
SVSM. Since the firmware supplied CA for the BSP is likely to be in
reserved memory, switch off that CA to a kernel provided CA so that access
and use of the CA is available during boot. The CA switch is done using
the SVSM core protocol SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA call.
An SVSM call is executed by filling out the SVSM CA and setting the proper
register state as documented by the SVSM protocol. The SVSM is invoked by
by requesting the hypervisor to run VMPL0.
Once it is safe to allocate/reserve memory, allocate a CA for each CPU.
After allocating the new CAs, the BSP will switch from the boot CA to the
per-CPU CA. The CA for an AP is identified to the SVSM when creating the
VMSA in preparation for booting the AP.
[ bp: Heavily simplify svsm_issue_call() asm, other touchups. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fa8021130bcc3bcf14d722a25548cb0cdf325456.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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During early boot phases, check for the presence of an SVSM when running
as an SEV-SNP guest.
An SVSM is present if not running at VMPL0 and the 64-bit value at offset
0x148 into the secrets page is non-zero. If an SVSM is present, save the
SVSM Calling Area address (CAA), located at offset 0x150 into the secrets
page, and set the VMPL level of the guest, which should be non-zero, to
indicate the presence of an SVSM.
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9d3fe161be93d4ea60f43c2a3f2c311fe708b63b.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state in the RMP
table to be private or shared using the Page State Change NAE event
as defined in the GHCB specification version 2.
Forward these requests to userspace as KVM_EXIT_VMGEXITs, similar to how
it is done for requests that don't use a GHCB page.
As with the MSR-based page-state changes, use the existing
KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to deliver these requests to
userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-11-michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state in the RMP
table to be private or shared using the Page State Change MSR protocol
as defined in the GHCB specification.
When using gmem, private/shared memory is allocated through separate
pools, and KVM relies on userspace issuing a KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
KVM ioctl to tell the KVM MMU whether or not a particular GFN should be
backed by private memory or not.
Forward these page state change requests to userspace so that it can
issue the expected KVM ioctls. The KVM MMU will handle updating the RMP
entries when it is ready to map a private page into a guest.
Use the existing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to deliver these
requests to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-10-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SEV-SNP guests are required to perform a GHCB GPA registration. Before
using a GHCB GPA for a vCPU the first time, a guest must register the
vCPU GHCB GPA. If hypervisor can work with the guest requested GPA then
it must respond back with the same GPA otherwise return -1.
On VMEXIT, verify that the GHCB GPA matches with the registered value.
If a mismatch is detected, then abort the guest.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-9-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of the GHCB specification introduced advertisement of features
that are supported by the Hypervisor.
Now that KVM supports version 2 of the GHCB specification, bump the
maximum supported protocol version.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for AP Reset Hold being invoked using the GHCB MSR protocol,
available in version 2 of the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In advance of providing support for unaccepted memory, switch from using
kmalloc() for allocating the Page State Change (PSC) structure to using a
local variable that lives on the stack. This is needed to avoid a possible
recursive call into set_pages_state() if the kmalloc() call requires
(more) memory to be accepted, which would result in a hang.
The current size of the PSC struct is 2,032 bytes. To make the struct more
stack friendly, reduce the number of PSC entries from 253 down to 64,
resulting in a size of 520 bytes. This is a nice compromise on struct size
and total PSC requests while still allowing parallel PSC operations across
vCPUs.
If the reduction in PSC entries results in any kind of performance issue
(that is not seen at the moment), use of a larger static PSC struct, with
fallback to the smaller stack version, can be investigated.
For more background info on this decision, see the subthread in the Link:
tag below.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/658c455c40e8950cb046dd885dd19dc1c52d060a.1659103274.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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The GHCB specification declares that the firmware error value for
a guest request will be stored in the lower 32 bits of EXIT_INFO_2. The
upper 32 bits are for the VMM's own error code. The fw_err argument to
snp_guest_issue_request() is thus a misnomer, and callers will need
access to all 64 bits.
The type of unsigned long also causes problems, since sw_exit_info2 is
u64 (unsigned long long) vs the argument's unsigned long*. Change this
type for issuing the guest request. Pass the ioctl command struct's error
field directly instead of in a local variable, since an incomplete guest
request may not set the error code, and uninitialized stack memory would
be written back to user space.
The firmware might not even be called, so bookend the call with the no
firmware call error and clear the error.
Since the "fw_err" field is really exitinfo2 split into the upper bits'
vmm error code and lower bits' firmware error code, convert the 64 bit
value to a union.
[ bp:
- Massage commit message
- adjust code
- Fix a build issue as
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303070609.vX6wp2Af-lkp@intel.com
- print exitinfo2 in hex
Tom:
- Correct -EIO exit case. ]
Signed-off-by: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214164638.1189804-5-dionnaglaze@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230307192449.24732-12-bp@alien8.de
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A potentially malicious SEV guest can constantly hammer the hypervisor
using this driver to send down requests and thus prevent or at least
considerably hinder other guests from issuing requests to the secure
processor which is a shared platform resource.
