| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core SMP updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of SMP core code changes:
- Rework the smp function call core code to avoid the allocation of
an additional cpumask
- Remove the not longer required GFP argument from on_each_cpu_cond()
and on_each_cpu_cond_mask() and fixup the callers"
* tag 'smp-core-2020-01-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
smp: Remove allocation mask from on_each_cpu_cond.*()
smp: Add a smp_cond_func_t argument to smp_call_function_many()
smp: Use smp_cond_func_t as type for the conditional function
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The timekeeping and timers departement provides:
- Time namespace support:
If a container migrates from one host to another then it expects
that clocks based on MONOTONIC and BOOTTIME are not subject to
disruption. Due to different boot time and non-suspended runtime
these clocks can differ significantly on two hosts, in the worst
case time goes backwards which is a violation of the POSIX
requirements.
The time namespace addresses this problem. It allows to set offsets
for clock MONOTONIC and BOOTTIME once after creation and before
tasks are associated with the namespace. These offsets are taken
into account by timers and timekeeping including the VDSO.
Offsets for wall clock based clocks (REALTIME/TAI) are not provided
by this mechanism. While in theory possible, the overhead and code
complexity would be immense and not justified by the esoteric
potential use cases which were discussed at Plumbers '18.
The overhead for tasks in the root namespace (ie where host time
offsets = 0) is in the noise and great effort was made to ensure
that especially in the VDSO. If time namespace is disabled in the
kernel configuration the code is compiled out.
Kudos to Andrei Vagin and Dmitry Sofanov who implemented this
feature and kept on for more than a year addressing review
comments, finding better solutions. A pleasant experience.
- Overhaul of the alarmtimer device dependency handling to ensure
that the init/suspend/resume ordering is correct.
- A new clocksource/event driver for Microchip PIT64
- Suspend/resume support for the Hyper-V clocksource
- The usual pile of fixes, updates and improvements mostly in the
driver code"
* tag 'timers-core-2020-01-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
alarmtimer: Make alarmtimer_get_rtcdev() a stub when CONFIG_RTC_CLASS=n
alarmtimer: Use wakeup source from alarmtimer platform device
alarmtimer: Make alarmtimer platform device child of RTC device
alarmtimer: Update alarmtimer_get_rtcdev() docs to reflect reality
hrtimer: Add missing sparse annotation for __run_timer()
lib/vdso: Only read hrtimer_res when needed in __cvdso_clock_getres()
MIPS: vdso: Define BUILD_VDSO32 when building a 32bit kernel
clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Set TSC clocksource as default w/ InvariantTSC
clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Untangle stimers and timesync from clocksources
clocksource/drivers/timer-microchip-pit64b: Fix sparse warning
clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Rename Exynos to lowercase
clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Fix uninitialized pointer access
clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Switch to platform_get_irq
clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Convert to devm_platform_ioremap_resource
clocksource/drivers/em_sti: Fix variable declaration in em_sti_probe
clocksource/drivers/em_sti: Convert to devm_platform_ioremap_resource
clocksource/drivers/bcm2835_timer: Fix memory leak of timer
clocksource/drivers/cadence-ttc: Use ttc driver as platform driver
clocksource/drivers/timer-microchip-pit64b: Add Microchip PIT64B support
clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Reserve PAGE_SIZE space for tsc page
...
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Fix for two regressions in this cycle, both reported by the postgresql
use case.
One removes the added restriction on who can submit IO, making it
possible for rings shared across forks to do so. The other fixes an
issue for the same kind of use case, where one exiting process would
cancel all IO"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-26' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: don't cancel all work on process exit
Revert "io_uring: only allow submit from owning task"
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Pull vfs fix from Al Viro:
"Fix a use-after-free in do_last() handling of sysctl_protected_...
checks.
The use-after-free normally doesn't happen there, but race with
rename() and it becomes possible"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
do_last(): fetch directory ->i_mode and ->i_uid before it's too late
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If we're sharing the ring across forks, then one process exiting means
that we cancel ALL work and prevent future work. This is overly
restrictive. As long as we cancel the work associated with the files
from the current task, it's safe to let others persist. Normal fd close
on exit will still wait (and cancel) pending work.
