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2024-03-10Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "KVM GUEST_MEMFD fixes for 6.8: - Make KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD mutually exclusive with KVM_MEM_READONLY to avoid creating an inconsistent ABI (KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD is not writable from userspace, so there would be no way to write to a read-only guest_memfd). - Update documentation for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to make it abundantly clear that such VMs are purely for development and testing. - Limit KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM guests to the TDP MMU, as the long term plan is to support confidential VMs with deterministic private memory (SNP and TDX) only in the TDP MMU. - Fix a bug in a GUEST_MEMFD dirty logging test that caused false passes. x86 fixes: - Fix missing marking of a guest page as dirty when emulating an atomic access. - Check for mmu_notifier invalidation events before faulting in the pfn, and before acquiring mmu_lock, to avoid unnecessary work and lock contention with preemptible kernels (including CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC in non-preemptible mode). - Disable AMD DebugSwap by default, it breaks VMSA signing and will be re-enabled with a better VM creation API in 6.10. - Do the cache flush of converted pages in svm_register_enc_region() before dropping kvm->lock, to avoid a race with unregistering of the same region and the consequent use-after-free issue" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: SEV: disable SEV-ES DebugSwap by default KVM: x86/mmu: Retry fault before acquiring mmu_lock if mapping is changing KVM: SVM: Flush pages under kvm->lock to fix UAF in svm_register_enc_region() KVM: selftests: Add a testcase to verify GUEST_MEMFD and READONLY are exclusive KVM: selftests: Create GUEST_MEMFD for relevant invalid flags testcases KVM: x86/mmu: Restrict KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to the TDP MMU KVM: x86: Update KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM docs to make it clear they're a WIP KVM: Make KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD mutually exclusive with KVM_MEM_READONLY KVM: x86: Mark target gfn of emulated atomic instruction as dirty
2024-03-09Merge tag 'kvm-x86-guest_memfd_fixes-6.8' of ↵Paolo Bonzini
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD KVM GUEST_MEMFD fixes for 6.8: - Make KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD mutually exclusive with KVM_MEM_READONLY to avoid creating ABI that KVM can't sanely support. - Update documentation for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to make it abundantly clear that such VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle, and come with zero guarantees. - Limit KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM guests to the TDP MMU, as the long term plan is to support confidential VMs with deterministic private memory (SNP and TDX) only in the TDP MMU. - Fix a bug in a GUEST_MEMFD negative test that resulted in false passes when verifying that KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can't be dirty logged.
2024-03-09SEV: disable SEV-ES DebugSwap by defaultPaolo Bonzini
The DebugSwap feature of SEV-ES provides a way for confidential guests to use data breakpoints. However, because the status of the DebugSwap feature is recorded in the VMSA, enabling it by default invalidates the attestation signatures. In 6.10 we will introduce a new API to create SEV VMs that will allow enabling DebugSwap based on what the user tells KVM to do. Contextually, we will change the legacy KVM_SEV_ES_INIT API to never enable DebugSwap. For compatibility with kernels that pre-date the introduction of DebugSwap, as well as with those where KVM_SEV_ES_INIT will never enable it, do not enable the feature by default. If anybody wants to use it, for now they can enable the sev_es_debug_swap_enabled module parameter, but this will result in a warning. Fixes: d1f85fbe836e ("KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-03-09Merge tag 'kvm-x86-guest_memfd_fixes-6.8' of ↵Paolo Bonzini
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD KVM GUEST_MEMFD fixes for 6.8: - Make KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD mutually exclusive with KVM_MEM_READONLY to avoid creating ABI that KVM can't sanely support. - Update documentation for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to make it abundantly clear that such VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle, and come with zero guarantees. - Limit KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM guests to the TDP MMU, as the long term plan is to support confidential VMs with deterministic private memory (SNP and TDX) only in the TDP MMU. - Fix a bug in a GUEST_MEMFD negative test that resulted in false passes when verifying that KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can't be dirty logged.
