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The following reproducer
mkdir lower upper work merge
touch lower/old
touch lower/new
mount -t overlay overlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work merge
rm merge/new
mv merge/old merge/new & unlink upper/new
may result in this race:
PROCESS A:
rename("merge/old", "merge/new");
overwrite=true,ovl_lower_positive(old)=true,
ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(new)=true -> flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE
PROCESS B:
unlink("upper/new");
PROCESS A:
lookup newdentry in new_upperdir
call vfs_rename() with negative newdentry and RENAME_EXCHANGE
Fix by adding the missing check for negative newdentry.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Liang <zhengliang6@huawei.com>
Fixes: e9be9d5e76e3 ("overlay filesystem")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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If function ovl_instantiate() returns an error, ovl_cleanup will be called
and try to remove newdentry from wdir, but the newdentry has been moved to
udir at this time. This will causes BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode !=
dir) in fs/namei.c:may_delete.
Signed-off-by: chenying <chenying.kernel@bytedance.com>
Fixes: 01b39dcc9568 ("ovl: use inode_insert5() to hash a newly created inode")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/e6496a94-a161-dc04-c38a-d2544633acb4@bytedance.com/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Enable optimizations only if user opted-in for any of extended features.
If optimization is enabled, it breaks existing use case when a lower layer
directory appears after directory was created on a merged layer. If
overlay.opaque is applied, new files on lower layer are not visible.
Consider the following scenario:
- /lower and /upper are mounted to /merged
- directory /merged/new-dir is created with a file test1
- overlay is unmounted
- directory /lower/new-dir is created with a file test2
- overlay is mounted again
If opaque is applied by default, file test2 is not going to be visible
without explicitly clearing the overlay.opaque attribute
Signed-off-by: Vyacheslav Yurkov <Vyacheslav.Yurkov@bruker.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Instead of passing the overlay dentry.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Add stacking for the fileattr operations.
Add hack for calling security_file_ioctl() for now. Probably better to
have a pair of specific hooks for these operations.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
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We need to lock d_parent->d_lock before dget_dlock, or this may
have d_lockref updated parallelly like calltrace below which will
cause dentry->d_lockref leak and risk a crash.
CPU 0 CPU 1
ovl_set_redirect lookup_fast
ovl_get_redirect __d_lookup
dget_dlock
//no lock protection here spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock)
dentry->d_lockref.count++ dentry->d_lockref.count++
[ 49.799059] PGD 800000061fed7067 P4D 800000061fed7067 PUD 61fec5067 PMD 0
[ 49.799689] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 49.800019] CPU: 2 PID: 2332 Comm: node Not tainted 4.19.24-7.20.al7.x86_64 #1
[ 49.800678] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8a46cfe 04/01/2014
[ 49.801380] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20
[ 49.803470] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 49.803949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000
[ 49.804600] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088
[ 49.805252] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040
[ 49.805898] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 49.806548] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0
[ 49.807200] FS: 00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 49.807935] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 49.808461] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[ 49.809113] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 49.809758] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 49.810410] Call Trace:
[ 49.810653] d_delete+0x2c/0xb0
[ 49.810951] vfs_rmdir+0xfd/0x120
[ 49.811264] do_rmdir+0x14f/0x1a0
[ 49.811573] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x190
[ 49.811917] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 49.812385] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbf505ffd7
[ 49.814404] RSP: 002b:00007ffbedffada8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
[ 49.815098] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffbedffb640 RCX: 00007ffbf505ffd7
[ 49.815744] RDX: 0000000004449700 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000006c8cd50
[ 49.816394] RBP: 00007ffbedffaea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000017d0b
