| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
x86 MSI irqdomains can handle MSI-X allocation post MSI-X enable just out
of the box - on the vector domain and on the remapping domains,
Add the feature flag to the supported feature list
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124232326.787373104@linutronix.de
|
|
and related code which is not longer required now that the interrupt remap
code has been converted to MSI parent domains.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124232326.267353814@linutronix.de
|
|
Remove the global PCI/MSI irqdomain implementation and provide the required
MSI parent ops so the PCI/MSI code can detect the new parent and setup per
device domains.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124232326.209212272@linutronix.de
|
|
Remove the global PCI/MSI irqdomain implementation and provide the required
MSI parent ops so the PCI/MSI code can detect the new parent and setup per
device domains.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124232326.151226317@linutronix.de
|
|
Enable MSI parent domain support in the x86 vector domain and fixup the
checks in the iommu implementations to check whether device::msi::domain is
the default MSI parent domain. That keeps the existing logic to protect
e.g. devices behind VMD working.
The interrupt remap PCI/MSI code still works because the underlying vector
domain still provides the same functionality.
None of the other x86 PCI/MSI, e.g. XEN and HyperV, implementations are
affected either. They still work the same way both at the low level and the
PCI/MSI implementations they provide.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124232326.034672592@linutronix.de
|
|
The retries in load_ucode_intel_ap() were in place to support systems
with mixed steppings. Mixed steppings are no longer supported and there is
only one microcode image at a time. Any retries will simply reattempt to
apply the same image over and over without making progress.
[ bp: Zap the circumstantial reasoning from the commit message. ]
Fixes: 06b8534cb728 ("x86/microcode: Rework microcode loading")
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221129210832.107850-3-ashok.raj@intel.com
|
|
It's truly a MSI only flag and for the upcoming per device MSI domains this
must be in the MSI flags so it can be set during domain setup without
exposing this quirk outside of x86.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124230313.454246167@linutronix.de
|
|
* kvm-arm64/dirty-ring:
: .
: Add support for the "per-vcpu dirty-ring tracking with a bitmap
: and sprinkles on top", courtesy of Gavin Shan.
:
: This branch drags the kvmarm-fixes-6.1-3 tag which was already
: merged in 6.1-rc4 so that the branch is in a working state.
: .
KVM: Push dirty information unconditionally to backup bitmap
KVM: selftests: Automate choosing dirty ring size in dirty_log_test
KVM: selftests: Clear dirty ring states between two modes in dirty_log_test
KVM: selftests: Use host page size to map ring buffer in dirty_log_test
KVM: arm64: Enable ring-based dirty memory tracking
KVM: Support dirty ring in conjunction with bitmap
KVM: Move declaration of kvm_cpu_dirty_log_size() to kvm_dirty_ring.h
KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_REQ_DIRTY_RING_SOFT_FULL
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
In xen_init_lock_cpu(), the @name has allocated new string by kasprintf(),
if bind_ipi_to_irqhandler() fails, it should be freed, otherwise may lead
to a memory leak issue, fix it.
Fixes: 2d9e1e2f58b5 ("xen: implement Xen-specific spinlocks")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123155858.11382-3-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
These local variables @{resched|pmu|callfunc...}_name saves the new
string allocated by kasprintf(), and when bind_{v}ipi_to_irqhandler()
fails, it goes to the @fail tag, and calls xen_smp_intr_free{_pv}() to
free resource, however the new string is not saved, which cause a memory
leak issue. fix it.
Fixes: 9702785a747a ("i386: move xen")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123155858.11382-2-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
Intel ICC -hotpatch inserts 2-byte "0x66 0x90" NOP at the start of each
function to reserve extra space for hot-patching, and currently it is not
possible to probe these functions because branch_setup_xol_ops() wrongly
rejects NOP with REP prefix as it treats them like word-sized branch
instructions.
