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2025-01-21Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.14_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 CPU speculation update from Borislav Petkov: - Add support for AMD hardware which is not affected by SRSO on the user/kernel attack vector and advertise it to guest userspace * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.14_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support
2025-01-21Merge tag 'ras_core_for_v6.14_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 RAS updates from Borislav Petkov: - Remove the shared threshold bank hack on AMD and streamline and simplify it - Cleanup and sanitize MCA code * tag 'ras_core_for_v6.14_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce/amd: Remove shared threshold bank plumbing x86/mce: Remove the redundant mce_hygon_feature_init() x86/mce: Convert family/model mixed checks to VFM-based checks x86/mce: Break up __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks() x86/mce: Make four functions return bool x86/mce/threshold: Remove the redundant this_cpu_dec_return() x86/mce: Make several functions return bool
2025-01-20x86: use cmov for user address maskingLinus Torvalds
This was a suggestion by David Laight, and while I was slightly worried that some micro-architecture would predict cmov like a conditional branch, there is little reason to actually believe any core would be that broken. Intel documents that their existing cores treat CMOVcc as a data dependency that will constrain speculation in their "Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" whitepaper: "Other instructions such as CMOVcc, AND, ADC, SBB and SETcc can also be used to prevent bounds check bypass by constraining speculative execution on current family 6 processors (Intel® Core™, Intel® Atom™, Intel® Xeon® and Intel® Xeon Phi™ processors)" and while that leaves the future uarch issues open, that's certainly true of our traditional SBB usage too. Any core that predicts CMOV will be unusable for various crypto algorithms that need data-independent timing stability, so let's just treat CMOV as the safe choice that simplifies the address masking by avoiding an extra instruction and doesn't need a temporary register. Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Link: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/336996-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.pdf Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2025-01-20x86: use proper 'clac' and 'stac' opcode namesLinus Torvalds
Back when we added SMAP support, all versions of binutils didn't necessarily understand the 'clac' and 'stac' instructions. So we implemented those instructions manually as ".byte" sequences. But we've since upgraded the minimum version of binutils to version 2.25, and that included proper support for the SMAP instructions, and there's no reason for us to use some line noise to express them any more. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2025-01-19Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Mark serialize() noinstr so that it can be used from instrumentation- free code - Make sure FRED's RSP0 MSR is synchronized with its corresponding per-CPU value in order to avoid double faults in hotplug scenarios - Disable EXECMEM_ROX on x86 for now because it didn't receive proper x86 maintainers review, went in and broke a bunch of things * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/asm: Make serialize() always_inline x86/fred: Fix the FRED RSP0 MSR out of sync with its per-CPU cache x86: Disable EXECMEM_ROX support
2025-01-16x86/asm: Make serialize() always_inlineJuergen Gross
In order to allow serialize() to be used from noinstr code, make it __always_inline. Fixes: 0ef8047b737d ("x86/static-call: provide a way to do very early static-call updates") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202412181756.aJvzih2K-lkp@intel.com/ Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218100918.22167-1-jgross@suse.com
2025-01-14x86/fred: Fix the FRED RSP0 MSR out of sync with its per-CPU cacheXin Li (Intel)
The FRED RSP0 MSR is only used for delivering events when running userspace. Linux leverages this property to reduce expensive MSR writes and optimize context switches. The kernel only writes the MSR when about to run userspace *and* when the MSR has actually changed since the last time userspace ran. This optimization is implemented by maintaining a per-CPU cache of FRED RSP0 and then checking that against the value for the top of current task stack before running userspace. However cpu_init_fred_exceptions() writes the MSR without updating the per-CPU cache. This means that the kernel might return to userspace with MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0==0 when it needed to point to the top of current task stack. This would induce a double fault (#DF), which is bad. A context switch after cpu_init_fred_exceptions() can paper over the issue since it updates the cached value. That evidently happens most of the time explaining how this bug got through. Fix the bug through resynchronizing the FRED RSP0 MSR with its per-CPU cache in cpu_init_fred_exceptions(). Fixes: fe85ee391966 ("x86/entry: Set FRED RSP0 on return to userspace instead of context switch") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250110174639.1250829-1-xin%40zytor.com
