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We are going to track per-extent information, so it'll be necessary to
distinguish between inode infos and extent infos. Rename fscrypt_info
to fscrypt_inode_info, adjusting any lines that now exceed 80
characters.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
[ebiggers: rebased onto fscrypt tree, renamed fscrypt_get_info(),
adjusted two comments, and fixed some lines over 80 characters]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005025757.33521-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Until now, fscrypt has always used the filesystem block size as the
granularity of file contents encryption. Two scenarios have come up
where a sub-block granularity of contents encryption would be useful:
1. Inline crypto hardware that only supports a crypto data unit size
that is less than the filesystem block size.
2. Support for direct I/O at a granularity less than the filesystem
block size, for example at the block device's logical block size in
order to match the traditional direct I/O alignment requirement.
(1) first came up with older eMMC inline crypto hardware that only
supports a crypto data unit size of 512 bytes. That specific case
ultimately went away because all systems with that hardware continued
using out of tree code and never actually upgraded to the upstream
inline crypto framework. But, now it's coming back in a new way: some
current UFS controllers only support a data unit size of 4096 bytes, and
there is a proposal to increase the filesystem block size to 16K.
(2) was discussed as a "nice to have" feature, though not essential,
when support for direct I/O on encrypted files was being upstreamed.
Still, the fact that this feature has come up several times does suggest
it would be wise to have available. Therefore, this patch implements it
by using one of the reserved bytes in fscrypt_policy_v2 to allow users
to select a sub-block data unit size. Supported data unit sizes are
powers of 2 between 512 and the filesystem block size, inclusively.
Support is implemented for both the FS-layer and inline crypto cases.
This patch focuses on the basic support for sub-block data units. Some
things are out of scope for this patch but may be addressed later:
- Supporting sub-block data units in combination with
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64, in most cases. Unfortunately this
combination usually causes data unit indices to exceed 32 bits, and
thus fscrypt_supported_policy() correctly disallows it. The users who
potentially need this combination are using f2fs. To support it, f2fs
would need to provide an option to slightly reduce its max file size.
- Supporting sub-block data units in combination with
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32. This has the same problem
described above, but also it will need special code to make DUN
wraparound still happen on a FS block boundary.
- Supporting use case (2) mentioned above. The encrypted direct I/O
code will need to stop requiring and assuming FS block alignment.
This won't be hard, but it belongs in a separate patch.
- Supporting this feature on filesystems other than ext4 and f2fs.
(Filesystems declare support for it via their fscrypt_operations.)
On UBIFS, sub-block data units don't make sense because UBIFS encrypts
variable-length blocks as a result of compression. CephFS could
support it, but a bit more work would be needed to make the
fscrypt_*_block_inplace functions play nicely with sub-block data
units. I don't think there's a use case for this on CephFS anyway.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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For a given filesystem, the number of bits used by the maximum file
logical block number is computable from the maximum file size and the
block size. These values are always present in struct super_block.
Therefore, compute it this way instead of using the value from
fscrypt_operations::get_ino_and_lblk_bits. Since filesystems always
have to set the super_block fields anyway, this avoids having to provide
this information redundantly via fscrypt_operations.
This change is in preparation for adding support for sub-block data
units. For that, the value that is needed will become "the maximum file
data unit index". A hardcoded value won't suffice for that; it will
need to be computed anyway.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230925055451.59499-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add a blk_crypto_config_supported_natively helper that wraps
__blk_crypto_cfg_supported to retrieve the crypto_profile from the
request queue. With this fscrypt can stop including
blk-crypto-profile.h and rely on the public consumer interface in
blk-crypto.h.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114042944.1009870-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Switch all public blk-crypto interfaces to use struct block_device
arguments to specify the device they operate on instead of th
request_queue, which is a block layer implementation detail.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221114042944.1009870-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux
Pull STATX_DIOALIGN support from Eric Biggers:
"Make statx() support reporting direct I/O (DIO) alignment information.
This provides a generic interface for userspace programs to determine
whether a file supports DIO, and if so with what alignment
restrictions. Specifically, STATX_DIOALIGN works on block devices, and
on regular files when their containing filesystem has implemented
support.
An interface like this has been requested for years, since the
conditions for when DIO is supported in Linux have gotten increasingly
complex over time. Today, DIO support and alignment requirements can
be affected by various filesystem features such as multi-device
support, data journalling, inline data, encryption, verity,
compression, checkpoint disabling, log-structured mode, etc.
Further complicating things, Linux v6.0 relaxed the traditional rule
of DIO needing to be aligned to the block device's logical block size;
now user buffers (but not file offsets) only need to be aligned to the
DMA alignment.
The approach of uplifting the XFS specific ioctl XFS_IOC_DIOINFO was
discarded in favor of creating a clean new interface with statx().
