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When SYSCALL/SYSENTER ability check failed, cs and ss is inited but
remain not used. Delay initializing cs and ss until SYSCALL/SYSENTER
ability check passed.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Intel SDM section 25.2 OTHER CAUSES OF VM EXITS specifies the following
on INIT signals: "Such exits do not modify register state or clear pending
events as they would outside of VMX operation."
When commit 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
was applied, I interepted above Intel SDM statement such that
INIT_SIGNAL exit don’t consume the LAPIC INIT pending event.
However, when Nadav Amit run matching kvm-unit-test on a bare-metal
machine, it turned out my interpetation was wrong. i.e. INIT_SIGNAL
exit does consume the LAPIC INIT pending event.
(See: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg196757.html)
Therefore, fix KVM code to behave as observed on bare-metal.
Fixes: 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
fixed KVM to also latch pending LAPIC INIT event when vCPU is in VMX
operation.
However, current API of KVM_SET_MP_STATE allows userspace to put vCPU
into KVM_MP_STATE_SIPI_RECEIVED or KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED even when
vCPU is in VMX operation.
Fix this by introducing a util method to check if vCPU state latch INIT
signals and use it in KVM_SET_MP_STATE handler.
Fixes: 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
fixed KVM to also latch pending LAPIC INIT event when vCPU is in VMX
operation.
However, current API of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS defines this field as
part of SMM state and only set pending LAPIC INIT event if vCPU is
specified to be in SMM mode (events->smi.smm is set).
Change KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS handler to set pending LAPIC INIT event
by latched_init field regardless of if vCPU is in SMM mode or not.
Fixes: 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states")
Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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It's enough to check the exit value and issue a direct call to avoid
the retpoline for all the common vmexit reasons.
After this commit is applied, here the most common retpolines executed
under a high resolution timer workload in the guest on a SVM host:
[..]
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
ktime_get_update_offsets_now+70
hrtimer_interrupt+131
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+106
apic_timer_interrupt+15
start_sw_timer+359
restart_apic_timer+85
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 1940
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_r12+33
force_qs_rnp+217
rcu_gp_kthread+1270
kthread+268
ret_from_fork+34
]: 4644
@[]: 25095
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
lapic_next_event+28
clockevents_program_event+148
hrtimer_start_range_ns+528
start_sw_timer+356
restart_apic_timer+85
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 41474
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
clockevents_program_event+148
hrtimer_start_range_ns+528
start_sw_timer+356
restart_apic_timer+85
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 41474
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
ktime_get+58
clockevents_program_event+84
hrtimer_start_range_ns+528
start_sw_timer+356
restart_apic_timer+85
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 41887
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
lapic_next_event+28
clockevents_program_event+148
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+168
hrtimer_cancel+21
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr+43
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 42723
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
clockevents_program_event+148
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+168
hrtimer_cancel+21
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr+43
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 42766
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
ktime_get+58
clockevents_program_event+84
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+168
hrtimer_cancel+21
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr+43
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 42848
@[
trace_retpoline+1
__trace_retpoline+30
__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+33
ktime_get+58
start_sw_timer+279
restart_apic_timer+85
kvm_set_msr_common+1497
msr_interception+142
vcpu_enter_guest+684
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+261
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+559
do_vfs_ioctl+164
ksys_ioctl+96
__x64_sys_ioctl+22
do_syscall_64+89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68
]: 499845
@total: 1780243
SVM has no TSC based programmable preemption timer so it is invoking
ktime_get() frequently.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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It's enough to check the exit value and issue a direct call to avoid
the retpoline for all the common vmexit reasons.
Of course CONFIG_RETPOLINE already forbids gcc to use indirect jumps
while compiling all switch() statements, however switch() would still
allow the compiler to bisect the case value. It's more efficient to
prioritize the most frequent vmexits instead.
The halt may be slow paths from the point of the guest, but not
necessarily so from the point of the host if the host runs at full CPU
capacity and no host CPU is ever left idle.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Eliminate wasteful call/ret non RETPOLINE case and unnecessary fentry
dynamic tracing hooking points.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Acquire the per-VM slots_lock when zapping all shadow pages as part of
toggling nx_huge_pages. The fast zap algorithm relies on exclusivity
(via slots_lock) to identify obsolete vs. valid shadow pages, because it
uses a single bit for its generation number. Holding slots_lock also
obviates the need to acquire a read lock on the VM's srcu.