2025-01-13Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-01-13-00-03' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton: "18 hotfixes. 11 are cc:stable. 13 are MM and 5 are non-MM. All patches are singletons - please see the relevant changelogs for details" * tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-01-13-00-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: fs/proc: fix softlockup in __read_vmcore (part 2) mm: fix assertion in folio_end_read() mm: vmscan : pgdemote vmstat is not getting updated when MGLRU is enabled. vmstat: disable vmstat_work on vmstat_cpu_down_prep() zram: fix potential UAF of zram table selftests/mm: set allocated memory to non-zero content in cow test mm: clear uffd-wp PTE/PMD state on mremap() module: fix writing of livepatch relocations in ROX text mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug Revert "mm: zswap: fix race between [de]compression and CPU hotunplug" hugetlb: fix NULL pointer dereference in trace_hugetlbfs_alloc_inode mm: fix div by zero in bdi_ratio_from_pages x86/execmem: fix ROX cache usage in Xen PV guests filemap: avoid truncating 64-bit offset to 32 bits tools: fix atomic_set() definition to set the value correctly mm/mempolicy: count MPOL_WEIGHTED_INTERLEAVE to "interleave_hit" scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: fix decoding of lines with an additional info mm/kmemleak: fix percpu memory leak detection failure
2025-01-13x86: Disable EXECMEM_ROX supportPeter Zijlstra
The whole module_writable_address() nonsense made a giant mess of alternative.c, not to mention it still contains bugs -- notable some of the CFI variants crash and burn. Mike has been working on patches to clean all this up again, but given the current state of things, this stuff just isn't ready. Disable for now, lets try again next cycle. Fixes: 5185e7f9f3bd ("x86/module: enable ROX caches for module text on 64 bit") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250113112934.GA8385@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
2025-01-12x86/execmem: fix ROX cache usage in Xen PV guestsJuergen Gross
The recently introduced ROX cache for modules is assuming large page support in 64-bit mode without testing the related feature bit. This results in breakage when running as a Xen PV guest, as in this mode large pages are not supported. Fix that by testing the X86_FEATURE_PSE capability when deciding whether to enable the ROX cache. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250103065631.26459-1-jgross@suse.com Fixes: 2e45474ab14f ("execmem: add support for cache of large ROX pages") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-01-07x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registersRick Edgecombe
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it. The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place. As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning. But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? __warn+0x91/0x150 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0 __regset_get+0xad/0xf0 copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0 ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140 ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850 ? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300 [...] Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be something to find in the XSAVE buffer. [ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ] Fixes: 2fab02b25ae7 ("x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack") Reported-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250107233056.235536-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2025-01-03x86/mce/amd: Remove shared threshold bank plumbingYazen Ghannam
Legacy AMD systems include an integrated Northbridge that is represented by MCA bank 4. This is the only non-core MCA bank in legacy systems. The Northbridge is physically shared by all the CPUs within an AMD "Node". However, in practice the "shared" MCA bank can only by managed by a single CPU within that AMD Node. This is known as the "Node Base Core" (NBC). For example, only the NBC will be able to read the MCA bank 4 registers; they will be Read-as-Zero for other CPUs. Also, the MCA Thresholding interrupt will only signal the NBC; the other CPUs will not receive it. This is enforced by hardware, and it should not be managed by software. The current AMD Thresholding code attempts to deal with the "shared" MCA bank by micromanaging the bank's sysfs kobjects. However, this does not follow the intended kobject use cases. It is also fragile, and it has caused bugs in the past. Modern AMD systems do not need this shared MCA bank support, and it should not be needed on legacy systems either. Remove the shared threshold bank code. Also, move the threshold struct definitions to mce/amd.c, since they are no longer needed in amd_nb.c. Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241206161210.163701-2-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
2025-01-02x86/static-call: Remove early_boot_irqs_disabled check to fix Xen PVH dom0Andrew Cooper
