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2023-11-02Merge tag 'v6.7-p1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface - Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls - Remove ahash alignmask attribute Algorithms: - Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc - Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1) - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad - Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum - Remove zlib-deflate Drivers: - Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver - Add STM32MP13x support in stm32 - Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng - Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip" * tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits) crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3 crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: ahash - improve file comment crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask ...
2023-10-31certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyringMimi Zohar
Originally the secondary trusted keyring provided a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided those keys were not blacklisted and were vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring. On systems with the machine keyring configured, additional keys may also be vouched for by a key on the machine keyring. Prevent loading additional certificates directly onto the secondary keyring, vouched for by keys on the machine keyring, yet allow these certificates to be loaded onto other trusted keyrings. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2023-10-27module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3Dimitri John Ledkov
Add Kconfig options to use SHA-3 for kernel module signing. 256 size for RSA only, and higher sizes for RSA and NIST P-384. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-20certs: Limit MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA to SHA384 or SHA512Dimitri John Ledkov
NIST FIPS 186-5 states that it is recommended that the security strength associated with the bit length of n and the security strength of the hash function be the same, or higher upon agreement. Given NIST P384 curve is used, force using either SHA384 or SHA512. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-09-24certs: make system keyring depend on built-in x509 parserMasahiro Yamada
Commit e90886291c7c ("certs: make system keyring depend on x509 parser") is not the right fix because x509_load_certificate_list() can be modular. The combination of CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=m still results in the following error: LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1 ld: certs/system_keyring.o: in function `load_system_certificate_list': system_keyring.c:(.init.text+0x8c): undefined reference to `x509_load_certificate_list' make: *** [Makefile:1169: vmlinux] Error 1 Fixes: e90886291c7c ("certs: make system keyring depend on x509 parser") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Tested-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
2022-07-24certs: make system keyring depend on x509 parserAdam Borowski
This code requires x509_load_certificate_list() to be built-in. Fixes: 60050ffe3d77 ("certs: Move load_certificate_list() to be with the asymmetric keys code") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202206221515.DqpUuvbQ-lkp@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220712104554.408dbf42@gandalf.local.home/ Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-23certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyringMickaël Salaün
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure. Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload. Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys. Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights: * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable; * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones); * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights. See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh . Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-05-23certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are validMickaël Salaün
Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time. This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes. Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of a hash string and how to generate certificate ones. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-3-mic@digikod.net Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-12-11certs: move the 'depends on' to the choice of module signing keysMasahiro Yamada
When the condition "MODULE_SIG || (IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG && MODULES)" is unmet, you cannot choose anything in the choice, but the choice menu is still displayed in the menuconfig etc. Move the 'depends on' to the choice to hide the meaningless menu. Also delete the redundant 'default'. In a choice, the first entry is the default. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2021-08-23certs: Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modulesStefan Berger
Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modules. It uses a NIST P384 (secp384r1) key if the user chooses an elliptic curve key and will have ECDSA support built into the kernel. Note: A developer choosing an ECDSA key for signing modules should still delete the signing key (rm certs/signing_key.*) when building an older version of a kernel that only supports RSA keys. Unless kbuild automati- cally detects and generates a new kernel module key, ECDSA-signed kernel modules will fail signature verification. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-05-01Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well. Also six trivial changes and bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments. ima: Fix function name error in comment. ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key keys: cleanup build time module signing keys ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
2021-04-26ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependenciesNayna Jain
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is used for verifying the integrity of both kernel and modules. Enabling IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG without MODULES causes a build break. Ensure the build time kernel signing key is only generated if both IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG and MODULES are enabled. Fixes: 0165f4ca223b ("ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-04-09ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated keyNayna Jain
The kernel build process currently only signs kernel modules when MODULE_SIG is enabled. Also, sign the kernel modules at build time when IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-03-11certs: Add ability to preload revocation certsEric Snowberg
Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring. DH Changes: - Make the new Kconfig option depend on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST. - Fix SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS=n, but CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y[1][2]. - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for extract-cert[3]. - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for revocation_certificates.o[3]. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e1c15c74-82ce-3a69-44de-a33af9b320ea@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303034418.106762-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304175030.184131-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428673564.677100.4112098280028451629.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433312452.902181.4146169951896577982.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529606657.163428.3340689182456495390.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
2021-03-11certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entriesEric Snowberg
This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled.[1][2] - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
2018-06-15docs: Fix some broken referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few false-positives. Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-04-03KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyringDavid Howells
Add the following: (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about blacklisted certificates and signatures. (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts no payload. (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel at build time. This is done by setting CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes that are in the form: "<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>" where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size. The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING. Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed: root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist Keyring 723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist 676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database. A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in here too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamicallyDavid Howells
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring. Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys). The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to .builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched too if the secondary keyring is searched. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key typeDavid Howells
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys onto it. This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to 'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'. Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency loops. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-26KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompilingMehmet Kayaalp
Place a system_extra_cert buffer of configurable size, right after the system_certificate_list, so that inserted keys can be readily processed by the existing mechanism. Added script takes a key file and a kernel image and inserts its contents to the reserved area. The system_certificate_list_size is also adjusted accordingly. Call the script as: scripts/insert-sys-cert -b <vmlinux> -c <certfile> If vmlinux has no symbol table, supply System.map file with -s flag. Subsequent runs replace the previously inserted key, instead of appending the new one. Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-08-14Move certificate handling to its own directoryDavid Howells
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/ directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated signing keys into this directory. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>