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rejected
If enabled, we fallback to the platform keyring if the trusted keyring doesn't have
the key used to sign the roothash. But if pkcs7_verify() rejects the key for other
reasons, such as usage restrictions, we do not fallback. Do so.
Follow-up for 6fce1f40e95182ebbfe1ee3096b8fc0b37903269
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
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Add a new configuration CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
that enables verifying dm-verity signatures using the platform keyring,
which is populated using the UEFI DB certificates. This is useful for
self-enrolled systems that do not use MOK, as the secondary keyring which
is already used for verification, if the relevant kconfig is enabled, is
linked to the machine keyring, which gets its certificates loaded from MOK.
On datacenter/virtual/cloud deployments it is more common to deploy one's
own certificate chain directly in DB on first boot in unattended mode,
rather than relying on MOK, as the latter typically requires interactive
authentication to enroll, and is more suited for personal machines.
Default to the same value as DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
if not otherwise specified, as it is likely that if one wants to use
MOK certificates to verify dm-verity volumes, DB certificates are
going to be used too. Keys in DB are allowed to load a full kernel
already anyway, so they are already highly privileged.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
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'GPL-2.0-only' is used instead of 'GPL-2.0' because SPDX has
deprecated its use.
Suggested-by: John Wiele <jwiele@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
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The third parameter of module_param() is permissions for the sysfs node
but it looks like it is being used as the initial value of the parameter
here. In fact, false here equates to omitting the file from sysfs and
does not affect the value of require_signatures.
Making the parameter writable is not simple because going from
false->true is fine but it should not be possible to remove the
requirement to verify a signature. But it can be useful to inspect the
value of this parameter from userspace, so change the permissions to
make a read-only file in sysfs.
Signed-off-by: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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Add a new configuration DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
to enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary
trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring
(with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include
certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child
certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring
enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which
did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of
trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates
without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel
(kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted
keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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The verification is to support cases where the root hash is not secured
by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after
boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume
has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be
used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be
created.
The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash
and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.
The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed
to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.
Adds CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG which can be turned on if root
hash verification is needed.
Kernel commandline dm_verity module parameter 'require_signatures' will
indicate whether to force root hash signature verification (for all dm
verity volumes).
Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-and-Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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