__static_call_update_early() has a check for early_boot_irqs_disabled, but is used before early_boot_irqs_disabled is set up in start_kernel(). Xen PV has always special cased early_boot_irqs_disabled, but Xen PVH does not and falls over the BUG when booting as dom0. It is very suspect that early_boot_irqs_disabled starts as 0, becomes 1 for a time, then becomes 0 again, but as this needs backporting to fix a breakage in a security fix, dropping the BUG_ON() is the far safer option. Fixes: 0ef8047b737d ("x86/static-call: provide a way to do very early static-call updates") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219620 Reported-by: Alex Zenla <alex@edera.dev> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Alex Zenla <alex@edera.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241221211046.6475-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
2024-12-31x86/mce: Remove the redundant mce_hygon_feature_init()Qiuxu Zhuo
Get HYGON to directly call mce_amd_feature_init() and remove the redundant mce_hygon_feature_init(). Suggested-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-7-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-31x86/mce: Convert family/model mixed checks to VFM-based checksQiuxu Zhuo
Convert family/model mixed checks to VFM-based checks to make the code more compact. Simplify. [ bp: Drop the "what" from the commit message - it should be visible from the diff alone. ] Suggested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-6-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-31x86/mce: Break up __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks()Tony Luck
Split each vendor specific part into its own helper function. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Tested-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-5-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-30x86/mce: Make four functions return boolQiuxu Zhuo
Make those functions whose callers only care about success or failure return a boolean value for better readability. Also, update the call sites accordingly as the polarities of all the return values have been flipped. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-4-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-30x86/mce/threshold: Remove the redundant this_cpu_dec_return()Qiuxu Zhuo
The 'storm' variable points to this_cpu_ptr(&storm_desc). Access the 'stormy_bank_count' field through the 'storm' to avoid calling this_cpu_*() on the same per-CPU variable twice. This minor optimization reduces the text size by 16 bytes. $ size threshold.o.* text data bss dec hex filename 1395 1664 0 3059 bf3 threshold.o.old 1379 1664 0 3043 be3 threshold.o.new No functional changes intended. Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-3-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-30x86/mce: Make several functions return boolQiuxu Zhuo
Make several functions that return 0 or 1 return a boolean value for better readability. No functional changes are intended. Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212140103.66964-2-qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com
2024-12-30KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspaceBorislav Petkov (AMD)
SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO denotes whether the CPU is affected by SRSO across user/kernel boundaries. Advertise it to guest userspace. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202120416.6054-3-bp@kernel.org
2024-12-30x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO supportBorislav Petkov (AMD)
If the machine has: CPUID Fn8000_0021_EAX[30] (SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO) -- If this bit is 1, it indicates the CPU is not subject to the SRSO vulnerability across user/kernel boundaries. have it fall back to IBPB on VMEXIT only, in the case it is going to run VMs: Speculative Return Stack Overflow: Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202120416.6054-2-bp@kernel.org
2024-12-29Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2024-12-29' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: - Fix a hang in the "kernel IBT no ENDBR" self-test that may trigger on FRED systems, caused by incomplete FRED state cleanup in the #CP fault handler - Improve TDX (Coco VM) guest unrecoverable error handling to not potentially leak decrypted memory * tag 'x86-urgent-2024-12-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: virt: tdx-guest: Just leak decrypted memory on unrecoverable errors x86/fred: Clear WFE in missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs
2024-12-29Merge tag 'perf-urgent-2024-12-29' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 perf fixes from Ingo Molnar: - Fix Intel Lunar Lake build-in event definitions - Fall back to (compatible) legacy features on new Intel PEBS format v6 hardware - Enable uncore support on Intel Clearwater Forest CPUs, which is the same as the existing Sierra Forest uncore driver * tag 'perf-urgent-2024-12-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: perf/x86/intel: Fix bitmask of OCR and FRONTEND events for LNC perf/x86/intel/ds: Add PEBS format 6 perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Clearwater Forest support
2024-12-29x86/fred: Clear WFE in missing-ENDBRANCH #CPsXin Li (Intel)