Fixes: 250bbd12c2fe ("uprobes/x86: Refuse to attach uprobe to "word-sized" branch insns")
Reported-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221204173933.GA31544@redhat.com
|
|
Instead of just saying "Disabled" when MTRRs are disabled for any
reason, tell what is disabled and why.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205080433.16643-3-jgross@suse.com
|
|
With the decoupling of PAT and MTRR initialization, PAT will be used
even with MTRRs disabled. This seems to break booting up as TDX guest,
as the recommended sequence to set the PAT MSR across CPUs can't work
in TDX guests due to disabling caches via setting CR0.CD isn't allowed
in TDX mode.
This is an inconsistency in the Intel documentation between the SDM
and the TDX specification. For now handle TDX mode the same way as Xen
PV guest mode by just accepting the current PAT MSR setting without
trying to modify it.
[ bp: Align conditions for better readability. ]
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205080433.16643-2-jgross@suse.com
|
|
GRUB currently relies on the magic number in the image header of ARM and
arm64 EFI kernel images to decide whether or not the image in question
is a bootable kernel.
However, the purpose of the magic number is to identify the image as one
that implements the bare metal boot protocol, and so GRUB, which only
does EFI boot, is limited unnecessarily to booting images that could
potentially be booted in a non-EFI manner as well.
This is problematic for the new zboot decompressor image format, as it
can only boot in EFI mode, and must therefore not use the bare metal
boot magic number in its header.
For this reason, the strict magic number was dropped from GRUB, to
permit essentially any kind of EFI executable to be booted via the
'linux' command, blurring the line between the linux loader and the
chainloader.
So let's use the same field in the DOS header that RISC-V and arm64
already use for their 'bare metal' magic numbers to store a 'generic
Linux kernel' magic number, which can be used to identify bootable
kernel images in PE format which don't necessarily implement a bare
metal boot protocol in the same binary. Note that, in the context of
EFI, the MS-DOS header is only described in terms of the fields that it
shares with the hybrid PE/COFF image format, (i.e., the MS-DOS EXE magic
number at offset #0 and the PE header offset at byte offset #0x3c).
Since we aim for compatibility with EFI only, and not with MS-DOS or
MS-Windows, we can use the remaining space in the MS-DOS header however
we want.
Let's set the generic magic number for x86 images as well: existing
bootloaders already have their own methods to identify x86 Linux images
that can be booted in a non-EFI manner, and having the magic number in
place there will ease any future transitions in loader implementations
to merge the x86 and non-x86 EFI boot paths.
Note that 32-bit ARM already uses the same location in the header for a
different purpose, but the ARM support is already widely implemented and
the EFI zboot decompressor is not available on ARM anyway, so we just
disregard it here.
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
|
collect_cpu_info() is used to collect the current microcode revision and
processor flags on every CPU.
It had a weird mechanism to try to mimick a "once" functionality in the
sense that, that information should be issued only when it is differing
from the previous CPU.
However (1):
the new calling sequence started doing that in parallel:
microcode_init()
|-> schedule_on_each_cpu(setup_online_cpu)
|-> collect_cpu_info()
resulting in multiple redundant prints:
microcode: sig=0x50654, pf=0x80, revision=0x2006e05
microcode: sig=0x50654, pf=0x80, revision=0x2006e05
microcode: sig=0x50654, pf=0x80, revision=0x2006e05
However (2):
dumping this here is not that important because the kernel does not
support mixed silicon steppings microcode. Finally!
Besides, there is already a pr_info() in microcode_reload_late() that
shows both the old and new revisions.
What is more, the CPU signature (sig=0x50654) and Processor Flags
(pf=0x80) above aren't that useful to the end user, they are available
via /proc/cpuinfo and they don't change anyway.
Remove the redundant pr_info().
[ bp: Heavily massage. ]
Fixes: b6f86689d5b7 ("x86/microcode: Rip out the subsys interface gunk")
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221103175901.164783-2-ashok.raj@intel.com
|
|
The "force" argument to write_spec_ctrl_current() is currently ambiguous
as it does not guarantee the MSR write. This is due to the optimization
that writes to the MSR happen only when the new value differs from the
cached value.
