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It allows this inline function to be reused by more callers in
more files, such as pmu_intel.c.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-14-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The bit 12 represents "Processor Event Based Sampling Unavailable (RO)" :
1 = PEBS is not supported.
0 = PEBS is supported.
A write to this PEBS_UNAVL available bit will bring #GP(0) when guest PEBS
is enabled. Some PEBS drivers in guest may care about this bit.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-13-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES.PEBS_BASELINE [bit 14] is set, the adaptive
PEBS is supported. The PEBS_DATA_CFG MSR and adaptive record enable
bits (IA32_PERFEVTSELx.Adaptive_Record and IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL.
FCx_Adaptive_Record) are also supported.
Adaptive PEBS provides software the capability to configure the PEBS
records to capture only the data of interest, keeping the record size
compact. An overflow of PMCx results in generation of an adaptive PEBS
record with state information based on the selections specified in
MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG.By default, the record only contain the Basic group.
When guest adaptive PEBS is enabled, the IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR will
be added to the perf_guest_switch_msr() and switched during the VMX
transitions just like CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR.
According to Intel SDM, software is recommended to PEBS Baseline
when the following is true. IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES.PEBS_BASELINE[14]
&& IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES.PEBS_FMT[11:8] ≥ 4.
Co-developed-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-12-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When CPUID.01H:EDX.DS[21] is set, the IA32_DS_AREA MSR exists and points
to the linear address of the first byte of the DS buffer management area,
which is used to manage the PEBS records.
When guest PEBS is enabled, the MSR_IA32_DS_AREA MSR will be added to the
perf_guest_switch_msr() and switched during the VMX transitions just like
CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR. The WRMSR to IA32_DS_AREA MSR brings a #GP(0)
if the source register contains a non-canonical address.
Originally-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-11-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The PEBS-PDIR facility on Ice Lake server is supported on IA31_FIXED0 only.
If the guest configures counter 32 and PEBS is enabled, the PEBS-PDIR
facility is supposed to be used, in which case KVM adjusts attr.precise_ip
to 3 and request host perf to assign the exactly requested counter or fail.
The CPU model check is also required since some platforms may place the
PEBS-PDIR facility in another counter index.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-10-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When a guest counter is configured as a PEBS counter through
IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, a guest PEBS event will be reprogrammed by
configuring a non-zero precision level in the perf_event_attr.
The guest PEBS overflow PMI bit would be set in the guest
GLOBAL_STATUS MSR when PEBS facility generates a PEBS
overflow PMI based on guest IA32_DS_AREA MSR.
Even with the same counter index and the same event code and
mask, guest PEBS events will not be reused for non-PEBS events.
Originally-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-9-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES.PEBS_BASELINE [bit 14] is set, the
IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR exists and all architecturally enumerated fixed
and general-purpose counters have corresponding bits in IA32_PEBS_ENABLE
that enable generation of PEBS records. The general-purpose counter bits
start at bit IA32_PEBS_ENABLE[0], and the fixed counter bits start at
bit IA32_PEBS_ENABLE[32].
When guest PEBS is enabled, the IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR will be
added to the perf_guest_switch_msr() and atomically switched during
the VMX transitions just like CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR.
Based on whether the platform supports x86_pmu.pebs_ept, it has also
refactored the way to add more msrs to arr[] in intel_guest_get_msrs()
for extensibility.
Originally-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-8-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The mask value of fixed counter control register should be dynamic
adjusted with the number of fixed counters. This patch introduces a
variable that includes the reserved bits of fixed counter control
registers. This is a generic code refactoring.
Co-developed-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-6-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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On Intel platforms, the software can use the IA32_MISC_ENABLE[7] bit to
detect whether the processor supports performance monitoring facility.
It depends on the PMU is enabled for the guest, and a software write
operation to this available bit will be ignored. The proposal to ignore
the toggle in KVM is the way to go and that behavior matches bare metal.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-5-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Splitting the logic for determining the guest values is unnecessarily
confusing, and potentially fragile. Perf should have full knowledge and
control of what values are loaded for the guest.