Fixes: fcb323cc53e2 ("io_uring: io_uring: add support for async work inheriting files")
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This ends up being too restrictive for tasks that willingly fork and
share the ring between forks. Andres reports that this breaks his
postgresql work. Since we're close to 5.5 release, revert this change
for now.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 44d282796f81 ("io_uring: only allow submit from owning task")
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The afs filesystem needs to prohibit certain characters from cell names,
such as '/', as these are used to form filenames in procfs, leading to
the following warning being generated:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3489 at fs/proc/generic.c:178
Fix afs_alloc_cell() to disallow nonprintable characters, '/', '@' and
names that begin with a dot.
Remove the check for "@cell" as that is then redundant.
This can be tested by running:
echo add foo/.bar 1.2.3.4 >/proc/fs/afs/cells
Note that we will also need to deal with:
- Names ending in ".invalid" shouldn't be passed to the DNS.
- Names that contain non-valid domainname chars shouldn't be passed to
the DNS.
- DNS replies that say "your-dns-needs-immediate-attention.<gTLD>" and
replies containing A records that say 127.0.53.53 should be
considered invalid.
[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-collision-mitigation-01aug14-en.pdf]
but these need to be dealt with by the kafs-client DNS program rather
than the kernel.
Reported-by: syzbot+b904ba7c947a37b4b291@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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may_create_in_sticky() call is done when we already have dropped the
reference to dir.
Fixes: 30aba6656f61e (namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
"Here's a last minute fix for a regression introduced in this
development cycle.
There's a small chance of a silent corruption when device replace and
NOCOW data writes happen at the same time in one block group. Metadata
or COW data writes are unaffected.
The extra fixup patch is there to silence an unnecessary warning"
* tag 'for-5.5-rc8-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: dev-replace: remove warning for unknown return codes when finished
btrfs: scrub: Require mandatory block group RO for dev-replace
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The fstests btrfs/011 triggered a warning at the end of device replace,
[ 1891.998975] BTRFS warning (device vdd): failed setting block group ro: -28
[ 1892.038338] BTRFS error (device vdd): btrfs_scrub_dev(/dev/vdd, 1, /dev/vdb) failed -28
[ 1892.059993] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1892.063032] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2244 at fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c:506 btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 1892.074346] CPU: 2 PID: 2244 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-default+ #942
[ 1892.079956] RIP: 0010:btrfs_dev_replace_start.cold+0xf9/0x140 [btrfs]
[ 1892.096576] RSP: 0018:ffffbb58c7b3fd10 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1892.098311] RAX: 00000000ffffffe4 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 8888888888888889
[ 1892.100342] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff9e889645f5d8 RDI: ffffffff92821080
[ 1892.102291] RBP: ffff9e889645c000 R08: 000001b8878fe1f6 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1892.104239] R10: ffffbb58c7b3fd08 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9e88a0017000
[ 1892.106434] R13: ffff9e889645f608 R14: ffff9e88794e1000 R15: ffff9e88a07b5200
[ 1892.108642] FS: 00007fcaed3f18c0(0000) GS:ffff9e88bda00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1892.111558] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1892.113492] CR2: 00007f52509ff420 CR3: 00000000603dd002 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
[ 1892.115814] Call Trace:
[ 1892.116896] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl+0x35/0x60 [btrfs]
[ 1892.118962] btrfs_ioctl+0x1d62/0x2550 [btrfs]
caused by the previous patch ("btrfs: scrub: Require mandatory block
group RO for dev-replace"). Hitting ENOSPC is possible and could happen
when the block group is set read-only, preventing NOCOW writes to the
area that's being accessed by dev-replace.
This has happend with scratch devices of size 12G but not with 5G and
20G, so this is depends on timing and other activity on the filesystem.
The whole replace operation is restartable, the space state should be
examined by the user in any case.
The error code is propagated back to the ioctl caller so the kernel
warning is causing false alerts.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The allocation mask is no longer used by on_each_cpu_cond() and
on_each_cpu_cond_mask() and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200117090137.1205765-4-bigeasy@linutronix.de
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[BUG]
For dev-replace test cases with fsstress, like btrfs/06[45] btrfs/071,
looped runs can lead to random failure, where scrub finds csum error.
The possibility is not high, around 1/20 to 1/100, but it's causing data
corruption.
The bug is observable after commit b12de52896c0 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't
check free space before marking a block group RO")
[CAUSE]
Dev-replace has two source of writes:
- Write duplication
All writes to source device will also be duplicated to target device.
Content: Not yet persisted data/meta
- Scrub copy
Dev-replace reused scrub code to iterate through existing extents, and
copy the verified data to target device.