2024-03-09Merge tag 'kvm-x86-fixes-6.8-2' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEADPaolo Bonzini
KVM x86 fixes for 6.8, round 2: - When emulating an atomic access, mark the gfn as dirty in the memslot to fix a bug where KVM could fail to mark the slot as dirty during live migration, ultimately resulting in guest data corruption due to a dirty page not being re-copied from the source to the target. - Check for mmu_notifier invalidation events before faulting in the pfn, and before acquiring mmu_lock, to avoid unnecessary work and lock contention. Contending mmu_lock is especially problematic on preemptible kernels, as KVM may yield mmu_lock in response to the contention, which severely degrades overall performance due to vCPUs making it difficult for the task that triggered invalidation to make forward progress. Note, due to another kernel bug, this fix isn't limited to preemtible kernels, as any kernel built with CONFIG_PREEMPT_DYNAMIC=y will yield contended rwlocks and spinlocks. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240110214723.695930-1-seanjc@google.com
2024-03-06mm/treewide: drop pXd_large()Peter Xu
They're not used anymore, drop all of them. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-10-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-03-06mm/treewide: replace pud_large() with pud_leaf()Peter Xu
pud_large() is always defined as pud_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose pud_leaf() because pud_leaf() is a global API, while pud_large() is not. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-9-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-03-06mm/treewide: replace pmd_large() with pmd_leaf()Peter Xu
pmd_large() is always defined as pmd_leaf(). Merge their usages. Chose pmd_leaf() because pmd_leaf() is a global API, while pmd_large() is not. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240305043750.93762-8-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-03-06KVM: x86: Use actual kvm_cpuid.base for clearing KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALTVitaly Kuznetsov
Commit ee3a5f9e3d9b ("KVM: x86: Do runtime CPUID update before updating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries") moved tweaking of the supplied CPUID data earlier in kvm_set_cpuid() but __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() actually uses 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid' (though __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features()) which gets set later in kvm_set_cpuid(). In some cases, e.g. when kvm_set_cpuid() is called for the first time and 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid' is clear, __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features() fails to find KVM PV feature entry and the logic which clears KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT after enabling KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT does not work. The logic, introduced by the commit ee3a5f9e3d9b ("KVM: x86: Do runtime CPUID update before updating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries") must stay: the supplied CPUID data is tweaked by KVM first (__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime()) and checked later (kvm_check_cpuid()) and the actual data (vcpu->arch.cpuid_*, vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid, vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid,..) is only updated on success. Switch to searching for KVM_SIGNATURE in the supplied CPUID data to discover KVM PV feature entry instead of using stale 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid'. While on it, drop pointless "&& (best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)" check when clearing KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT bit. Fixes: ee3a5f9e3d9b ("KVM: x86: Do runtime CPUID update before updating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries") Reported-and-tested-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228101837.93642-3-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-06KVM: x86: Introduce __kvm_get_hypervisor_cpuid() helperVitaly Kuznetsov
Similar to kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features()/__kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(), introduce a helper to search for the specific hypervisor signature in any struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 array, not only in vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228101837.93642-2-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-04KVM: x86/xen: fix recursive deadlock in timer injectionDavid Woodhouse
The fast-path timer delivery introduced a recursive locking deadlock when userspace configures a timer which has already expired and is delivered immediately. The call to kvm_xen_inject_timer_irqs() can call to kvm_xen_set_evtchn() which may take kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock, which is already held in kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr(). ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.8.0-smp--5e10b4d51d77-drs #232 Tainted: G O -------------------------------------------- xen_shinfo_test/250013 is trying to acquire lock: ffff938c9930cc30 (&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_xen_set_evtchn+0x74/0x170 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffff938c9930cc30 (&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_xen_vcpu_get_attr+0x38/0x250 [kvm] Now that the gfn_to_pfn_cache has its own self-sufficient locking, its callers no longer need to ensure serialization, so just stop taking kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock from kvm_xen_set_evtchn(). Fixes: 77c9b9dea4fb ("KVM: x86/xen: Use fast path for Xen timer delivery") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227115648.3104-6-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-04KVM: x86/xen: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() with false positives in evtchn deliveryDavid Woodhouse