This is fine in most cases, but breaks for S3 resume when the cached MSR
value gets out of sync with the hardware MSR value due to S3 resetting
it.
When x86_spec_ctrl_current is same as x86_spec_ctrl_base, the MSR write
is skipped. Which results in SPEC_CTRL mitigations not getting restored.
Move the MSR write from write_spec_ctrl_current() to a new function that
unconditionally writes to the MSR. Update the callers accordingly and
rename functions.
[ bp: Rework a bit. ]
Fixes: caa0ff24d5d0 ("x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value")
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/806d39b0bfec2fe8f50dc5446dff20f5bb24a959.1669821572.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc hotfixes from Andrew Morton:
"15 hotfixes, 11 marked cc:stable.
Only three or four of the latter address post-6.0 issues, which is
hopefully a sign that things are converging"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2022-12-02' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
revert "kbuild: fix -Wimplicit-function-declaration in license_is_gpl_compatible"
Kconfig.debug: provide a little extra FRAME_WARN leeway when KASAN is enabled
drm/amdgpu: temporarily disable broken Clang builds due to blown stack-frame
mm/khugepaged: invoke MMU notifiers in shmem/file collapse paths
mm/khugepaged: fix GUP-fast interaction by sending IPI
mm/khugepaged: take the right locks for page table retraction
mm: migrate: fix THP's mapcount on isolation
mm: introduce arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young()
mm: add dummy pmd_young() for architectures not having it
mm/damon/sysfs: fix wrong empty schemes assumption under online tuning in damon_sysfs_set_schemes()
tools/vm/slabinfo-gnuplot: use "grep -E" instead of "egrep"
nilfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry()
hugetlb: don't delete vma_lock in hugetlb MADV_DONTNEED processing
madvise: use zap_page_range_single for madvise dontneed
mm: replace VM_WARN_ON to pr_warn if the node is offline with __GFP_THISNODE
|
|
Pull Xen-for-KVM changes from David Woodhouse:
* add support for 32-bit guests in SCHEDOP_poll
* the rest of the gfn-to-pfn cache API cleanup
"I still haven't reinstated the last of those patches to make gpc->len
immutable."
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
CPUID.80000021H:EAX[bit 9] indicates that the SMM_CTL MSR (0xc0010116) is
not supported. This defeature can be advertised by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
regardless of whether or not the host enumerates it; currently it will be
included only if the host enumerates at least leaf 8000001DH, due to a
preexisting bug in QEMU that KVM has to work around (commit f751d8eac176,
"KVM: x86: work around QEMU issue with synthetic CPUID leaves", 2022-04-29).
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221007221644.138355-1-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Several symbols are not used by vendor modules but still exported.
Removing them ensures that new coupling between kvm.ko and kvm-*.ko
is noticed and reviewed.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When a VM reboots itself, the reset process will result in
an ioctl(KVM_SET_LAPIC, ...) to disable x2APIC mode and set
the xAPIC id of the vCPU to its default value, which is the
vCPU id.
That will be handled in KVM as follows:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic
kvm_apic_set_state
kvm_lapic_set_base => disable X2APIC mode
kvm_apic_state_fixup
kvm_lapic_xapic_id_updated
kvm_xapic_id(apic) != apic->vcpu->vcpu_id
kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED)
memcpy(vcpu->arch.apic->regs, s->regs, sizeof(*s)) => update APIC_ID
When kvm_apic_set_state invokes kvm_lapic_set_base to disable
x2APIC mode, the old 32-bit x2APIC id is still present rather
than the 8-bit xAPIC id. kvm_lapic_xapic_id_updated will set the
APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_APIC_ID_MODIFIED bit and disable APICv/x2AVIC.
Instead, kvm_lapic_xapic_id_updated must be called after APIC_ID is
changed.