Therefore, the host is permitted and encouraged to throttle such guest
requests.
Add the capability to handle the case when the hypervisor throttles
excessive numbers of requests issued by the guest. Otherwise, the VM
platform communication key will be disabled, preventing the guest from
attesting itself.
Realistically speaking, a well-behaved guest should not even care about
throttling. During its lifetime, it would end up issuing a handful of
requests which the hardware can easily handle.
This is more to address the case of a malicious guest. Such guest should
get throttled and if its VMPCK gets disabled, then that's its own
wrongdoing and perhaps that guest even deserves it.
To the implementation: the hypervisor signals with SNP_GUEST_REQ_ERR_BUSY
that the guest requests should be throttled. That error code is returned
in the upper 32-bit half of exitinfo2 and this is part of the GHCB spec
v2.
So the guest is given a throttling period of 1 minute in which it
retries the request every 2 seconds. This is a good default but if it
turns out to not pan out in practice, it can be tweaked later.
For safety, since the encryption algorithm in GHCBv2 is AES_GCM, control
must remain in the kernel to complete the request with the current
sequence number. Returning without finishing the request allows the
guest to make another request but with different message contents. This
is IV reuse, and breaks cryptographic protections.
[ bp:
- Rewrite commit message and do a simplified version.
- The stable tags are supposed to denote that a cleanup should go
upfront before backporting this so that any future fixes to this
can preserve the sanity of the backporter(s). ]
Fixes: d5af44dde546 ("x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs")
Signed-off-by: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # d6fd48eff750 ("virt/coco/sev-guest: Check SEV_SNP attribute at probe time")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # 970ab823743f (" virt/coco/sev-guest: Simplify extended guest request handling")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # c5a338274bdb ("virt/coco/sev-guest: Remove the disable_vmpck label in handle_guest_request()")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # 0fdb6cc7c89c ("virt/coco/sev-guest: Carve out the request issuing logic into a helper")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # d25bae7dc7b0 ("virt/coco/sev-guest: Do some code style cleanups")
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # fa4ae42cc60a ("virt/coco/sev-guest: Convert the sw_exit_info_2 checking to a switch-case")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214164638.1189804-2-dionnaglaze@google.com
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Version 2 of GHCB specification provides SNP_GUEST_REQUEST and
SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE that can be used by the SNP guest to
communicate with the PSP.
While at it, add a snp_issue_guest_request() helper that will be used by
driver or other subsystem to issue the request to PSP.
See SEV-SNP firmware and GHCB spec for more details.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-42-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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CPUID instructions generate a #VC exception for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests,
for which early handlers are currently set up to handle. In the case
of SEV-SNP, guests can use a configurable location in guest memory
that has been pre-populated with a firmware-validated CPUID table to
look up the relevant CPUID values rather than requesting them from
hypervisor via a VMGEXIT. Add the various hooks in the #VC handlers to
allow CPUID instructions to be handled via the table. The code to
actually configure/enable the table will be added in a subsequent
commit.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-33-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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To provide a more secure way to start APs under SEV-SNP, use the SEV-SNP
AP Creation NAE event. This allows for guest control over the AP register
state rather than trusting the hypervisor with the SEV-ES Jump Table
address.
During native_smp_prepare_cpus(), invoke an SEV-SNP function that, if
SEV-SNP is active, will set/override apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu. This
will allow the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event method to be used to boot
the APs. As a result of installing the override when SEV-SNP is active,
this method of starting the APs becomes the required method. The override
function will fail to start the AP if the hypervisor does not have
support for AP creation.
[ bp: Work in forgotten review comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-23-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared
to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as
documented in the GHCB spec.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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The SEV-SNP guest is required by the GHCB spec to register the GHCB's
Guest Physical Address (GPA). This is because the hypervisor may prefer
that a guest use a consistent and/or specific GPA for the GHCB associated
with a vCPU. For more information, see the GHCB specification section
"GHCB GPA Registration".
If hypervisor can not work with the guest provided GPA then terminate the
guest boot.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through the
Reverse Map Table (RMP). Each RMP entry contains the GPA at which a
particular page of DRAM should be mapped. The VMs can request the
hypervisor to add pages in the RMP table via the Page State Change
VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification.
Inside each RMP entry is a Validated flag; this flag is automatically
cleared to 0 by the CPU hardware when a new RMP entry is created for a
guest. Each VM page can be either validated or invalidated, as indicated
by the Validated flag in the RMP entry. Memory access to a private page
that is not validated generates a #VC. A VM must use the PVALIDATE
instruction to validate a private page before using it.
