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The flags for KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR and KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
have no protection for their unused bits. Without protection, future
development for these features will be difficult. Add the protection
needed to make it possible to extend these features in the future.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220714161314.1715227-1-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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'vector' and 'trig_mode' fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' are left
uninitialized in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(). While these fields are normally
not needed for APIC_DM_REMRD, they're still referenced by
__apic_accept_irq() for trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(). Fully initialize
the structure to avoid consuming random stack memory.
Fixes: a183b638b61c ("KVM: x86: make apic_accept_irq tracepoint more generic")
Reported-by: syzbot+d6caa905917d353f0d07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220708125147.593975-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Some of the statistics values exported by KVM are always only 0 or 1.
It can be useful to export this fact to userspace so that it can track
them specially (for example by polling the value every now and then to
compute a % of time spent in a specific state).
Therefore, add "boolean value" as a new "unit". While it is not exactly
a unit, it walks and quacks like one. In particular, using the type
would be wrong because boolean values could be instantaneous or peak
values (e.g. "is the rmap allocated?") or even two-bucket histograms
(e.g. "number of posted vs. non-posted interrupt injections").
Suggested-by: Amneesh Singh <natto@weirdnatto.in>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The recent mmio_stale_data fixes broke the noinstr constraints:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x15b: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x1bf: call to kvm_arch_has_assigned_device() leaves .noinstr.text section
make it all happy again.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"While last week's pull request contained miscellaneous fixes for x86,
this one covers other architectures, selftests changes, and a bigger
series for APIC virtualization bugs that were discovered during 5.20
development. The idea is to base 5.20 development for KVM on top of
this tag.
ARM64:
- Properly reset the SVE/SME flags on vcpu load
- Fix a vgic-v2 regression regarding accessing the pending state of a
HW interrupt from userspace (and make the code common with vgic-v3)
- Fix access to the idreg range for protected guests
- Ignore 'kvm-arm.mode=protected' when using VHE
- Return an error from kvm_arch_init_vm() on allocation failure
- A bunch of small cleanups (comments, annotations, indentation)
RISC-V:
- Typo fix in arch/riscv/kvm/vmid.c
- Remove broken reference pattern from MAINTAINERS entry
x86-64:
- Fix error in page tables with MKTME enabled
- Dirty page tracking performance test extended to running a nested
guest
- Disable APICv/AVIC in cases that it cannot implement correctly"
[ This merge also fixes a misplaced end parenthesis bug introduced in
commit 3743c2f02517 ("KVM: x86: inhibit APICv/AVIC on changes to APIC
ID or APIC base") pointed out by Sean Christopherson ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220610191813.371682-1-seanjc@google.com/
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (34 commits)
KVM: selftests: Restrict test region to 48-bit physical addresses when using nested
KVM: selftests: Add option to run dirty_log_perf_test vCPUs in L2
KVM: selftests: Clean up LIBKVM files in Makefile
KVM: selftests: Link selftests directly with lib object files
KVM: selftests: Drop unnecessary rule for STATIC_LIBS
KVM: selftests: Add a helper to check EPT/VPID capabilities
KVM: selftests: Move VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP_AD_BITS to vmx.h
KVM: selftests: Refactor nested_map() to specify target level
KVM: selftests: Drop stale function parameter comment for nested_map()
KVM: selftests: Add option to create 2M and 1G EPT mappings
KVM: selftests: Replace x86_page_size with PG_LEVEL_XX
KVM: x86: SVM: fix nested PAUSE filtering when L0 intercepts PAUSE
KVM: x86: SVM: drop preempt-safe wrappers for avic_vcpu_load/put
KVM: x86: disable preemption around the call to kvm_arch_vcpu_{un|}blocking
KVM: x86: disable preemption while updating apicv inhibition
KVM: x86: SVM: fix avic_kick_target_vcpus_fast
KVM: x86: SVM: remove avic's broken code that updated APIC ID
KVM: x86: inhibit APICv/AVIC on changes to APIC ID or APIC base
KVM: x86: document AVIC/APICv inhibit reasons
KVM: x86/mmu: Set memory encryption "value", not "mask", in shadow PDPTRs
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 MMIO stale data fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another hw vulnerability with a software mitigation: Processor
MMIO Stale Data.