In fact, this fixes another small issue in the code in that
potential changes to a vCPU's xAPIC ID need not be tracked for
KVM_GET_LAPIC.
Fixes: 3743c2f02517 ("KVM: x86: inhibit APICv/AVIC on changes to APIC ID or APIC base")
Signed-off-by: Yuan ZhaoXiong <yuanzhaoxiong@baidu.com>
Message-Id: <1669984574-32692-1-git-send-email-yuanzhaoxiong@baidu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Misc KVM x86 fixes and cleanups for 6.2:
- One-off fixes for various emulation flows (SGX, VMXON, NRIPS=0).
- Reinstate IBPB on emulated VM-Exit that was incorrectly dropped a few
years back when eliminating unnecessary barriers when switching between
vmcs01 and vmcs02.
- Clean up the MSR filter docs.
- Clean up vmread_error_trampoline() to make it more obvious that params
must be passed on the stack, even for x86-64.
- Let userspace set all supported bits in MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL irrespective
of the current guest CPUID.
- Fudge around a race with TSC refinement that results in KVM incorrectly
thinking a guest needs TSC scaling when running on a CPU with a
constant TSC, but no hardware-enumerated TSC frequency.
|
|
The documentation says that the ioctl has been deprecated, but it has been
actually removed and the remaining references are just left overs.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221202105011.185147-3-javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
kmap_local_page() is the preferred way to create temporary mappings when it
is feasible, because the mappings are thread-local and CPU-local.
kmap_local_page() uses per-task maps rather than per-CPU maps. This in
effect removes the need to disable preemption on the local CPU while the
mapping is active, and thus vastly reduces overall system latency. It is
also valid to take pagefaults within the mapped region.
The use of kmap_atomic() in the SGX code was not an explicit design choice
to disable page faults or preemption, and there is no compelling design
reason to using kmap_atomic() vs. kmap_local_page().
Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/Y0biN3%2FJsZMa0yUr@kernel.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115161627.4169428-1-kristen@linux.intel.com
|
|
Presently, init/boot time interrupt delivery mode is enumerated only for
ACPI enabled systems by parsing MADT table or for older systems by parsing
MP table. But for OF based x86 systems, it is assumed & hardcoded to be
legacy PIC mode. This causes a boot time crash for platforms which do not
provide a 8259 compliant legacy PIC.
Add support for configuration of init time interrupt delivery mode for x86
OF based systems by introducing a new optional boolean property
'intel,virtual-wire-mode' for the local APIC interrupt-controller
node. This property emulates IMCRP Bit 7 of MP feature info byte 2 of MP
floating pointer structure.
Defaults to legacy PIC mode if absent. Configures it to virtual wire
compatibility mode if present.
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124084143.21841-5-rtanwar@maxlinear.com
|
|
Use pr_lvl() instead of the deprecated printk(KERN_LVL).
Just a upgrade of print utilities usage. no functional changes.
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rahul Tanwar <rtanwar@maxlinear.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124084143.21841-4-rtanwar@maxlinear.com
|
|
Recently objtool started complaining about dead code in the object files,
in particular
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: early_init_dt_scan_memory+0x191: unreachable instruction
when CONFIG_OF=y.
Indeed, early_init_dt_scan() is not used on x86 and making it compile (with
help of CONFIG_OF) will abrupt the code flow since in the middle of it
there is a BUG() instruction.
Remove the pointless function.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124184824.9548-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
|
|
A kernel that was compiled without CONFIG_X86_X2APIC was unable to boot on
platforms that have x2APIC already enabled in the BIOS before starting the
kernel.
The kernel was supposed to panic with an approprite error message in
validate_x2apic() due to the missing X2APIC support.
However, validate_x2apic() was run too late in the boot cycle, and the
kernel tried to initialize the APIC nonetheless. This resulted in an
earlier panic in setup_local_APIC() because the APIC was not registered.
In my experiments, a panic message in setup_local_APIC() was not visible
in the graphical console, which resulted in a hang with no indication
what has gone wrong.