The kvm_xen_inject_vcpu_vector() function has a comment saying "the fast version will always work for physical unicast", justifying its use of kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast() and the WARN_ON_ONCE() when that fails. In fact that assumption isn't true if X2APIC isn't in use by the guest and there is (8-bit x)APIC ID aliasing. A single "unicast" destination APIC ID *may* then be delivered to multiple vCPUs. Remove the warning, and in fact it might as well just call kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic(). Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Fixes: fde0451be8fb3 ("KVM: x86/xen: Support per-vCPU event channel upcall via local APIC") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227115648.3104-4-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-04KVM: x86/xen: inject vCPU upcall vector when local APIC is enabledDavid Woodhouse
Linux guests since commit b1c3497e604d ("x86/xen: Add support for HVMOP_set_evtchn_upcall_vector") in v6.0 onwards will use the per-vCPU upcall vector when it's advertised in the Xen CPUID leaves. This upcall is injected through the guest's local APIC as an MSI, unlike the older system vector which was merely injected by the hypervisor any time the CPU was able to receive an interrupt and the upcall_pending flags is set in its vcpu_info. Effectively, that makes the per-CPU upcall edge triggered instead of level triggered, which results in the upcall being lost if the MSI is delivered when the local APIC is *disabled*. Xen checks the vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending flag when the local APIC for a vCPU is software enabled (in fact, on any write to the SPIV register which doesn't disable the APIC). Do the same in KVM since KVM doesn't provide a way for userspace to intervene and trap accesses to the SPIV register of a local APIC emulated by KVM. Fixes: fde0451be8fb3 ("KVM: x86/xen: Support per-vCPU event channel upcall via local APIC") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227115648.3104-3-dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-04KVM: x86/xen: improve accuracy of Xen timersDavid Woodhouse
A test program such as http://david.woodhou.se/timerlat.c confirms user reports that timers are increasingly inaccurate as the lifetime of a guest increases. Reporting the actual delay observed when asking for 100µs of sleep, it starts off OK on a newly-launched guest but gets worse over time, giving incorrect sleep times: root@ip-10-0-193-21:~# ./timerlat -c -n 5 00000000 latency 103243/100000 (3.2430%) 00000001 latency 103243/100000 (3.2430%) 00000002 latency 103242/100000 (3.2420%) 00000003 latency 103245/100000 (3.2450%) 00000004 latency 103245/100000 (3.2450%) The biggest problem is that get_kvmclock_ns() returns inaccurate values when the guest TSC is scaled. The guest sees a TSC value scaled from the host TSC by a mul/shift conversion (hopefully done in hardware). The guest then converts that guest TSC value into nanoseconds using the mul/shift conversion given to it by the KVM pvclock information. But get_kvmclock_ns() performs only a single conversion directly from host TSC to nanoseconds, giving a different result. A test program at http://david.woodhou.se/tsdrift.c demonstrates the cumulative error over a day. It's non-trivial to fix get_kvmclock_ns(), although I'll come back to that. The actual guest hv_clock is per-CPU, and *theoretically* each vCPU could be running at a *different* frequency. But this patch is needed anyway because... The other issue with Xen timers was that the code would snapshot the host CLOCK_MONOTONIC at some point in time, and then... after a few interrupts may have occurred, some preemption perhaps... would also read the guest's kvmclock. Then it would proceed under the false assumption that those two happened at the *same* time. Any time which *actually* elapsed between reading the two clocks was introduced as inaccuracies in the time at which the timer fired. Fix it to use a variant of kvm_get_time_and_clockread(), which reads the host TSC just *once*, then use the returned TSC value to calculate the kvmclock (making sure to do that the way the guest would instead of making the same mistake get_kvmclock_ns() does). Sadly, hrtimers based on CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW are not supported, so Xen timers still have to use CLOCK_MONOTONIC. In practice the difference between the two won't matter over the timescales involved, as the *absolute* values don't matter; just the delta. This does mean a new variant of kvm_get_time_and_clockread() is needed; called kvm_get_monotonic_and_clockread() because that's what it does. Fixes: 536395260582 ("KVM: x86/xen: handle PV timers oneshot mode") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227115648.3104-2-dwmw2@infradead.org [sean: massage moved comment, tweak if statement formatting] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-04x86/cpu: Provide a declaration for itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigationThomas Gleixner
Sparse complains rightfully about the missing declaration which has been placed sloppily into the usage site: bugs.c:2223:6: sparse: warning: symbol 'itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation' was not declared. Should it be static? Add it to <asm/spec-ctrl.h> where it belongs and remove the one in the KVM code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240304005104.787173239@linutronix.de
2024-02-27KVM: VMX: Combine "check" and "get" APIs for passthrough MSR lookupsSean Christopherson
Combine possible_passthrough_msr_slot() and is_valid_passthrough_msr() into a single function, vmx_get_passthrough_msr_slot(), and have the combined helper return the slot on success, using a negative value to indicate "failure". Combining the operations avoids iterating over the array of passthrough MSRs twice for relevant MSRs. Suggested-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223202104.3330974-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-27kvm/x86: allocate the write-tracking metadata on-demandAndrei Vagin
The write-track is used externally only by the gpu/drm/i915 driver. Currently, it is always enabled, if a kernel has been compiled with this driver. Enabling the write-track mechanism adds a two-byte overhead per page across all memory slots. It isn't significant for regular VMs. However in gVisor, where the entire process virtual address space is mapped into the VM, even with a 39-bit address space, the overhead amounts to 256MB. Rework the write-tracking mechanism to enable it on-demand in kvm_page_track_register_notifier. Here is Sean's comment about the locking scheme: The only potential hiccup would be if taking slots_arch_lock would deadlock, but it should be impossible for slots_arch_lock to be taken in any other path that involves VFIO and/or KVMGT *and* can be coincident. Except for kvm_arch_destroy_vm() (which deletes KVM's internal memslots), slots_arch_lock is taken only through KVM ioctls(), and the caller of kvm_page_track_register_notifier() *must* hold a reference to the VM. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213192340.2023366-1-avagin@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-27KVM: VMX: return early if msr_bitmap is not supportedDongli Zhang