They are a class of MMIO-related weaknesses which can expose stale
data by propagating it into core fill buffers. Data which can then be
leaked using the usual speculative execution methods.
Mitigations include this set along with microcode updates and are
similar to MDS and TAA vulnerabilities: VERW now clears those buffers
too"
* tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning
KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests
x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS
x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection
x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data
x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle
x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations
x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update
x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
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Currently nothing prevents preemption in kvm_vcpu_update_apicv.
On SVM, If the preemption happens after we update the
vcpu->arch.apicv_active, the preemption itself will
'update' the inhibition since the AVIC will be first disabled
on vCPU unload and then enabled, when the current task
is loaded again.
Then we will try to update it again, which will lead to a warning
in __avic_vcpu_load, that the AVIC is already enabled.
Fix this by disabling preemption in this code.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220606180829.102503-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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into HEAD
KVM/riscv fixes for 5.19, take #1
- Typo fix in arch/riscv/kvm/vmid.c
- Remove broken reference pattern from MAINTAINERS entry
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Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
- syzkaller NULL pointer dereference
- TDP MMU performance issue with disabling dirty logging
- 5.14 regression with SVM TSC scaling
- indefinite stall on applying live patches
- unstable selftest
- memory leak from wrong copy-and-paste
- missed PV TLB flush when racing with emulation
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: do not report a vCPU as preempted outside instruction boundaries
KVM: x86: do not set st->preempted when going back to user space
KVM: SVM: fix tsc scaling cache logic
KVM: selftests: Make hyperv_clock selftest more stable
KVM: x86/MMU: Zap non-leaf SPTEs when disabling dirty logging
x86: drop bogus "cc" clobber from __try_cmpxchg_user_asm()
KVM: x86/mmu: Check every prev_roots in __kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots()
entry/kvm: Exit to user mode when TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL is set
KVM: Don't null dereference ops->destroy
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If a vCPU is outside guest mode and is scheduled out, it might be in the
process of making a memory access. A problem occurs if another vCPU uses
the PV TLB flush feature during the period when the vCPU is scheduled
out, and a virtual address has already been translated but has not yet
been accessed, because this is equivalent to using a stale TLB entry.
To avoid this, only report a vCPU as preempted if sure that the guest
is at an instruction boundary. A rescheduling request will be delivered
to the host physical CPU as an external interrupt, so for simplicity
consider any vmexit *not* instruction boundary except for external
interrupts.
It would in principle be okay to report the vCPU as preempted also
if it is sleeping in kvm_vcpu_block(): a TLB flush IPI will incur the
vmentry/vmexit overhead unnecessarily, and optimistic spinning is
also unlikely to succeed. However, leave it for later because right
now kvm_vcpu_check_block() is doing memory accesses. Even
though the TLB flush issue only applies to virtual memory address,
it's very much preferrable to be conservative.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Similar to the Xen path, only change the vCPU's reported state if the vCPU
was actually preempted. The reason for KVM's behavior is that for example
optimistic spinning might not be a good idea if the guest is doing repeated
exits to userspace; however, it is confusing and unlikely to make a difference,
because well-tuned guests will hardly ever exit KVM_RUN in the first place.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of small x86 cleanups:
- Remove unused headers in the IDT code
- Kconfig indendation and comment fixes
- Fix all 'the the' typos in one go instead of waiting for bots to
fix one at a time"
* tag 'x86-cleanups-2022-06-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Fix all occurences of the "the the" typo
x86/idt: Remove unused headers
x86/Kconfig: Fix indentation of arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
x86/Kconfig: Fix indentation and add endif comments to arch/x86/Kconfig
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Rather than waiting for the bots to fix these one-by-one,
fix all occurences of "the the" throughout arch/x86.
Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <liubo03@inspur.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527061400.5694-1-liubo03@inspur.com
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Whenever x86_decode_emulated_instruction() detects a breakpoint, it
returns the value that kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() writes into its
pass-by-reference second argument. Unfortunately this is completely
bogus because the expected outcome of x86_decode_emulated_instruction
is an EMULATION_* value.
Then, if kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() does "*r = 0" (corresponding to
a KVM_EXIT_DEBUG userspace exit), it is misunderstood as EMULATION_OK
and x86_emulate_instruction() is called without having decoded the
instruction. This causes various havoc from running with a stale
emulation context.
