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2021-04-19x86/cpu: Add helper function to get the type of the current hybrid CPURicardo Neri
On processors with Intel Hybrid Technology (i.e., one having more than one type of CPU in the same package), all CPUs support the same instruction set and enumerate the same features on CPUID. Thus, all software can run on any CPU without restrictions. However, there may be model-specific differences among types of CPUs. For instance, each type of CPU may support a different number of performance counters. Also, machine check error banks may be wired differently. Even though most software will not care about these differences, kernel subsystems dealing with these differences must know. Add and expose a new helper function get_this_hybrid_cpu_type() to query the type of the current hybrid CPU. The function will be used later in the perf subsystem. The Intel Software Developer's Manual defines the CPU type as 8-bit identifier. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1618237865-33448-3-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2021-03-28x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lockFenghua Yu
Bus locks degrade performance for the whole system, not just for the CPU that requested the bus lock. Two CPU features "#AC for split lock" and "#DB for bus lock" provide hooks so that the operating system may choose one of several mitigation strategies. #AC for split lock is already implemented. Add code to use the #DB for bus lock feature to cover additional situations with new options to mitigate. split_lock_detect= #AC for split lock #DB for bus lock off Do nothing Do nothing warn Kernel OOPs Warn once per task and Warn once per task and and continues to run. disable future checking When both features are supported, warn in #AC fatal Kernel OOPs Send SIGBUS to user. Send SIGBUS to user When both features are supported, fatal in #AC ratelimit:N Do nothing Limit bus lock rate to N per second in the current non-root user. Default option is "warn". Hardware only generates #DB for bus lock detect when CPL>0 to avoid nested #DB from multiple bus locks while the first #DB is being handled. So no need to handle #DB for bus lock detected in the kernel. #DB for bus lock is enabled by bus lock detection bit 2 in DEBUGCTL MSR while #AC for split lock is enabled by split lock detection bit 29 in TEST_CTRL MSR. Both breakpoint and bus lock in the same instruction can trigger one #DB. The bus lock is handled before the breakpoint in the #DB handler. Delivery of #DB for bus lock in userspace clears DR6[11], which is set by the #DB handler right after reading DR6. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322135325.682257-3-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2021-03-21x86: Fix various typos in comments, take #2Ingo Molnar
Fix another ~42 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments, missed a few in the first pass, in particular in .S files. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
2021-02-20Merge tag 'ras_updates_for_v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RAS updates from Borislav Petkov: - move therm_throt.c to the thermal framework, where it belongs. - identify CPUs which miss to enter the broadcast handler, as an additional debugging aid. * tag 'ras_updates_for_v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: thermal: Move therm_throt there from x86/mce x86/mce: Get rid of mcheck_intel_therm_init() x86/mce: Make mce_timed_out() identify holdout CPUs
2021-02-08thermal: Move therm_throt there from x86/mceBorislav Petkov
This functionality has nothing to do with MCE, move it to the thermal framework and untangle it from MCE. Requested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210202121003.GD18075@zn.tnic
2021-02-01x86/split_lock: Enable the split lock feature on another Alder Lake CPUFenghua Yu
Add Alder Lake mobile processor to CPU list to enumerate and enable the split lock feature. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210201190007.4031869-1-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2020-08-10Merge tag 'locking-urgent-2020-08-10' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull locking updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of locking fixes and updates: - Untangle the header spaghetti which causes build failures in various situations caused by the lockdep additions to seqcount to validate that the write side critical sections are non-preemptible. - The seqcount associated lock debug addons which were blocked by the above fallout. seqcount writers contrary to seqlock writers must be externally serialized, which usually happens via locking - except for strict per CPU seqcounts. As the lock is not part of the seqcount, lockdep cannot validate that the lock is held. This new debug mechanism adds the concept of associated locks. sequence count has now lock type variants and corresponding initializers which take a pointer to the associated lock used for writer serialization. If lockdep is enabled the pointer is stored and write_seqcount_begin() has a lockdep assertion to validate that the lock is held. Aside of the type and the initializer no other code changes are required at the seqcount usage sites. The rest of the seqcount API is unchanged and determines the type at compile time with the help of _Generic which is possible now that the minimal GCC version has been moved up. Adding this lockdep coverage unearthed a handful of seqcount bugs which have been addressed already independent of this. While generally useful this comes with a Trojan Horse twist: On RT kernels the write side critical section can become preemtible if the writers are serialized by an associated lock, which leads to the well known reader preempts writer livelock. RT prevents this by storing the associated lock pointer independent of lockdep in the seqcount and changing the reader side to block on the lock when a reader detects that a writer is in the write side critical