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Replace all the occurrences of FIELD_SIZEOF() with sizeof_field() except
at places where these are defined. Later patches will remove the unused
definition of FIELD_SIZEOF().
This patch is generated using following script:
EXCLUDE_FILES="include/linux/stddef.h|include/linux/kernel.h"
git grep -l -e "\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b" | while read file;
do
if [[ "$file" =~ $EXCLUDE_FILES ]]; then
continue
fi
sed -i -e 's/\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b/sizeof_field/g' $file;
done
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Bharadiya <pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924105839.110713-3-pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for net
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull device properties framework updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"Add support for printing fwnode names using a new conversion specifier
"%pfw" (Sakari Ailus), clean up the software node and
efi/apple-properties code in preparation for improved software node
reference properties handling (Dmitry Torokhov) and fix the struct
fwnode_operations description (Heikki Krogerus)"
* tag 'devprop-5.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (22 commits)
software node: simplify property_entry_read_string_array()
software node: unify PROPERTY_ENTRY_XXX macros
software node: remove property_entry_read_uNN_array functions
software node: get rid of property_set_pointer()
software node: clean up property_copy_string_array()
software node: mark internal macros with double underscores
efi/apple-properties: use PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8_ARRAY_LEN
software node: introduce PROPERTY_ENTRY_XXX_ARRAY_LEN()
software node: remove DEV_PROP_MAX
device property: Fix the description of struct fwnode_operations
lib/test_printf: Add tests for %pfw printk modifier
lib/vsprintf: Add %pfw conversion specifier for printing fwnode names
lib/vsprintf: OF nodes are first and foremost, struct device_nodes
lib/vsprintf: Make use of fwnode API to obtain node names and separators
lib/vsprintf: Add a note on re-using %pf or %pF
lib/vsprintf: Remove support for %pF and %pf in favour of %pS and %ps
device property: Add a function to obtain a node's prefix
device property: Add fwnode_get_name for returning the name of a node
device property: Add functions for accessing node's parents
device property: Move fwnode_get_parent() up
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull ACPI updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"These update the ACPICA code in the kernel to upstream revision
20191018, add support for EFI specific purpose memory, update the ACPI
EC driver to make it work on systems with hardware-reduced ACPI,
improve ACPI-based device enumeration for some platforms, rework the
lid blacklist handling in the button driver and add more lid quirks to
it, unify ACPI _HID/_UID matching, fix assorted issues and clean up
the code and documentation.
Specifics:
- Update the ACPICA code in the kernel to upstream revision 20191018
including:
* Fixes for Clang warnings (Bob Moore)
* Fix for possible overflow in get_tick_count() (Bob Moore)
* Introduction of acpi_unload_table() (Bob Moore)
* Debugger and utilities updates (Erik Schmauss)
* Fix for unloading tables loaded via configfs (Nikolaus Voss)
- Add support for EFI specific purpose memory to optionally allow
either application-exclusive or core-kernel-mm managed access to
differentiated memory (Dan Williams)
- Fix and clean up processing of the HMAT table (Brice Goglin, Qian
Cai, Tao Xu)
- Update the ACPI EC driver to make it work on systems with
hardware-reduced ACPI (Daniel Drake)
- Always build in support for the Generic Event Device (GED) to allow
one kernel binary to work both on systems with full hardware ACPI
and hardware-reduced ACPI (Arjan van de Ven)
- Fix the table unload mechanism to unregister platform devices
created when the given table was loaded (Andy Shevchenko)
- Rework the lid blacklist handling in the button driver and add more
lid quirks to it (Hans de Goede)
- Improve ACPI-based device enumeration for some platforms based on
Intel BayTrail SoCs (Hans de Goede)
- Add an OpRegion driver for the Cherry Trail Crystal Cove PMIC and
prevent handlers from being registered for unhandled PMIC OpRegions
(Hans de Goede)
- Unify ACPI _HID/_UID matching (Andy Shevchenko)
- Clean up documentation and comments (Cao jin, James Pack, Kacper
Piwiński)"
* tag 'acpi-5.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (52 commits)
ACPI: OSI: Shoot duplicate word
ACPI: HMAT: use %u instead of %d to print u32 values
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: fix a section mismatch
ACPI: HMAT: don't mix pxm and nid when setting memory target processor_pxm
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: Register "soft reserved" memory as an "hmem" device
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: Register HMAT at device_initcall level
device-dax: Add a driver for "hmem" devices
dax: Fix alloc_dax_region() compile warning
lib: Uplevel the pmem "region" ida to a global allocator
x86/efi: Add efi_fake_mem support for EFI_MEMORY_SP
arm/efi: EFI soft reservation to memblock
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration
efi: Common enable/disable infrastructure for EFI soft reservation
x86/efi: Push EFI_MEMMAP check into leaf routines
efi: Enumerate EFI_MEMORY_SP
ACPI: NUMA: Establish a new drivers/acpi/numa/ directory
ACPICA: Update version to 20191018
ACPICA: debugger: remove leading whitespaces when converting a string to a buffer
ACPICA: acpiexec: initialize all simple types and field units from user input
ACPICA: debugger: add field unit support for acpi_db_get_next_token
...