Instead of calling panic(), disable the APIC, which results in a somewhat
working system with the PIC only (and no SMP). This way the user is able to
diagnose the problem more easily.
Disabling X2APIC mode is not an option because it's impossible on systems
with locked x2APIC.
The proper place to disable the APIC in this case is in check_x2apic(),
which is called early from setup_arch(). Doing this in
__apic_intr_mode_select() is too late.
Make check_x2apic() unconditionally available and remove the empty stub.
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Reported-by: Robert Elliott (Servers) <elliott@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d573ba1c-0dc4-3016-712a-cc23a8a33d42@molgen.mpg.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220911084711.13694-3-mat.jonczyk@o2.pl
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221129215008.7247-1-mat.jonczyk@o2.pl
|
|
After the removal of the stack canary segment setup code, this function
does nothing.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115184328.70874-1-brgerst@gmail.com
|
|
Due to the explicit 'noinline' GCC-7.3 is not able to optimize away the
argument setup of:
apply_ibt_endbr(__ibt_endbr_seal, __ibt_enbr_seal_end);
even when X86_KERNEL_IBT=n and the function is an empty stub, which leads
to link errors due to missing __ibt_endbr_seal* symbols:
ld: arch/x86/kernel/alternative.o: in function `alternative_instructions':
alternative.c:(.init.text+0x15d): undefined reference to `__ibt_endbr_seal_end'
ld: alternative.c:(.init.text+0x164): undefined reference to `__ibt_endbr_seal'
Remove the explicit 'noinline' to help gcc optimize them away.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011113803.956808-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
|
|
The helper crypto_tfm_ctx is only used by the Crypto API algorithm
code and should really be in algapi.h. However, for historical
reasons many files relied on it to be in crypto.h. This patch
changes those files to use algapi.h instead in prepartion for a
move.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
|
curve25519-x86_64.c fails to build when CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL is enabled.
The error is "inline assembly requires more registers than available"
thrown from the `fsqr()` function. Therefore, excluding this file from
GCOV profiling until this issue is resolved. Thereby allowing
CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL to be enabled for x86.
Signed-off-by: Joe Fradley <joefradley@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
|
The actual size of the following arrays at run-time depends on
CONFIG_X86_PAE.
427 pmd_t *u_pmds[MAX_PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS];
428 pmd_t *pmds[MAX_PREALLOCATED_PMDS];
If CONFIG_X86_PAE is not enabled, their final size will be zero (which
is technically not a legal storage size in C, but remains "valid" via
the GNU extension). In that case, the compiler complains about trying to
access objects of size zero when calling functions where these objects
are passed as arguments.
Fix this by sanity-checking the size of those arrays just before the
function calls. Also, the following warnings are fixed by these changes
when building with GCC 11+ and -Wstringop-overflow enabled:
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:437:13: warning: ‘preallocate_pmds.constprop’ accessing 8 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:440:13: warning: ‘preallocate_pmds.constprop’ accessing 8 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:462:9: warning: ‘free_pmds.constprop’ accessing 8 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:455:9: warning: ‘pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd’ accessing 8 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c:464:9: warning: ‘free_pmds.constprop’ accessing 8 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
This is one of the last cases in the ongoing effort to globally enable
-Wstringop-overflow.
The alternative to this is to make the originally suggested change:
make the pmds argument from an array pointer to a pointer pointer. That
situation is considered "legal" for C in the sense that it does not have
a way to reason about the storage. i.e.:
-static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
+static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t **pmds)
With the above change, there's no difference in binary output, and the
compiler warning is silenced.
However, with this patch, the compiler can actually figure out that it
isn't using the code at all, and it gets dropped:
text data bss dec hex filename
8218 718 32 8968 2308 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.o.before
7765 694 32 8491 212b arch/x86/mm/pgtable.o.after
So this case (fixing a warning and reducing image size) is a clear win.