To maintain the security guarantee of SEV-SNP guests, when transitioning
pages from private to shared, the guest must invalidate the pages before
asking the hypervisor to change the page state to shared in the RMP table.
After the pages are mapped private in the page table, the guest must
issue a page state change VMGEXIT to mark the pages private in the RMP
table and validate them.
Upon boot, BIOS should have validated the entire system memory.
During the kernel decompression stage, early_setup_ghcb() uses
set_page_decrypted() to make the GHCB page shared (i.e. clear encryption
attribute). And while exiting from the decompression, it calls
set_page_encrypted() to make the page private.
Add snp_set_page_{private,shared}() helpers that are used by
set_page_{decrypted,encrypted}() to change the page state in the RMP
table.
[ bp: Massage commit message and comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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The Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL) feature in the SEV-SNP
architecture allows a guest VM to divide its address space into four
levels. The level can be used to provide hardware isolated abstraction
layers within a VM. VMPL0 is the highest privilege level, and VMPL3 is
the least privilege level. Certain operations must be done by the VMPL0
software, such as:
* Validate or invalidate memory range (PVALIDATE instruction)
* Allocate VMSA page (RMPADJUST instruction when VMSA=1)
The initial SNP support requires that the guest kernel is running at
VMPL0. Add such a check to verify the guest is running at level 0 before
continuing the boot. There is no easy method to query the current VMPL
level, so use the RMPADJUST instruction to determine whether the guest
is running at the VMPL0.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Version 2 of the GHCB specification added the advertisement of features
that are supported by the hypervisor. If the hypervisor supports SEV-SNP
then it must set the SEV-SNP features bit to indicate that the base
functionality is supported.
Check that feature bit while establishing the GHCB; if failed, terminate
the guest.
Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds several new Non-Automatic Exits
(NAEs), most of them are optional except the hypervisor feature. Now
that the hypervisor feature NAE is implemented, bump the GHCB maximum
supported protocol version.
While at it, move the GHCB protocol negotiation check from the #VC
exception handler to sev_enable() so that all feature detection happens
before the first #VC exception.
While at it, document why the GHCB page cannot be setup from
load_stage2_idt().
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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The GHCB specification defines the reason code for reason set 0. The
reason codes defined in the set 0 do not cover all possible causes for a
guest to request termination.
The reason sets 1 to 255 are reserved for the vendor-specific codes.
Reserve the reason set 1 for the Linux guest. Define the error codes for
reason set 1 so that one can have meaningful termination reasons and thus
better guest failure diagnosis.
While at it, change sev_es_terminate() to accept a reason set parameter.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:
"The accumulated pile of x86/sev generalizations and cleanups:
- Share the SEV string unrolling logic with TDX as TDX guests need it
too
- Cleanups and generalzation of code shared by SEV and TDX"
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c
x86/sev: Rename mem_encrypt.c to mem_encrypt_amd.c
x86/sev: Use CC_ATTR attribute to generalize string I/O unroll
x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations
x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper
x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines
x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names
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Currently, an SEV-ES guest is terminated if the validation of the VMGEXIT
exit code or exit parameters fails.
The VMGEXIT instruction can be issued from userspace, even though
userspace (likely) can't update the GHCB. To prevent userspace from being
able to kill the guest, return an error through the GHCB when validation
fails rather than terminating the guest. For cases where the GHCB can't be
updated (e.g. the GHCB can't be mapped, etc.), just return back to the
guest.
The new error codes are documented in the lasest update to the GHCB
specification.
Fixes: 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b57280b5562893e2616257ac9c2d4525a9aeeb42.1638471124.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove all the defines of masks and bit positions for the GHCB MSR
protocol and use comments instead which correspond directly to the spec
so that following those can be a lot easier and straightforward with the
spec opened in parallel to the code.
Aligh vertically while at it.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211110220731.2396491-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Shorten macro names for improved readability.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211110220731.2396491-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Add the necessary defines for supporting the GHCB version 2 protocol.
This includes defines for:
- MSR-based AP hlt request/response
- Hypervisor Feature request/response
This is the bare minimum of requests that need to be supported by a GHCB
version 2 implementation. There are more requests in the specification,
but those depend on Secure Nested Paging support being available.
These defines are shared between SEV host and guest support.
[ bp: Fold in https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210622144825.27588-2-joro@8bytes.org too.
Simplify the brewing macro maze into readability. ]
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YNLXQIZ5e1wjkshG@8bytes.org
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The guest and the hypervisor contain separate macros to get and set
the GHCB MSR protocol and NAE event fields. Consolidate the GHCB
protocol definitions and helper macros in one place.
Leave the supported protocol version define in separate files to keep
the guest and hypervisor flexibility to support different GHCB version
in the same release.
There is no functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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