An indirect branch instruction sets the CPU indirect branch tracker (IBT) into WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH (WFE) state and WFE stays asserted across the instruction boundary. When the decoder finds an inappropriate instruction while WFE is set ENDBR, the CPU raises a #CP fault. For the "kernel IBT no ENDBR" selftest where #CPs are deliberately triggered, the WFE state of the interrupted context needs to be cleared to let execution continue. Otherwise when the CPU resumes from the instruction that just caused the previous #CP, another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP is raised and the CPU enters a dead loop. This is not a problem with IDT because it doesn't preserve WFE and IRET doesn't set WFE. But FRED provides space on the entry stack (in an expanded CS area) to save and restore the WFE state, thus the WFE state is no longer clobbered, so software must clear it. Clear WFE to avoid dead looping in ibt_clear_fred_wfe() and the !ibt_fatal code path when execution is allowed to continue. Clobbering WFE in any other circumstance is a security-relevant bug. [ dhansen: changelog rewording ] Fixes: a5f6c2ace997 ("x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241113175934.3897541-1-xin%40zytor.com
2024-12-22Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull KVM x86 fixes from Paolo Bonzini: - Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled systems that don't allow writes to the virtual APIC page, as such hosts will hit unexpected RMP #PFs in the host when running VMs of any flavor. - Fix a WARN in the hypercall completion path due to KVM trying to determine if a guest with protected register state is in 64-bit mode (KVM's ABI is to assume such guests only make hypercalls in 64-bit mode). - Allow the guest to write to supported bits in MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG to fix a regression with Windows guests, and because KVM's read-only behavior appears to be entirely made up. - Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if the faulting access is allowed given the existing SPTE. This fixes a benign WARN (other than the WARN itself) due to unexpectedly replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE. - Emit a warning when KVM is configured with ignore_msrs=1 and also to hide the MSRs that the guest is looking for from the kernel logs. ignore_msrs can trick guests into assuming that certain processor features are present, and this in turn leads to bogus bug reports. * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: x86: let it be known that ignore_msrs is a bad idea KVM: VMX: don't include '<linux/find.h>' directly KVM: x86/mmu: Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if access is already allowed KVM: SVM: Allow guest writes to set MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG bits KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit() KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed feature
2024-12-22Merge tag 'kvm-x86-fixes-6.13-rcN' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEADPaolo Bonzini
KVM x86 fixes for 6.13: - Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled systems that don't allow writes to the virtual APIC page, as such hosts will hit unexpected RMP #PFs in the host when running VMs of any flavor. - Fix a WARN in the hypercall completion path due to KVM trying to determine if a guest with protected register state is in 64-bit mode (KVM's ABI is to assume such guests only make hypercalls in 64-bit mode). - Allow the guest to write to supported bits in MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG to fix a regression with Windows guests, and because KVM's read-only behavior appears to be entirely made up. - Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if the faulting access is allowed given the existing SPTE. This fixes a benign WARN (other than the WARN itself) due to unexpectedly replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE.
2024-12-22KVM: x86: let it be known that ignore_msrs is a bad ideaPaolo Bonzini
When running KVM with ignore_msrs=1 and report_ignored_msrs=0, the user has no clue that that the guest is being lied to. This may cause bug reports such as https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2571, where enabling a CPUID bit in QEMU caused Linux guests to try reading MSR_CU_DEF_ERR; and being lied about the existence of MSR_CU_DEF_ERR caused the guest to assume other things about the local APIC which were not true: Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: mce: [Firmware Bug]: Your BIOS is not setting up LVT offset 0x2 for deferred error IRQs correctly. Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x852 at rIP: 0xffffffffb548ffa7 (native_read_msr+0x7/0x40) Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: Call Trace: ... Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: native_apic_msr_read+0x20/0x30 Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: setup_APIC_eilvt+0x47/0x110 Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: mce_amd_feature_init+0x485/0x4e0 ... Sep 14 12:02:53 kernel: [Firmware Bug]: cpu 0, try to use APIC520 (LVT offset 2) for vector 0xf4, but the register is already in use for vector 0x0 on this cpu Without reported_ignored_msrs=0 at least the host kernel log will contain enough information to avoid going on a wild goose chase. But if reports about individual MSR accesses are being silenced too, at least complain loudly the first time a VM is started. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-12-22KVM: VMX: don't include '<linux/find.h>' directlyWolfram Sang
The header clearly states that it does not want to be included directly, only via '<linux/bitmap.h>'. Replace the include accordingly. Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Message-ID: <20241217070539.2433-2-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-12-20perf/x86/intel: Fix bitmask of OCR and FRONTEND events for LNCKan Liang