Content: Previously persisted data and metadata
The difference in contents makes the following race possible:
Regular Writer | Dev-replace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
^ |
| Preallocate one data extent |
| at bytenr X, len 1M |
v |
^ Commit transaction |
| Now extent [X, X+1M) is in |
v commit root |
================== Dev replace starts =========================
| ^
| | Scrub extent [X, X+1M)
| | Read [X, X+1M)
| | (The content are mostly garbage
| | since it's preallocated)
^ | v
| Write back happens for |
| extent [X, X+512K) |
| New data writes to both |
| source and target dev. |
v |
| ^
| | Scrub writes back extent [X, X+1M)
| | to target device.
| | This will over write the new data in
| | [X, X+512K)
| v
This race can only happen for nocow writes. Thus metadata and data cow
writes are safe, as COW will never overwrite extents of previous
transaction (in commit root).
This behavior can be confirmed by disabling all fallocate related calls
in fsstress (*), then all related tests can pass a 2000 run loop.
*: FSSTRESS_AVOID="-f fallocate=0 -f allocsp=0 -f zero=0 -f insert=0 \
-f collapse=0 -f punch=0 -f resvsp=0"
I didn't expect resvsp ioctl will fallback to fallocate in VFS...
[FIX]
Make dev-replace to require mandatory block group RO, and wait for current
nocow writes before calling scrub_chunk().
This patch will mostly revert commit 76a8efa171bf ("btrfs: Continue replace
when set_block_ro failed") for dev-replace path.
The side effect is, dev-replace can be more strict on avaialble space, but
definitely worth to avoid data corruption.
Reported-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Fixes: 76a8efa171bf ("btrfs: Continue replace when set_block_ro failed")
Fixes: b12de52896c0 ("btrfs: scrub: Don't check free space before marking a block group RO")
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Pull ceph fix from Ilya Dryomov:
"A fix for a potential use-after-free from Jeff, marked for stable"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.5-rc8' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: hold extra reference to r_parent over life of request
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In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I changed filldir to not do individual __put_user()
accesses, but instead use unsafe_put_user() surrounded by the proper
user_access_begin/end() pair.
That make them enormously faster on modern x86, where the STAC/CLAC
games make individual user accesses fairly heavy-weight.
However, the user_access_begin() range was not really the exact right
one, since filldir() has the unfortunate problem that it needs to not
only fill out the new directory entry, it also needs to fix up the
previous one to contain the proper file offset.
It's unfortunate, but the "d_off" field in "struct dirent" is _not_ the
file offset of the directory entry itself - it's the offset of the next
one. So we end up backfilling the offset in the previous entry as we
walk along.
But since x86 didn't really care about the exact range, and used to be
the only architecture that did anything fancy in user_access_begin() to
begin with, the filldir[64]() changes did something lazy, and even
commented on it:
/*
* Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
* The real range was checked in getdents
*/
if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
goto efault;
and it all worked fine.
But now 32-bit ppc is starting to also implement user_access_begin(),
and the fact that we faked the range to only be the (possibly not even
valid) previous directory entry becomes a problem, because ppc32 will
actually be using the range that is passed in for more than just "check
that it's user space".
This is a complete rewrite of Christophe's original patch.
By saving off the record length of the previous entry instead of a
pointer to it in the filldir data structures, we can simplify the range
check and the writing of the previous entry d_off field. No need for
any conditionals in the user accesses themselves, although we retain the
conditional EINTR checking for the "was this the first directory entry"
signal handling latency logic.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a02d3426f93f7eb04960a4d9140902d278cab0bb.1579697910.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/408c90c4068b00ea8f1c41cca45b84ec23d4946b.1579783936.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Reported-and-tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 8a23eb804ca4 ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry
filename is valid") added some minimal validity checks on the directory
entries passed to filldir[64](). But they really were pretty minimal.
This fleshes out at least the name length check: we used to disallow
zero-length names, but really, negative lengths or oevr-long names
aren't ok either. Both could happen if there is some filesystem
corruption going on.
Now, most filesystems tend to use just an "unsigned char" or similar for
the length of a directory entry name, so even with a corrupt filesystem
you should never see anything odd like that. But since we then use the
name length to create the directory entry record length, let's make sure
it actually is half-way sensible.
Note how POSIX states that the size of a path component is limited by
NAME_MAX, but we actually use PATH_MAX for the check here. That's
because while NAME_MAX is generally the correct maximum name length
(it's 255, for the same old "name length is usually just a byte on
disk"), there's nothing in the VFS layer that really cares.
