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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Replace the EFI runtime services check with one that tells us whether
EFI GetVariable() is implemented by the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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The IMA arch code attempts to inspect the "SetupMode" EFI variable
by populating a variable called efi_SetupMode_name with the string
"SecureBoot" and passing that to the EFI GetVariable service, which
obviously does not yield the expected result.
Given that the string is only referenced a single time, let's get
rid of the intermediate variable, and pass the correct string as
an immediate argument. While at it, do the same for "SecureBoot".
Fixes: 399574c64eaf ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Fixes: 980ef4d22a95 ("x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too")
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Checking "SecureBoot" mode is not sufficient, also check "SetupMode".
Fixes: 399574c64eaf ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Checking efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) is not sufficient to ensure that
EFI runtime services are available, e.g. if efi=noruntime is used.
Without this, I get an oops on a PREEMPT_RT kernel where efi=noruntime is
the default.
Fixes: 399574c64eaf94e8 ("x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0)
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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As reported by 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure:
arch/x86//kernel/ima_arch.c: In function 'arch_get_ima_policy':
>> arch/x86//kernel/ima_arch.c:78:4: error: implicit declaration of
function 'set_module_sig_enforced' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Have the IMA architecture specific policy require signed kernel modules
on systems with secure boot mode enabled; and coordinate the different
signature verification methods, so only one signature is required.
Requiring appended kernel module signatures may be configured, enabled
on the boot command line, or with this patch enabled in secure boot
mode. This patch defines set_module_sig_enforced().
To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA
signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled. A custom IMA policy may still define
and require an IMA signature.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
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The secure boot mode may not be detected on boot for some reason (eg.
buggy firmware). This patch attempts one more time to detect the
secure boot mode.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.
Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.
When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall.
As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with
secureboot enabled.
This patch defines the new arch specific function called
arch_ima_get_secureboot() to retrieve the secureboot state of the system.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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