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* acpi-mm:
ACPI: HMAT: use %u instead of %d to print u32 values
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: fix a section mismatch
ACPI: HMAT: don't mix pxm and nid when setting memory target processor_pxm
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: Register "soft reserved" memory as an "hmem" device
ACPI: NUMA: HMAT: Register HMAT at device_initcall level
device-dax: Add a driver for "hmem" devices
dax: Fix alloc_dax_region() compile warning
lib: Uplevel the pmem "region" ida to a global allocator
x86/efi: Add efi_fake_mem support for EFI_MEMORY_SP
arm/efi: EFI soft reservation to memblock
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration
efi: Common enable/disable infrastructure for EFI soft reservation
x86/efi: Push EFI_MEMMAP check into leaf routines
efi: Enumerate EFI_MEMORY_SP
ACPI: NUMA: Establish a new drivers/acpi/numa/ directory
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* acpica:
ACPICA: Update version to 20191018
ACPICA: debugger: remove leading whitespaces when converting a string to a buffer
ACPICA: acpiexec: initialize all simple types and field units from user input
ACPICA: debugger: add field unit support for acpi_db_get_next_token
ACPICA: debugger: surround field unit output with braces '{'
ACPICA: debugger: add command to dump all fields of particular subtype
ACPICA: utilities: add flag to only display data when dumping buffers
ACPICA: make acpi_load_table() return table index
ACPICA: Add new external interface, acpi_unload_table()
ACPICA: More Clang changes
ACPICA: Win OSL: Replace get_tick_count with get_tick_count64
ACPICA: Results from Clang
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Given that EFI_MEMORY_SP is platform BIOS policy decision for marking
memory ranges as "reserved for a specific purpose" there will inevitably
be scenarios where the BIOS omits the attribute in situations where it
is desired. Unlike other attributes if the OS wants to reserve this
memory from the kernel the reservation needs to happen early in init. So
early, in fact, that it needs to happen before e820__memblock_setup()
which is a pre-requisite for efi_fake_memmap() that wants to allocate
memory for the updated table.
Introduce an x86 specific efi_fake_memmap_early() that can search for
attempts to set EFI_MEMORY_SP via efi_fake_mem and update the e820 table
accordingly.
The KASLR code that scans the command line looking for user-directed
memory reservations also needs to be updated to consider
"efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:0x40000" requests.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose".
The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is
reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for
any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev
scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can
be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique
node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in
the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the
reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be
disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with
efi=nosoftreserve.
For this patch, update the ARM paths that consider
EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY to optionally take the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute
into account as a reservation indicator. Publish the soft reservation as
IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED memory, similar to x86.
(Based on an original patch by Ard)
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose".
The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is
reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for
any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev
scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can
be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique
node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in
the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the
reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be
disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with
efi=nosoftreserve.
As for this patch, define the common helpers to determine if the
EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute should be honored. The determination needs to be
made early to prevent the kernel from being loaded into soft-reserved
memory, or otherwise allowing early allocations to land there. Follow-on
changes are needed per architecture to leverage these helpers in their
respective mem-init paths.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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In preparation for adding another EFI_MEMMAP dependent call that needs
to occur before e820__memblock_setup() fixup the existing efi calls to
check for EFI_MEMMAP internally. This ends up being cleaner than the
alternative of checking EFI_MEMMAP multiple times in setup_arch().
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose". The intent of this bit is to allow the OS to identify precious
or scarce memory resources and optionally manage it separately from
EfiConventionalMemory. As defined older OSes that do not know about this
attribute are permitted to ignore it and the memory will be handled
according to the OS default policy for the given memory type.