The released OCR and FRONTEND events utilized more bits on Lunar Lake p-core. The corresponding mask in the extra_regs has to be extended to unblock the extra bits. Add a dedicated intel_lnc_extra_regs. Fixes: a932aa0e868f ("perf/x86: Add Lunar Lake and Arrow Lake support") Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241216160252.430858-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2024-12-19KVM: x86/mmu: Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if access is already allowedSean Christopherson
Treat slow-path TDP MMU faults as spurious if the access is allowed given the existing SPTE to fix a benign warning (other than the WARN itself) due to replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE, and to avoid the unnecessary LOCK CMPXCHG and subsequent TLB flush. If a read fault races with a write fault, fast GUP fails for any reason when trying to "promote" the read fault to a writable mapping, and KVM resolves the write fault first, then KVM will end up trying to install a read-only SPTE (for a !map_writable fault) overtop a writable SPTE. Note, it's not entirely clear why fast GUP fails, or if that's even how KVM ends up with a !map_writable fault with a writable SPTE. If something else is going awry, e.g. due to a bug in mmu_notifiers, then treating read faults as spurious in this scenario could effectively mask the underlying problem. However, retrying the faulting access instead of overwriting an existing SPTE is functionally correct and desirable irrespective of the WARN, and fast GUP _can_ legitimately fail with a writable VMA, e.g. if the Accessed bit in primary MMU's PTE is toggled and causes a PTE value mismatch. The WARN was also recently added, specifically to track down scenarios where KVM is unnecessarily overwrites SPTEs, i.e. treating the fault as spurious doesn't regress KVM's bug-finding capabilities in any way. In short, letting the WARN linger because there's a tiny chance it's due to a bug elsewhere would be excessively paranoid. Fixes: 1a175082b190 ("KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and flush if resolving a TDP MMU fault clears MMU-writable") Reported-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219588 Tested-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218213611.3181643-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-12-19KVM: SVM: Allow guest writes to set MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG bitsSean Christopherson
Drop KVM's arbitrary behavior of making DE_CFG.LFENCE_SERIALIZE read-only for the guest, as rejecting writes can lead to guest crashes, e.g. Windows in particular doesn't gracefully handle unexpected #GPs on the WRMSR, and nothing in the AMD manuals suggests that LFENCE_SERIALIZE is read-only _if it exists_. KVM only allows LFENCE_SERIALIZE to be set, by the guest or host, if the underlying CPU has X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC, i.e. if LFENCE is guaranteed to be serializing. So if the guest sets LFENCE_SERIALIZE, KVM will provide the desired/correct behavior without any additional action (the guest's value is never stuffed into hardware). And having LFENCE be serializing even when it's not _required_ to be is a-ok from a functional perspective. Fixes: 74a0e79df68a ("KVM: SVM: Disallow guest from changing userspace's MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG value") Fixes: d1d93fa90f1a ("KVM: SVM: Add MSR-based feature support for serializing LFENCE") Reported-by: Simon Pilkington <simonp.git@mailbox.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/52914da7-a97b-45ad-86a0-affdf8266c61@mailbox.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211172952.1477605-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-12-19KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()Sean Christopherson
Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bit hypercall when completing said hypercall. For guests with protected state, e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bit mode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable. Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm] Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470 Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024 RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2400/0x2720 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x54f/0x630 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x6b/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: b5aead0064f3 ("KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128004344.4072099-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-12-19KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed featureSuravee Suthikulpanit