[ 49.817038] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000012
[ 49.817687] R13: 00000000072823d8 R14: 00007ffbedffb700 R15: 00000000072823d8
[ 49.818338] Modules linked in: pvpanic cirrusfb button qemu_fw_cfg atkbd libps2 i8042
[ 49.819052] CR2: 0000000000000088
[ 49.819368] ---[ end trace 4e652b8aa299aa2d ]---
[ 49.819796] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20
[ 49.821880] RSP: 0018:ffffac6fc5417e98 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 49.822363] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93b8da3446c0 RCX: 0000000a00000000
[ 49.823008] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: 0000000000000088
[ 49.823658] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff993cf040
[ 49.825404] R10: ffff93b92292e580 R11: ffffd27f188a4b80 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 49.827147] R13: 00000000ffffff9c R14: 00000000fffffffe R15: ffff93b8da3446c0
[ 49.828890] FS: 00007ffbedffb700(0000) GS:ffff93b927880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 49.830725] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 49.832359] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 00000005e3f74006 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[ 49.834085] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 49.835792] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: a6c606551141 ("ovl: redirect on rename-dir")
Signed-off-by: Liangyan <liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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The various vfs_*() helpers are called by filesystems or by the vfs
itself to perform core operations such as create, link, mkdir, mknod, rename,
rmdir, tmpfile and unlink. Enable them to handle idmapped mounts. If the
inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace and pass it down. Afterwards the checks and
operations are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-15-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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This paves the way for optionally using the "user.overlay." xattr
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Currently ovl_get_inode() initializes OVL_UPPERDATA flag and for that it
has to call ovl_check_metacopy_xattr() and check if metacopy xattr is
present or not.
yangerkun reported sometimes underlying filesystem might return -EIO and in
that case error handling path does not cleanup properly leading to various
warnings.
Run generic/461 with ext4 upper/lower layer sometimes may trigger the bug
as below(linux 4.19):
[ 551.001349] overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (-5)
[ 551.003464] overlayfs: failed to get inode (-5)
[ 551.004243] overlayfs: cleanup of 'd44/fd51' failed (-5)
[ 551.004941] overlayfs: failed to get origin (-5)
[ 551.005199] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 551.006697] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 24674 at fs/inode.c:1528 iput+0x33b/0x400
...
[ 551.027219] Call Trace:
[ 551.027623] ovl_create_object+0x13f/0x170
[ 551.028268] ovl_create+0x27/0x30
[ 551.028799] path_openat+0x1a35/0x1ea0
[ 551.029377] do_filp_open+0xad/0x160
[ 551.029944] ? vfs_writev+0xe9/0x170
[ 551.030499] ? page_counter_try_charge+0x77/0x120
[ 551.031245] ? __alloc_fd+0x160/0x2a0
[ 551.031832] ? do_sys_open+0x189/0x340
[ 551.032417] ? get_unused_fd_flags+0x34/0x40
[ 551.033081] do_sys_open+0x189/0x340
[ 551.033632] __x64_sys_creat+0x24/0x30
[ 551.034219] do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x430
[ 551.034800] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
One solution is to improve error handling and call iget_failed() if error
is encountered. Amir thinks that this path is little intricate and there
is not real need to check and initialize OVL_UPPERDATA in ovl_get_inode().
Instead caller of ovl_get_inode() can initialize this state. And this will
avoid double checking of metacopy xattr lookup in ovl_lookup() and
ovl_get_inode().
OVL_UPPERDATA is inode flag. So I was little concerned that initializing
it outside ovl_get_inode() might have some races. But this is one way
transition. That is once a file has been fully copied up, it can't go back
to metacopy file again. And that seems to help avoid races. So as of now
I can't see any races w.r.t OVL_UPPERDATA being set wrongly. So move
settingof OVL_UPPERDATA inside the callers of ovl_get_inode().
ovl_obtain_alias() already does it. So only two callers now left are
ovl_lookup() and ovl_instantiate().
Reported-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Share inode with different whiteout files for saving inode and speeding up
delete operation.
If EMLINK is encountered when linking a shared whiteout, create a new one.
In case of any other error, disable sharing for this super block.
