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path: root/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
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2020-02-10s390/pkey: fix missing length of protected key on returnHarald Freudenberger
The pkey ioctl call PKEY_SEC2PROTK updates a struct pkey_protkey on return. The protected key is stored in, the protected key type is stored in but the len information was not updated. This patch now fixes this and so the len field gets an update to refrect the actual size of the protected key value returned. Fixes: efc598e6c8a9 ("s390/zcrypt: move cca misc functions to new code file") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Christian Rund <RUNDC@de.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-30s390/pkey/zcrypt: Support EP11 AES secure keysHarald Freudenberger
Extend the low level ep11 misc functions implementation by several functions to support EP11 key objects for paes and pkey: - EP11 AES secure key generation - EP11 AES secure key generation from given clear key value - EP11 AES secure key blob check - findcard function returns list of apqns based on given criterias - EP11 AES secure key derive to CPACF protected key Extend the pkey module to be able to generate and handle EP11 secure keys and also use them as base for deriving protected keys for CPACF usage. These ioctls are extended to support EP11 keys: PKEY_GENSECK2, PKEY_CLR2SECK2, PKEY_VERIFYKEY2, PKEY_APQNS4K, PKEY_APQNS4KT, PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2. Additionally the 'clear key' token to protected key now uses an EP11 card if the other ways (via PCKMO, via CCA) fail. The PAES cipher implementation needed a new upper limit for the max key size, but is now also working with EP11 keys. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2020-01-30s390/pkey: Add support for key blob with clear key valueHarald Freudenberger
This patch adds support for a new key blob format to the pkey kernel module. The new key blob comprises a clear key value together with key type information. The implementation tries to derive an protected key from the blob with the clear key value inside with 1) the PCKMO instruction. This may fail as the LPAR profile may disable this way. 2) Generate an CCA AES secure data key with exact the clear key value. This requires to have a working crypto card in CCA Coprocessor mode. Then derive an protected key from the CCA AES secure key again with the help of a working crypto card in CCA mode. If both way fail, the transformation of the clear key blob into a protected key will fail. For the PAES cipher this would result in a failure at setkey() invocation. A clear key value exposed in main memory is a security risk. The intention of this new 'clear key blob' support for pkey is to provide self-tests for the PAES cipher key implementation. These known answer tests obviously need to be run with well known key values. So with the clear key blob format there is a way to provide knwon answer tests together with an pkey clear key blob for the in-kernel self tests done at cipher registration. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-11-12s390/pkey: use memdup_user() to simplify codeMarkus Elfring
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup_user.cocci Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aca044e8-e4b2-eda8-d724-b08772a44ed9@web.de [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: use ==0 instead of <=0 for a size_t variable] [heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: split bugfix into separate patch; shorten changelog] Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <Markus.Elfring@web.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-11-12s390/pkey: fix memory leak within _copy_apqns_from_user()Heiko Carstens
Fixes: f2bbc96e7cfad ("s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support") Reported-by: Markus Elfring <Markus.Elfring@web.de> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-09-19s390/pkey: Add sysfs attributes to emit AES CIPHER key blobsIngo Franzki
Now that the pkey kernel module also supports CCA AES CIPHER keys: Add binary read-only sysfs attributes for the pkey module that can be used to read random CCA AES CIPHER secure keys from, similar to the already existing sysfs attributes for AES DATA and random protected keys. Keys are read from these attributes using a cat-like interface. A typical use case for those keys is to encrypt a swap device using the paes cipher. During processing of /etc/crypttab, the CCA random AES CIPHER secure key to encrypt the swap device is read from one of the attributes. The following attributes are added: ccacipher/ccacipher_aes_128 ccacipher/ccacipher_aes_192 ccacipher/ccacipher_aes_256 ccacipher/ccacipher_aes_128_xts ccacipher/ccacipher_aes_256_xts Each attribute emits a secure key blob for the corresponding key size and cipher mode. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-08-21s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key supportHarald Freudenberger
Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-08-21s390/pkey: pkey cleanup: narrow in-kernel API, fix some variable typesHarald Freudenberger
There are a lot of pkey functions exported as in-kernel callable API functions but not used at all. This patch narrows down the pkey in-kernel API to what is currently only used and exploited. Within the kernel just use u32 without any leading __u32. Also functions declared in a header file in arch/s390/include/asm don't need a comment 'In-kernel API', this is by definition, otherwise the header file would be in arch/s390/include/uapi/asm. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-07-29s390/zcrypt: move cca misc functions to new code fileHarald Freudenberger
Rework of the pkey code. Moved all the cca generic code away from pkey_api.c into a new file zcrypt_ccamisc.c. This new file is now part of the zcrypt device driver and exports a bunch of cca functions to pkey and may be called from other kernel modules as well. The pkey ioctl API is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-15s390/pkey: Use -ENODEV instead of -EOPNOTSUPPDavid Hildenbrand