If we change .guest_get_msrs() to take a struct kvm_pmu pointer, then it
can generate the full set of guest values by grabbing guest ds_area and
pebs_data_cfg. Alternatively, .guest_get_msrs() could take the desired
guest MSR values directly (ds_area and pebs_data_cfg), but kvm_pmu is
vendor agnostic, so we don't see any reason to not just pass the pointer.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220411101946.20262-4-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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With IPI virtualization enabled, the processor emulates writes to
APIC registers that would send IPIs. The processor sets the bit
corresponding to the vector in target vCPU's PIR and may send a
notification (IPI) specified by NDST and NV fields in target vCPU's
Posted-Interrupt Descriptor (PID). It is similar to what IOMMU
engine does when dealing with posted interrupt from devices.
A PID-pointer table is used by the processor to locate the PID of a
vCPU with the vCPU's APIC ID. The table size depends on maximum APIC
ID assigned for current VM session from userspace. Allocating memory
for PID-pointer table is deferred to vCPU creation, because irqchip
mode and VM-scope maximum APIC ID is settled at that point. KVM can
skip PID-pointer table allocation if !irqchip_in_kernel().
Like VT-d PI, if a vCPU goes to blocked state, VMM needs to switch its
notification vector to wakeup vector. This can ensure that when an IPI
for blocked vCPUs arrives, VMM can get control and wake up blocked
vCPUs. And if a VCPU is preempted, its posted interrupt notification
is suppressed.
Note that IPI virtualization can only virualize physical-addressing,
flat mode, unicast IPIs. Sending other IPIs would still cause a
trap-like APIC-write VM-exit and need to be handled by VMM.
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419154510.11938-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce new max_vcpu_ids in KVM for x86 architecture. Userspace
can assign maximum possible vcpu id for current VM session using
KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID of KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl().
This is done for x86 only because the sole use case is to guide
memory allocation for PID-pointer table, a structure needed to
enable VMX IPI.
By default, max_vcpu_ids set as KVM_MAX_VCPU_IDS.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419154444.11888-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate() targets to handle arch specific VM resource
to be prepared prior to the actual creation of vCPU. For example, x86
platform may need do per-VM allocation based on max_vcpu_ids at the
first vCPU creation. It probably leads to concurrency control on this
allocation as multiple vCPU creation could happen simultaneously. From
the architectual point of view, it's necessary to execute
kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate() under protect of kvm->lock.
Currently only arm64, x86 and s390 have non-nop implementations at the
stage of vCPU pre-creation. Remove the lock acquiring in s390's design
and make sure all architecture can run kvm_arch_vcpu_precreate() safely
under kvm->lock without recrusive lock issue.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419154409.11842-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove the condition check cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls(). Calling
vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() premises secondary controls activated
and VMCS fields related to APICv valid as well. If it's invoked in
wrong circumstance at the worst case, VMX operation will report
VMfailValid error without further harmful impact and just functions
as if all the secondary controls were 0.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419153604.11786-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Upcoming Intel CPUs will support virtual x2APIC MSR writes to the vICR,
i.e. will trap and generate an APIC-write VM-Exit instead of intercepting
the WRMSR. Add support for handling "nodecode" x2APIC writes, which
were previously impossible.
Note, x2APIC MSR writes are 64 bits wide.
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419153516.11739-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add tertiary_exec_control field report in dump_vmcs(). Meanwhile,
reorganize the dump output of VMCS category as follows.
Before change:
*** Control State ***
PinBased=0x000000ff CPUBased=0xb5a26dfa SecondaryExec=0x061037eb
EntryControls=0000d1ff ExitControls=002befff
After change:
*** Control State ***
CPUBased=0xb5a26dfa SecondaryExec=0x061037eb TertiaryExec=0x0000000000000010
PinBased=0x000000ff EntryControls=0000d1ff ExitControls=002befff
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419153441.11687-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Check VMX features on tertiary execution control in VMCS config setup.
Sub-features in tertiary execution control to be enabled are adjusted
according to hardware capabilities although no sub-feature is enabled
in this patch.
EVMCSv1 doesn't support tertiary VM-execution control, so disable it
when EVMCSv1 is in use. And define the auxiliary functions for Tertiary
control field here, using the new BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW().