On SNP-enabled system, VMRUN marks AVIC Backing Page as in-use while the guest is running for both secure and non-secure guest. Any hypervisor write to the in-use vCPU's AVIC backing page (e.g. to inject an interrupt) will generate unexpected #PF in the host. Currently, attempt to run AVIC guest would result in the following error: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff3a442e549cc270 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation PGD b6ee01067 P4D b6ee02067 PUD 10096d063 PMD 11c540063 PTE 80000001149cc163 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x1149cc unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x114800 - 0x114a00] ... Newer AMD system is enhanced to allow hypervisor to modify the backing page for non-secure guest on SNP-enabled system. This enhancement is available when the CPUID Fn8000_001F_EAX bit 30 is set (HvInUseWrAllowed). This table describes AVIC support matrix w.r.t. SNP enablement: | Non-SNP system | SNP system ----------------------------------------------------- Non-SNP guest | AVIC Activate | AVIC Activate iff | | HvInuseWrAllowed=1 ----------------------------------------------------- SNP guest | N/A | Secure AVIC Therefore, check and disable AVIC in kvm_amd driver when the feature is not available on SNP-enabled system. See the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual (APM) Volume 2 for detail. (https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/ programmer-references/40332.pdf) Fixes: 216d106c7ff7 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support") Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241104075845.7583-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-12-18Merge tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed-20241217' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux Pull hyperv fixes from Wei Liu: - Various fixes to Hyper-V tools in the kernel tree (Dexuan Cui, Olaf Hering, Vitaly Kuznetsov) - Fix a bug in the Hyper-V TSC page based sched_clock() (Naman Jain) - Two bug fixes in the Hyper-V utility functions (Michael Kelley) - Convert open-coded timeouts to secs_to_jiffies() in Hyper-V drivers (Easwar Hariharan) * tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed-20241217' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: tools/hv: reduce resource usage in hv_kvp_daemon tools/hv: add a .gitignore file tools/hv: reduce resouce usage in hv_get_dns_info helper hv/hv_kvp_daemon: Pass NIC name to hv_get_dns_info as well Drivers: hv: util: Avoid accessing a ringbuffer not initialized yet Drivers: hv: util: Don't force error code to ENODEV in util_probe() tools/hv: terminate fcopy daemon if read from uio fails drivers: hv: Convert open-coded timeouts to secs_to_jiffies() tools: hv: change permissions of NetworkManager configuration file x86/hyperv: Fix hv tsc page based sched_clock for hibernation tools: hv: Fix a complier warning in the fcopy uio daemon
2024-12-17perf/x86/intel/ds: Add PEBS format 6Kan Liang
The only difference between 5 and 6 is the new counters snapshotting group, without the following counters snapshotting enabling patches, it's impossible to utilize the feature in a PEBS record. It's safe to share the same code path with format 5. Add format 6, so the end user can at least utilize the legacy PEBS features. Fixes: a932aa0e868f ("perf/x86: Add Lunar Lake and Arrow Lake support") Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241216204505.748363-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2024-12-17perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Clearwater Forest supportKan Liang
From the perspective of the uncore PMU, the Clearwater Forest is the same as the previous Sierra Forest. The only difference is the event list, which will be supported in the perf tool later. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241211161146.235253-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2024-12-17Merge tag 'xsa465+xsa466-6.13-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross: "Fix xen netfront crash (XSA-465) and avoid using the hypercall page that doesn't do speculation mitigations (XSA-466)" * tag 'xsa465+xsa466-6.13-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: x86/xen: remove hypercall page x86/xen: use new hypercall functions instead of hypercall page x86/xen: add central hypercall functions x86/xen: don't do PV iret hypercall through hypercall page x86/static-call: provide a way to do very early static-call updates objtool/x86: allow syscall instruction x86: make get_cpu_vendor() accessible from Xen code xen/netfront: fix crash when removing device
2024-12-17x86/xen: remove hypercall pageJuergen Gross
The hypercall page is no longer needed. It can be removed, as from the Xen perspective it is optional. But, from Linux's perspective, it removes naked RET instructions that escape the speculative protections that Call Depth Tracking and/or Untrain Ret are trying to achieve. This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
2024-12-17x86/xen: use new hypercall functions instead of hypercall pageJuergen Gross
Call the Xen hypervisor via the new xen_hypercall_func static-call instead of the hypercall page. This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2024-12-17x86/xen: add central hypercall functionsJuergen Gross
Add generic hypercall functions usable for all normal (i.e. not iret) hypercalls. Depending on the guest type and the processor vendor different functions need to be used due to the to be used instruction for entering the hypervisor: - PV guests need to use syscall - HVM/PVH guests on Intel need to use vmcall - HVM/PVH guests on AMD and Hygon need to use vmmcall As PVH guests need to issue hypercalls very early during boot, there is a 4th hypercall function needed for HVM/PVH which can be used on Intel and AMD processors. It will check the vendor type and then set the Intel or AMD specific function to use via static_call(). This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