Additionally drops an old work-around for GCC in the same code.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/203
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/181
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Yytb67xvrnctxnEe@work
|
|
find_timens_vvar_page() is not architecture-specific, as can be seen from
how all five per-architecture versions of it are the same.
(arm64, powerpc and riscv are exactly the same; x86 and s390 have two
characters difference inside a comment, less blank lines, and mark the
!CONFIG_TIME_NS version as inline.)
Refactor the five copies into a central copy in kernel/time/namespace.c.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130115320.2918447-1-jannh@google.com
|
|
Don't snapshot tsc_khz into per-cpu cpu_tsc_khz if the host TSC is
constant, in which case the actual TSC frequency will never change and thus
capturing TSC during initialization is unnecessary, KVM can simply use
tsc_khz. This value is snapshotted from
kvm_timer_init->kvmclock_cpu_online->tsc_khz_changed(NULL)
On CPUs with constant TSC, but not a hardware-specified TSC frequency,
snapshotting cpu_tsc_khz and using that to set a VM's target TSC frequency
can lead to VM to think its TSC frequency is not what it actually is if
refining the TSC completes after KVM snapshots tsc_khz. The actual
frequency never changes, only the kernel's calculation of what that
frequency is changes.
Ideally, KVM would not be able to race with TSC refinement, or would have
a hook into tsc_refine_calibration_work() to get an alert when refinement
is complete. Avoiding the race altogether isn't practical as refinement
takes a relative eternity; it's deliberately put on a work queue outside of
the normal boot sequence to avoid unnecessarily delaying boot.
Adding a hook is doable, but somewhat gross due to KVM's ability to be
built as a module. And if the TSC is constant, which is likely the case
for every VMX/SVM-capable CPU produced in the last decade, the race can be
hit if and only if userspace is able to create a VM before TSC refinement
completes; refinement is slow, but not that slow.
For now, punt on a proper fix, as not taking a snapshot can help some uses
cases and not taking a snapshot is arguably correct irrespective of the
race with refinement.
Signed-off-by: Anton Romanov <romanton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220608183525.1143682-1-romanton@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Move the check on IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL being locked, i.e. read-only from
the guest, into the helper to check the overall validity of the incoming
value. Opportunistically rename the helper to make it clear that it
returns a bool.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607232353.3375324-3-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Allow userspace to set all supported bits in MSR IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
irrespective of the guest CPUID model, e.g. via KVM_SET_MSRS. KVM's ABI
is that userspace is allowed to set MSRs before CPUID, i.e. can set MSRs
to values that would fault according to the guest CPUID model.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607232353.3375324-2-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Declare vmread_error_trampoline() as an opaque symbol so that it cannot
be called from C code, at least not without some serious fudging. The
trampoline always passes parameters on the stack so that the inline
VMREAD sequence doesn't need to clobber registers. regparm(0) was
originally added to document the stack behavior, but it ended up being
confusing because regparm(0) is a nop for 64-bit targets.
Opportunustically wrap the trampoline and its declaration in #ifdeffery
to make it even harder to invoke incorrectly, to document why it exists,
and so that it's not left behind if/when CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
is true for all supported toolchains.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928232015.745948-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Reword the comments that (attempt to) document nVMX's overrides of the
CR0/4 read shadows for L2 after calling vmx_set_cr0/4(). The important
behavior that needs to be documented is that KVM needs to override the
shadows to account for L1's masks even though the shadows are set by the
common helpers (and that setting the shadows first would result in the
correct shadows being clobbered).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220831000721.4066617-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted
Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling
the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software
executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two
different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such
isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor
Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS.
Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and
guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize
IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts,
hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't
sufficient architecturally.)
For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction
barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of
indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that
was executed in L2.
Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be
deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is
clear at emulated VM-exit.
This is CVE-2022-2196.