In other words, this "specific purpose" hint is deliberately weaker than
EfiReservedMemoryType in that the system continues to operate if the OS
takes no action on the attribute. The risk of taking no action is
potentially unwanted / unmovable kernel allocations from the designated
resource that prevent the full realization of the "specific purpose".
For example, consider a system with a high-bandwidth memory pool. Older
kernels are permitted to boot and consume that memory as conventional
"System-RAM" newer kernels may arrange for that memory to be set aside
(soft reserved) by the system administrator for a dedicated
high-bandwidth memory aware application to consume.
Specifically, this mechanism allows for the elimination of scenarios
where platform firmware tries to game OS policy by lying about ACPI SLIT
values, i.e. claiming that a precious memory resource has a high
distance to trigger the OS to avoid it by default. This reservation hint
allows platform-firmware to instead tell the truth about performance
characteristics by indicate to OS memory management to put immovable
allocations elsewhere.
Implement simple detection of the bit for EFI memory table dumps and
save the kernel policy for a follow-on change.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Wire up the existing code for ARM that loads the TPM event log into
OS accessible buffers while running the EFI stub so that the kernel
proper can access it at runtime.
Tested-by: Zou Cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinwei Kong <kong.kongxinwei@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Invoke the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL protocol in the context of the x86 EFI stub,
same as is done on arm/arm64 since commit 568bc4e87033 ("efi/arm*/libstub:
Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table"). Within the stub,
a Linux-specific RNG seed UEFI config table will be seeded. The EFI routines
in the core kernel will pick that up later, yet still early during boot,
to seed the kernel entropy pool. If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, entropy
is credited for this seed.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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To handle all arch-specific peculiarities when calling an EFI protocol
function, a wrapper efi_call_proto() exists on all relevant architectures.
On arm/arm64, this is merely a plain function call. On x86, a special EFI
entry stub needs to be used, however, as the calling convention differs.
To make the efi/random stub arch-independent, use efi_call_proto()
instead of the existing non-portable calls to the EFI get_rng protocol
function. This also requires the addition of some typedefs.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Let's switch to using PROPERTY_ENTRY_U8_ARRAY_LEN() to initialize
property entries. Also, when dumping data, rely on local variables
instead of poking into the property entry structure directly.
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.
Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.
Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.
The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.
[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Currently, kernel fails to boot on some HyperV VMs when using EFI.
And it's a potential issue on all x86 platforms.
It's caused by broken kernel relocation on EFI systems, when below three
conditions are met:
1. Kernel image is not loaded to the default address (LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
by the loader.
2. There isn't enough room to contain the kernel, starting from the
default load address (eg. something else occupied part the region).
3. In the memmap provided by EFI firmware, there is a memory region
starts below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, and suitable for containing the
kernel.
EFI stub will perform a kernel relocation when condition 1 is met. But
due to condition 2, EFI stub can't relocate kernel to the preferred
address, so it fallback to ask EFI firmware to alloc lowest usable memory
region, got the low region mentioned in condition 3, and relocated
kernel there.
It's incorrect to relocate the kernel below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. This
is the lowest acceptable kernel relocation address.
The first thing goes wrong is in arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
Kernel decompression will force use LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR as the output
address if kernel is located below it. Then the relocation before
decompression, which move kernel to the end of the decompression buffer,
will overwrite other memory region, as there is no enough memory there.
To fix it, just don't let EFI stub relocate the kernel to any address
lower than lowest acceptable address.
[ ardb: introduce efi_low_alloc_above() to reduce the scope of the change ]
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-6-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The EFI stubloader for ARM starts out by allocating a 32 MB window
at the base of RAM, in order to ensure that the decompressor (which
blindly copies the uncompressed kernel into that window) does not
overwrite other allocations that are made while running in the context
of the EFI firmware.
In some cases, (e.g., U-Boot running on the Raspberry Pi 2), this is
causing boot failures because this initial allocation conflicts with
a page of reserved memory at the base of RAM that contains the SMP spin
tables and other pieces of firmware data and which was put there by
the bootloader under the assumption that the TEXT_OFFSET window right
below the kernel is only used partially during early boot, and will be
left alone once the memory reservations are processed and taken into
account.