Note: ofs->whiteout is protected by inode lock on workdir.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Changes to underlying layers should not cause WARN_ON(), but this repro
does:
mkdir w l u mnt
sudo mount -t overlay -o workdir=w,lowerdir=l,upperdir=u overlay mnt
touch mnt/h
ln u/h u/k
rm -rf mnt/k
rm -rf mnt/h
dmesg
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 116244 at fs/inode.c:302 drop_nlink+0x28/0x40
After upper hardlinks were added while overlay is mounted, unlinking all
overlay hardlinks drops overlay nlink to zero before all upper inodes
are unlinked.
After unlink/rename prevent i_nlink from going to zero if there are still
hashed aliases (i.e. cached hard links to the victim) remaining.
Reported-by: Phasip <phasip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
As with other required upper fs features, we only warn if support is
missing to avoid breaking existing sub-optimal setups.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Allow completely skipping ->revalidate() on a per-dentry basis, in case the
underlying layers used for a dentry do not themselves have ->revalidate().
E.g. negative overlay dentry has no underlying layers, hence revalidate is
unnecessary. Or if lower layer is remote but overlay dentry is pure-upper,
then can skip revalidate.
The following places need to update whether the dentry needs revalidate or
not:
- fill-super (root dentry)
- lookup
- create
- fh_to_dentry
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Use pr_fmt auto generate "overlayfs: " prefix.
Signed-off-by: lijiazi <lijiazi@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
In ovl_rename(), if new upper is hardlinked to old upper underneath
overlayfs before upper dirs are locked, user will get an ESTALE error
and a WARN_ON will be printed.
Changes to underlying layers while overlayfs is mounted may result in
unexpected behavior, but it shouldn't crash the kernel and it shouldn't
trigger WARN_ON() either, so relax this WARN_ON().
Reported-by: syzbot+bb1836a212e69f8e201a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 804032fabb3b ("ovl: don't check rename to self")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull still more SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Another round of SPDX updates for 5.2-rc6
Here is what I am guessing is going to be the last "big" SPDX update
for 5.2. It contains all of the remaining GPLv2 and GPLv2+ updates
that were "easy" to determine by pattern matching. The ones after this
are going to be a bit more difficult and the people on the spdx list
will be discussing them on a case-by-case basis now.
Another 5000+ files are fixed up, so our overall totals are:
Files checked: 64545
Files with SPDX: 45529
Compared to the 5.1 kernel which was:
Files checked: 63848
Files with SPDX: 22576
This is a huge improvement.
Also, we deleted another 20000 lines of boilerplate license crud,
always nice to see in a diffstat"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx: (65 commits)
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 507
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 506
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 505
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 504
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 503
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 502
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 501
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 499
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 498
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 497
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 496
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 495
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 491
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 490
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 489
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 488
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 487
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 486
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 485
...
|
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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Change first argument to MODULE_PARM_DESC() calls, that each of them
matched the actual module parameter name. The matching results in
changing (the 'parm' section from) the output of `modinfo overlay` from:
parm: ovl_check_copy_up:Obsolete; does nothing
parm: redirect_max:ushort
parm: ovl_redirect_max:Maximum length of absolute redirect xattr value
parm: redirect_dir:bool
parm: ovl_redirect_dir_def:Default to on or off for the redirect_dir feature
parm: redirect_always_follow:bool
parm: ovl_redirect_always_follow:Follow redirects even if redirect_dir feature is turned off
parm: index:bool
parm: ovl_index_def:Default to on or off for the inodes index feature
parm: nfs_export:bool
parm: ovl_nfs_export_def:Default to on or off for the NFS export feature
parm: xino_auto:bool
parm: ovl_xino_auto_def:Auto enable xino feature
parm: metacopy:bool
parm: ovl_metacopy_def:Default to on or off for the metadata only copy up feature
into:
parm: check_copy_up:Obsolete; does nothing
parm: redirect_max:Maximum length of absolute redirect xattr value (ushort)
parm: redirect_dir:Default to on or off for the redirect_dir feature (bool)
parm: redirect_always_follow:Follow redirects even if redirect_dir feature is turned off (bool)
parm: index:Default to on or off for the inodes index feature (bool)
parm: nfs_export:Default to on or off for the NFS export feature (bool)
parm: xino_auto:Auto enable xino feature (bool)
parm: metacopy:Default to on or off for the metadata only copy up feature (bool)
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schier <n.schier@avm.de>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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This nasty little syzbot repro:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c7a94f400000
Creates overlay mounts where the same directory is both in upper and lower
layers. Simplified example:
mkdir foo work
mount -t overlay none foo -o"lowerdir=.,upperdir=foo,workdir=work"
The repro runs several threads in parallel that attempt to chdir into foo
and attempt to symlink/rename/exec/mkdir the file bar.