Fixes: 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02")
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-3-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
At this point in time, most guests (in the default, out-of-the-box
configuration) are likely to use IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Therefore, drop the
compiler hint that it is unlikely for KVM to be intercepting WRMSR of
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221019213620.1953281-2-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Inject #GP for if VMXON is attempting with a CR0/CR4 that fails the
generic "is CRx valid" check, but passes the CR4.VMXE check, and do the
generic checks _after_ handling the post-VMXON VM-Fail.
The CR4.VMXE check, and all other #UD cases, are special pre-conditions
that are enforced prior to pivoting on the current VMX mode, i.e. occur
before interception if VMXON is attempted in VMX non-root mode.
All other CR0/CR4 checks generate #GP and effectively have lower priority
than the post-VMXON check.
Per the SDM:
IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ...
THEN #UD;
ELSIF not in VMX operation
THEN
IF (CPL > 0) or (in A20M mode) or
(the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation)
THEN #GP(0);
ELSIF in VMX non-root operation
THEN VMexit;
ELSIF CPL > 0
THEN #GP(0);
ELSE VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation");
FI;
which, if re-written without ELSIF, yields:
IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ...
THEN #UD
IF in VMX non-root operation
THEN VMexit;
IF CPL > 0
THEN #GP(0)
IF in VMX operation
THEN VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation");
IF (in A20M mode) or
(the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation)
THEN #GP(0);
Note, KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits that occur in L2 to L1,
i.e. there is no need to check the vCPU is not in VMX non-root mode. Add
a comment to explain why unconditionally forwarding such exits is
functionally correct.
Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli@ucdavis.edu>
Fixes: c7d855c2aff2 ("KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006001956.329314-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
The use of kmap_atomic() is being deprecated in favor of
kmap_local_page()[1].
The main difference between atomic and local mappings is that local
mappings don't disable page faults or preemption.
There're 2 reasons we can use kmap_local_page() here:
1. SEV is 64-bit only and kmap_local_page() doesn't disable migration in
this case, but here the function clflush_cache_range() uses CLFLUSHOPT
instruction to flush, and on x86 CLFLUSHOPT is not CPU-local and flushes
the page out of the entire cache hierarchy on all CPUs (APM volume 3,
chapter 3, CLFLUSHOPT). So there's no need to disable preemption to ensure
CPU-local.
2. clflush_cache_range() doesn't need to disable pagefault and the mapping
is still valid even if sleeps. This is also true for sched out/in when
preempted.
In addition, though kmap_local_page() is a thin wrapper around
page_address() on 64-bit, kmap_local_page() should still be used here in
preference to page_address() since page_address() isn't suitable to be used
in a generic function (like sev_clflush_pages()) where the page passed in
is not easy to determine the source of allocation. Keeping the kmap* API in
place means it can be used for things other than highmem mappings[2].
Therefore, sev_clflush_pages() is a function that should use
kmap_local_page() in place of kmap_atomic().
Convert the calls of kmap_atomic() / kunmap_atomic() to kmap_local_page() /
kunmap_local().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220813220034.806698-1-ira.weiny@intel.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5d667258-b58b-3d28-3609-e7914c99b31b@intel.com/
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928092748.463631-1-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Skip the WRMSR fastpath in SVM's VM-Exit handler if the next RIP isn't
valid, e.g. because KVM is running with nrips=false. SVM must decode and
emulate to skip the WRMSR if the CPU doesn't provide the next RIP.
Getting the instruction bytes to decode the WRMSR requires reading guest
memory, which in turn means dereferencing memslots, and that isn't safe
because KVM doesn't hold SRCU when the fastpath runs.