The fix is to move the call to kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() where it was
before commit 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction
emulation with decoding") introduced x86_decode_emulated_instruction().
The other caller of the function does not need breakpoint checks,
because it is invoked as part of a vmexit and the processor has already
checked those before executing the instruction that #GP'd.
This fixes CVE-2022-1852.
Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <qiuhao@sysec.org>
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction emulation with decoding")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220311032801.3467418-2-seanjc@google.com>
[Rewrote commit message according to Qiuhao's report, since a patch
already existed to fix the bug. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for 5.19
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed
to the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
[Due to the conflict, KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM is relocated
from 4 to 6. - Paolo]
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In commit ec0671d5684a ("KVM: LAPIC: Delay trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire
tracepoint to after vmexit", 2019-06-04), trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire
was moved after guest_exit_irqoff() because invoking tracepoints within
kvm_guest_enter/kvm_guest_exit caused a lockdep splat.
These days this is not necessary, because commit 87fa7f3e98a1 ("x86/kvm:
Move context tracking where it belongs", 2020-07-09) restricted
the RCU extended quiescent state to be closer to vmentry/vmexit.
Moving the tracepoint back to __kvm_wait_lapic_expire is more accurate,
because it will be reported even if vcpu_enter_guest causes multiple
vmentries via the IPI/Timer fast paths, and it allows the removal of
advance_expire_delta.
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1650961551-38390-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Expand and clean up the page fault stats. The current stats are at best
incomplete, and at worst misleading. Differentiate between faults that
are actually fixed vs those that result in an MMIO SPTE being created,
track faults that are spurious, faults that trigger emulation, faults
that that are fixed in the fast path, and last but not least, track the
number of faults that are taken.
Note, the number of faults that require emulation for write-protected
shadow pages can roughly be calculated by subtracting the number of MMIO
SPTEs created from the overall number of faults that trigger emulation.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220423034752.1161007-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move kvm_arch_async_page_ready() to mmu.c where it belongs, and move all
of the page fault handling collateral that was in mmu.h purely for the
async #PF handler into mmu_internal.h, where it belongs. This will allow
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() to act on the RET_PF_* return without having to
expose those enums outside of the MMU.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220423034752.1161007-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This shows up as a TDP MMU leak when running nested. Non-working cmpxchg on L0
relies makes L1 install two different shadow pages under same spte, and one of
them is leaked.
Fixes: 1c2361f667f36 ("KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to emulate atomic accesses")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220512101420.306759-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This can cause various unexpected issues, since VM is partially
destroyed at that point.
For example when AVIC is enabled, this causes avic_vcpu_load to
access physical id page entry which is already freed by .vm_destroy.
Fixes: 8221c1370056 ("svm: Manage vcpu load/unload when enable AVIC")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220322172449.235575-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This can help identify potential performance issues when handles
AVIC incomplete IPI due vCPU not running.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420154954.19305-3-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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direct_map is always equal to the direct field of the root page's role:
- for shadow paging, direct_map is true if CR0.PG=0 and root_role.direct is
copied from cpu_role.base.direct
- for TDP, it is always true and root_role.direct is also always true
- for shadow TDP, it is always false and root_role.direct is also always
false
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Replace the per-vendor hack-a-fix for KVM's #PF => #PF => #DF workaround
with an explicit, common workaround in kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault().
Aside from being a hack, the current approach is brittle and incomplete,
e.g. nSVM's KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE fails to set ->inject_page_fault(),
and nVMX fails to apply the workaround when VMX is intercepting #PF due
to allow_smaller_maxphyaddr=1.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Fixes for (relatively) old bugs, to be merged in both the -rc and next
development trees.
The merge reconciles the ABI fixes for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT between
5.18 and commit c24a950ec7d6 ("KVM, SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata
for SEV-ES", 2022-04-13).