The vmx_msr_filter_changed() may directly/indirectly calls only vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr() or vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(). Those two functions may exit immediately if !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap(). vmx_msr_filter_changed() -> vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() -> pt_update_intercept_for_msr() -> vmx_set_intercept_for_msr() -> vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr() -> vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() Therefore, we exit early if !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap(). Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223202104.3330974-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-27KVM: VMX: fix comment to add LBR to passthrough MSRsDongli Zhang
According to the is_valid_passthrough_msr(), the LBR MSRs are also passthrough MSRs, since the commit 1b5ac3226a1a ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Pass-through LBR msrs when the guest LBR event is ACTIVE"). Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223202104.3330974-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-26KVM: x86/pmu: Explicitly check NMI from guest to reducee false positivesLike Xu
Explicitly check that the source of external interrupt is indeed an NMI in kvm_arch_pmi_in_guest(), which reduces perf-kvm false positive samples (host samples labelled as guest samples) generated by perf/core NMI mode if an NMI arrives after VM-Exit, but before kvm_after_interrupt(): # test: perf-record + cpu-cycles:HP (which collects host-only precise samples) # Symbol Overhead sys usr guest sys guest usr # ....................................... ........ ........ ........ ......... ......... # # Before: [g] entry_SYSCALL_64 24.63% 0.00% 0.00% 24.63% 0.00% [g] syscall_return_via_sysret 23.23% 0.00% 0.00% 23.23% 0.00% [g] files_lookup_fd_raw 6.35% 0.00% 0.00% 6.35% 0.00% # After: [k] perf_adjust_freq_unthr_context 57.23% 57.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% [k] __vmx_vcpu_run 4.09% 4.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% [k] vmx_update_host_rsp 3.17% 3.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% In the above case, perf records the samples labelled '[g]', the RIPs behind the weird samples are actually being queried by perf_instruction_pointer() after determining whether it's in GUEST state or not, and here's the issue: If VM-Exit is caused by a non-NMI interrupt (such as hrtimer_interrupt) and at least one PMU counter is enabled on host, the kvm_arch_pmi_in_guest() will remain true (KVM_HANDLING_IRQ is set) until kvm_before_interrupt(). During this window, if a PMI occurs on host (since the KVM instructions on host are being executed), the control flow, with the help of the host NMI context, will be transferred to perf/core to generate performance samples, thus perf_instruction_pointer() and perf_guest_get_ip() is called. Since kvm_arch_pmi_in_guest() only checks if there is an interrupt, it may cause perf/core to mistakenly assume that the source RIP of the host NMI belongs to the guest world and use perf_guest_get_ip() to get the RIP of a vCPU that has already exited by a non-NMI interrupt. Error samples are recorded and presented to the end-user via perf-report. Such false positive samples could be eliminated by explicitly determining if the exit reason is KVM_HANDLING_NMI. Note that when VM-exit is indeed triggered by PMI and before HANDLING_NMI is cleared, it's also still possible that another PMI is generated on host. Also for perf/core timer mode, the false positives are still possible since those non-NMI sources of interrupts are not always being used by perf/core. For events that are host-only, perf/core can and should eliminate false positives by checking event->attr.exclude_guest, i.e. events that are configured to exclude KVM guests should never fire in the guest. Events that are configured to count host and guest are trickier, perhaps impossible to handle with 100% accuracy? And regardless of what accuracy is provided by perf/core, improving KVM's accuracy is cheap and easy, with no real downsides. Fixes: dd60d217062f ("KVM: x86: Fix perf timer mode IP reporting") Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206032054.55070-1-likexu@tencent.com [sean: massage changelog, squash !!in_nmi() fixup from Like] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-23KVM: Get rid of return value from kvm_arch_create_vm_debugfs()Oliver Upton
The general expectation with debugfs is that any initialization failure is nonfatal. Nevertheless, kvm_arch_create_vm_debugfs() allows implementations to return an error and kvm_create_vm_debugfs() allows that to fail VM creation. Change to a void return to discourage architectures from making debugfs failures fatal for the VM. Seems like everyone already had the right idea, as all implementations already return 0 unconditionally. Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240216155941.2029458-1-oliver.upton@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
2024-02-23KVM: x86/mmu: Retry fault before acquiring mmu_lock if mapping is changingSean Christopherson