section. - Conversion of seqcount usage sites to associated types and initializers" * tag 'locking-urgent-2020-08-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits) locking/seqlock, headers: Untangle the spaghetti monster locking, arch/ia64: Reduce <asm/smp.h> header dependencies by moving XTP bits into the new <asm/xtp.h> header x86/headers: Remove APIC headers from <asm/smp.h> seqcount: More consistent seqprop names seqcount: Compress SEQCNT_LOCKNAME_ZERO() seqlock: Fold seqcount_LOCKNAME_init() definition seqlock: Fold seqcount_LOCKNAME_t definition seqlock: s/__SEQ_LOCKDEP/__SEQ_LOCK/g hrtimer: Use sequence counter with associated raw spinlock kvm/eventfd: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock userfaultfd: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock NFSv4: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock iocost: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock raid5: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock vfs: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock timekeeping: Use sequence counter with associated raw spinlock xfrm: policy: Use sequence counters with associated lock netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Use sequence counter with associated rwlock netfilter: conntrack: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock sched: tasks: Use sequence counter with associated spinlock ...
2020-08-06locking/seqlock, headers: Untangle the spaghetti monsterPeter Zijlstra
By using lockdep_assert_*() from seqlock.h, the spaghetti monster attacked. Attack back by reducing seqlock.h dependencies from two key high level headers: - <linux/seqlock.h>: -Remove <linux/ww_mutex.h> - <linux/time.h>: -Remove <linux/seqlock.h> - <linux/sched.h>: +Add <linux/seqlock.h> The price was to add it to sched.h ... Core header fallout, we add direct header dependencies instead of gaining them parasitically from higher level headers: - <linux/dynamic_queue_limits.h>: +Add <asm/bug.h> - <linux/hrtimer.h>: +Add <linux/seqlock.h> - <linux/ktime.h>: +Add <asm/bug.h> - <linux/lockdep.h>: +Add <linux/smp.h> - <linux/sched.h>: +Add <linux/seqlock.h> - <linux/videodev2.h>: +Add <linux/kernel.h> Arch headers fallout: - PARISC: <asm/timex.h>: +Add <asm/special_insns.h> - SH: <asm/io.h>: +Add <asm/page.h> - SPARC: <asm/timer_64.h>: +Add <uapi/asm/asi.h> - SPARC: <asm/vvar.h>: +Add <asm/processor.h>, <asm/barrier.h> -Remove <linux/seqlock.h> - X86: <asm/fixmap.h>: +Add <asm/pgtable_types.h> -Remove <asm/acpi.h> There's also a bunch of parasitic header dependency fallout in .c files, not listed separately. [ mingo: Extended the changelog, split up & fixed the original patch. ] Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804133438.GK2674@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2020-07-25x86/split_lock: Enable the split lock feature on Sapphire Rapids and Alder ↵Fenghua Yu
Lake CPUs Add Sapphire Rapids and Alder Lake processors to CPU list to enumerate and enable the split lock feature. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1595634320-79689-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2020-06-30x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelistedSean Christopherson
Choo! Choo! All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to Wreckage! Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL. MSR_TEST_CTRL exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs. Writing the MSR, even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior. This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM guest. Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence, which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled. On Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode. When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining (see kvm_starting_cpu()). Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting flow is effectively: on_each_ap_cpu() { WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0) VMXON } As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has already done VMXON. This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs. The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above. Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence. The additional VMXON, which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD. The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and so forth. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386! CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G D Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0 vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260 __schedule+0x460/0x720 _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0 ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: dbaba47085b0c ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-06-11Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-06-11' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull more x86 updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of fixes and updates for x86: - Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks. While the VDSO code was moved into lib for sharing a subtle check for the validity of paravirt clocks got replaced. While the replacement works perfectly fine for bare metal as the update of the VDSO clock mode is synchronous, it fails for paravirt clocks because the hypervisor can invalidate them asynchronously. Bring it back as an optional function so it does not inflict this on architectures which are free of PV damage. - Fix the jiffies to jiffies64 mapping on 64bit so it does not trigger an ODR violation on newer compilers - Three fixes for the SSBD and *IB* speculation mitigation maze to ensure consistency, not disabling of some *IB* variants wrongly and to prevent a rogue cross process shutdown of SSBD. All marked for stable. - Add yet more CPU models to the splitlock detection capable list !@#%$! - Bring the pr_info() back which tells that TSC deadline timer is enabled. - Reboot quirk for MacBook6,1" * tag 'x86-urgent-2020-06-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/vdso: Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks lib/vdso: Provide sanity check for cycles (again) clocksource: Remove obsolete ifdef x86_64: Fix jiffies ODR violation x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches. x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS. x86/cpu: Add Sapphire Rapids CPU model number x86/split_lock: Add Icelake microserver and Tigerlake CPU models x86/apic: Make TSC deadline timer detection message visible x86/reboot/quirks: Add MacBook6,1 reboot quirk