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419153400.11642-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The Tertiary VM-Exec Control, different from previous control fields, is 64
bit. So extend BUILD_CONTROLS_SHADOW() by adding a 'bit' parameter, to
support both 32 bit and 64 bit fields' auxiliary functions building.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220419153318.11595-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a comment to FNAME(sync_page) to explain why the TLB flushing logic
conspiculously doesn't handle the scenario of guest protections being
reduced. Specifically, if synchronizing a SPTE drops execute protections,
KVM will not emit a TLB flush, whereas dropping writable or clearing A/D
bits does trigger a flush via mmu_spte_update(). Architecturally, until
the GPTE is implicitly or explicitly flushed from the guest's perspective,
KVM is not required to flush any old, stale translations.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220513195000.99371-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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All of sync_page()'s existing checks filter out only !PRESENT gPTE,
because without execute-only, all upper levels are guaranteed to be at
least READABLE. However, if EPT with execute-only support is in use by
L1, KVM can create an SPTE that is shadow-present but guest-inaccessible
(RWX=0) if the upper level combined permissions are R (or RW) and
the leaf EPTE is changed from R (or RW) to X. Because the EPTE is
considered present when viewed in isolation, and no reserved bits are set,
FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte) will consider the GPTE valid, and cause a
not-present SPTE to be created.
The SPTE is "correct": the guest translation is inaccessible because
the combined protections of all levels yield RWX=0, and KVM will just
redirect any vmexits to the guest. If EPT A/D bits are disabled, KVM
can mistake the SPTE for an access-tracked SPTE, but again such confusion
isn't fatal, as the "saved" protections are also RWX=0. However,
creating a useless SPTE in general means that KVM messed up something,
even if this particular goof didn't manifest as a functional bug.
So, drop SPTEs whose new protections will yield a RWX=0 SPTE, and
add a WARN in make_spte() to detect creation of SPTEs that will
result in RWX=0 protections.
Fixes: d95c55687e11 ("kvm: mmu: track read permission explicitly for shadow EPT page tables")
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220513195000.99371-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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A NMI that L1 wants to inject into its L2 should be directly re-injected,
without causing L0 side effects like engaging NMI blocking for L1.
It's also worth noting that in this case it is L1 responsibility
to track the NMI window status for its L2 guest.
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <f894d13501cd48157b3069a4b4c7369575ddb60e.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In the IRQ injection tracepoint, differentiate between Hard IRQs and Soft
"IRQs", i.e. interrupts that are reinjected after incomplete delivery of
a software interrupt from an INTn instruction. Tag reinjected interrupts
as such, even though the information is usually redundant since soft
interrupts are only ever reinjected by KVM. Though rare in practice, a
hard IRQ can be reinjected.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[MSS: change "kvm_inj_virq" event "reinjected" field type to bool]
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <9664d49b3bd21e227caa501cff77b0569bebffe2.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Print the error code in the exception injection tracepoint if and only if
the exception has an error code. Define the entire error code sequence
as a set of formatted strings, print empty strings if there's no error
code, and abuse __print_symbolic() by passing it an empty array to coerce
it into printing the error code as a hex string.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <e8f0511733ed2a0410cbee8a0a7388eac2ee5bac.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Trace exceptions that are re-injected, not just those that KVM is
injecting for the first time. Debugging re-injection bugs is painful
enough as is, not having visibility into what KVM is doing only makes
things worse.
Delay propagating pending=>injected in the non-reinjection path so that
the tracing can properly identify reinjected exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <25470690a38b4d2b32b6204875dd35676c65c9f2.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Re-inject INTn software interrupts instead of retrying the instruction if
the CPU encountered an intercepted exception while vectoring the INTn,
e.g. if KVM intercepted a #PF when utilizing shadow paging. Retrying the
instruction is architecturally wrong e.g. will result in a spurious #DB
if there's a code breakpoint on the INT3/O, and lack of re-injection also
breaks nested virtualization, e.g. if L1 injects a software interrupt and
vectoring the injected interrupt encounters an exception that is
intercepted by L0 but not L1.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <1654ad502f860948e4f2d57b8bd881d67301f785.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction if the CPU
encountered an intercepted exception while vectoring the software
exception, e.g. if vectoring INT3 encounters a #PF and KVM is using
shadow paging. Retrying the instruction is architecturally wrong, e.g.
will result in a spurious #DB if there's a code breakpoint on the INT3/O,
and lack of re-injection also breaks nested virtualization, e.g. if L1
injects a software exception and vectoring the injected exception
encounters an exception that is intercepted by L0 but not L1.
Due to, ahem, deficiencies in the SVM architecture, acquiring the next
RIP may require flowing through the emulator even if NRIPS is supported,
as the CPU clears next_rip if the VM-Exit is due to an exception other
than "exceptions caused by the INT3, INTO, and BOUND instructions". To
deal with this, "skip" the instruction to calculate next_rip (if it's
not already known), and then unwind the RIP write and any side effects
(RFLAGS updates).