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Fixes for (relatively) old bugs, to be merged in both the -rc and next
development trees:
* Fix potential races when walking host page table
* Fix bad user ABI for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT
* Fix shadow page table leak when KVM runs nested
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When KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT was introduced, it included a flags
member that at the time was unused. Unfortunately this extensibility
mechanism has several issues:
- x86 is not writing the member, so it would not be possible to use it
on x86 except for new events
- the member is not aligned to 64 bits, so the definition of the
uAPI struct is incorrect for 32- on 64-bit userspace. This is a
problem for RISC-V, which supports CONFIG_KVM_COMPAT, but fortunately
usage of flags was only introduced in 5.18.
Since padding has to be introduced, place a new field in there
that tells if the flags field is valid. To allow further extensibility,
in fact, change flags to an array of 16 values, and store how many
of the values are valid. The availability of the new ndata field
is tied to a system capability; all architectures are changed to
fill in the field.
To avoid breaking compilation of userspace that was using the flags
field, provide a userspace-only union to overlap flags with data[0].
The new field is placed at the same offset for both 32- and 64-bit
userspace.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220422103013.34832-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Disallow memslots and MMIO SPTEs whose gpa range would exceed the host's
MAXPHYADDR, i.e. don't create SPTEs for gfns that exceed host.MAXPHYADDR.
The TDP MMU bounds its zapping based on host.MAXPHYADDR, and so if the
guest, possibly with help from userspace, manages to coerce KVM into
creating a SPTE for an "impossible" gfn, KVM will leak the associated
shadow pages (page tables):
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 1122 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:57
kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 10 PID: 1122 Comm: set_memory_regi Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1+ #293
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu+0x4b/0x60 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x130/0x1b0 [kvm]
kvm_destroy_vm+0x162/0x2d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_release+0x1d/0x30 [kvm]
__fput+0x82/0x240
task_work_run+0x5b/0x90
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xd2/0xe0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
On bare metal, encountering an impossible gpa in the page fault path is
well and truly impossible, barring CPU bugs, as the CPU will signal #PF
during the gva=>gpa translation (or a similar failure when stuffing a
physical address into e.g. the VMCS/VMCB). But if KVM is running as a VM
itself, the MAXPHYADDR enumerated to KVM may not be the actual MAXPHYADDR
of the underlying hardware, in which case the hardware will not fault on
the illegal-from-KVM's-perspective gpa.
Alternatively, KVM could continue allowing the dodgy behavior and simply
zap the max possible range. But, for hosts with MAXPHYADDR < 52, that's
a (minor) waste of cycles, and more importantly, KVM can't reasonably
support impossible memslots when running on bare metal (or with an
accurate MAXPHYADDR as a VM). Note, limiting the overhead by checking if
KVM is running as a guest is not a safe option as the host isn't required
to announce itself to the guest in any way, e.g. doesn't need to set the
HYPERVISOR CPUID bit.
A second alternative to disallowing the memslot behavior would be to
disallow creating a VM with guest.MAXPHYADDR > host.MAXPHYADDR. That
restriction is undesirable as there are legitimate use cases for doing
so, e.g. using the highest host.MAXPHYADDR out of a pool of heterogeneous
systems so that VMs can be migrated between hosts with different
MAXPHYADDRs without running afoul of the allow_smaller_maxphyaddr mess.
Note that any guest.MAXPHYADDR is valid with shadow paging, and it is
even useful in order to test KVM with MAXPHYADDR=52 (i.e. without
any reserved physical address bits).
The now common kvm_mmu_max_gfn() is inclusive instead of exclusive.
The memslot and TDP MMU code want an exclusive value, but the name
implies the returned value is inclusive, and the MMIO path needs an
inclusive check.
Fixes: faaf05b00aec ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 524a1e4e381f ("KVM: x86/mmu: Don't leak non-leaf SPTEs when zapping all SPTEs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220428233416.2446833-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Skip the APICv inhibit update for KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ if APICv is
disabled at the module level to avoid having to acquire the mutex and
potentially process all vCPUs. The DISABLE inhibit will (barring bugs)
never be lifted, so piling on more inhibits is unnecessary.
Fixes: cae72dcc3b21 ("KVM: x86: inhibit APICv when KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ active")
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Make a KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE request when creating a vCPU with an
in-kernel local APIC and APICv enabled at the module level. Consuming
kvm_apicv_activated() and stuffing vcpu->arch.apicv_active directly can
race with __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(), as vCPU creation happens
before the vCPU is fully onlined, i.e. it won't get the request made to
"all" vCPUs. If APICv is globally inhibited between setting apicv_active
and onlining the vCPU, the vCPU will end up running with APICv enabled
and trigger KVM's sanity check.