2024-12-15Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "ARM64: - Fix confusion with implicitly-shifted MDCR_EL2 masks breaking SPE/TRBE initialization - Align nested page table walker with the intended memory attribute combining rules of the architecture - Prevent userspace from constraining the advertised ASID width, avoiding horrors of guest TLBIs not matching the intended context in hardware - Don't leak references on LPIs when insertion into the translation cache fails RISC-V: - Replace csr_write() with csr_set() for HVIEN PMU overflow bit x86: - Cache CPUID.0xD XSTATE offsets+sizes during module init On Intel's Emerald Rapids CPUID costs hundreds of cycles and there are a lot of leaves under 0xD. Getting rid of the CPUIDs during nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit is planned for the next release, for now just cache them: even on Skylake that is 40% faster" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: x86: Cache CPUID.0xD XSTATE offsets+sizes during module init RISC-V: KVM: Fix csr_write -> csr_set for HVIEN PMU overflow bit KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Add error handling in vgic_its_cache_translation KVM: arm64: Do not allow ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.ASIDbits to be overridden KVM: arm64: Fix S1/S2 combination when FWB==1 and S2 has Device memory type arm64: Fix usage of new shifted MDCR_EL2 values
2024-12-13KVM: x86: Cache CPUID.0xD XSTATE offsets+sizes during module initSean Christopherson
Snapshot the output of CPUID.0xD.[1..n] during kvm.ko initiliaization to avoid the overead of CPUID during runtime. The offset, size, and metadata for CPUID.0xD.[1..n] sub-leaves does not depend on XCR0 or XSS values, i.e. is constant for a given CPU, and thus can be cached during module load. On Intel's Emerald Rapids, CPUID is *wildly* expensive, to the point where recomputing XSAVE offsets and sizes results in a 4x increase in latency of nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit (nested transitions can trigger xstate_required_size() multiple times per transition), relative to using cached values. The issue is easily visible by running `perf top` while triggering nested transitions: kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() shows up at a whopping 50%. As measured via RDTSC from L2 (using KVM-Unit-Test's CPUID VM-Exit test and a slightly modified L1 KVM to handle CPUID in the fastpath), a nested roundtrip to emulate CPUID on Skylake (SKX), Icelake (ICX), and Emerald Rapids (EMR) takes: SKX 11650 ICX 22350 EMR 28850 Using cached values, the latency drops to: SKX 6850 ICX 9000 EMR 7900 The underlying issue is that CPUID itself is slow on ICX, and comically slow on EMR. The problem is exacerbated on CPUs which support XSAVES and/or XSAVEC, as KVM invokes xstate_required_size() twice on each runtime CPUID update, and because there are more supported XSAVE features (CPUID for supported XSAVE feature sub-leafs is significantly slower). SKX: CPUID.0xD.2 = 348 cycles CPUID.0xD.3 = 400 cycles CPUID.0xD.4 = 276 cycles CPUID.0xD.5 = 236 cycles <other sub-leaves are similar> EMR: CPUID.0xD.2 = 1138 cycles CPUID.0xD.3 = 1362 cycles CPUID.0xD.4 = 1068 cycles CPUID.0xD.5 = 910 cycles CPUID.0xD.6 = 914 cycles CPUID.0xD.7 = 1350 cycles CPUID.0xD.8 = 734 cycles CPUID.0xD.9 = 766 cycles CPUID.0xD.10 = 732 cycles CPUID.0xD.11 = 718 cycles CPUID.0xD.12 = 734 cycles CPUID.0xD.13 = 1700 cycles CPUID.0xD.14 = 1126 cycles CPUID.0xD.15 = 898 cycles CPUID.0xD.16 = 716 cycles CPUID.0xD.17 = 748 cycles CPUID.0xD.18 = 776 cycles Note, updating runtime CPUID information multiple times per nested transition is itself a flaw, especially since CPUID is a mandotory intercept on both Intel and AMD. E.g. KVM doesn't need to ensure emulated CPUID state is up-to-date while running L2. That flaw will be fixed in a future patch, as deferring runtime CPUID updates is more subtle than it appears at first glance, the benefits aren't super critical to have once the XSAVE issue is resolved, and caching CPUID output is desirable even if KVM's updates are deferred. Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20241211013302.1347853-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-12-13x86/xen: don't do PV iret hypercall through hypercall pageJuergen Gross
Instead of jumping to the Xen hypercall page for doing the iret hypercall, directly code the required sequence in xen-asm.S. This is done in preparation of no longer using hypercall page at all, as it has shown to cause problems with speculation mitigations. This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
2024-12-13x86/static-call: provide a way to do very early static-call updatesJuergen Gross
Add static_call_update_early() for updating static-call targets in very early boot. This will be needed for support of Xen guest type specific hypercall functions. This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2024-12-13x86: make get_cpu_vendor() accessible from Xen codeJuergen Gross
In order to be able to differentiate between AMD and Intel based systems for very early hypercalls without having to rely on the Xen hypercall page, make get_cpu_vendor() non-static. Refactor early_cpu_init() for the same reason by splitting out the loop initializing cpu_devs() into an externally callable function. This is part of XSA-466 / CVE-2024-53241. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2024-12-09x86/hyperv: Fix hv tsc page based sched_clock for hibernationNaman Jain