Retry page faults without acquiring mmu_lock, and without even faulting the page into the primary MMU, if the resolved gfn is covered by an active invalidation. Contending for mmu_lock is especially problematic on preemptible kernels as the mmu_notifier invalidation task will yield mmu_lock (see rwlock_needbreak()), delay the in-progress invalidation, and ultimately increase the latency of resolving the page fault. And in the worst case scenario, yielding will be accompanied by a remote TLB flush, e.g. if the invalidation covers a large range of memory and vCPUs are accessing addresses that were already zapped. Faulting the page into the primary MMU is similarly problematic, as doing so may acquire locks that need to be taken for the invalidation to complete (the primary MMU has finer grained locks than KVM's MMU), and/or may cause unnecessary churn (getting/putting pages, marking them accessed, etc). Alternatively, the yielding issue could be mitigated by teaching KVM's MMU iterators to perform more work before yielding, but that wouldn't solve the lock contention and would negatively affect scenarios where a vCPU is trying to fault in an address that is NOT covered by the in-progress invalidation. Add a dedicated lockess version of the range-based retry check to avoid false positives on the sanity check on start+end WARN, and so that it's super obvious that checking for a racing invalidation without holding mmu_lock is unsafe (though obviously useful). Wrap mmu_invalidate_in_progress in READ_ONCE() to ensure that pre-checking invalidation in a loop won't put KVM into an infinite loop, e.g. due to caching the in-progress flag and never seeing it go to '0'. Force a load of mmu_invalidate_seq as well, even though it isn't strictly necessary to avoid an infinite loop, as doing so improves the probability that KVM will detect an invalidation that already completed before acquiring mmu_lock and bailing anyways. Do the pre-check even for non-preemptible kernels, as waiting to detect the invalidation until mmu_lock is held guarantees the vCPU will observe the worst case latency in terms of handling the fault, and can generate even more mmu_lock contention. E.g. the vCPU will acquire mmu_lock, detect retry, drop mmu_lock, re-enter the guest, retake the fault, and eventually re-acquire mmu_lock. This behavior is also why there are no new starvation issues due to losing the fairness guarantees provided by rwlocks: if the vCPU needs to retry, it _must_ drop mmu_lock, i.e. waiting on mmu_lock doesn't guarantee forward progress in the face of _another_ mmu_notifier invalidation event. Note, adding READ_ONCE() isn't entirely free, e.g. on x86, the READ_ONCE() may generate a load into a register instead of doing a direct comparison (MOV+TEST+Jcc instead of CMP+Jcc), but practically speaking the added cost is a few bytes of code and maaaaybe a cycle or three. Reported-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZNnPF4W26ZbAyGto@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com Reported-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com> Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Cc: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222012640.2820927-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-23kbuild: change tool coverage variables to take the path relative to $(obj)Masahiro Yamada
Commit 54b8ae66ae1a ("kbuild: change *FLAGS_<basetarget>.o to take the path relative to $(obj)") changed the syntax of per-file compiler flags. The situation is the same for the following variables: OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_<basetarget>.o GCOV_PROFILE_<basetarget>.o KASAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o KMSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS_<basetarget>.o UBSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o KCOV_INSTRUMENT_<basetarget>.o KCSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o KCSAN_INSTRUMENT_BARRIERS_<basetarget>.o The <basetarget> is the filename of the target with its directory and suffix stripped. This syntax comes into a trouble when two files with the same basename appear in one Makefile, for example: obj-y += dir1/foo.o obj-y += dir2/foo.o OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o := y OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o is applied to both dir1/foo.o and dir2/foo.o. This syntax is not flexbile enough to handle cases where one of them is a standard object, but the other is not. It is more sensible to use the relative path to the Makefile, like this: obj-y += dir1/foo.o OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_dir1/foo.o := y obj-y += dir2/foo.o OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_dir2/foo.o := y To maintain the current behavior, I made adjustments to the following two Makefiles: - arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile, which compiles vclock_gettime.o, vgetcpu.o, and their vdso32 variants. - arch/x86/kvm/Makefile, which compiles vmx/vmenter.o and svm/vmenter.o Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu> Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-23KVM: SVM: Flush pages under kvm->lock to fix UAF in svm_register_enc_region()Sean Christopherson
Do the cache flush of converted pages in svm_register_enc_region() before dropping kvm->lock to fix use-after-free issues where region and/or its array of pages could be freed by a different task, e.g. if userspace has __unregister_enc_region_locked() already queued up for the region. Note, the "obvious" alternative of using local variables doesn't fully resolve the bug, as region->pages is also dynamically allocated. I.e. the region structure itself would be fine, but region->pages could be freed. Flushing multiple pages under kvm->lock is unfortunate, but the entire flow is a rare slow path, and the manual flush is only needed on CPUs that lack coherency for encrypted memory. Fixes: 19a23da53932 ("Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region") Reported-by: Gabe Kirkpatrick <gkirkpatrick@google.com> Cc: Josh Eads <josheads@google.com> Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20240217013430.2079561-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Restrict KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to the TDP MMUSean Christopherson
Advertise and support software-protected VMs if and only if the TDP MMU is enabled, i.e. disallow KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM if TDP is enabled for KVM's legacy/shadow MMU. TDP support for the shadow MMU is maintenance-only, e.g. support for TDX and SNP will also be restricted to the TDP MMU. Fixes: 89ea60c2c7b5 ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private memory") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222190612.2942589-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Update KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM docs to make it clear they're a WIPSean Christopherson