Mark APICv as active during vCPU creation if APICv is enabled at the
module level, both to be optimistic about it's final state, e.g. to avoid
additional VMWRITEs on VMX, and because there are likely bugs lurking
since KVM checks apicv_active in multiple vCPU creation paths. While
keeping the current behavior of consuming kvm_apicv_activated() is
arguably safer from a regression perspective, force apicv_active so that
vCPU creation runs with deterministic state and so that if there are bugs,
they are found sooner than later, i.e. not when some crazy race condition
is hit.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 484 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 484 Comm: syz-executor361 Not tainted 5.16.13 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1~cloud0 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10039 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x337/0x15e0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10234
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4d2/0xc80 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3727
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16d/0x1d0 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The bug was hit by a syzkaller spamming VM creation with 2 vCPUs and a
call to KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG.
r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x0)
r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0)
ioctl$KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP(r1, 0x4068aea3, &(0x7f0000000000)) (async)
r2 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x0) (async)
r3 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x400000000000002)
ioctl$KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG(r3, 0x4048ae9b, &(0x7f00000000c0)={0x5dda9c14aa95f5c5})
ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0)
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 8df14af42f00 ("kvm: x86: Add support for dynamic APICv activation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Set the DISABLE inhibit, not the ABSENT inhibit, if APICv is disabled via
module param. A recent refactoring to add a wrapper for setting/clearing
inhibits unintentionally changed the flag, probably due to a copy+paste
goof.
Fixes: 4f4c4a3ee53c ("KVM: x86: Trace all APICv inhibit changes and capture overall status")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add wrappers to acquire/release KVM's SRCU lock when stashing the index
in vcpu->src_idx, along with rudimentary detection of illegal usage,
e.g. re-acquiring SRCU and thus overwriting vcpu->src_idx. Because the
SRCU index is (currently) either 0 or 1, illegal nesting bugs can go
unnoticed for quite some time and only cause problems when the nested
lock happens to get a different index.
Wrap the WARNs in PROVE_RCU=y, and make them ONCE, otherwise KVM will
likely yell so loudly that it will bring the kernel to its knees.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Don't re-acquire SRCU in complete_emulated_io() now that KVM acquires the
lock in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(). More importantly, don't overwrite
vcpu->srcu_idx. If the index acquired by complete_emulated_io() differs
from the one acquired by kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(), KVM will effectively
leak a lock and hang if/when synchronize_srcu() is invoked for the
relevant grace period.
Fixes: 8d25b7beca7e ("KVM: x86: pull kvm->srcu read-side to kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Exit to userspace when emulating an atomic guest access if the CMPXCHG on
the userspace address faults. Emulating the access as a write and thus
likely treating it as emulated MMIO is wrong, as KVM has already
confirmed there is a valid, writable memslot.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220202004945.2540433-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Use the recently introduce __try_cmpxchg_user() to emulate atomic guest
accesses via the associated userspace address instead of mapping the
backing pfn into kernel address space. Using kvm_vcpu_map() is unsafe as
it does not coordinate with KVM's mmu_notifier to ensure the hva=>pfn
translation isn't changed/unmapped in the memremap() path, i.e. when
there's no struct page and thus no elevated refcount.
Fixes: 42e35f8072c3 ("KVM/X86: Use kvm_vcpu_map in emulator_cmpxchg_emulated")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220202004945.2540433-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The pmu_ops should be moved to kvm_x86_init_ops and tagged as __initdata.
That'll save those precious few bytes, and more importantly make
the original ops unreachable, i.e. make it harder to sneak in post-init
modification bugs.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220329235054.3534728-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Replace the kvm_pmu_ops pointer in common x86 with an instance of the
struct to save one pointer dereference when invoking functions. Copy the
struct by value to set the ops during kvm_init().