read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() assumes that the Hyper-V clock counter is bigger than the variable hv_sched_clock_offset, which is cached during early boot, but depending on the timing this assumption may be false when a hibernated VM starts again (the clock counter starts from 0 again) and is resuming back (Note: hv_init_tsc_clocksource() is not called during hibernation/resume); consequently, read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() may return a negative integer (which is interpreted as a huge positive integer since the return type is u64) and new kernel messages are prefixed with huge timestamps before read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() grows big enough (which typically takes several seconds). Fix the issue by saving the Hyper-V clock counter just before the suspend, and using it to correct the hv_sched_clock_offset in resume. This makes hv tsc page based sched_clock continuous and ensures that post resume, it starts from where it left off during suspend. Override x86_platform.save_sched_clock_state and x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state routines to correct this as soon as possible. Note: if Invariant TSC is available, the issue doesn't happen because 1) we don't register read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() for sched clock: See commit e5313f1c5404 ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Rework clocksource and sched clock setup"); 2) the common x86 code adjusts TSC similarly: see __restore_processor_state() -> tsc_verify_tsc_adjust(true) and x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1349401ff1aa ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Suspend/resume Hyper-V clocksource for hibernation") Co-developed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Naman Jain <namjain@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Message-ID: <20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com>
2024-12-09Merge tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.13_rc3' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 perf fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure the PEBS buffer is drained before reconfiguring the hardware - Add Arrow Lake U support * tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.13_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: perf/x86/intel/ds: Unconditionally drain PEBS DS when changing PEBS_DATA_CFG perf/x86/intel: Add Arrow Lake U support
2024-12-09x86: Fix build regression with CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP enabledDamien Le Moal
Build 6.13-rc12 for x86_64 with gcc 14.2.1 fails with the error: ld: vmlinux.o: in function `virtual_mapped': linux/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S:249:(.text+0x5915b): undefined reference to `saved_context_gdt_desc' when CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP is enabled. This was introduced by commit 07fa619f2a40 ("x86/kexec: Restore GDT on return from ::preserve_context kexec") which introduced a use of saved_context_gdt_desc without a declaration for it. Fix that by including asm/asm-offsets.h where saved_context_gdt_desc is defined (indirectly in include/generated/asm-offsets.h which asm/asm-offsets.h includes). Fixes: 07fa619f2a40 ("x86/kexec: Restore GDT on return from ::preserve_context kexec") Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411270006.ZyyzpYf8-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-12-08Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.13_rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Have the Automatic IBRS setting check on AMD does not falsely fire in the guest when it has been set already on the host - Make sure cacheinfo structures memory is allocated to address a boot NULL ptr dereference on Intel Meteor Lake which has different numbers of subleafs in its CPUID(4) leaf - Take care of the GDT restoring on the kexec path too, as expected by the kernel - Make sure SMP is not disabled when IO-APIC is disabled on the kernel cmdline - Add a PGD flag _PAGE_NOPTISHADOW to instruct machinery not to propagate changes to the kernelmode page tables, to the user portion, in PTI - Mark Intel Lunar Lake as affected by an issue where MONITOR wakeups can get lost and thus user-visible delays happen - Make sure PKRU is properly restored with XRSTOR on AMD after a PRKU write of 0 (WRPKRU) which will mark PKRU in its init state and thus lose the actual buffer * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.13_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/CPU/AMD: WARN when setting EFER.AUTOIBRS if and only if the WRMSR fails x86/cacheinfo: Delete global num_cache_leaves cacheinfo: Allocate memory during CPU hotplug if not done from the primary CPU x86/kexec: Restore GDT on return from ::preserve_context kexec x86/cpu/topology: Remove limit of CPUs due to disabled IO/APIC x86/mm: Add _PAGE_NOPTISHADOW bit to avoid updating userspace page tables x86/cpu: Add Lunar Lake to list of CPUs with a broken MONITOR implementation x86/pkeys: Ensure updated PKRU value is XRSTOR'd x86/pkeys: Change caller of update_pkru_in_sigframe()
2024-12-06x86/CPU/AMD: WARN when setting EFER.AUTOIBRS if and only if the WRMSR failsSean Christopherson
When ensuring EFER.AUTOIBRS is set, WARN only on a negative return code from msr_set_bit(), as '1' is used to indicate the WRMSR was successful ('0' indicates the MSR bit was already set). Fixes: 8cc68c9c9e92 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z1MkNofJjt7Oq0G6@google.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241205220604.GA2054199@thelio-3990X
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2025-04-24 19:56:04 +0000