The repro hits a WARN_ON() I placed in ovl_instantiate(), which suggests
that an overlay inode already exists in cache and is hashed by the pointer
of the real upper dentry that ovl_create_real() has just created. At the
point of the WARN_ON(), for overlay dir inode lock is held and upper dir
inode lock, so at first, I did not see how this was possible.
On a closer look, I see that after ovl_create_real(), because of the
overlapping upper and lower layers, a lookup by another thread can find the
file foo/bar that was just created in upper layer, at overlay path
foo/foo/bar and hash the an overlay inode with the new real dentry as lower
dentry. This is possible because the overlay directory foo/foo is not
locked and the upper dentry foo/bar is in dcache, so ovl_lookup() can find
it without taking upper dir inode shared lock.
Overlapping layers is considered a wrong setup which would result in
unexpected behavior, but it shouldn't crash the kernel and it shouldn't
trigger WARN_ON() either, so relax this WARN_ON() and leave a pr_warn()
instead to cover all cases of failure to get an overlay inode.
The error returned from failure to insert new inode to cache with
inode_insert5() was changed to -EEXIST, to distinguish from the error
-ENOMEM returned on failure to get/allocate inode with iget5_locked().
Reported-by: syzbot+9c69c282adc4edd2b540@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 01b39dcc9568 ("ovl: use inode_insert5() to hash a newly...")
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
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Theodore Ts'o reported a v4.19 regression with docker-dropbox:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=154070089431116&w=2
"I was rebuilding my dropbox Docker container, and it failed in 4.19
with the following error:
...
dpkg: error: error creating new backup file \
'/var/lib/dpkg/status-old': Invalid cross-device link"
The problem did not reproduce with metacopy feature disabled.
The error was caused by insufficient credentials to set
"trusted.overlay.redirect" xattr on link of a metacopy file.
Reproducer:
echo Y > /sys/module/overlay/parameters/redirect_dir
echo Y > /sys/module/overlay/parameters/metacopy
cd /tmp
mkdir l u w m
chmod 777 l u
touch l/foo
ln l/foo l/link
chmod 666 l/foo
mount -t overlay none -olowerdir=l,upperdir=u,workdir=w m
su fsgqa
ln m/foo m/bar
[ 21.455823] overlayfs: failed to set redirect (-1)
ln: failed to create hard link 'm/bar' => 'm/foo':\
Invalid cross-device link
Reported-by: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Maciej Zięba <maciekz82@gmail.com>
Fixes: 4120fe64dce4 ("ovl: Set redirect on upper inode when it is linked")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Kaixuxia repors that it's possible to crash overlayfs by removing the
whiteout on the upper layer before creating a directory over it. This is a
reproducer:
mkdir lower upper work merge
touch lower/file
mount -t overlay overlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work merge
rm merge/file
ls -al merge/file
rm upper/file
ls -al merge/
mkdir merge/file
Before commencing with a vfs_rename(..., RENAME_EXCHANGE) verify that the
lookup of "upper" is positive and is a whiteout, and return ESTALE
otherwise.