systemd-modules-load.service automatically tries to load the pkey module on systems that have MSA. Pkey also requires the MSA3 facility and a bunch of subfunctions. Failing with -EOPNOTSUPP makes "systemd-modules-load.service" fail on any system that does not have all needed subfunctions. For example, when running under QEMU TCG (but also on systems where protected keys are disabled via the HMC). Let's use -ENODEV, so systemd-modules-load.service properly ignores failing to load the pkey module because of missing HW functionality. While at it, also convert the -EOPNOTSUPP in pkey_clr2protkey() to -ENODEV. Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-04-15s390/pkey: add one more argument space for debug feature entryHarald Freudenberger
The debug feature entries have been used with up to 5 arguents (including the pointer to the format string) but there was only space reserved for 4 arguemnts. So now the registration does reserve space for 5 times a long value. This fixes a sometime appearing weired value as the last value of an debug feature entry like this: ... pkey_sec2protkey zcrypt_send_cprb (cardnr=10 domain=12) failed with errno -2143346254 Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Christian Rund <Christian.Rund@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2019-02-21pkey: Indicate old mkvp only if old and current mkvp are differentIngo Franzki
When the CCA master key is set twice with the same master key, then the old and the current master key are the same and thus the verification patterns are the same, too. The check to report if a secure key is currently wrapped by the old master key erroneously reports old mkvp in this case. Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-22s390/pkey: move pckmo subfunction available checks away from module initHarald Freudenberger
The init of the pkey module currently fails if the pckmo instruction or the subfunctions are not available. However, customers may restrict their LPAR to switch off exactly these functions and work with secure key only. So it is a valid case to have the pkey module active and use it for secure key to protected key transfer only. This patch moves the pckmo subfunction check from the pkey module init function into the internal function where the pckmo instruction is called. So now only on invocation of the pckmo instruction the check for the required subfunction is done. If not available EOPNOTSUPP is returned to the caller. The check for having the pckmo instruction available is still done during module init. This instruction came in with MSA 3 together with the basic set of kmc instructions needed to work with protected keys. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-19s390/pkey: Load pkey kernel module automaticallyIngo Franzki
With the recent enhancements of the pkey kernel module, the pkey kernel module should be loaded automatically during system startup, if MSA is available. When used for swap device encryption with random protected keys, pkey must be loaded before /etc/crypttab is processed, otherwise the sysfs attributes to read the key from are not available. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-10s390/pkey: Introduce new API for transforming key blobsIngo Franzki
Introduce a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to transform a variable length key blob of any supported type into a protected key. Transforming a secure key blob uses the already existing function pkey_sec2protk(). Transforming a protected key blob also verifies if the protected key is still valid. If not, -ENODEV is returned. Both APIs are described in detail in the header files arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-10s390/pkey: Introduce new API for random protected key verificationIngo Franzki
Introduce a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to verify if a random protected key is still valid. A protected key is invalid when its wrapping key verification pattern does not match the verification pattern of the LPAR. Each time an LPAR is activated, a new LPAR wrapping key is generated and the wrapping key verification pattern is updated. Both APIs are described in detail in the header files arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-10s390/pkey: Add sysfs attributes to emit secure key blobsIngo Franzki
Add binary read-only sysfs attributes for the pkey module that can be used to read random ccadata secure keys from. Keys are read from these attributes using a cat-like interface. A typical use case for those keys is to encrypt a swap device using the paes cipher. During processing of /etc/crypttab, the random random ccadata secure key to encrypt the swap device is read from one of the attributes. The following attributes are added: ccadata/aes_128 ccadata/aes_192 ccadata/aes_256 ccadata/aes_128_xts ccadata/aes_256_xts Each attribute emits a secure key blob for the corresponding key size and cipher mode. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-10s390/pkey: Add sysfs attributes to emit protected key blobsIngo Franzki
Add binary read-only sysfs attributes for the pkey module that can be used to read random protected keys from. Keys are read from these attributes using a cat-like interface. A typical use case for those keys is to encrypt a swap device using the paes cipher. During processing of /etc/crypttab, the random protected key to encrypt the swap device is read from one of the attributes. The following attributes are added: protkey/aes_128 protkey/aes_192 protkey/aes_256 protkey/aes_128_xts protkey/aes_256_xts Each attribute emits a protected key blob for the corresponding key size and cipher mode. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-09s390/pkey: Define protected key blob formatIngo Franzki
Define a new protected key blob format. Protected key blobs use a type of 0x00, to be distinguished from other CCA key blobs. CCA defines type 0x00 as NULL key blob, but pkey will never use NULL keys anyway, so it is save to reuse this type. Using another so far undefined type value would introduce the risk that sometimes in the future CCA defines this so far unassigned type for a future key blob. Also add defines for the key token types and versions, and use them instead of hard coded hex values. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-10-09s390/pkey: Introduce new API for random protected key generationIngo Franzki
This patch introduces a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to generate a random protected key. The protected key is generated in a way that the effective clear key is never exposed in clear. Both APIs are described in detail in the header files arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-08-20s390/zcrypt: code beautifyHarald Freudenberger