Save the computed next_rip and use it to re-stuff next_rip if injection
doesn't complete. This allows KVM to do the right thing if next_rip was
known prior to injection, e.g. if L1 injects a soft event into L2, and
there is no backing INTn instruction, e.g. if L1 is injecting an
arbitrary event.
Note, it's impossible to guarantee architectural correctness given SVM's
architectural flaws. E.g. if the guest executes INTn (no KVM injection),
an exit occurs while vectoring the INTn, and the guest modifies the code
stream while the exit is being handled, KVM will compute the incorrect
next_rip due to "skipping" the wrong instruction. A future enhancement
to make this less awful would be for KVM to detect that the decoded
instruction is not the correct INTn and drop the to-be-injected soft
event (retrying is a lesser evil compared to shoving the wrong RIP on the
exception stack).
Reported-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <65cb88deab40bc1649d509194864312a89bbe02e.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If NRIPS is supported in hardware but disabled in KVM, set next_rip to
the next RIP when advancing RIP as part of emulating INT3 injection.
There is no flag to tell the CPU that KVM isn't using next_rip, and so
leaving next_rip is left as is will result in the CPU pushing garbage
onto the stack when vectoring the injected event.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Fixes: 66b7138f9136 ("KVM: SVM: Emulate nRIP feature when reinjecting INT3")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <cd328309a3b88604daa2359ad56f36cb565ce2d4.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Unwind the RIP advancement done by svm_queue_exception() when injecting
an INT3 ultimately "fails" due to the CPU encountering a VM-Exit while
vectoring the injected event, even if the exception reported by the CPU
isn't the same event that was injected. If vectoring INT3 encounters an
exception, e.g. #NP, and vectoring the #NP encounters an intercepted
exception, e.g. #PF when KVM is using shadow paging, then the #NP will
be reported as the event that was in-progress.
Note, this is still imperfect, as it will get a false positive if the
INT3 is cleanly injected, no VM-Exit occurs before the IRET from the INT3
handler in the guest, the instruction following the INT3 generates an
exception (directly or indirectly), _and_ vectoring that exception
encounters an exception that is intercepted by KVM. The false positives
could theoretically be solved by further analyzing the vectoring event,
e.g. by comparing the error code against the expected error code were an
exception to occur when vectoring the original injected exception, but
SVM without NRIPS is a complete disaster, trying to make it 100% correct
is a waste of time.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Fixes: 66b7138f9136 ("KVM: SVM: Emulate nRIP feature when reinjecting INT3")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <450133cf0a026cb9825a2ff55d02cb136a1cb111.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Don't BUG/WARN on interrupt injection due to GIF being cleared,
since it's trivial for userspace to force the situation via
KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS (even if having at least a WARN there would be correct
for KVM internally generated injections).
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3386!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 15 PID: 926 Comm: smm_test Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #264
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:svm_inject_irq+0xab/0xb0 [kvm_amd]
Code: <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 80 3d ac b3 01 00 00 55 48 89 f5 53
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b37d88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810a234ac0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc90000b37df7 RDI: ffff88810a234ac0
RBP: ffffc90000b37df7 R08: ffff88810a1fa410 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888109571000 R14: ffff88810a234ac0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000001821380(0000) GS:ffff88846fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f74fc550008 CR3: 000000010a6fe000 CR4: 0000000000350ea0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
inject_pending_event+0x2f7/0x4c0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x791/0x17a0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x26d/0x650 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
</TASK>
Fixes: 219b65dcf6c0 ("KVM: SVM: Improve nested interrupt injection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <35426af6e123cbe91ec7ce5132ce72521f02b1b5.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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The next_rip field of a VMCB is *not* an output-only field for a VMRUN.
This field value (instead of the saved guest RIP) in used by the CPU for
the return address pushed on stack when injecting a software interrupt or
INT3 or INTO exception.
Make sure this field gets synced from vmcb12 to vmcb02 when entering L2 or
loading a nested state and NRIPS is exposed to L1. If NRIPS is supported
in hardware but not exposed to L1 (nrips=0 or hidden by userspace), stuff
vmcb02's next_rip from the new L2 RIP to emulate a !NRIPS CPU (which
saves RIP on the stack as-is).