So let's permit reserved memory regions to exist in the region starting
at the base of RAM, and ending at TEXT_OFFSET - 5 * PAGE_SIZE, which is
the window below the kernel that is not touched by the early boot code.
Tested-by: Guillaume Gardet <Guillaume.Gardet@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Commit 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") introduced
add_bootloader_randomness(), permitting randomness provided by the
bootloader or firmware to be credited as entropy. However, the fact
that the UEFI support code was already wired into the RNG subsystem
via a call to add_device_randomness() was overlooked, and so it was
not converted at the same time.
Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only
implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must be enabled, and this should be
done only if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader
_and_ its source of randomness.
[ ardb: update commit log ]
Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-4-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Currently nothing checks the return value of efi_tpm_eventlog_init(),
but in case that changes in the future make sure an error is
returned when it fails to determine the tpm final events log
size.
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e658c82be556 ("efi/tpm: Only set 'efi_tpm_final_log_size' after ...")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-3-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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For the EFI_RCI2_TABLE Kconfig option, 'make oldconfig' asks the user
for input on platforms where the option may not be applicable. This patch
modifies the Kconfig option to ask the user for input only when CONFIG_X86
or CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set to y.
Suggested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Narendra K <Narendra.K@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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ACPICA commit d1716a829d19be23277d9157c575a03b9abb7457
For unloading an ACPI table, it is necessary to provide the index of
the table. The method intended for dynamically loading or hotplug
addition of tables, acpi_load_table(), should provide this information
via an optional pointer to the loaded table index.
This patch fixes the table unload function of acpi_configfs.
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: d06c47e3dd07f ("ACPI: configfs: Resolve objects on host-directed table loads")
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/d1716a82
Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@loewensteinmedical.de>
Signed-off-by: Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Currently the check for tbl_size being less than zero is always false
because tbl_size is unsigned. Fix this by making it a signed int.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e658c82be556 ("efi/tpm: Only set 'efi_tpm_final_log_size' after successful event log parsing")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191008100153.8499-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The efi_rci2_sysfs_init() is not used outside of rci2-table.c so
make it static to silence the following Sparse warning:
drivers/firmware/efi/rci2-table.c:79:12: warning: symbol 'efi_rci2_sysfs_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-7-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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If __calc_tpm2_event_size() fails to parse an event it will return 0,
resulting tpm2_calc_event_log_size() returning -1. Currently there is
no check of this return value, and 'efi_tpm_final_log_size' can end up
being set to this negative value resulting in a crash like this one:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffbc8fc00866ad
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
Call Trace:
tpm_read_log_efi()
tpm_bios_log_setup()
tpm_chip_register()
tpm_tis_core_init.cold.9+0x28c/0x466
tpm_tis_plat_probe()
platform_drv_probe()
...
Also __calc_tpm2_event_size() returns a size of 0 when it fails
to parse an event, so update function documentation to reflect this.
The root cause of the issue that caused the failure of event parsing
in this case is resolved by Peter Jone's patchset dealing with large
event logs where crossing over a page boundary causes the page with
the event count to be unmapped.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c46f3405692de ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-6-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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When there are no entries to put into the final event log, some machines
will return the template they would have populated anyway. In this case
the nr_events field is 0, but the rest of the log is just garbage.
This patch stops us from trying to iterate the table with
__calc_tpm2_event_size() when the number of events in the table is 0.
Tested-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
The kernel command line option efivar_ssdt= allows the name to be
specified of an EFI variable containing an ACPI SSDT table that should
be loaded into memory by the OS, and treated as if it was provided by
the firmware.
Currently, that code will always iterate over the EFI variables and
compare each name with the provided name, even if the command line
option wasn't set to begin with.
So bail early when no variable name was provided. This works around a
boot regression on the 2012 Mac Pro, as reported by Scott.