Failing to take slots_lock when toggling nx_huge_pages allows multiple
instances of kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() to run concurrently, as the other
user, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, does not take the global kvm_lock.
(kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() does take kvm->mmu_lock, but it can be
temporarily dropped by kvm_zap_obsolete_pages(), so it is not enough
to enforce exclusivity).
Concurrent fast zap instances causes obsolete shadow pages to be
incorrectly identified as valid due to the single bit generation number
wrapping, which results in stale shadow pages being left in KVM's MMU
and leads to all sorts of undesirable behavior.
The bug is easily confirmed by running with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING and
toggling nx_huge_pages via its module param.
Note, until commit 4ae5acbc4936 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Take slots_lock when
using kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast()", 2019-11-13) the fast zap algorithm used
an ulong-sized generation instead of relying on exclusivity for
correctness, but all callers except the recently added set_nx_huge_pages()
needed to hold slots_lock anyways. Therefore, this patch does not have
to be backported to stable kernels.
Given that toggling nx_huge_pages is by no means a fast path, force it
to conform to the current approach instead of reintroducing the previous
generation count.
Fixes: b8e8c8303ff28 ("kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation", but NOT FOR STABLE)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When applying commit 7a5ee6edb42e ("KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR
lists"), it forgot to reset the three MSR lists number varialbes to 0
while removing the useless conditionals.
Fixes: 7a5ee6edb42e (KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR lists)
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If a huge page is recovered (and becomes no executable) while another
thread is executing it, the resulting contention on mmu_lock can cause
latency spikes. Disabling recovery for PREEMPT_RT kernels fixes this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Fix unwinding of KVM_CREATE_VM failure, VT-d posted interrupts,
DAX/ZONE_DEVICE, and module unload/reload"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: MMU: Do not treat ZONE_DEVICE pages as being reserved
KVM: VMX: Introduce pi_is_pir_empty() helper
KVM: VMX: Do not change PID.NDST when loading a blocked vCPU
KVM: VMX: Consider PID.PIR to determine if vCPU has pending interrupts
KVM: VMX: Fix comment to specify PID.ON instead of PIR.ON
KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR lists
KVM: fix placement of refcount initialization
KVM: Fix NULL-ptr deref after kvm_create_vm fails
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Explicitly exempt ZONE_DEVICE pages from kvm_is_reserved_pfn() and
instead manually handle ZONE_DEVICE on a case-by-case basis. For things
like page refcounts, KVM needs to treat ZONE_DEVICE pages like normal
pages, e.g. put pages grabbed via gup(). But for flows such as setting
A/D bits or shifting refcounts for transparent huge pages, KVM needs to
to avoid processing ZONE_DEVICE pages as the flows in question lack the
underlying machinery for proper handling of ZONE_DEVICE pages.
This fixes a hang reported by Adam Borowski[*] in dev_pagemap_cleanup()
when running a KVM guest backed with /dev/dax memory, as KVM straight up
doesn't put any references to ZONE_DEVICE pages acquired by gup().
Note, Dan Williams proposed an alternative solution of doing put_page()
on ZONE_DEVICE pages immediately after gup() in order to simplify the
auditing needed to ensure is_zone_device_page() is called if and only if
the backing device is pinned (via gup()). But that approach would break
kvm_vcpu_{un}map() as KVM requires the page to be pinned from map() 'til
unmap() when accessing guest memory, unlike KVM's secondary MMU, which
coordinates with mmu_notifier invalidations to avoid creating stale
page references, i.e. doesn't rely on pages being pinned.
[*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190919115547.GA17963@angband.pl
Reported-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Analyzed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3565fce3a659 ("mm, x86: get_user_pages() for dax mappings")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Streamline the PID.PIR check and change its call sites to use
the newly added helper.
Suggested-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When vCPU enters block phase, pi_pre_block() inserts vCPU to a per pCPU
linked list of all vCPUs that are blocked on this pCPU. Afterwards, it
changes PID.NV to POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR which its handler
(wakeup_handler()) is responsible to kick (unblock) any vCPU on that
linked list that now has pending posted interrupts.
While vCPU is blocked (in kvm_vcpu_block()), it may be preempted which
will cause vmx_vcpu_pi_put() to set PID.SN. If later the vCPU will be
scheduled to run on a different pCPU, vmx_vcpu_pi_load() will clear
PID.SN but will also *overwrite PID.NDST to this different pCPU*.
Instead of keeping it with original pCPU which vCPU had entered block
phase on.