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <c2e0a3d78db3ae30530f11d4e9254b452a89f42b.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SVM uses a per-cpu variable to cache the current value of the
tsc scaling multiplier msr on each cpu.
Commit 1ab9287add5e2
("KVM: X86: Add vendor callbacks for writing the TSC multiplier")
broke this caching logic.
Refactor the code so that all TSC scaling multiplier writes go through
a single function which checks and updates the cache.
This fixes the following scenario:
1. A CPU runs a guest with some tsc scaling ratio.
2. New guest with different tsc scaling ratio starts on this CPU
and terminates almost immediately.
This ensures that the short running guest had set the tsc scaling ratio just
once when it was set via KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ. Due to the bug,
the per-cpu cache is not updated.
3. The original guest continues to run, it doesn't restore the msr
value back to its own value, because the cache matches,
and thus continues to run with a wrong tsc scaling ratio.
Fixes: 1ab9287add5e2 ("KVM: X86: Add vendor callbacks for writing the TSC multiplier")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220606181149.103072-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Currently disabling dirty logging with the TDP MMU is extremely slow.
On a 96 vCPU / 96G VM backed with gigabyte pages, it takes ~200 seconds
to disable dirty logging with the TDP MMU, as opposed to ~4 seconds with
the shadow MMU.
When disabling dirty logging, zap non-leaf parent entries to allow
replacement with huge pages instead of recursing and zapping all of the
child, leaf entries. This reduces the number of TLB flushes required.
and reduces the disable dirty log time with the TDP MMU to ~3 seconds.
Opportunistically add a WARN() to catch GFNs that are mapped at a
higher level than their max level.
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220525230904.1584480-1-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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When freeing obsolete previous roots, check prev_roots as intended, not
the current root.
Signed-off-by: Shaoqin Huang <shaoqin.huang@intel.com>
Fixes: 527d5cd7eece ("KVM: x86/mmu: Zap only obsolete roots if a root shadow page is zapped")
Message-Id: <20220607005905.2933378-1-shaoqin.huang@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of small x86 cleanups:
- Remove unused headers in the IDT code
- Kconfig indendation and comment fixes
- Fix all 'the the' typos in one go instead of waiting for bots to
fix one at a time"
* tag 'x86-cleanups-2022-06-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Fix all occurences of the "the the" typo
x86/idt: Remove unused headers
x86/Kconfig: Fix indentation of arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
x86/Kconfig: Fix indentation and add endif comments to arch/x86/Kconfig
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Pull bitmap updates from Yury Norov:
- bitmap: optimize bitmap_weight() usage, from me
- lib/bitmap.c make bitmap_print_bitmask_to_buf parseable, from Mauro
Carvalho Chehab
- include/linux/find: Fix documentation, from Anna-Maria Behnsen
- bitmap: fix conversion from/to fix-sized arrays, from me
- bitmap: Fix return values to be unsigned, from Kees Cook
It has been in linux-next for at least a week with no problems.
* tag 'bitmap-for-5.19-rc1' of https://github.com/norov/linux: (31 commits)
nodemask: Fix return values to be unsigned
bitmap: Fix return values to be unsigned
KVM: x86: hyper-v: replace bitmap_weight() with hweight64()
KVM: x86: hyper-v: fix type of valid_bank_mask
ia64: cleanup remove_siblinginfo()
drm/amd/pm: use bitmap_{from,to}_arr32 where appropriate
KVM: s390: replace bitmap_copy with bitmap_{from,to}_arr64 where appropriate
lib/bitmap: add test for bitmap_{from,to}_arr64
lib: add bitmap_{from,to}_arr64
lib/bitmap: extend comment for bitmap_(from,to)_arr32()
include/linux/find: Fix documentation
lib/bitmap.c make bitmap_print_bitmask_to_buf parseable
MAINTAINERS: add cpumask and nodemask files to BITMAP_API
arch/x86: replace nodes_weight with nodes_empty where appropriate
mm/vmstat: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty where appropriate
clocksource: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty in clocksource.c
genirq/affinity: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty where appropriate
irq: mips: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty where appropriate
drm/i915/pmu: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty where appropriate
arch/x86: replace cpumask_weight with cpumask_empty where appropriate
...
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kvm_hv_flush_tlb() applies bitmap API to a u64 variable valid_bank_mask.
Since valid_bank_mask has a fixed size, we can use hweight64() and avoid
excessive bloating.