Tested-by: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
Cc: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 475fb4e8b2f4 ("efi / ACPI: load SSTDs from EFI variables")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
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The CPER parser assumes that the class code is big endian, but at least
on this edk2-derived Intel Purley platform it's little endian:
efi: EFI v2.50 by EDK II BIOS ID:PLYDCRB1.86B.0119.R05.1701181843
DMI: Intel Corporation PURLEY/PURLEY, BIOS PLYDCRB1.86B.0119.R05.1701181843 01/18/2017
{1}[Hardware Error]: device_id: 0000:5d:00.0
{1}[Hardware Error]: slot: 0
{1}[Hardware Error]: secondary_bus: 0x5e
{1}[Hardware Error]: vendor_id: 0x8086, device_id: 0x2030
{1}[Hardware Error]: class_code: 000406
^^^^^^ (should be 060400)
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Talbert <swt@techie.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002165904.8819-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
- refactor the EFI config table handling across architectures
- add support for the Dell EMC OEM config table
- include AER diagnostic output to CPER handling of fatal PCIe errors
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi: cper: print AER info of PCIe fatal error
efi: Export Runtime Configuration Interface table to sysfs
efi: ia64: move SAL systab handling out of generic EFI code
efi/x86: move UV_SYSTAB handling into arch/x86
efi: x86: move efi_is_table_address() into arch/x86
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efivar_ssdt_load allows the kernel to import arbitrary ACPI code from an
EFI variable, which gives arbitrary code execution in ring 0. Prevent
that when the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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AER info of PCIe fatal error is not printed in the current driver.
Because APEI driver will panic directly for fatal error, and can't
run to the place of printing AER info.
An example log is as following:
{763}[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 11
{763}[Hardware Error]: event severity: fatal
{763}[Hardware Error]: Error 0, type: fatal
{763}[Hardware Error]: section_type: PCIe error
{763}[Hardware Error]: port_type: 0, PCIe end point
{763}[Hardware Error]: version: 4.0
{763}[Hardware Error]: command: 0x0000, status: 0x0010
{763}[Hardware Error]: device_id: 0000:82:00.0
{763}[Hardware Error]: slot: 0
{763}[Hardware Error]: secondary_bus: 0x00
{763}[Hardware Error]: vendor_id: 0x8086, device_id: 0x10fb
{763}[Hardware Error]: class_code: 000002
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal hardware error!
This issue was imported by the patch, '37448adfc7ce ("aerdrv: Move
cper_print_aer() call out of interrupt context")'. To fix this issue,
this patch adds print of AER info in cper_print_pcie() for fatal error.
Here is the example log after this patch applied:
{24}[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 10
{24}[Hardware Error]: event severity: fatal
{24}[Hardware Error]: Error 0, type: fatal
{24}[Hardware Error]: section_type: PCIe error
{24}[Hardware Error]: port_type: 0, PCIe end point
{24}[Hardware Error]: version: 4.0
{24}[Hardware Error]: command: 0x0546, status: 0x4010
{24}[Hardware Error]: device_id: 0000:01:00.0
{24}[Hardware Error]: slot: 0
{24}[Hardware Error]: secondary_bus: 0x00
{24}[Hardware Error]: vendor_id: 0x15b3, device_id: 0x1019
{24}[Hardware Error]: class_code: 000002
{24}[Hardware Error]: aer_uncor_status: 0x00040000, aer_uncor_mask: 0x00000000
{24}[Hardware Error]: aer_uncor_severity: 0x00062010
{24}[Hardware Error]: TLP Header: 000000c0 01010000 00000001 00000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal hardware error!
Fixes: 37448adfc7ce ("aerdrv: Move cper_print_aer() call out of interrupt context")
Signed-off-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[ardb: put parens around terms of && operator]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
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Fix get_efi_config_table using the wrong structs when booting a
64 bit kernel on 32 bit firmware.
Fixes: 82d736ac56d7 ("Abstract out support for locating an EFI config table")
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-By: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
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System firmware advertises the address of the 'Runtime
Configuration Interface table version 2 (RCI2)' via
an EFI Configuration Table entry. This code retrieves the RCI2
table from the address and exports it to sysfs as a binary
attribute 'rci2' under /sys/firmware/efi/tables directory.
The approach adopted is similar to the attribute 'DMI' under
/sys/firmware/dmi/tables.
RCI2 table contains BIOS HII in XML format and is used to populate
BIOS setup page in Dell EMC OpenManage Server Administrator tool.
The BIOS setup page contains BIOS tokens which can be configured.
Signed-off-by: Narendra K <Narendra.K@dell.com>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
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The SAL systab is an Itanium specific EFI configuration table, so
move its handling into arch/ia64 where it belongs.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
|
The SGI UV UEFI machines are tightly coupled to the x86 architecture
so there is no need to keep any awareness of its existence in the
generic EFI layer, especially since we already have the infrastructure
to handle arch-specific configuration tables, and were even already
using it to some extent.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
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The function efi_is_table_address() and the associated array of table
pointers is specific to x86. Since we will be adding some more x86
specific tables, let's move this code out of the generic code first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core and debugfs updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the "big" driver core and debugfs changes for 5.3-rc1
It's a lot of different patches, all across the tree due to some api
changes and lots of debugfs cleanups.