2020-06-09mm: reorder includes after introduction of linux/pgtable.hMike Rapoport
The replacement of <asm/pgrable.h> with <linux/pgtable.h> made the include of the latter in the middle of asm includes. Fix this up with the aid of the below script and manual adjustments here and there. import sys import re if len(sys.argv) is not 3: print "USAGE: %s <file> <header>" % (sys.argv[0]) sys.exit(1) hdr_to_move="#include <linux/%s>" % sys.argv[2] moved = False in_hdrs = False with open(sys.argv[1], "r") as f: lines = f.readlines() for _line in lines: line = _line.rstrip(' ') if line == hdr_to_move: continue if line.startswith("#include <linux/"): in_hdrs = True elif not moved and in_hdrs: moved = True print hdr_to_move print line Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09mm: introduce include/linux/pgtable.hMike Rapoport
The include/linux/pgtable.h is going to be the home of generic page table manipulation functions. Start with moving asm-generic/pgtable.h to include/linux/pgtable.h and make the latter include asm/pgtable.h. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-3-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-05-28x86/split_lock: Add Icelake microserver and Tigerlake CPU modelsFenghua Yu
Icelake microserver CPU supports split lock detection while it doesn't have the split lock enumeration bit in IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES. Tigerlake CPUs do enumerate the MSR. [ bp: Merge the two model-adding patches into one. ] Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1588290395-2677-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2020-05-06x86/resctrl: Query LLC monitoring properties once during bootReinette Chatre
Cache and memory bandwidth monitoring are features that are part of x86 CPU resource control that is supported by the resctrl subsystem. The monitoring properties are obtained via CPUID from every CPU and only used within the resctrl subsystem where the properties are only read from boot_cpu_data. Obtain the monitoring properties once, placed in boot_cpu_data, via the ->c_bsp_init() helpers of the vendors that support X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6d74a6ac3e69f4b7a8b4115835f9455faf0f468d.1588715690.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2020-04-18x86/split_lock: Add Tremont family CPU modelsTony Luck
Tremont CPUs support IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES bits to indicate whether specific SKUs have support for split lock detection. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416205754.21177-4-tony.luck@intel.com
2020-04-18x86/split_lock: Bits in IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES are not architecturalTony Luck
The Intel Software Developers' Manual erroneously listed bit 5 of the IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES register as an architectural feature. It is not. Features enumerated by IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES are model specific and implementation details may vary in different cpu models. Thus it is only safe to trust features after checking the CPU model. Icelake client and server models are known to implement the split lock detect feature even though they don't enumerate IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES [ tglx: Use switch() for readability and massage comments ] Fixes: 6650cdd9a8cc ("x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel") Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416205754.21177-3-tony.luck@intel.com
2020-04-17x86/split_lock: Update to use X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL()Tony Luck
The SPLIT_LOCK_CPU() macro escaped the tree-wide sweep for old-style initialization. Update to use X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(). Fixes: 6650cdd9a8cc ("x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel") Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416205754.21177-2-tony.luck@intel.com
2020-04-11x86/split_lock: Provide handle_guest_split_lock()Thomas Gleixner
Without at least minimal handling for split lock detection induced #AC, VMX will just run into the same problem as the VMWare hypervisor, which was reported by Kenneth. It will inject the #AC blindly into the guest whether the guest is prepared or not. Provide a function for guest mode which acts depending on the host SLD mode. If mode == sld_warn, treat it like user space, i.e. emit a warning, disable SLD and mark the task accordingly. Otherwise force SIGBUS. [ bp: Add a !CPU_SUP_INTEL stub for handle_guest_split_lock(). ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200410115516.978037132@linutronix.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200402123258.895628824@linutronix.de
2020-03-27x86/split_lock: Avoid runtime reads of the TEST_CTRL MSRXiaoyao Li
In a context switch from a task that is detecting split locks to one that is not (or vice versa) we need to update the TEST_CTRL MSR. Currently this is done with the common sequence: read the MSR flip the bit write the MSR in order to avoid changing the value of any reserved bits in the MSR. Cache unused and reserved bits of TEST_CTRL MSR with SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT bit cleared during initialization, so we can avoid an expensive RDMSR instruction during context switch. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Originally-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200325030924.132881-3-xiaoyao.li@intel.com