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
CC: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CC: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
CC: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
CC: kvm@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
CC: x86@kernel.org
Acked-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
|
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In kvm_hv_flush_tlb(), valid_bank_mask is declared as unsigned long,
but is used as u64, which is wrong for i386, and has been spotted by
LKP after applying "KVM: x86: hyper-v: replace bitmap_weight() with
hweight64()"
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220510154750.212913-12-yury.norov@gmail.com/
But it's wrong even without that patch because now bitmap_weight()
dereferences a word after valid_bank_mask on i386.
>> include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:76: warning: right shift count >= width of type
+[-Wshift-count-overflow]
21 | #define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) >> 32))
| ^~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:10:16: note: in definition of macro '__const_hweight8'
10 | ((!!((w) & (1ULL << 0))) + \
| ^
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:20:31: note: in expansion of macro '__const_hweight16'
20 | #define __const_hweight32(w) (__const_hweight16(w) + __const_hweight16((w) >> 16))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:54: note: in expansion of macro '__const_hweight32'
21 | #define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) >> 32))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:29:49: note: in expansion of macro '__const_hweight64'
29 | #define hweight64(w) (__builtin_constant_p(w) ? __const_hweight64(w) : __arch_hweight64(w))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:1983:36: note: in expansion of macro 'hweight64'
1983 | if (hc->var_cnt != hweight64(valid_bank_mask))
| ^~~~~~~~~
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
CC: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CC: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
CC: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
CC: kvm@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
CC: x86@kernel.org
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20220519171504.1238724-1-yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Rather than waiting for the bots to fix these one-by-one,
fix all occurences of "the the" throughout arch/x86.
Signed-off-by: Bo Liu <liubo03@inspur.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527061400.5694-1-liubo03@inspur.com
|
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"S390:
- ultravisor communication device driver
- fix TEID on terminating storage key ops
RISC-V:
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
ARM:
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed to
the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
x86:
- New ioctls to get/set TSC frequency for a whole VM
- Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
- Only do MSR filtering for MSRs accessed by rdmsr/wrmsr
AMD SEV improvements:
- Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata for SEV-ES
- V_TSC_AUX support
Nested virtualization improvements for AMD:
- Support for "nested nested" optimizations (nested vVMLOAD/VMSAVE,
nested vGIF)
- Allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running
- Fixes for LBR virtualizations when a nested guest is running, and
nested LBR virtualization support
- PAUSE filtering for nested hypervisors
Guest support:
- Decoupling of vcpu_is_preempted from PV spinlocks"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (199 commits)
KVM: x86: Fix the intel_pt PMI handling wrongly considered from guest
KVM: selftests: x86: Sync the new name of the test case to .gitignore
Documentation: kvm: reorder ARM-specific section about KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND
x86, kvm: use correct GFP flags for preemption disabled
KVM: LAPIC: Drop pending LAPIC timer injection when canceling the timer
x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of raw spinlock
KVM: x86: avoid calling x86 emulator without a decoded instruction
KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel data leak
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
s390/uv_uapi: depend on CONFIG_S390
KVM: selftests: x86: Fix test failure on arch lbr capable platforms
KVM: LAPIC: Trace LAPIC timer expiration on every vmentry
KVM: s390: selftest: Test suppression indication on key prot exception
KVM: s390: Don't indicate suppression on dirtying, failing memop
selftests: drivers/s390x: Add uvdevice tests
drivers/s390/char: Add Ultravisor io device
MAINTAINERS: Update KVM RISC-V entry to cover selftests support
RISC-V: KVM: Introduce ISA extension register
RISC-V: KVM: Cleanup stale TLB entries when host CPU changes
RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
...
|
|
Certain guest operating systems (e.g., UNIXWARE) clear bit 0 of
MC1_CTL to ignore single-bit ECC data errors. Single-bit ECC data
errors are always correctable and thus are safe to ignore because they
are informational in nature rather than signaling a loss of data
integrity.