Reported by: kaixuxia <xiakaixu1987@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: e9be9d5e76e3 ("overlay filesystem")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18
|
|
There is no functional change but it seems better to get size by calling
posix_acl_xattr_size() instead of calling posix_acl_to_xattr() with
NULL buffer argument. Additionally, remove unnecessary assignments.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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|
It just makes the interface strange without adding any significant value.
The only case where locked is false and return value is 0 is in
ovl_rename() when new is negative, so handle that case explicitly in
ovl_rename().
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
linking a non-copied-up file into a non-copied-up parent results in a
nested call to mutex_lock_interruptible(&oi->lock). Fix this by copying up
target parent before ovl_nlink_start(), same as done in ovl_rename().
~/unionmount-testsuite$ ./run --ov -s
~/unionmount-testsuite$ ln /mnt/a/foo100 /mnt/a/dir100/
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
ln/1545 is trying to acquire lock:
00000000bcce7c4c (&ovl_i_lock_key[depth]){+.+.}, at:
ovl_copy_up_start+0x28/0x7d
but task is already holding lock:
0000000026d73d5b (&ovl_i_lock_key[depth]){+.+.}, at:
ovl_nlink_start+0x3c/0xc1
[SzM: this seems to be a false positive, but doing the copy-up first is
harmless and removes the lockdep splat]
Reported-by: syzbot+3ef5c0d1a5cb0b21e6be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 5f8415d6b87e ("ovl: persistent overlay inode nlink for...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
...otherwise there will be list corruption due to inode_sb_list_add() being
called for inode already on the sb list.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: e950564b97fd ("vfs: don't evict uninitialized inode")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When we create a hardlink to a metacopy upper file, first the redirect on
that inode. Path based lookup will not work with newly created link and
redirect will solve that issue.
Also use absolute redirect as two hardlinks could be in different
directores and relative redirect will not work.
I have not put any additional locking around setting redirects while
introducing redirects for non-dir files. For now it feels like existing
locking is sufficient. If that's not the case, we will have add more
locking. Following is my rationale about why do I think current locking
seems ok.
Basic problem for non-dir files is that more than on dentry could be
pointing to same inode and in theory only relying on dentry based locks
(d->d_lock) did not seem sufficient.
We set redirect upon rename and upon link creation. In both the paths for
non-dir file, VFS locks both source and target inodes (->i_rwsem). That
means vfs rename and link operations on same source and target can't he
happening in parallel (Even if there are multiple dentries pointing to same
inode). So that probably means that at a time on an inode, only one call
of ovl_set_redirect() could be working and we don't need additional locking
in ovl_set_redirect().
ovl_inode->redirect is initialized only when inode is created new. That
means it should not race with any other path and setting
ovl_inode->redirect should be fine.
Reading of ovl_inode->redirect happens in ovl_get_redirect() path. And
this called only in ovl_set_redirect(). And ovl_set_redirect() already
seemed to be protected using ->i_rwsem. That means ovl_set_redirect() and
ovl_get_redirect() on source/target inode should not make progress in
parallel and is mutually exclusive. Hence no additional locking required.
Now, only case where ovl_set_redirect() and ovl_get_redirect() could race
seems to be case of absolute redirects where ovl_get_redirect() has to
travel up the tree. In that case we already take d->d_lock and that should
be sufficient as directories will not have multiple dentries pointing to
same inode.
So given VFS locking and current usage of redirect, current locking around
redirect seems to be ok for non-dir as well. Once we have the logic to
remove redirect when metacopy file gets copied up, then we probably will
need additional locking.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Set redirect on metacopy files upon rename. This will help find data
dentry in lower dirs.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Copy up mtime and ctime to overlay inode after times in real object are
modified. Be careful not to dirty cachelines when not necessary.
This is in preparation for moving overlay functionality out of the VFS.
This patch shouldn't have any observable effect.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently, there is a small window where ovl_obtain_alias() can
race with ovl_instantiate() and create two different overlay inodes
with the same underlying real non-dir non-hardlink inode.