Rewrite the help message for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to make it clear that software-protected VMs are a development and testing vehicle for guest_memfd(), and that attempting to use KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM for anything remotely resembling a "real" VM will fail. E.g. any memory accesses from KVM will incorrectly access shared memory, nested TDP is wildly broken, and so on and so forth. Update KVM's API documentation with similar warnings to discourage anyone from attempting to run anything but selftests with KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM. Fixes: 89ea60c2c7b5 ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private memory") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222190612.2942589-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Free TDP MMU roots while holding mmy_lock for readSean Christopherson
Free TDP MMU roots from vCPU context while holding mmu_lock for read, it is completely legal to invoke kvm_tdp_mmu_put_root() as a reader. This eliminates the last mmu_lock writer in the TDP MMU's "fast zap" path after requesting vCPUs to reload roots, i.e. allows KVM to zap invalidated roots, free obsolete roots, and allocate new roots in parallel. On large VMs, e.g. 100+ vCPUs, allowing the bulk of the "fast zap" operation to run in parallel with freeing and allocating roots reduces the worst case latency for a vCPU to reload a root from 2-3ms to <100us. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-9-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Alloc TDP MMU roots while holding mmu_lock for readSean Christopherson
Allocate TDP MMU roots while holding mmu_lock for read, and instead use tdp_mmu_pages_lock to guard against duplicate roots. This allows KVM to create new roots without forcing kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots() to yield, e.g. allows vCPUs to load new roots after memslot deletion without forcing the zap thread to detect contention and yield (or complete if the kernel isn't preemptible). Note, creating a new TDP MMU root as an mmu_lock reader is safe for two reasons: (1) paths that must guarantee all roots/SPTEs are *visited* take mmu_lock for write and so are still mutually exclusive, e.g. mmu_notifier invalidations, and (2) paths that require all roots/SPTEs to *observe* some given state without holding mmu_lock for write must ensure freshness through some other means, e.g. toggling dirty logging must first wait for SRCU readers to recognize the memslot flags change before processing existing roots/SPTEs. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-8-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Check for usable TDP MMU root while holding mmu_lock for readSean Christopherson
When allocating a new TDP MMU root, check for a usable root while holding mmu_lock for read and only acquire mmu_lock for write if a new root needs to be created. There is no need to serialize other MMU operations if a vCPU is simply grabbing a reference to an existing root, holding mmu_lock for write is "necessary" (spoiler alert, it's not strictly necessary) only to ensure KVM doesn't end up with duplicate roots. Allowing vCPUs to get "new" roots in parallel is beneficial to VM boot and to setups that frequently delete memslots, i.e. which force all vCPUs to reload all roots. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-7-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Skip invalid TDP MMU roots when write-protecting SPTEsSean Christopherson
When write-protecting SPTEs, don't process invalid roots as invalid roots are unreachable, i.e. can't be used to access guest memory and thus don't need to be write-protected. Note, this is *almost* a nop for kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(), which is called under slots_lock, i.e. is mutually exclusive with kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(). But it's possible for something other than the "fast zap" thread to grab a reference to an invalid root and thus keep a root alive (but completely empty) after kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() completes. The kvm_tdp_mmu_write_protect_gfn() case is more interesting as KVM write- protects SPTEs for reasons other than dirty logging, e.g. if a KVM creates a SPTE for a nested VM while a fast zap is in-progress. Add another TDP MMU iterator to visit only valid roots, and opportunistically convert kvm_tdp_mmu_get_vcpu_root_hpa() to said iterator. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-6-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Skip invalid roots when zapping leaf SPTEs for GFN rangeSean Christopherson
When zapping a GFN in response to an APICv or MTRR change, don't zap SPTEs for invalid roots as KVM only needs to ensure the guest can't use stale mappings for the GFN. Unlike kvm_tdp_mmu_unmap_gfn_range(), which must zap "unreachable" SPTEs to ensure KVM doesn't mark a page accessed/dirty, kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs() isn't used (and isn't intended to be used) to handle freeing of host memory. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Allow passing '-1' for "all" as_id for TDP MMU iteratorsSean Christopherson
Modify for_each_tdp_mmu_root() and __for_each_tdp_mmu_root_yield_safe() to accept -1 for _as_id to mean "process all memslot address spaces". That way code that wants to process both SMM and !SMM doesn't need to iterate over roots twice (and likely copy+paste code in the process). Deliberately don't cast _as_id to an "int", just in case not casting helps the compiler elide the "_as_id >=0" check when being passed an unsigned value, e.g. from a memslot. No functional change intended. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Don't do TLB flush when zappings SPTEs in invalid rootsSean Christopherson
Don't force a TLB flush when zapping SPTEs in invalid roots as vCPUs can't be actively using invalid roots (zapping SPTEs in invalid roots is necessary only to ensure KVM doesn't mark a page accessed/dirty after it is freed by the primary MMU). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Zap invalidated TDP MMU roots at 4KiB granularitySean Christopherson