2020-03-27x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detectionXiaoyao Li
Current initialization flow of split lock detection has following issues: 1. It assumes the initial value of MSR_TEST_CTRL.SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT to be zero. However, it's possible that BIOS/firmware has set it. 2. X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT flag is unconditionally set even if there is a virtualization flaw that FMS indicates the existence while it's actually not supported. Rework the initialization flow to solve above issues. In detail, explicitly clear and set split_lock_detect bit to verify MSR_TEST_CTRL can be accessed, and rdmsr after wrmsr to ensure bit is cleared/set successfully. X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT flag is set only when the feature does exist and the feature is not disabled with kernel param "split_lock_detect=off" On each processor, explicitly updating the SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT bit based on sld_sate in split_lock_init() since BIOS/firmware may touch it. Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200325030924.132881-2-xiaoyao.li@intel.com
2020-02-20x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernelPeter Zijlstra (Intel)
A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-30Merge tag 'mpx-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-mpx Pull x86 MPX removal from Dave Hansen: "MPX requires recompiling applications, which requires compiler support. Unfortunately, GCC 9.1 is expected to be be released without support for MPX. This means that there was only a relatively small window where folks could have ever used MPX. It failed to gain wide adoption in the industry, and Linux was the only mainstream OS to ever support it widely. Support for the feature may also disappear on future processors. This set completes the process that we started during the 5.4 merge window when the MPX prctl()s were removed. XSAVE support is left in place, which allows MPX-using KVM guests to continue to function" * tag 'mpx-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-mpx: x86/mpx: remove MPX from arch/x86 mm: remove arch_bprm_mm_init() hook x86/mpx: remove bounds exception code x86/mpx: remove build infrastructure x86/alternatives: add missing insn.h include
2020-01-23x86/mpx: remove MPX from arch/x86Dave Hansen
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support in the toolchain going forward (gcc). This removes all the remaining (dead at this point) MPX handling code remaining in the tree. The only remaining code is the XSAVE support for MPX state which is currently needd for KVM to handle VMs which might use MPX. Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
2020-01-13x86/cpu: Set synthetic VMX cpufeatures during init_ia32_feat_ctl()Sean Christopherson
Set the synthetic VMX cpufeatures, which need to be kept to preserve /proc/cpuinfo's ABI, in the common IA32_FEAT_CTL initialization code. Remove the vendor code that manually sets the synthetic flags. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-13-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at bootSean Christopherson
Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection. Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the kernel and enabled via feature control, but the kernel currently uses LMCE if and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. Keep the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can opt in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so. Always lock IA32_FEAT_CTL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't support VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries the MSR can assume it's locked. Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to IA32_FEAT_CTL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so as not to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2019-11-19Merge tag 'v5.4-rc8' into WIP.x86/mm, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-28x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by defaultPawan Gupta
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack. Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c. [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer. - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh. - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-09-16x86/cpu: Clean up intel_tlb_table[]Sylvain 'ythier' Hitier
- Remove the unneeded backslash at EOL: that's not a macro. And let's please checkpatch by aligning to open parenthesis. - For 0x4f descriptor, remove " */" from the info field. - For 0xc2 descriptor, sync the beginning of info to match the tlb_type. (The value of info fields could be made more regular, but it's unused by the code and will be read only by developers, so don't bother.) Signed-off-by: Sylvain 'ythier' Hitier <sylvain.hitier@gmail.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: trivial@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190915090917.GA5086@lilas Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-06x86/cpu: Update init data for new Airmont CPU modelRahul Tanwar
Update properties for newly added Airmont CPU variant. Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190905193020.14707-5-tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-06Merge branch 'x86/cleanups' into x86/cpu, to pick up dependent changesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-08-28x86/intel: Aggregate microserver namingPeter Zijlstra
Currently big microservers have _XEON_D while small microservers have _X, Make it uniformly: _D. for i in `git grep -l "\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*_\(X\|XEON_D\)"` do sed -i -e 's/\(\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*ATOM.*\)_X/\1_D/g' \ -e 's/\(\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*\)_XEON_D/\1_D/g' ${i} done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190827195122.677152989@infradead.org