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
[sean: Move pmc_is_enabled(), make kvm_pmu_ops static]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220329235054.3534728-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The kvm_ops_static_call_update() is defined in kvm_host.h. That's
completely unnecessary, it should have exactly one caller,
kvm_arch_hardware_setup(). Move the helper to x86.c and have it do the
actual memcpy() of the ops in addition to the static call updates. This
will also allow for cleanly giving kvm_pmu_ops static_call treatment.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
[sean: Move memcpy() into the helper and rename accordingly]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220329235054.3534728-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Merge branch for features that did not make it into 5.18:
* New ioctls to get/set TSC frequency for a whole VM
* Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
Nested virtualization improvements for AMD:
* Support for "nested nested" optimizations (nested vVMLOAD/VMSAVE,
nested vGIF)
* Allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running
* Fixes for LBR virtualizations when a nested guest is running,
and nested LBR virtualization support
* PAUSE filtering for nested hypervisors
Guest support:
* Decoupling of vcpu_is_preempted from PV spinlocks
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The following WARN is triggered from kvm_vm_ioctl_set_clock():
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 579353 at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3161 mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
CPU: 10 PID: 579353 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G W O 5.16.0.stable #20
Hardware name: LENOVO 20UF001CUS/20UF001CUS, BIOS R1CET65W(1.34 ) 06/17/2021
RIP: 0010:mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x6c/0x80 [kvm]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? kvm_write_guest+0x114/0x120 [kvm]
kvm_hv_invalidate_tsc_page+0x9e/0xf0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa26/0xc50 [kvm]
? schedule+0x4e/0xc0
? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
? futex_wait+0x166/0x250
? __send_signal+0x1f1/0x3d0
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x747/0xda0 [kvm]
...
The WARN was introduced by commit 03c0304a86bc ("KVM: Warn if
mark_page_dirty() is called without an active vCPU") but the change seems
to be correct (unlike Hyper-V TSC page update mechanism). In fact, there's
no real need to actually write to guest memory to invalidate TSC page, this
can be done by the first vCPU which goes through kvm_guest_time_update().
Reported-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407201013.963226-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
|
|
Resolve nx_huge_pages to true/false when kvm.ko is loaded, leaving it as
-1 is technically undefined behavior when its value is read out by
param_get_bool(), as boolean values are supposed to be '0' or '1'.
Alternatively, KVM could define a custom getter for the param, but the
auto value doesn't depend on the vendor module in any way, and printing
"auto" would be unnecessarily unfriendly to the user.
In addition to fixing the undefined behavior, resolving the auto value
also fixes the scenario where the auto value resolves to N and no vendor
module is loaded. Previously, -1 would result in Y being printed even
though KVM would ultimately disable the mitigation.
Rename the existing MMU module init/exit helpers to clarify that they're
invoked with respect to the vendor module, and add comments to document
why KVM has two separate "module init" flows.
=========================================================================
UBSAN: invalid-load in kernel/params.c:320:33
load of value 255 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
CPU: 6 PID: 892 Comm: tail Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #799
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x43/0x48
param_get_bool.cold+0xf/0x14
param_attr_show+0x55/0x80
module_attr_show+0x1c/0x30
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x93/0xc0
seq_read_iter+0x11c/0x450
new_sync_read+0x11b/0x1a0
vfs_read+0xf0/0x190
ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
=========================================================================
Fixes: b8e8c8303ff2 ("kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Bruno Goncalves <bgoncalv@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220331221359.3912754-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
- Only do MSR filtering for MSRs accessed by rdmsr/wrmsr
- Documentation improvements
- Prevent module exit until all VMs are freed
- PMU Virtualization fixes
- Fix for kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast() NULL-pointer dereferences
- Other miscellaneous bugfixes
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (42 commits)
KVM: x86: fix sending PV IPI
KVM: x86/mmu: do compare-and-exchange of gPTE via the user address
KVM: x86: Remove redundant vm_entry_controls_clearbit() call
KVM: x86: cleanup enter_rmode()
KVM: x86: SVM: fix tsc scaling when the host doesn't support it
kvm: x86: SVM: remove unused defines
KVM: x86: SVM: move tsc ratio definitions to svm.h
KVM: x86: SVM: fix avic spec based definitions again
KVM: MIPS: remove reference to trap&emulate virtualization
KVM: x86: document limitations of MSR filtering
KVM: x86: Only do MSR filtering when access MSR by rdmsr/wrmsr
KVM: x86/emulator: Emulate RDPID only if it is enabled in guest
KVM: x86/pmu: Fix and isolate TSX-specific performance event logic
KVM: x86: mmu: trace kvm_mmu_set_spte after the new SPTE was set
KVM: x86/svm: Clear reserved bits written to PerfEvtSeln MSRs
KVM: x86: Trace all APICv inhibit changes and capture overall status
KVM: x86: Add wrappers for setting/clearing APICv inhibits
KVM: x86: Make APICv inhibit reasons an enum and cleanup naming
KVM: X86: Handle implicit supervisor access with SMAP
KVM: X86: Rename variable smap to not_smap in permission_fault()
...