The race requires an adversary to guess the file handle of the
yet to be created upper inode and decode the guessed file handle
after ovl_creat_real(), but before ovl_instantiate().
This race does not affect overlay directory inodes, because those
are decoded via ovl_lookup_real() and not with ovl_obtain_alias().
This patch fixes the race, by using inode_insert5() to add a newly
created inode to cache.
If the newly created inode apears to already exist in cache (hashed
by the same real upper inode), we instantiate the dentry with the old
inode and drop the new inode, instead of silently not hashing the new
inode.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
EIO better represents an internal error than ENOENT.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
vfs_mkdir() may succeed and leave the dentry passed to it unhashed and
negative. ovl_create_real() is the last caller breaking when that
happens.
[amir: split re-factoring of ovl_create_temp() to prep patch
add comment about unhashed dir after mkdir
add pr_warn() if mkdir succeeds and lookup fails]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Also used ovl_create_temp() in ovl_create_index() instead of calling
ovl_do_mkdir() directly, so now all callers of ovl_do_mkdir() are routed
through ovl_create_real(), which paves the way for Al's fix for non-hashed
result from vfs_mkdir().
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Al Viro suggested to simplify callers of ovl_create_real() by
returning the created dentry (or ERR_PTR) from ovl_create_real().
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
* Rename to ovl_cattr
* Fold ovl_create_real() hardlink argument into struct ovl_cattr
* Create macro OVL_CATTR() to initialize struct ovl_cattr from mode
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
It did not prove to be useful.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Overlayfs should cope with online changes to underlying layer
without crashing the kernel, which is what xfstest overlay/019
checks.
This test may sometimes trigger WARN_ON() in ovl_create_or_link()
when linking an overlay inode that has been changed on underlying
layer.
Remove those WARN_ON() to prevent the stress test from failing.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
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With NFS export feature enabled, when overlay inode nlink drops to
zero, instead of removing the index entry, replace it with a whiteout
index entry.
This is needed for NFS export in order to prevent future open by handle
from opening the lower file directly.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
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The functions ovl_lower_positive() and ovl_check_empty_dir() both take
inode mutex on the real lower dir under ovl_want_write() which takes
the upper_mnt sb_writers lock.
While this is not a clear locking order or layering violation, it creates
an undesired lock dependency between two unrelated layers for no good
reason.
This lock dependency materializes to a false(?) positive lockdep warning
when calling rmdir() on a nested overlayfs, where both nested and
underlying overlayfs both use the same fs type as upper layer.
rmdir() on the nested overlayfs creates the lock chain:
sb_writers of upper_mnt (e.g. tmpfs) in ovl_do_remove()
ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[] of lower overlay dir in ovl_lower_positive()
rmdir() on the underlying overlayfs creates the lock chain in
reverse order:
ovl_i_mutex_dir_key[] of lower overlay dir in vfs_rmdir()
sb_writers of nested upper_mnt (e.g. tmpfs) in ovl_do_remove()
To rid of the unneeded locking dependency, move both ovl_lower_positive()
and ovl_check_empty_dir() to before ovl_want_write() in rmdir() and
rename() implementation.
This change spreads the pieces of ovl_check_empty_and_clear() directly
inside the rmdir()/rename() implementations so the helper is no longer
needed and removed.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Conform two stray warning messages to the standard overlayfs: prefix.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
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ovl_rename() updates dir cache version for impure old parent if an entry
with copy up origin is moved into old parent, but it did not update
cache version if the entry moved out of old parent has a copy up origin.
[SzM] Same for new dir: we updated the version if an entry with origin was
moved in, but not if an entry with origin was moved out.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
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An "origin && non-merge" upper dir may have leftover whiteouts that
were created in past mount. overlayfs does no clear this dir when we
delete it, which may lead to rmdir fail or temp file left in workdir.