2019-08-28x86/intel: Aggregate big core graphics namingPeter Zijlstra
Currently big core clients with extra graphics on have: - _G - _GT3E Make it uniformly: _G for i in `git grep -l "\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*_GT3E"` do sed -i -e 's/\(\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*\)_GT3E/\1_G/g' ${i} done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190827195122.622802314@infradead.org
2019-08-28x86/intel: Aggregate big core mobile namingPeter Zijlstra
Currently big core mobile chips have either: - _L - _ULT - _MOBILE Make it uniformly: _L. for i in `git grep -l "\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*_\(MOBILE\|ULT\)"` do sed -i -e 's/\(\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*\)_\(MOBILE\|ULT\)/\1_L/g' ${i} done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190827195122.568978530@infradead.org
2019-08-28x86/intel: Aggregate big core client namingPeter Zijlstra
Currently the big core client models either have: - no OPTDIFF - _CORE - _DESKTOP Make it uniformly: 'no OPTDIFF'. for i in `git grep -l "\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*_\(CORE\|DESKTOP\)"` do sed -i -e 's/\(\(INTEL_FAM6_\|VULNWL_INTEL\|INTEL_CPU_FAM6\).*\)_\(CORE\|DESKTOP\)/\1/g' ${i} done Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190827195122.513945586@infradead.org
2019-08-17x86/cpu: Use constant definitions for CPU modelsRahul Tanwar
Replace model numbers with their respective macro definitions when comparing CPU models. Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Cc: cheol.yong.kim@intel.com Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: qi-ming.wu@intel.com Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f7a0e142faa953a53d5f81f78055e1b3c793b134.1565940653.git.rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com
2019-06-28x86/cpu/intel: Clear cache self-snoop capability in CPUs with known errataRicardo Neri
Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to unpredictable behavior, machine check errors, or hangs. Clear this feature on affected CPUs to prevent its use. Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan.cox@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Mohammad Etemadi <mohammad.etemadi@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561689337-19390-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
2019-04-07PM / arch: x86: Rework the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handlingRafael J. Wysocki
The current handling of MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS in the kernel is problematic, because it may cause changes made by user space to that MSR (with the help of the x86_energy_perf_policy tool, for example) to be lost every time a CPU goes offline and then back online as well as during system-wide power management transitions into sleep states and back into the working state. The first problem is that if the current EPB value for a CPU going online is 0 ('performance'), the kernel will change it to 6 ('normal') regardless of whether or not this is the first bring-up of that CPU. That also happens during system-wide resume from sleep states (including, but not limited to, hibernation). However, the EPB may have been adjusted by user space this way and the kernel should not blindly override that setting. The second problem is that if the platform firmware resets the EPB values for any CPUs during system-wide resume from a sleep state, the kernel will not restore their previous EPB values that may have been set by user space before the preceding system-wide suspend transition. Again, that behavior may at least be confusing from the user space perspective. In order to address these issues, rework the handling of MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS so that the EPB value is saved on CPU offline and restored on CPU online as well as (for the boot CPU) during the syscore stages of system-wide suspend and resume transitions, respectively. However, retain the policy by which the EPB is set to 6 ('normal') on the first bring-up of each CPU if its initial value is 0, based on the observation that 0 may mean 'not initialized' just as well as 'performance' in that case. While at it, move the MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS handling code into a separate file and document it in Documentation/admin-guide. Fixes: abe48b108247 (x86, intel, power: Initialize MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS) Fixes: b51ef52df71c (x86/cpu: Restore MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS after resume) Reported-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-27x86/spectre: Add missing family 6 check to microcode checkAndi Kleen
The check for Spectre microcodes does not check for family 6, only the model numbers. Add a family 6 check to avoid ambiguity with other families. Fixes: a5b296636453 ("x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes") Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-2-andi@firstfloor.org
2018-08-14Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set. If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible. While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack. While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism. The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 The mitigations provided by this pull request include: - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory. - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER. - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of mitigations. Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways - patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes heated, but at the end constructive discussions. There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their complexity and limitations" * 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits) x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond' x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS ...