Zap invalidated TDP MMU roots at maximum granularity, i.e. with more frequent conditional resched checkpoints, in order to avoid running for an extended duration (milliseconds, or worse) without honoring a reschedule request. And for kernels running with full or real-time preempt models, zapping at 4KiB granularity also provides significantly reduced latency for other tasks that are contending for mmu_lock (which isn't necessarily an overall win for KVM, but KVM should do its best to honor the kernel's preemption model). To keep KVM's assertion that zapping at 1GiB granularity is functionally ok, which is the main reason 1GiB was selected in the past, skip straight to zapping at 1GiB if KVM is configured to prove the MMU. Zapping roots is far more common than a vCPU replacing a 1GiB page table with a hugepage, e.g. generally happens multiple times during boot, and so keeping the test coverage provided by root zaps is desirable, just not for production. Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Pattara Teerapong <pteerapong@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240111020048.844847-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Clean up directed yield API for "has pending interrupt"Sean Christopherson
Directly return the boolean result of whether or not a vCPU has a pending interrupt instead of effectively doing: if (true) return true; return false; Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110003938.490206-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Rely solely on preempted_in_kernel flag for directed yieldSean Christopherson
Snapshot preempted_in_kernel using kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() so that the flag is "accurate" (or rather, consistent and deterministic within KVM) for guests with protected state, and explicitly use preempted_in_kernel when checking if a vCPU was preempted in kernel mode instead of bouncing through kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(). Drop the gnarly logic in kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() that redirects to preempted_in_kernel if the target vCPU is not the "running", i.e. loaded, vCPU, as the only reason that code existed was for the directed yield case where KVM wants to check the CPL of a vCPU that may or may not be loaded on the current pCPU. Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110003938.490206-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: Add dedicated arch hook for querying if vCPU was preempted in-kernelSean Christopherson
Plumb in a dedicated hook for querying whether or not a vCPU was preempted in-kernel. Unlike literally every other architecture, x86's VMX can check if a vCPU is in kernel context if and only if the vCPU is loaded on the current pCPU. x86's kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel() works around the limitation by querying kvm_get_running_vcpu() and redirecting to vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel as needed. But that's unnecessary, confusing, and fragile, e.g. x86 has had at least one bug where KVM incorrectly used a stale preempted_in_kernel. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110003938.490206-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Sanity check that kvm_has_noapic_vcpu is zero at module_exit()Sean Christopherson
WARN if kvm.ko is unloaded with an elevated kvm_has_noapic_vcpu to guard against incorrect management of the key, e.g. to detect if KVM fails to decrement the key in error paths. Because kvm_has_noapic_vcpu is purely an optimization, in all likelihood KVM could completely botch handling of kvm_has_noapic_vcpu and no one would notice (which is a good argument for deleting the key entirely, but that's a problem for another day). Note, ideally the sanity check would be performance when kvm_usage_count goes to zero, but adding an arch callback just for this sanity check isn't at all worth doing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209222047.394389-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Move "KVM no-APIC vCPU" key management into local APIC codeSean Christopherson
Move incrementing and decrementing of kvm_has_noapic_vcpu into kvm_create_lapic() and kvm_free_lapic() respectively to fix a benign bug where KVM fails to decrement the count if vCPU creation ultimately fails, e.g. due to a memory allocation failing. Note, the bug is benign as kvm_has_noapic_vcpu is used purely to optimize lapic_in_kernel() checks, and that optimization is quite dubious. That, and practically speaking no setup that cares at all about performance runs with a userspace local APIC. Reported-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209222047.394389-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Fully defer to vendor code to decide how to force immediate exitSean Christopherson
Now that vmx->req_immediate_exit is used only in the scope of vmx_vcpu_run(), use force_immediate_exit to detect that KVM should usurp the VMX preemption to force a VM-Exit and let vendor code fully handle forcing a VM-Exit. Opportunsitically drop __kvm_request_immediate_exit() and just have vendor code call smp_send_reschedule() directly. SVM already does this when injecting an event while also trying to single-step an IRET, i.e. it's not exactly secret knowledge that KVM uses a reschedule IPI to force an exit. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-7-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: VMX: Handle KVM-induced preemption timer exits in fastpath for L2Sean Christopherson
Eat VMX treemption timer exits in the fastpath regardless of whether L1 or L2 is active. The VM-Exit is 100% KVM-induced, i.e. there is nothing directly related to the exit that KVM needs to do on behalf of the guest, thus there is no reason to wait until the slow path to do nothing. Opportunistically add comments explaining why preemption timer exits for emulating the guest's APIC timer need to go down the slow path. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-6-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Move handling of is_guest_mode() into fastpath exit handlersSean Christopherson
Let the fastpath code decide which exits can/can't be handled in the fastpath when L2 is active, e.g. when KVM generates a VMX preemption timer exit to forcefully regain control, there is no "work" to be done and so such exits can be handled in the fastpath regardless of whether L1 or L2 is active. Moving the is_guest_mode() check into the fastpath code also makes it easier to see that L2 isn't allowed to use the fastpath in most cases, e.g. it's not immediately obvious why handle_fastpath_preemption_timer() is called from the fastpath and the normal path. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-5-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: VMX: Handle forced exit due to preemption timer in fastpathSean Christopherson