Don't bother trying to enable the fastpath for this case, e.g. by doing
only the WRMSR and leaving the "skip" until later. NRIPS is supported on
all modern CPUs (KVM has considered making it mandatory), and the next
RIP will be valid the vast, vast majority of the time.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13 Tainted: G O
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:954 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by stable/206475:
#0: ffff9d9dfebcc0f0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x620 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 152 PID: 206475 Comm: stable Tainted: G O 6.0.0-smp--4e557fcd3d80-skip #13
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 10.48.0 01/27/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xaa
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x11e/0x130
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x155/0x190 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot+0x18/0x80 [kvm]
paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x183/0x450 [kvm]
paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x63/0xd0 [kvm]
kvm_fetch_guest_virt+0x53/0xc0 [kvm]
__do_insn_fetch_bytes+0x18b/0x1c0 [kvm]
x86_decode_insn+0xf0/0xef0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0xba/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_instruction+0x17/0x20 [kvm]
__svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x85/0x100 [kvm_amd]
svm_skip_emulated_instruction+0x13/0x20 [kvm_amd]
handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff+0xae/0x180 [kvm]
svm_vcpu_run+0x4b8/0x5a0 [kvm_amd]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x16ca/0x22f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x39d/0x900 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x538/0x620 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x77/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1d/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fixes: 404d5d7bff0d ("KVM: X86: Introduce more exit_fastpath_completion enum values")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930234031.1732249-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Treat any exception during instruction decode for EMULTYPE_SKIP as a
"full" emulation failure, i.e. signal failure instead of queuing the
exception. When decoding purely to skip an instruction, KVM and/or the
CPU has already done some amount of emulation that cannot be unwound,
e.g. on an EPT misconfig VM-Exit KVM has already processeed the emulated
MMIO. KVM already does this if a #UD is encountered, but not for other
exceptions, e.g. if a #PF is encountered during fetch.
In SVM's soft-injection use case, queueing the exception is particularly
problematic as queueing exceptions while injecting events can put KVM
into an infinite loop due to bailing from VM-Enter to service the newly
pending exception. E.g. multiple warnings to detect such behavior fire:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9873 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass
CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1+ #220
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1de5/0x20a0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1017 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9987 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm]
Modules linked in: kvm_amd ccp kvm irqbypass
CPU: 3 PID: 1017 Comm: svm_nested_soft Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc1+ #220
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x12a3/0x20a0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x223/0x6d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x85/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: 6ea6e84309ca ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233632.1725475-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
Acquire SRCU before taking the gpc spinlock in wait_pending_event() so as
to be consistent with all other functions that acquire both locks. It's
not illegal to acquire SRCU inside a spinlock, nor is there deadlock
potential, but in general it's preferable to order locks from least
restrictive to most restrictive, e.g. if wait_pending_event() needed to
sleep for whatever reason, it could do so while holding SRCU, but would
need to drop the spinlock.
Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <flyingpeng@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAPm50a++Cb=QfnjMZ2EnCj-Sb9Y4UM-=uOEtHAcjnNLCAAf-dQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Let's add one sanity check for CONFIG_DEBUG_VM on the write bit in
whatever chance we have when walking through the pgtables. It can bring
the error earlier even before the app notices the data was corrupted on
the snapshot. Also it helps us to identify this is a wrong pgtable setup,
so hopefully a great information to have for debugging too.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114000447.1681003-3-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Resume the guest immediately when injecting a #GP on ECREATE due to an
invalid enclave size, i.e. don't attempt ECREATE in the host. The #GP is
a terminal fault, e.g. skipping the instruction if ECREATE is successful
would result in KVM injecting #GP on the instruction following ECREATE.
Fixes: 70210c044b4e ("KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930233132.1723330-1-seanjc@google.com
|
|
|
|
When running as a Xen PV guests commit eed9a328aa1a ("mm: x86: add
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG") can cause a protection violation in
pmdp_test_and_clear_young():
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8880083374d0
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
PGD 3026067 P4D 3026067 PUD 3027067 PMD 7fee5067 PTE 8010000008337065
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 158 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-20221118-doflr+ #1
RIP: e030:pmdp_test_and_clear_young+0x25/0x40
This happens because the Xen hypervisor can't emulate direct writes to
page table entries other than PTEs.
This can easily be fixed by introducing arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young()
similar to arch_has_hw_pte_young() and test that instead of
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123064510.16225-1-jgross@suse.com
Fixes: eed9a328aa1a ("mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> [core changes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