Simple reproducer:
mkdir lower upper work merge
mkdir -p lower/dir
touch lower/dir/a
mount -t overlay overlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,\
workdir=work merge
rm merge/dir/a
umount merge
rm -rf lower/*
touch lower/dir (*)
mount -t overlay overlay -olowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,\
workdir=work merge
rm -rf merge/dir
Syslog dump:
overlayfs: cleanup of 'work/#7' failed (-39)
(*): if we do not create the regular file, the result is different:
rm: cannot remove "dir/": Directory not empty
This patch adds a check for the case of non-merge dir that may contain
whiteouts, and calls ovl_check_empty_dir() to check and clear whiteouts
from upper dir when an empty dir is being deleted.
[amir: split patch from ovl_check_empty_dir() cleanup
rename ovl_is_origin() to ovl_may_have_whiteouts()
check OVL_WHITEOUTS flag instead of checking origin xattr]
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
Filter out non-whiteout non-upper entries from list of merge dir entries
while checking if merge dir is empty in ovl_check_empty_dir().
The remaining work for ovl_clear_empty() is to clear all entries on the
list.
[amir: split patch from rmdir bug fix]
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Use the ovl_lock_rename_workdir() helper which requires
unlock_rename() only on lock success.
Fixes: ("fd210b7d67ee ovl: move copy up lock out")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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GFP_TEMPORARY was introduced by commit e12ba74d8ff3 ("Group short-lived
and reclaimable kernel allocations") along with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE. It's
primary motivation was to allow users to tell that an allocation is
short lived and so the allocator can try to place such allocations close
together and prevent long term fragmentation. As much as this sounds
like a reasonable semantic it becomes much less clear when to use the
highlevel GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag. How long is temporary? Can the
context holding that memory sleep? Can it take locks? It seems there is
no good answer for those questions.
The current implementation of GFP_TEMPORARY is basically GFP_KERNEL |
__GFP_RECLAIMABLE which in itself is tricky because basically none of
the existing caller provide a way to reclaim the allocated memory. So
this is rather misleading and hard to evaluate for any benefits.
I have checked some random users and none of them has added the flag
with a specific justification. I suspect most of them just copied from
other existing users and others just thought it might be a good idea to
use without any measuring. This suggests that GFP_TEMPORARY just
motivates for cargo cult usage without any reasoning.
I believe that our gfp flags are quite complex already and especially
those with highlevel semantic should be clearly defined to prevent from
confusion and abuse. Therefore I propose dropping GFP_TEMPORARY and
replace all existing users to simply use GFP_KERNEL. Please note that
SLAB users with shrinkers will still get __GFP_RECLAIMABLE heuristic and
so they will be placed properly for memory fragmentation prevention.
I can see reasons we might want some gfp flag to reflect shorterm
allocations but I propose starting from a clear semantic definition and
only then add users with proper justification.
This was been brought up before LSF this year by Matthew [1] and it
turned out that GFP_TEMPORARY really doesn't have a clear semantic. It
seems to be a heuristic without any measured advantage for most (if not
all) its current users. The follow up discussion has revealed that
opinions on what might be temporary allocation differ a lot between
developers. So rather than trying to tweak existing users into a
semantic which they haven't expected I propose to simply remove the flag
and start from scratch if we really need a semantic for short term
allocations.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170118054945.GD18349@bombadil.infradead.org
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: drm/i915: fix up]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816144703.378d4f4d@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170728091904.14627-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Impure directories are ones which contain objects with origins (i.e. those
that have been copied up). These are relevant to readdir operation only
because of the d_ino field, no other transformation is necessary. Also a
directory can become impure between two getdents(2) calls.
This patch creates a cache for impure directories. Unlike the cache for
merged directories, this one only contains entries with origin and is not
refcounted but has a its lifetime tied to that of the dentry.
Similarly to the merged cache, the impure cache is invalidated based on a
version number. This version number is incremented when an entry with
origin is added or removed from the directory.
If the cache is empty, then the impure xattr is removed from the directory.
This patch also fixes up handling of d_ino for the ".." entry if the parent
directory is merged.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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