For more information, see the individual commits and the man page
update[1]"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722074229.148925-1-ebiggers@kernel.org [1]
* tag 'statx-dioalign-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux:
xfs: support STATX_DIOALIGN
f2fs: support STATX_DIOALIGN
f2fs: simplify f2fs_force_buffered_io()
f2fs: move f2fs_force_buffered_io() into file.c
ext4: support STATX_DIOALIGN
fscrypt: change fscrypt_dio_supported() to prepare for STATX_DIOALIGN
vfs: support STATX_DIOALIGN on block devices
statx: add direct I/O alignment information
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request_queues are a block layer implementation detail that should not
leak into file systems. Change the fscrypt inline crypto code to
retrieve block devices instead of request_queues from the file system.
As part of that, clean up the interaction with multi-device file systems
by returning both the number of devices and the actual device array in a
single method call.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[ebiggers: bug fixes and minor tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
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Now that the fscrypt_master_key lifetime has been reworked to not be
subject to the quirks of the keyrings subsystem, blk_crypto_evict_key()
no longer gets called after the filesystem has already been unmounted.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to hold extra references to the
filesystem's request_queue(s). (And these references didn't always do
their intended job anyway, as pinning a request_queue doesn't
necessarily pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile.)
Stop taking these extra references. Instead, just pass the super_block
to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(), and use it to get the list of
block devices the key needs to be evicted from.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
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To prepare for STATX_DIOALIGN support, make two changes to
fscrypt_dio_supported().
First, remove the filesystem-block-alignment check and make the
filesystems handle it instead. It previously made sense to have it in
fs/crypto/; however, to support STATX_DIOALIGN the alignment restriction
would have to be returned to filesystems. It ends up being simpler if
filesystems handle this part themselves, especially for f2fs which only
allows fs-block-aligned DIO in the first place.
Second, make fscrypt_dio_supported() work on inodes whose encryption key
hasn't been set up yet, by making it set up the key if needed. This is
required for statx(), since statx() doesn't require a file descriptor.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220827065851.135710-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
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When inline encryption is used, the usual message "fscrypt: AES-256-XTS
using implementation <impl>" doesn't appear in the kernel log. Add a
similar message for the blk-crypto case that indicates that inline
encryption was used, and whether blk-crypto-fallback was used or not.
This can be useful for debugging performance problems.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414053415.158986-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
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Encrypted files traditionally haven't supported DIO, due to the need to
encrypt/decrypt the data. However, when the encryption is implemented
using inline encryption (blk-crypto) instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer encryption, it is straightforward to support DIO.
In preparation for supporting this, add the following functions:
- fscrypt_dio_supported() checks whether a DIO request is supported as
far as encryption is concerned. Encrypted files will only support DIO
when inline encryption is used and the I/O request is properly
aligned; this function checks these preconditions.
- fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() limits the length of a bio to avoid crossing
a place in the file that a bio with an encryption context cannot
cross due to a DUN discontiguity. This function is needed by
filesystems that use the iomap DIO implementation (which operates
directly on logical ranges, so it won't use fscrypt_mergeable_bio())
and that support FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32.
Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220128233940.79464-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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The new helper function fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() runs before
S_ENCRYPTED has been set on the new inode. This accidentally made
fscrypt_select_encryption_impl() never enable inline encryption on newly
created files, due to its use of fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption()
which only returns true when S_ENCRYPTED is set.
Fix this by using S_ISREG() directly instead of
fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(), analogous to what
select_encryption_mode() does.
I didn't notice this earlier because by design, the user-visible
behavior is the same (other than performance, potentially) regardless of
whether inline encryption is used or not.
Fixes: a992b20cd4ee ("fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context()")
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111015224.303073-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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fscrypt_get_encryption_info() has never actually been safe to call in a
context that needs GFP_NOFS, since it calls crypto_alloc_skcipher().
crypto_alloc_skcipher() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe, even if called under
memalloc_nofs_save(). This is because it may load kernel modules, and
also because it internally takes crypto_alg_sem. Other tasks can do
GFP_KERNEL allocations while holding crypto_alg_sem for write.
The use of fscrypt_init_mutex isn't GFP_NOFS-safe either.
So, stop pretending that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is nofs-safe.
I.e., when it allocates memory, just use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_NOFS.
Note, another reason to do this is that GFP_NOFS is deprecated in favor
of using memalloc_nofs_save() in the proper places.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(), ->i_crypt_info isn't known to be
non-NULL until we check fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(). So, load
->i_crypt_info after the check rather than before. This makes no
difference currently, but it prevents people from introducing bugs where
the pointer is dereferenced when it may be NULL.
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727174158.121456-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire(). Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE(). However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself. This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.
fscrypt_prepared_key includes a pointer to a crypto_skcipher object,
which is internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem. By using
READ_ONCE() for it, we're relying on internal implementation details of
the crypto subsystem.
Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.
(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here. This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)
Fixes: 5fee36095cda ("fscrypt: add inline encryption support")
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline
encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part
of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of
the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs.
To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with
'-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents
of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key
and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same;
therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification
tests.
Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and
also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt,
this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline
encryption hardware.
Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when
submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This
patch just adds the common code.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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