So the real limitation at a VFS layer is the total pathname length you
can pass as a filename: PATH_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"This was supposed to have gone in last week, but due to a brain fart
on my part, I forgot that we made this struct addition in the 5.5
cycle. So here it is for 5.5, to prevent having a 32 vs 64-bit
compatability issue with the files_update command"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix compat for IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE
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Currently, we just assume that it will stick around by virtue of the
submitter's reference, but later patches will allow the syscall to
return early and we can't rely on that reference at that point.
While I'm not aware of any reports of it, Xiubo pointed out that this
may fix a use-after-free. If the wait for a reply times out or is
canceled via signal, and then the reply comes in after the syscall
returns, the client can end up trying to access r_parent without a
reference.
Take an extra reference to the inode when setting r_parent and release
it when releasing the request.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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fds field of struct io_uring_files_update is problematic with regards
to compat user space, as pointer size is different in 32-bit, 32-on-64-bit,
and 64-bit user space. In order to avoid custom handling of compat in
the syscall implementation, make fds __u64 and use u64_to_user_ptr in
order to retrieve it. Also, align the field naturally and check that
no garbage is passed there.
Fixes: c3a31e605620c279 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE")
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull reiserfs fix from Jan Kara:
"A fixup of a recently merged reiserfs fix which has caused problem
when xattrs were not compiled in"
* tag 'fixes_for_v5.5-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
reiserfs: fix handling of -EOPNOTSUPP in reiserfs_for_each_xattr
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Pull io_uring fixes form Jens Axboe:
- Ensure ->result is always set when IO is retried (Bijan)
- In conjunction with the above, fix a regression in polled IO issue
when retried (me/Bijan)
- Don't setup async context for read/write fixed, otherwise we may
wrongly map the iovec on retry (me)
- Cancel io-wq work if we fail getting mm reference (me)
- Ensure dependent work is always initialized correctly (me)
- Only allow original task to submit IO, don't allow it from a passed
ring fd (me)
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-16' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: only allow submit from owning task
io_uring: ensure workqueue offload grabs ring mutex for poll list
io_uring: clear req->result always before issuing a read/write request
io_uring: be consistent in assigning next work from handler
io-wq: cancel work if we fail getting a mm reference
io_uring: don't setup async context for read/write fixed
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few more fixes that have been in the works during last twp weeks.
All have a user visible effect and are stable material:
- scrub: properly update progress after calling cancel ioctl, calling
'resume' would start from the beginning otherwise
- fix subvolume reference removal, after moving out of the original
path the reference is not recognized and will lead to transaction
abort
- fix reloc root lifetime checks, could lead to crashes when there's
subvolume cleaning running in parallel
- fix memory leak when quotas get disabled in the middle of extent
accounting
- fix transaction abort in case of balance being started on degraded
mount on eg. RAID1"
* tag 'for-5.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: check rw_devices, not num_devices for balance
Btrfs: always copy scrub arguments back to user space
btrfs: relocation: fix reloc_root lifespan and access
btrfs: fix memory leak in qgroup accounting
btrfs: do not delete mismatched root refs
btrfs: fix invalid removal of root ref
btrfs: rework arguments of btrfs_unlink_subvol
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse
Pull fuse fix from Miklos Szeredi:
"Fix a regression in the last release affecting the ftp module of the
gvfs filesystem"
* tag 'fuse-fixes-5.5-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse:
fuse: fix fuse_send_readpages() in the syncronous read case
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The fstest btrfs/154 reports
[ 8675.381709] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
[ 8675.383302] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31900 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2038 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.390925] CPU: 1 PID: 31900 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-default+ #935
[ 8675.392780] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 8675.395452] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.402672] RSP: 0018:ffffb2090888fb00 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 8675.404413] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92026dfa91c8 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 8675.406609] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e100899 RDI: ffffffff8e100971
[ 8675.408775] RBP: ffff920247c61660 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8675.410978] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffe4
[ 8675.412647] R13: ffff92026db74000 R14: ffff920247c616b8 R15: ffff92026dfbc000
[ 8675.413994] FS: 00007fd5e57248c0(0000) GS:ffff92027d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8675.416146] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8675.417833] CR2: 0000564aa51682d8 CR3: 000000006dcbc004 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
[ 8675.419801] Call Trace:
[ 8675.420742] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x355/0x480 [btrfs]
[ 8675.422600] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xc8/0xaf0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.424335] reset_balance_state+0x14a/0x190 [btrfs]
[ 8675.425824] btrfs_balance.cold+0xe7/0x154 [btrfs]
[ 8675.427313] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x235/0x2c0
[ 8675.428663] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x298/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 8675.430285] btrfs_ioctl+0x466/0x2550 [btrfs]
[ 8675.431788] ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics+0x51/0xf0
[ 8675.433487] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x56/0x400
[ 8675.435122] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0
[ 8675.436618] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 8675.438093] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x499/0x740
[ 8675.439619] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.441034] do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.442411] ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
[ 8675.443718] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 8675.445333] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[ 8675.446705] do_syscall_64+0x50/0x210
[ 8675.448059] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 8675.479187] BTRFS: error (device vdb) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2038: errno=-28 No space left
We now use btrfs_can_overcommit() to see if we can flip a block group
read only. Before this would fail because we weren't taking into
account the usable un-allocated space for allocating chunks. With my
patches we were allowed to do the balance, which is technically correct.