This results in an issue because when a posted interrupt is delivered, as
the wakeup_handler() will be executed and fail to find blocked vCPU on
its per pCPU linked list of all vCPUs that are blocked on this pCPU.
Which is due to the vCPU being placed on a *different* per pCPU
linked list i.e. the original pCPU in which it entered block phase.
The regression is introduced by commit c112b5f50232 ("KVM: x86:
Recompute PID.ON when clearing PID.SN"). Therefore, partially revert
it and reintroduce the condition in vmx_vcpu_pi_load() responsible for
avoiding changing PID.NDST when loading a blocked vCPU.
Fixes: c112b5f50232 ("KVM: x86: Recompute PID.ON when clearing PID.SN")
Tested-by: Nathan Ni <nathan.ni@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit 17e433b54393 ("KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU")
introduced vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt() in order to determine
if a vCPU have a pending posted interrupt. This routine is used by
kvm_vcpu_on_spin() when searching for a a new runnable vCPU to schedule
on pCPU instead of a vCPU doing busy loop.
vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt() determines if a
vCPU has a pending posted interrupt solely based on PID.ON. However,
when a vCPU is preempted, vmx_vcpu_pi_put() sets PID.SN which cause
raised posted interrupts to only set bit in PID.PIR without setting
PID.ON (and without sending notification vector), as depicted in VT-d
manual section 5.2.3 "Interrupt-Posting Hardware Operation".
Therefore, checking PID.ON is insufficient to determine if a vCPU has
pending posted interrupts and instead we should also check if there is
some bit set on PID.PIR if PID.SN=1.
Fixes: 17e433b54393 ("KVM: Fix leak vCPU's VMCS value into other pCPU")
Reviewed-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The Outstanding Notification (ON) bit is part of the Posted Interrupt
Descriptor (PID) as opposed to the Posted Interrupts Register (PIR).
The latter is a bitmap for pending vectors.
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and
msr_based_features[]) are global arrays of kvm.ko, which are
adjusted (copy supported MSRs forward to override the unsupported MSRs)
when insmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko, but it doesn't reset these three arrays
to their initial value when rmmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko. Thus, at the next
installation, kvm-{intel,amd}.ko will do operations on the modified
arrays with some MSRs lost and some MSRs duplicated.
So define three constant arrays to hold the initial MSR lists and
initialize msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and msr_based_features[]
based on the constant arrays.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
[Remove now useless conditionals. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The odd out jump label is really not needed. Get rid of
it by return true directly while r < 0 as suggested by
Paolo. This further lead to var changed being unused.
Remove it too.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution. This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.
By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.
Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen. With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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to pick up the KVM fix which is required for the NX series.
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Commit 0bc48bea36d1 ("KVM: x86: update master clock before computing
kvmclock_offset")
switches the order of operations to avoid the conversion
TSC (without frequency correction) ->
system_timestamp (with frequency correction),
which might cause a time jump.
However, it leaves any other masterclock update unsafe, which includes,
at the moment:
* HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC MSR write.
* TSC writes.
* Host suspend/resume.
Avoid the time jump issue by using frequency uncorrected
CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW clock.
Its the guests time keeping software responsability
to track and correct a reference clock such as UTC.
This fixes forward time jump (which can result in
failure to bring up a vCPU) during vCPU hotplug:
Oct 11 14:48:33 storage kernel: CPU2 has been hot-added
Oct 11 14:48:34 storage kernel: CPU3 has been hot-added
Oct 11 14:49:22 storage kernel: smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 2 APIC 0x2 <-- time jump of almost 1 minute
Oct 11 14:49:22 storage kernel: smpboot: do_boot_cpu failed(-1) to wakeup CPU#2
Oct 11 14:49:23 storage kernel: smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 3 APIC 0x3
Oct 11 14:49:23 storage kernel: kvm-clock: cpu 3, msr 0:7ff640c1, secondary cpu clock
Which happens because:
/*
* Wait 10s total for a response from AP
*/
boot_error = -1;
timeout = jiffies + 10*HZ;
while (time_before(jiffies, timeout)) {
...
}
Analyzed-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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VMX already does so if the host has SMEP, in order to support the combination of
CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1. However, it is perfectly safe to always do so, and in
fact VMX already ends up running with EFER.NXE=1 on old processors that lack the
"load EFER" controls, because it may help avoiding a slow MSR write. Removing
all the conditionals simplifies the code.