2018-08-03x86/cpufeatures: Add EPT_AD feature bitPeter Feiner
Some Intel processors have an EPT feature whereby the accessed & dirty bits in EPT entries can be updated by HW. MSR IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP exposes the presence of this capability. There is no point in trying to use that new feature bit in the VMX code as VMX needs to read the MSR anyway to access other bits, but having the feature bit for EPT_AD in place helps virtualization management as it exposes "ept_ad" in /proc/cpuinfo/$proc/flags if the feature is present. [ tglx: Amended changelog ] Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180801180657.138051-1-pshier@google.com
2018-06-21x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings earlyThomas Gleixner
Make use of the new early detection function to initialize smp_num_siblings on the boot cpu before the MP-Table or ACPI/MADT scan happens. That's required for force disabling SMT. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-04Merge branch 'x86-boot-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar: - Centaur CPU updates (David Wang) - AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes (Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit) - Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov) * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores() x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo() x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
2018-05-19Merge branches 'x86/urgent' and 'core/urgent' into x86/boot, to pick up ↵Ingo Molnar
fixes and avoid conflicts Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-17x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumerationThomas Gleixner
The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different. Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific features or family dependent setup. Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-05-17x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRSThomas Gleixner
The availability of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is enumerated by a CPUID bit on Intel and implied by IBRS or STIBP support on AMD. That's just confusing and in case an AMD CPU has IBRS not supported because the underlying problem has been fixed but has another bit valid in the SPEC_CTRL MSR, the thing falls apart. Add a synthetic feature bit X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL to denote the availability on both Intel and AMD. While at it replace the boot_cpu_has() checks with static_cpu_has() where possible. This prevents late microcode loading from exposing SPEC_CTRL, but late loading is already very limited as it does not reevaluate the mitigation options and other bits and pieces. Having static_cpu_has() is the simplest and least fragile solution. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-05-13x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores()Thomas Gleixner
No point to have it at the call sites. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-13x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo()David Wang
There is no point in having the conditional cpu_detect_cache_sizes() call at the callsite of init_intel_cacheinfo(). Move it into init_intel_cacheinfo() and make init_intel_cacheinfo() void. [ tglx: Made the init_intel_cacheinfo() void as the return value was pointless. Adjust changelog accordingly ] Signed-off-by: David Wang <davidwang@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: lukelin@viacpu.com Cc: qiyuanwang@zhaoxin.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: brucechang@via-alliance.com Cc: timguo@zhaoxin.com Cc: cooperyan@zhaoxin.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: benjaminpan@viatech.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525314766-18910-3-git-send-email-davidwang@zhaoxin.com
2018-05-13x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() genericDavid Wang
intel_num_cpu_cores() is a static function in intel.c which can't be used by other files. Define another function called detect_num_cpu_cores() in common.c to replace this function so it can be reused. Signed-off-by: David Wang <davidwang@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: lukelin@viacpu.com Cc: qiyuanwang@zhaoxin.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: brucechang@via-alliance.com Cc: timguo@zhaoxin.com Cc: cooperyan@zhaoxin.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: benjaminpan@viatech.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525314766-18910-2-git-send-email-davidwang@zhaoxin.com
2018-05-09x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBDKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2] as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable). Hence changing it. It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No. Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD. [ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>