The test is trying to start balance on degraded mount. So now we're
trying to allocate a chunk and cannot because we want to allocate a
RAID1 chunk, but there's only 1 device that's available for usage. This
results in an ENOSPC.
But we shouldn't even be making it this far, we don't have enough
devices to restripe. The problem is we're using btrfs_num_devices(),
that also includes missing devices. That's not actually what we want, we
need to use rw_devices.
The chunk_mutex is not needed here, rw_devices changes only in device
add, remove or replace, all are excluded by EXCL_OP mechanism.
Fixes: e4d8ec0f65b9 ("Btrfs: implement online profile changing")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add stacktrace, update changelog, drop chunk_mutex ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
If scrub returns an error we are not copying back the scrub arguments
structure to user space. This prevents user space to know how much
progress scrub has done if an error happened - this includes -ECANCELED
which is returned when users ask for scrub to stop. A particular use
case, which is used in btrfs-progs, is to resume scrub after it is
canceled, in that case it relies on checking the progress from the scrub
arguments structure and then use that progress in a call to resume
scrub.
So fix this by always copying the scrub arguments structure to user
space, overwriting the value returned to user space with -EFAULT only if
copying the structure failed to let user space know that either that
copying did not happen, and therefore the structure is stale, or it
happened partially and the structure is probably not valid and corrupt
due to the partial copy.
Reported-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/d0a97688-78be-08de-ca7d-bcb4c7fb397e@cobb.uk.net/
Fixes: 06fe39ab15a6a4 ("Btrfs: do not overwrite scrub error with fault error in scrub ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
If the credentials or the mm doesn't match, don't allow the task to
submit anything on behalf of this ring. The task that owns the ring can
pass the file descriptor to another task, but we don't want to allow
that task to submit an SQE that then assumes the ring mm and creds if
it needs to go async.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Commit 60e4cf67a58 (reiserfs: fix extended attributes on the root
directory) introduced a regression open_xa_root started returning
-EOPNOTSUPP but it was not handled properly in reiserfs_for_each_xattr.
When the reiserfs module is built without CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR,
deleting an inode would result in a warning and chowning an inode
would also result in a warning and then fail to complete.
With CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR enabled, the xattr root would always be
present for read-write operations.
This commit handles -EOPNOSUPP in the same way -ENODATA is handled.
Fixes: 60e4cf67a582 ("reiserfs: fix extended attributes on the root directory")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # Commit 60e4cf67a58 was picked up by stable
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115180059.6935-1-jeffm@suse.com
Reported-by: Michael Brunnbauer <brunni@netestate.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
|
Buffered read in fuse normally goes via:
-> generic_file_buffered_read()
-> fuse_readpages()
-> fuse_send_readpages()
->fuse_simple_request() [called since v5.4]
In the case of a read request, fuse_simple_request() will return a
non-negative bytecount on success or a negative error value. A positive
bytecount was taken to be an error and the PG_error flag set on the page.
This resulted in generic_file_buffered_read() falling back to ->readpage(),
which would repeat the read request and succeed. Because of the repeated
read succeeding the bug was not detected with regression tests or other use
cases.
The FTP module in GVFS however fails the second read due to the
non-seekable nature of FTP downloads.
Fix by checking and ignoring positive return value from
fuse_simple_request().