Prior to this patch, these guests would crash upon writing MC1_CTL,
with resultant error messages like the following:
error: kvm run failed Operation not permitted
EAX=fffffffe EBX=fffffffe ECX=00000404 EDX=ffffffff
ESI=ffffffff EDI=00000001 EBP=fffdaba4 ESP=fffdab20
EIP=c01333a5 EFL=00000246 [---Z-P-] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS [-WA]
CS =0100 00000000 ffffffff 00c09b00 DPL=0 CS32 [-RA]
SS =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS [-WA]
DS =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS [-WA]
FS =0000 00000000 ffffffff 00c00000
GS =0000 00000000 ffffffff 00c00000
LDT=0118 c1026390 00000047 00008200 DPL=0 LDT
TR =0110 ffff5af0 00000067 00008b00 DPL=0 TSS32-busy
GDT= ffff5020 000002cf
IDT= ffff52f0 000007ff
CR0=8001003b CR2=00000000 CR3=0100a000 CR4=00000230
DR0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DR2=00000000 DR3=00000000
DR6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
EFER=0000000000000000
Code=08 89 01 89 51 04 c3 8b 4c 24 08 8b 01 8b 51 04 8b 4c 24 04 <0f>
30 c3 f7 05 a4 6d ff ff 10 00 00 00 74 03 0f 31 c3 33 c0 33 d2 c3 8d
74 26 00 0f 31 c3
Signed-off-by: Lev Kujawski <lkujaw@member.fsf.org>
Message-Id: <20220521081511.187388-1-lkujaw@member.fsf.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Change the printf format character from 'd' to 'u' for the
VM-instruction error in vmwrite_error().
Fixes: 6aa8b732ca01 ("[PATCH] kvm: userspace interface")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220510224035.1792952-2-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Include the value of the "VM-instruction error" field from the current
VMCS (if any) in the error message for VMCLEAR and VMPTRLD, since each
of these instructions may result in more than one VM-instruction
error. Previously, this field was only reported for VMWRITE errors.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
[Rebased and refactored code; dropped the error number for INVVPID and
INVEPT; reworded commit message.]
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220510224035.1792952-1-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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When kernel handles the vm-exit caused by external interrupts and NMI,
it always sets kvm_intr_type to tell if it's dealing an IRQ or NMI. For
the PMI scenario, it could be IRQ or NMI.
However, intel_pt PMIs are only generated for HARDWARE perf events, and
HARDWARE events are always configured to generate NMIs. Use
kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest() to precisely identify if the intel_pt PMI
came from the guest; this avoids false positives if an intel_pt PMI/NMI
arrives while the host is handling an unrelated IRQ VM-Exit.
Fixes: db215756ae59 ("KVM: x86: More precisely identify NMI from guest when handling PMI")
Signed-off-by: Yanfei Xu <yanfei.xu@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220523140821.1345605-1-yanfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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The timer is disarmed when switching between TSC deadline and other modes;
however, the pending timer is still in-flight, so let's accurately remove
any traces of the previous mode.
Fixes: 4427593258 ("KVM: x86: thoroughly disarm LAPIC timer around TSC deadline switch")
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Whenever x86_decode_emulated_instruction() detects a breakpoint, it
returns the value that kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() writes into its
pass-by-reference second argument. Unfortunately this is completely
bogus because the expected outcome of x86_decode_emulated_instruction
is an EMULATION_* value.
Then, if kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() does "*r = 0" (corresponding to
a KVM_EXIT_DEBUG userspace exit), it is misunderstood as EMULATION_OK
and x86_emulate_instruction() is called without having decoded the
instruction. This causes various havoc from running with a stale
emulation context.
The fix is to move the call to kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() where it was
before commit 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction
emulation with decoding") introduced x86_decode_emulated_instruction().
The other caller of the function does not need breakpoint checks,
because it is invoked as part of a vmexit and the processor has already
checked those before executing the instruction that #GP'd.
This fixes CVE-2022-1852.
Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <qiuhao@sysec.org>
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction emulation with decoding")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220311032801.3467418-2-seanjc@google.com>
[Rewrote commit message according to Qiuhao's report, since a patch
already existed to fix the bug. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe
less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data
that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory
that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data.
Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these
sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eaf78265a4ab3 ("KVM: SVM: Move SEV code to separate file")
Fixes: 2c07ded06427d ("KVM: SVM: add support for SEV attestation command")
Fixes: 4cfdd47d6d95a ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command")
Fixes: d3d1af85e2c75 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command")
Fixes: eba04b20e4861 ("KVM: x86: Account a variety of miscellaneous allocations")
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220516154310.3685678-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM/riscv changes for 5.19
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for 5.19
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed
to the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
[Due to the conflict, KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM is relocated
from 4 to 6. - Paolo]
|