SVM does not have similar code, but it should since recent AMD processors do
support SMEP. So this patch also makes the code for the two vendors more similar
while fixing NPT=0, CR0.WP=1 and CR4.SMEP=1 on AMD processors.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull RCU and LKMM changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- Documentation updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Dynamic tick (nohz) updates, perhaps most notably changes to
force the tick on when needed due to lengthy in-kernel execution
on CPUs on which RCU is waiting.
- Replace rcu_swap_protected() with rcu_prepace_pointer().
- Torture-test updates.
- Linux-kernel memory consistency model updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This commit replaces the use of rcu_swap_protected() with the more
intuitively appealing rcu_replace_pointer() as a step towards removing
rcu_swap_protected().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiAsJLw1egFEE=Z7-GGtM6wcvtyytXZA1+BHqta4gg6Hw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ paulmck: From rcu_replace() to rcu_replace_pointer() per Ingo Molnar. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
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Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX
Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated
microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain,
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers.
Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is
enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is
not exported to the guests.
In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the
VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk
in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k
page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On
hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical
address.
KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by
a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize
APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02.
The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the
vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT"
VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest
physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference
the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the
vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in
the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the
APIC-access page in L1.
When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1,
the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when
the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2
guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2
gets direct access to L1's APIC.
Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot
faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace
with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.
Fixes: fe3ef05c7572 ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12")
Reported-by: Dan Cross <dcross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Guest physical APIC ID may not equal to vcpu->vcpu_id in some case.
We may set the wrong physical id in avic_handle_ldr_update as we
always use vcpu->vcpu_id. Get physical APIC ID from vAPIC page
instead.
Export and use kvm_xapic_id here and in avic_handle_apic_id_update
as suggested by Vitaly.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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AMD CPUs now support XSAVES in a limited fashion (they require IA32_XSS
to be zero).
AMD has no equivalent of Intel's "Enable XSAVES/XRSTORS" VM-execution
control. Instead, XSAVES is always available to the guest when supported
on the host.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: I40dc2c682eb0d38c2208d95d5eb7bbb6c47f6317
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Hoist support for RDMSR/WRMSR of IA32_XSS from vmx into common code so
that it can be used for svm as well.
Right now, kvm only allows the guest IA32_XSS to be zero,
so the guest's usage of XSAVES will be exactly the same as XSAVEC.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie4b0f777d71e428fbee6e82071ac2d7618e9bb40
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Hoist the vendor-specific code related to loading the hardware IA32_XSS
MSR with guest/host values on VM-entry/VM-exit to common x86 code.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic6e3430833955b98eb9b79ae6715cf2a3fdd6d82
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When the guest can execute the XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions, use wrmsr to
set the hardware IA32_XSS MSR to guest/host values on VM-entry/VM-exit,
rather than the MSR-load areas. By using the same approach as AMD, we
will be able to use a common implementation for both (in the next
patch).
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: I9447d104b2615c04e39e4af0c911e1e7309bf464
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When the guest can execute the XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions, set the
hardware IA32_XSS MSR to guest/host values on VM-entry/VM-exit.
Note that vcpu->arch.ia32_xss is currently guaranteed to be 0 on AMD,
since there is no way to change it.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: Id51a782462086e6d7a3ab621838e200f1c005afd
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The kvm_vcpu variable, guest_xcr0_loaded, is a waste of an 'int'
and a conditional branch. VMX and SVM are the only users, and both
unconditionally pair kvm_load_guest_xcr0() with kvm_put_guest_xcr0()
making this check unnecessary. Without this variable, the predicates in
kvm_load_guest_xcr0 and kvm_put_guest_xcr0 should match.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: I7b1eb9b62969d7bbb2850f27e42f863421641b23
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Volume 4 of the SDM says that IA32_XSS is supported
if CPUID(EAX=0DH,ECX=1):EAX.XSS[bit 3] is set, so only the
X86_FEATURE_XSAVES check is necessary (X86_FEATURE_XSAVES is the Linux
name for CPUID(EAX=0DH,ECX=1):EAX.XSS[bit 3]).
Fixes: 4d763b168e9c5 ("KVM: VMX: check CPUID before allowing read/write of IA32_XSS")
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: I9059b9f2e3595e4b09a4cdcf14b933b22ebad419
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Cache whether XSAVES is enabled in the guest by adding xsaves_enabled to
vcpu->arch.