Reported-by: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
Link: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/issues/441
Fixes: 134831e36bbd ("fuse: convert readpages to simple api")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
|
|
A previous commit moved the locking for the async sqthread, but didn't
take into account that the io-wq workers still need it. We can't use
req->in_async for this anymore as both the sqthread and io-wq workers
set it, gate the need for locking on io_wq_current_is_worker() instead.
Fixes: 8a4955ff1cca ("io_uring: sqthread should grab ctx->uring_lock for submissions")
Reported-by: Bijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
req->result is cleared when io_issue_sqe() calls io_read/write_pre()
routines. Those routines however are not called when the sqe
argument is NULL, which is the case when io_issue_sqe() is called from
io_wq_submit_work(). io_issue_sqe() may then examine a stale result if
a polled request had previously failed with -EAGAIN:
if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
if (req->result == -EAGAIN)
return -EAGAIN;
io_iopoll_req_issued(req);
}
and in turn cause a subsequently completed request to be re-issued in
io_wq_submit_work().
Signed-off-by: Bijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Fixes for mountpoint_last() bugs (by converting to use of
lookup_last()) and an autofs regression fix from this cycle (caused by
follow_managed() breakage introduced in barrier fixes series)"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fix autofs regression caused by follow_managed() changes
reimplement path_mountpoint() with less magic
|
|
we need to reload ->d_flags after the call of ->d_manage() - the thing
might've been called with dentry still negative and have the damn thing
turned positive while we'd waited.
Fixes: d41efb522e90 "fs/namei.c: pull positivity check into follow_managed()"
Reported-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Tested-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
... and get rid of a bunch of bugs in it. Background:
the reason for path_mountpoint() is that umount() really doesn't
want attempts to revalidate the root of what it's trying to umount.
The thing we want to avoid actually happen from complete_walk();
solution was to do something parallel to normal path_lookupat()
and it both went overboard and got the boilerplate subtly
(and not so subtly) wrong.
A better solution is to do pretty much what the normal path_lookupat()
does, but instead of complete_walk() do unlazy_walk(). All it takes
to avoid that ->d_weak_revalidate() call... mountpoint_last() goes
away, along with everything it got wrong, and so does the magic around
LOOKUP_NO_REVAL.
Another source of bugs is that when we traverse mounts at the final
location (and we need to do that - umount . expects to get whatever's
overmounting ., if any, out of the lookup) we really ought to take
care of ->d_manage() - as it is, manual umount of autofs automount
in progress can lead to unpleasant surprises for the daemon. Easily
solved by using handle_lookup_down() instead of follow_mount().
Tested-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
If we pass back dependent work in case of links, we need to always
ensure that we call the link setup and work prep handler. If not, we
might be missing some setup for the next work item.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we require mm and user context, mark the request for cancellation
if we fail to acquire the desired mm.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Merge misc fixes from David Howells.
Two afs fixes and a key refcounting fix.
* dhowells:
afs: Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version on a new dentry
afs: Fix use-after-loss-of-ref
keys: Fix request_key() cache
|
|
Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version set on a new dentry by
afs_do_lookup() - especially as it's using the wrong version of the
version (we need to use the one given to us by whatever op the dir
contents correspond to rather than what's in the afs_vnode).
Fixes: 9dd0b82ef530 ("afs: Fix missing dentry data version updating")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
afs_lookup() has a tracepoint to indicate the outcome of
d_splice_alias(), passing it the inode to retrieve the fid from.
However, the function gave up its ref on that inode when it called
d_splice_alias(), which may have failed and dropped the inode.
Fix this by caching the fid.
Fixes: 80548b03991f ("afs: Add more tracepoints")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
API to set time namespace offsets for children processes, i.e.:
echo "$clockid $offset_sec $offset_nsec" > /proc/self/timens_offsets
Co-developed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-28-dima@arista.com
|
|
Make sure that /proc/uptime is adjusted to the tasks time namespace.
Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-19-dima@arista.com
|
|
timerfd_settime() accepts an absolute value of the expiration time if
TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME is specified. This value is in the task's time namespace
and has to be converted to the host's time namespace.
Co-developed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-14-dima@arista.com
|
|
Time Namespace isolates clock values.
The kernel provides access to several clocks CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, etc.
CLOCK_REALTIME
System-wide clock that measures real (i.e., wall-clock) time.
CLOCK_MONOTONIC
Clock that cannot be set and represents monotonic time since
some unspecified starting point.