Other than the debugfs cleanups, in this set of changes we have:
- bus iteration function cleanups
- scripts/get_abi.pl tool to display and parse Documentation/ABI
entries in a simple way
- cleanups to Documenatation/ABI/ entries to make them parse easier
due to typos and other minor things
- default_attrs use for some ktype users
- driver model documentation file conversions to .rst
- compressed firmware file loading
- deferred probe fixes
All of these have been in linux-next for a while, with a bunch of
merge issues that Stephen has been patient with me for"
* tag 'driver-core-5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (102 commits)
debugfs: make error message a bit more verbose
orangefs: fix build warning from debugfs cleanup patch
ubifs: fix build warning after debugfs cleanup patch
driver: core: Allow subsystems to continue deferring probe
drivers: base: cacheinfo: Ensure cpu hotplug work is done before Intel RDT
arch_topology: Remove error messages on out-of-memory conditions
lib: notifier-error-inject: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
swiotlb: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
ceph: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
sunrpc: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
ubifs: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
orangefs: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
nfsd: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
lib: 842: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
debugfs: provide pr_fmt() macro
debugfs: log errors when something goes wrong
drivers: s390/cio: Fix compilation warning about const qualifiers
drivers: Add generic helper to match by of_node
driver_find_device: Unify the match function with class_find_device()
bus_find_device: Unify the match callback with class_find_device
...
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Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"This contains two critical bug fixes and support for obtaining TPM
events triggered by ExitBootServices().
For the latter I have to give a quite verbose explanation not least
because I had to revisit all the details myself to remember what was
going on in Matthew's patches.
The preboot software stack maintains an event log that gets entries
every time something gets hashed to any of the PCR registers. What
gets hashed could be a component to be run or perhaps log of some
actions taken just to give couple of coarse examples. In general,
anything relevant for the boot process that the preboot software does
gets hashed and a log entry with a specific event type [1].
The main application for this is remote attestation and the reason why
it is useful is nicely put in the very first section of [1]:
"Attestation is used to provide information about the platform’s
state to a challenger. However, PCR contents are difficult to
interpret; therefore, attestation is typically more useful when
the PCR contents are accompanied by a measurement log. While not
trusted on their own, the measurement log contains a richer set of
information than do the PCR contents. The PCR contents are used to
provide the validation of the measurement log."
Because EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL.GetEventLog() is not available after calling
ExitBootServices(), Linux EFI stub copies the event log to a custom
configuration table. Unfortunately, ExitBootServices() also generates
events and obviously these events do not get copied to that table.
Luckily firmware does this for us by providing a configuration table
identified by EFI_TCG2_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID.
This essentially contains necessary changes to provide the full event
log for the use the user space that is concatenated from these two
partial event logs [2]"
[1] https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-specific-platform-firmware-profile-specification/
[2] The final concatenation is done in drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/efi.c
* tag 'tpmdd-next-20190625' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd:
tpm: Don't duplicate events from the final event log in the TCG2 log
Abstract out support for locating an EFI config table
tpm: Fix TPM 1.2 Shutdown sequence to prevent future TPM operations
efi: Attempt to get the TCG2 event log in the boot stub
tpm: Append the final event log to the TPM event log
tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table
tpm: Abstract crypto agile event size calculations
tpm: Actually fail on TPM errors during "get random"
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Four fixes:
- fix a kexec crash on arm64
- fix a reboot crash on some Android platforms
- future-proof the code for upcoming ACPI 6.2 changes
- fix a build warning on x86"
* 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efibc: Replace variable set function in notifier call
x86/efi: fix a -Wtype-limits compilation warning
efi/bgrt: Drop BGRT status field reserved bits check
efi/memreserve: deal with memreserve entries in unmapped memory
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After the first call to GetEventLog() on UEFI systems using the TCG2
crypto agile log format, any further log events (other than those
triggered by ExitBootServices()) will be logged in both the main log and
also in the Final Events Log. While the kernel only calls GetEventLog()
immediately before ExitBootServices(), we can't control whether earlier
parts of the boot process have done so. This will result in log entries
that exist in both logs, and so the current approach of simply appending
the Final Event Log to the main log will result in events being
duplicated.