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: If4638e0901c28a4494dad2e103e2c075e8ab5d68
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rename {vmx,nested_vmx}_vcpu_setup() to match what they really do.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the initialization of vmx->guest_msrs[] from vmx_vcpu_setup() to
vmx_create_vcpu(), and put it right after its allocation.
This also is the preperation for next patch.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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... It can be removed here because the same code is called later in
vmx_vcpu_reset() as the flow:
kvm_arch_vcpu_setup()
-> kvm_vcpu_reset()
-> vmx_vcpu_reset()
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the code that writes vmx->vpid to vmcs from vmx_vcpu_reset() to
vmx_vcpu_setup(), because vmx->vpid is allocated when creating vcpu and
never changed. So we don't need to update the vmcs.vpid when resetting
vcpu.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Replace the explicit declaration of "u64 reprogram_pmi" with the generic
macro DECLARE_BITMAP for all possible appropriate number of bits.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If we reach here with r = 0, we will reassign r = 0
unnecesarry, then do the label set_irqchip_out work.
If we reach here with r != 0, then we will do the label
work directly. So this if statement and r = 0 assignment
is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Generally, APICv for all vcpus in the VM are enable/disable in the same
manner. So, get_enable_apicv() should represent APICv status of the VM
instead of each VCPU.
Modify kvm_x86_ops.get_enable_apicv() to take struct kvm as parameter
instead of struct kvm_vcpu.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle caching CR3 (from VMX's VMCS) into struct kvm_vcpu via the common
cache_reg() callback and drop the dedicated decache_cr3(). The name
decache_cr3() is somewhat confusing as the caching behavior of CR3
follows that of GPRs, RFLAGS and PDPTRs, (handled via cache_reg()), and
has nothing in common with the caching behavior of CR0/CR4 (whose
decache_cr{0,4}_guest_bits() likely provided the 'decache' verbiage).
This would effectivel adds a BUG() if KVM attempts to cache CR3 on SVM.
Change it to a WARN_ON_ONCE() -- if the cache never requires filling,
the value is already in the right place -- and opportunistically add one
in VMX to provide an equivalent check.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add helpers to prettify code that tests and/or marks whether or not a
register is available and/or dirty.
Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that indexing into arch.regs is either protected by WARN_ON_ONCE or
done with hardcoded enums, combine all definitions for registers that
are tracked by regs_avail and regs_dirty into 'enum kvm_reg'. Having a
single enum type will simplify additional cleanup related to regs_avail
and regs_dirty.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add WARN_ON_ONCE() checks in kvm_register_{read,write}() to detect reg
values that would cause KVM to overflow vcpu->arch.regs. Change the reg
param to an 'int' to make it clear that the reg index is unverified.
Regarding the overhead of WARN_ON_ONCE(), now that all fixed GPR reads
and writes use dedicated accessors, e.g. kvm_rax_read(), the overhead
is limited to flows where the reg index is generated at runtime. And
there is at least one historical bug where KVM has generated an out-of-
bounds access to arch.regs (see commit b68f3cc7d9789, "KVM: x86: Always
use 32-bit SMRAM save state for 32-bit kernels").
Adding the WARN_ON_ONCE() protection paves the way for additional
cleanup related to kvm_reg and kvm_reg_ex.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework vmx_set_rflags() to avoid the extra code need to handle emulation
of real mode and invalid state when unrestricted guest is disabled. The
primary reason for doing so is to avoid the call to vmx_get_rflags(),
which will incur a VMREAD when RFLAGS is not already available. When
running nested VMs, the majority of calls to vmx_set_rflags() will occur
without an associated vmx_get_rflags(), i.e. when stuffing GUEST_RFLAGS
during transitions between vmcs01 and vmcs02.
Note, vmx_get_rflags() guarantees RFLAGS is marked available.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Replace "else" with early "return" in the unrestricted guest branch. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Capture struct vcpu_vmx in a local variable to improve the readability
of vmx_{g,s}et_rflags().
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Skip the VMWRITE to update GUEST_CR3 if CR3 is not available, i.e. has
not been read from the VMCS since the last VM-Enter. If vcpu->arch.cr3
is stale, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) will refresh vcpu->arch.cr3 from the VMCS,
meaning KVM will do a VMREAD and then VMWRITE the value it just pulled
from the VMCS.
Note, this is a purely theoretical change, no instances of skipping
the VMREAD+VMWRITE have been observed with this change.
Tested-by: Reto Buerki <reet@codelabs.ch>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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