CLOCK_BOOTTIME
Identical to CLOCK_MONOTONIC, except it also includes any time
that the system is suspended.
For many users, the time namespace means the ability to changes date and
time in a container (CLOCK_REALTIME). Providing per namespace notions of
CLOCK_REALTIME would be complex with a massive overhead, but has a dubious
value.
But in the context of checkpoint/restore functionality, monotonic and
boottime clocks become interesting. Both clocks are monotonic with
unspecified starting points. These clocks are widely used to measure time
slices and set timers. After restoring or migrating processes, it has to be
guaranteed that they never go backward. In an ideal case, the behavior of
these clocks should be the same as for a case when a whole system is
suspended. All this means that it is required to set CLOCK_MONOTONIC and
CLOCK_BOOTTIME clocks, which can be achieved by adding per-namespace
offsets for clocks.
A time namespace is similar to a pid namespace in the way how it is
created: unshare(CLONE_NEWTIME) system call creates a new time namespace,
but doesn't set it to the current process. Then all children of the process
will be born in the new time namespace, or a process can use the setns()
system call to join a namespace.
This scheme allows setting clock offsets for a namespace, before any
processes appear in it.
All available clone flags have been used, so CLONE_NEWTIME uses the highest
bit of CSIGNAL. It means that it can be used only with the unshare() and
the clone3() system calls.
[ tglx: Adjusted paragraph about clone3() to reality and massaged the
changelog a bit. ]
Co-developed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://criu.org/Time_namespace
Link: https://lists.openvz.org/pipermail/criu/2018-June/041504.html
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-4-dima@arista.com
|
|
We don't need it, and if we have it, then the retry handler will attempt
to copy the non-existent iovec with the inline iovec, with a segment
count that doesn't make sense.
Fixes: f67676d160c6 ("io_uring: ensure async punted read/write requests copy iovec")
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
[BUG]
There are several different KASAN reports for balance + snapshot
workloads. Involved call paths include:
should_ignore_root+0x54/0xb0 [btrfs]
build_backref_tree+0x11af/0x2280 [btrfs]
relocate_tree_blocks+0x391/0xb80 [btrfs]
relocate_block_group+0x3e5/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x240/0x4d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x53/0xf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_balance+0xc91/0x1840 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x416/0x4e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x8af/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
create_reloc_root+0x9f/0x460 [btrfs]
btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot+0xff/0x6c0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0xa9b/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot+0x85/0xc0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0x209/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
[CAUSE]
All these call sites are only relying on root->reloc_root, which can
undergo btrfs_drop_snapshot(), and since we don't have real refcount
based protection to reloc roots, we can reach already dropped reloc
root, triggering KASAN.
[FIX]
To avoid such access to unstable root->reloc_root, we should check
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit first.
This patch introduces wrappers that provide the correct way to check the
bit with memory barriers protection.
Most callers don't distinguish merged reloc tree and no reloc tree. The
only exception is should_ignore_root(), as merged reloc tree can be
ignored, while no reloc tree shouldn't.
[CRITICAL SECTION ANALYSIS]
Although test_bit()/set_bit()/clear_bit() doesn't imply a barrier, the
DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit has extra help from transaction as a higher level
barrier, the lifespan of root::reloc_root and DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit are:
NULL: reloc_root is NULL PTR: reloc_root is not NULL
0: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit not set DEAD: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit set
(NULL, 0) Initial state __
| /\ Section A
btrfs_init_reloc_root() \/
| __
(PTR, 0) reloc_root initialized /\
| |
btrfs_update_reloc_root() | Section B
| |
(PTR, DEAD) reloc_root has been merged \/
| __
=== btrfs_commit_transaction() ====================
| /\
clean_dirty_subvols() |
| | Section C
(NULL, DEAD) reloc_root cleanup starts \/
| __
btrfs_drop_snapshot() /\
| | Section D
(NULL, 0) Back to initial state \/
Every have_reloc_root() or test_bit(DEAD_RELOC_ROOT) caller holds
transaction handle, so none of such caller can cross transaction boundary.
In Section A, every caller just found no DEAD bit, and grab reloc_root.
In the cross section A-B, caller may get no DEAD bit, but since reloc_root
is still completely valid thus accessing reloc_root is completely safe.
No test_bit() caller can cross the boundary of Section B and Section C.
In Section C, every caller found the DEAD bit, so no one will access
reloc_root.