We can avoid this problem by looking at the size of the Final Event Log
just before we call ExitBootServices() and exporting this to the main
kernel. The kernel can then skip over all events that occured before
ExitBootServices() and only append events that were not also logged to
the main log.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reported-by: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Suggested-by: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
|
|
We want to grab a pointer to the TPM final events table, so abstract out
the existing code for finding an FDT table and make it generic.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
|
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Right now we only attempt to obtain the SHA1-only event log. The
protocol also supports a crypto agile log format, which contains digests
for all algorithms in use. Attempt to obtain this first, and fall back
to obtaining the older format if the system doesn't support it. This is
lightly complicated by the event sizes being variable (as we don't know
in advance which algorithms are in use), and the interface giving us
back a pointer to the start of the final entry rather than a pointer to
the end of the log - as a result, we need to parse the final entry to
figure out its length in order to know how much data to copy up to the
OS.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>
Tested-by: Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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UEFI systems provide a boot services protocol for obtaining the TPM
event log, but this is unusable after ExitBootServices() is called.
Unfortunately ExitBootServices() itself triggers additional TPM events
that then can't be obtained using this protocol. The platform provides a
mechanism for the OS to obtain these events by recording them to a
separate UEFI configuration table which the OS can then map.
Unfortunately this table isn't self describing in terms of providing its
length, so we need to parse the events inside it to figure out how long
it is. Since the table isn't mapped at this point, we need to extend the
length calculation function to be able to map the event as it goes
along.
(Fixes by Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>
Tested-by: Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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There is an arbitrary difference between the prototypes of
bus_find_device() and class_find_device() preventing their callers
from passing the same pair of data and match() arguments to both of
them, which is the const qualifier used in the prototype of
class_find_device(). If that qualifier is also used in the
bus_find_device() prototype, it will be possible to pass the same
match() callback function to both bus_find_device() and
class_find_device(), which will allow some optimizations to be made in
order to avoid code duplication going forward. Also with that, constify
the "data" parameter as it is passed as a const to the match function.
For this reason, change the prototype of bus_find_device() to match
the prototype of class_find_device() and adjust its callers to use the
const qualifier in accordance with the new prototype of it.
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kershner <david.kershner@unisys.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com>
Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hartmut Knaack <knaack.h@gmx.de>
Cc: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Cc: Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>
Cc: rafael@kernel.org
Acked-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Acked-by: David Kershner <david.kershner@unisys.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> # for the I2C parts
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Replace the variable set function from "efivar_entry_set" to
"efivar_entry_set_safe" in efibc panic notifier.
In safe function parameter "block" will set to false
and will call "efivar_entry_set_nonblocking"to set efi variables.
efivar_entry_set_nonblocking is guaranteed to
not block and is suitable for calling from crash/panic handlers.
In UEFI android platform, when warm reset happens,
with this change, efibc will not block the reboot process.
Otherwise, set variable will call queue work and send to other offlined
cpus then cause another panic, finally will cause reboot failure.
Signed-off-by: Tian Baofeng <baofeng.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luo XinanX <xinanx.luo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this file is part of the linux kernel and is made available under
the terms of the gnu general public license version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 28 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.534229504@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Starting with ACPI 6.2 bits 1 and 2 of the BGRT status field are no longer
reserved. These bits are now used to indicate if the image needs to be
rotated before being displayed.
The first device using these bits has now shown up (the GPD MicroPC) and
the reserved bits check causes us to reject the valid BGRT table on this
device.
Rather then changing the reserved bits check, allowing only the 2 new bits,
instead just completely remove it so that we do not end up with a similar
problem when more bits are added in the future.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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Ensure that the EFI memreserve entries can be accessed, even if they
are located in memory that the kernel (e.g., a crashkernel) omits from
the linear map.
Fixes: 80424b02d42b ("efi: Reduce the amount of memblock reservations ...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0+
Reported-by: Jonathan Richardson <jonathan.richardson@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Richardson <jonathan.richardson@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Richardson <jonathan.richardson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
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|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this file is released under the gplv2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 68 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190114.292346262@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Only try and access the EFI configuration tables if there there are any
reported. This allows EFI to be continued to used on systems where there
are no configuration table entries.
Signed-off-by: Rob Bradford <robert.bradford@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190525112559.7917-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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