|
|
kvm_load_{guest|host}_xsave_state handles xsave on vm entry and exit,
part of which is managing memory protection key state. The latest
arch.pkru is updated with a rdpkru, and if that doesn't match the base
host_pkru (which about 70% of the time), we issue a __write_pkru.
To improve performance, implement the following optimizations:
1. Reorder if conditions prior to wrpkru in both
kvm_load_{guest|host}_xsave_state.
Flip the ordering of the || condition so that XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU is
checked first, which when instrumented in our environment appeared
to be always true and less overall work than kvm_read_cr4_bits.
For kvm_load_guest_xsave_state, hoist arch.pkru != host_pkru ahead
one position. When instrumented, I saw this be true roughly ~70% of
the time vs the other conditions which were almost always true.
With this change, we will avoid 3rd condition check ~30% of the time.
2. Wrap PKU sections with CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS,
as if the user compiles out this feature, we should not have
these branches at all.
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Message-Id: <20220324004439.6709-1-jon@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add optional callback .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons returning
extra inhibit reasons that prevent APICv from working on this vCPU.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220322174050.241850-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Don't snapshot tsc_khz into max_tsc_khz during KVM initialization if the
host TSC is constant, in which case the actual TSC frequency will never
change and thus capturing the "max" TSC during initialization is
unnecessary, KVM can simply use tsc_khz during VM creation.
On CPUs with constant TSC, but not a hardware-specified TSC frequency,
snapshotting max_tsc_khz and using that to set a VM's default TSC
frequency can lead to KVM thinking it needs to manually scale the guest's
TSC if refining the TSC completes after KVM snapshots tsc_khz. The
actual frequency never changes, only the kernel's calculation of what
that frequency is changes. On systems without hardware TSC scaling, this
either puts KVM into "always catchup" mode (extremely inefficient), or
prevents creating VMs altogether.
Ideally, KVM would not be able to race with TSC refinement, or would have
a hook into tsc_refine_calibration_work() to get an alert when refinement
is complete. Avoiding the race altogether isn't practical as refinement
takes a relative eternity; it's deliberately put on a work queue outside
of the normal boot sequence to avoid unnecessarily delaying boot.
Adding a hook is doable, but somewhat gross due to KVM's ability to be
built as a module. And if the TSC is constant, which is likely the case
for every VMX/SVM-capable CPU produced in the last decade, the race can
be hit if and only if userspace is able to create a VM before TSC
refinement completes; refinement is slow, but not that slow.
For now, punt on a proper fix, as not taking a snapshot can help some
uses cases and not taking a snapshot is arguably correct irrespective of
the race with refinement.
[ dwmw2: Rebase on top of KVM-wide default_tsc_khz to ensure that all
vCPUs get the same frequency even if we hit the race. ]
Cc: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Cc: Anton Romanov <romanton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20220225145304.36166-3-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This sets the default TSC frequency for subsequently created vCPUs.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20220225145304.36166-2-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
At the end of the patch series adding this batch of event channel
acceleration features, finally add the feature bit which advertises
them and document it all.
For SCHEDOP_poll we need to wake a polling vCPU when a given port
is triggered, even when it's masked — and we want to implement that
in the kernel, for efficiency. So we want the kernel to know that it
has sole ownership of event channel delivery. Thus, we allow
userspace to make the 'promise' by setting the corresponding feature
bit in its KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG call. As we implement SCHEDOP_poll
bypass later, we will do so only if that promise has been made by
userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220303154127.202856-16-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In order to intercept hypercalls such as VCPUOP_set_singleshot_timer, we
need to be aware of the Xen CPU numbering.
This looks a lot like the Hyper-V handling of vpidx, for obvious reasons.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220303154127.202856-12-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|