In the cross section C-D, either caller gets the DEAD bit set, avoiding
access reloc_root no matter if it's safe or not. Or caller get the DEAD
bit cleared, then access reloc_root, which is already NULL, nothing will
be wrong.
The memory write barriers are between the reloc_root updates and bit
set/clear, the pairing read side is before test_bit.
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Fixes: d2311e698578 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ barriers ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc fix from Greg KH:
"Here is a single fix, for the chrdev core, for 5.5-rc6
There's been a long-standing race condition triggered by syzbot, and
occasionally real people, in the chrdev open() path. Will finally took
the time to track it down and fix it for real before the holidays.
Here's that one patch, it's been in linux-next for a while with no
reported issues and it does fix the reported problem"
* tag 'char-misc-5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
chardev: Avoid potential use-after-free in 'chrdev_open()'
|
|
Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A few fixes that should go into this round.
This pull request contains two NVMe fixes via Keith, removal of a dead
function, and a fix for the bio op for read truncates (Ming)"
* tag 'block-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
nvmet: fix per feat data len for get_feature
nvme: Translate more status codes to blk_status_t
fs: move guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs
block: remove unused mp_bvec_last_segment
|
|
Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"Single fix for this series, fixing a regression with the short read
handling.
This just removes it, as it cannot safely be done for all cases"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: remove punt of short reads to async context
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull pstore fix from Kees Cook:
"Cengiz Can forwarded a Coverity report about more problems with a rare
pstore initialization error path, so the allocation lifetime was
rearranged to avoid needing to share the kfree() responsibilities
between caller and callee"
* tag 'pstore-v5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
pstore/ram: Regularize prz label allocation lifetime
|
|
Commit 85a8ce62c2ea ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
adds bio_truncate() for handling bio EOD. However, bio_truncate()
doesn't use the passed 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod's callers.
So bio_trunacate() may retrieve wrong 'op', and zering pages may
not be done for READ bio.
Fixes this issue by moving guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs()
in submit_bh_wbc() so that bio_truncate() can always retrieve correct
op info.
Meantime remove the 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod() because it isn't
used any more.
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85a8ce62c2ea ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Fold in kerneldoc and bio_op() change.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
In my attempt to fix a memory leak, I introduced a double-free in the
pstore error path. Instead of trying to manage the allocation lifetime
between persistent_ram_new() and its callers, adjust the logic so
persistent_ram_new() always takes a kstrdup() copy, and leaves the
caller's allocation lifetime up to the caller. Therefore callers are
_always_ responsible for freeing their label. Before, it only needed
freeing when the prz itself failed to allocate, and not in any of the
other prz failure cases, which callers would have no visibility into,
which is the root design problem that lead to both the leak and now
double-free bugs.
Reported-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz@kernel.wtf>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d4ec59002ede4aaf9928c7f7526da87c@kernel.wtf
Fixes: 8df955a32a73 ("pstore/ram: Fix error-path memory leak in persistent_ram_new() callers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
When running xfstests on the current btrfs I get the following splat from
kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88821b2404e0 (size 32):
comm "kworker/u4:7", pid 26663, jiffies 4295283698 (age 8.776s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...........&....
10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff 20 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...&.... ..&....
backtrace:
[<00000000f94fd43f>] ulist_alloc+0x25/0x60 [btrfs]
[<00000000fd023d99>] btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41/0x100 [btrfs]
[<000000008f17bd32>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x52/0x70 [btrfs]
[<00000000b7660afb>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x343/0x680 [btrfs]
[<0000000058e66778>] btrfs_work_helper+0xac/0x1e0 [btrfs]
[<00000000f0188930>] process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
[<00000000af5f2f8e>] worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
[<00000000b55a1add>] kthread+0x109/0x120
[<00000000f88cbd17>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
This corresponds to:
(gdb) l *(btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41)
0x8d7e1 is in btrfs_find_all_roots_safe (fs/btrfs/backref.c:1413).
1408
1409 tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
1410 if (!tmp)
1411 return -ENOMEM;
1412 *roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
1413 if (!*roots) {
1414 ulist_free(tmp);
1415 return -ENOMEM;
1416 }
1417
Following the lifetime of the allocated 'roots' ulist, it gets freed
again in btrfs_qgroup_account_extent().
But this does not happen if the function is called with the
'BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED' flag cleared, then btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
does a short leave and directly returns.
Instead of directly returning we should jump to the 'out_free' in order to
free all resources as expected.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
[ add comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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