Handle VMX preemption timer VM-Exits due to KVM forcing an exit in the exit fastpath, i.e. avoid calling back into handle_preemption_timer() for the same exit. There is no work to be done for forced exits, as the name suggests the goal is purely to get control back in KVM. In addition to shaving a few cycles, this will allow cleanly separating handle_fastpath_preemption_timer() from handle_preemption_timer(), e.g. it's not immediately obvious why _apparently_ calling handle_fastpath_preemption_timer() twice on a "slow" exit is necessary: the "slow" call is necessary to handle exits from L2, which are excluded from the fastpath by vmx_vcpu_run(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: VMX: Re-enter guest in fastpath for "spurious" preemption timer exitsSean Christopherson
Re-enter the guest in the fast path if VMX preeemption timer VM-Exit was "spurious", i.e. if KVM "soft disabled" the timer by writing -1u and by some miracle the timer expired before any other VM-Exit occurred. This is just an intermediate step to cleaning up the preemption timer handling, optimizing these types of spurious VM-Exits is not interesting as they are extremely rare/infrequent. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Plumb "force_immediate_exit" into kvm_entry() tracepointSean Christopherson
Annotate the kvm_entry() tracepoint with "immediate exit" when KVM is forcing a VM-Exit immediately after VM-Enter, e.g. when KVM wants to inject an event but needs to first complete some other operation. Knowing that KVM is (or isn't) forcing an exit is useful information when debugging issues related to event injection. Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110012705.506918-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Drop superfluous check on direct MMU vs. WRITE_PF_TO_SP flagSean Christopherson
Remove reexecute_instruction()'s final check on the MMU being direct, as EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP is only ever set if the MMU is indirect, i.e. is a shadow MMU. Prior to commit 93c05d3ef252 ("KVM: x86: improve reexecute_instruction"), the flag simply didn't exist (and KVM actually returned "true" unconditionally for both types of MMUs). I.e. the explicit check for a direct MMU is simply leftover artifact from old code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203002343.383056-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Drop dedicated logic for direct MMUs in reexecute_instruction()Sean Christopherson
Now that KVM doesn't pointlessly acquire mmu_lock for direct MMUs, drop the dedicated path entirely and always query indirect_shadow_pages when deciding whether or not to try unprotecting the gfn. For indirect, a.k.a. shadow MMUs, checking indirect_shadow_pages is harmless; unless *every* shadow page was somehow zapped while KVM was attempting to emulate the instruction, indirect_shadow_pages is guaranteed to be non-zero. Well, unless the instruction used a direct hugepage with 2-level paging for its code page, but in that case, there's obviously nothing to unprotect. And in the extremely unlikely case all shadow pages were zapped, there's again obviously nothing to unprotect. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203002343.383056-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86/mmu: Don't acquire mmu_lock when using indirect_shadow_pages as a ↵Mingwei Zhang
heuristic Drop KVM's completely pointless acquisition of mmu_lock when deciding whether or not to unprotect any shadow pages residing at the gfn before resuming the guest to let it retry an instruction that KVM failed to emulated. In this case, indirect_shadow_pages is used as a coarse-grained heuristic to check if there is any chance of there being a relevant shadow page to unprotected. But acquiring mmu_lock largely defeats any benefit to the heuristic, as taking mmu_lock for write is likely far more costly to the VM as a whole than unnecessarily walking mmu_page_hash. Furthermore, the current code is already prone to false negatives and false positives, as it drops mmu_lock before checking the flag and unprotecting shadow pages. And as evidenced by the lack of bug reports, neither false positives nor false negatives are problematic. A false positive simply means that KVM will try to unprotect shadow pages that have already been zapped. And a false negative means that KVM will resume the guest without unprotecting the gfn, i.e. if a shadow page was _just_ created, the vCPU will hit the same page fault and do the whole dance all over again, and detect and unprotect the shadow page the second time around (or not, if something else zaps it first). Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> [sean: drop READ_ONCE() and comment change, rewrite changelog] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203002343.383056-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Open code all direct reads to guest DR6 and DR7Sean Christopherson
Bite the bullet, and open code all direct reads of DR6 and DR7. KVM currently has a mix of open coded accesses and calls to kvm_get_dr(), which is confusing and ugly because there's no rhyme or reason as to why any particular chunk of code uses kvm_get_dr(). The obvious alternative is to force all accesses through kvm_get_dr(), but it's not at all clear that doing so would be a net positive, e.g. even if KVM ends up wanting/needing to force all reads through a common helper, e.g. to play caching games, the cost of reverting this change is likely lower than the ongoing cost of maintaining weird, arbitrary code. No functional change intended. Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Reviewed-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209220752.388160-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-02-22KVM: x86: Make kvm_get_dr() return a value, not use an out parameterSean Christopherson
Convert kvm_get_dr()'s output parameter to a return value, and clean up most of the mess that was created by forcing callers to provide a pointer. No functional change intended. Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Reviewed-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209220752.388160-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>