Code beautify by following most of the checkpatch suggestions: - SPDX license identifier line complains by checkpatch - missing space or newline complains by checkpatch - octal numbers for permssions complains by checkpatch - renaming of static sysfs functions complains by checkpatch - fix of block comment complains by checkpatch - fix printf like calls where function name instead of %s __func__ was used - __packed instead of __attribute__((packed)) - init to zero for static variables removed - use of DEVICE_ATTR_RO and DEVICE_ATTR_RW macros No functional code changes or API changes! Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-07-16s390/crypto: fix gcc 8 stringop-truncation warningVasily Gorbik
Replace strncpy which is used to deliberately avoid string NUL-termination with memcpy. This allows to get rid of gcc 8 stringop-truncation warning: inlined from 'query_crypto_facility.constprop' at drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:702:2: ./include/linux/string.h:246:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying 8 bytes from a string of the same length [-Wstringop-truncation] Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2018-06-12treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()Kees Cook
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This patch replaces cases of: kzalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kcalloc(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kzalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kzalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kzalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kzalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kzalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kzalloc + kcalloc ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()Kees Cook
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-04-11s390/zcrypt: Support up to 256 crypto adapters.Harald Freudenberger
There was an artificial restriction on the card/adapter id to only 6 bits but all the AP commands do support adapter ids with 8 bit. This patch removes this restriction to 64 adapters and now up to 256 adapter can get addressed. Some of the ioctl calls work on the max number of cards possible (which was 64). These ioctls are now deprecated but still supported. All the defines, structs and ioctl interface declarations have been kept for compabibility. There are now new ioctls (and defines for these) with an additional '2' appended which provide the extended versions with 256 cards supported. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-11-24s390: crypto: Remove redundant license textGreg Kroah-Hartman
Now that the SPDX tag is in all drivers/s390/crypto/ files, that identifies the license in a specific and legally-defined manner. So the extra GPL text wording can be removed as it is no longer needed at all. This is done on a quest to remove the 700+ different ways that files in the kernel describe the GPL license text. And there's unneeded stuff like the address (sometimes incorrect) for the FSF which is never needed. No copyright headers or other non-license-description text was removed. Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-11-24s390: crypto: add SPDX identifiers to the remaining filesGreg Kroah-Hartman
It's good to have SPDX identifiers in all files to make it easier to audit the kernel tree for correct licenses. Update the drivers/s390/crypto/ files with the correct SPDX license identifier based on the license text in the file itself. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This work is based on a script and data from Thomas Gleixner, Philippe Ombredanne, and Kate Stewart. Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-10-16s390/pkey: fix kzalloc-simple.cocci warningsVasyl Gomonovych
drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:128:11-18: WARNING: kzalloc should be used for cprbmem, instead of kmalloc/memset Use kzalloc rather than kmalloc followed by memset with 0 Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-06-12s390/pkey: add missing __user annotationsHeiko Carstens
Add missing __user annotations to get rid of a couple of sparse warnings. All callers actually pass kernel pointers instead of user space pointers, however the pointers are being used within KERNEL_DS. So everything is fine. Corresponding sparse warnings: drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:181:41: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) expected char [noderef] <asn:1>*request_control_blk_addr got void *<noident> Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-06-12s390/pkey: make pkey_init() staticHeiko Carstens
drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:1197:12: warning: symbol 'pkey_init' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-03-22s390/pkey: Introduce new API for secure key verificationHarald Freudenberger
User space needs some information about the secure key(s) before actually invoking the pkey and/or paes funcionality. This patch introduces a new ioctl API and in kernel API to verify the the secure key blob and give back some information about the key (type, bitsize, old MKVP). Both APIs are described in detail in the header files arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-03-22s390/pkey: Fix wrong handling of secure key with old MKVPHarald Freudenberger
When a secure key with an old Master Key Verification Pattern was given to the pkey_findcard function, there was no responsible card found because only the current MKVP of each card was compared. With this fix also the old MKVP values are considered and so a matching card able to handle the key is reported back to the caller. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2017-02-23s390/pkey: Introduce pkey kernel moduleHarald Freudenberger
This patch introcudes a new kernel module pkey which is providing protected key handling and management functions. The pkey API is available within the kernel for other s390 specific code to create and manage protected keys. Additionally the functions are exported to user space via IOCTL calls. The implementation makes extensive use of functions provided by the zcrypt device driver. For generating protected keys from secure keys there is also a CEX coprocessor card needed. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>