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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull copy_struct_to_user helper from Christian Brauner:
"This adds a copy_struct_to_user() helper which is a companion helper
to the already widely used copy_struct_from_user().
It copies a struct from kernel space to userspace, in a way that
guarantees backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments as
long as future struct extensions are made such that all new fields are
appended to the old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same
meaning as the old struct.
The first user is sched_getattr() system call but the new extensible
pidfs ioctl will be ported to it as well"
* tag 'vfs-6.13.usercopy' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
sched_getattr: port to copy_struct_to_user
uaccess: add copy_struct_to_user helper
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The barrier_nospec() in 64-bit copy_from_user() is slow. Instead use
pointer masking to force the user pointer to all 1's for an invalid
address.
The kernel test robot reports a 2.6% improvement in the per_thread_ops
benchmark [1].
This is a variation on a patch originally by Josh Poimboeuf [2].
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/202410281344.d02c72a2-oliver.sang@intel.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/5b887fe4c580214900e21f6c61095adf9a142735.1730166635.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org [2]
Tested-and-reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is based on copy_struct_from_user(), but there is one additional
case to consider when creating a syscall that returns an
extensible-struct to userspace -- how should data in the struct that
cannot fit into the userspace struct be handled (ksize > usize)?
There are three possibilies:
1. The interface is like sched_getattr(2), where new information will
be silently not provided to userspace. This is probably what most
interfaces will want to do, as it provides the most possible
backwards-compatibility.
2. The interface is like lsm_list_modules(2), where you want to return
an error like -EMSGSIZE if not providing information could result in
the userspace program making a serious mistake (such as one that
could lead to a security problem) or if you want to provide some
flag to userspace so they know that they are missing some
information.
3. The interface is like statx(2), where there some kind of a request
mask that indicates what data userspace would like. One could
imagine that statx2(2) (using extensible structs) would want to
return -EMSGSIZE if the user explicitly requested a field that their
structure is too small to fit, but not return an error if the field
was not explicitly requested. This is kind of a mix between (1) and
(2) based on the requested mask.
The copy_struct_to_user() helper includes a an extra argument that is
used to return a boolean flag indicating whether there was a non-zero
byte in the trailing bytes that were not copied to userspace. This can
be used in the following ways to handle all three cases, respectively:
1. Just pass NULL, as you don't care about this case.
2. Return an error (say -EMSGSIZE) if the argument was set to true by
copy_struct_to_user().
3. If the argument was set to true by copy_struct_to_user(), check if
there is a flag that implies a field larger than usize.
This is the only case where callers of copy_struct_to_user() should
check usize themselves. This will probably require scanning an array
that specifies what flags were added for each version of the flags
struct and returning an error if the request mask matches any of the
flags that were added in versions of the struct that are larger than
usize.
At the moment we don't have any users of (3), so this patch doesn't
include any helpers to make the necessary scanning easier, but it should
be fairly easy to add some if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010-extensible-structs-check_fields-v3-1-d2833dfe6edd@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Merge user access fast validation using address masking.
This allows architectures to optionally use a data dependent address
masking model instead of a conditional branch for validating user
accesses. That avoids the Spectre-v1 speculation barriers.
Right now only x86-64 takes advantage of this, and not all architectures
will be able to do it. It requires a guard region between the user and
kernel address spaces (so that you can't overflow from one to the
other), and an easy way to generate a guaranteed-to-fault address for
invalid user pointers.
Also note that this currently assumes that there is no difference
between user read and write accesses. If extended to architectures like
powerpc, we'll also need to separate out the user read-vs-write cases.
* address-masking:
x86: make the masked_user_access_begin() macro use its argument only once
x86: do the user address masking outside the user access area
x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional
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The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since
it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address.
All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user
address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast
"unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast
case got slowed down.
This introduces a notion of using
src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the
more traditional conditional
if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) {
model.
This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on
architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in
between the user space and the kernel space area.
With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because
a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking
trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into
all ones, since we don't map the top of address space).
This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code
generation for loading two words from user space:
stac
mov %rax,%rcx
sar $0x3f,%rcx
or %rax,%rcx
mov (%rcx),%r13
mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14
clac
where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of
line by the exception path.
Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac',
the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we
could.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Rust code needs to be able to access _copy_from_user and _copy_to_user
so that it can skip the check_copy_size check in cases where the length
is known at compile-time, mirroring the logic for when C code will skip
check_copy_size. To do this, we ensure that exported versions of these
methods are available when CONFIG_RUST is enabled.
Alice has verified that this patch passes the CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY test
on x86 using the Android cuttlefish emulator.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528-alice-mm-v7-2-78222c31b8f4@google.com
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
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untagged_addr() removes tags/metadata from the address and brings it to
the canonical form. The helper is implemented on arm64 and sparc. Both of
them do untagging based on global rules.
However, Linear Address Masking (LAM) on x86 introduces per-process
settings for untagging. As a result, untagged_addr() is now only
suitable for untagging addresses for the current proccess.
The new helper untagged_addr_remote() has to be used when the address
targets remote process. It requires the mmap lock for target mm to be
taken.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230312112612.31869-6-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
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While there is logic about the difference between ksize and usize,
copy_struct_from_user() didn't check the size of the destination buffer
(when it was known) against ksize. Add this check so there is an upper
bounds check on the possible memset() call, otherwise lower bounds
checks made by callers will trigger bounds warnings under -Warray-bounds.
Seen under GCC 13:
In function 'copy_struct_from_user',
inlined from 'iommufd_fops_ioctl' at
../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:333:8:
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:59:33: warning: '__builtin_memset' offset [57, 4294967294] is out of the bounds [0, 56] of object 'buf' with type 'union ucmd_buffer' [-Warray-bounds=]
59 | #define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
| ^
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:453:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memset'
453 | __underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size); \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:461:25: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memset_chk'
461 | #define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s, \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/uaccess.h:334:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memset'
334 | memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
| ^~~~~~
../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c: In function 'iommufd_fops_ioctl':
../drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:311:27: note: 'buf' declared here
311 | union ucmd_buffer buf;
| ^~~
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230203193523.never.667-kees@kernel.org/
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Introduce instrument_copy_from_user_before() and
instrument_copy_from_user_after() hooks to be invoked before and after the
call to copy_from_user().
KASAN and KCSAN will be only using instrument_copy_from_user_before(), but
for KMSAN we'll need to insert code after copy_from_user().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-4-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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it's inline and unlikely() inside of it (including the implicit one
in WARN_ON_ONCE()) suffice to convince the compiler that getting
false from check_copy_size() is unlikely.
Spotted-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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On hardware with features like arm64 MTE or SPARC ADI, an access fault
can be triggered at sub-page granularity. Depending on how the
fault_in_writeable() function is used, the caller can get into a
live-lock by continuously retrying the fault-in on an address different
from the one where the uaccess failed.
In the majority of cases progress is ensured by the following
conditions:
1. copy_to_user_nofault() guarantees at least one byte access if the
user address is not faulting.
2. The fault_in_writeable() loop is resumed from the first address that
could not be accessed by copy_to_user_nofault().
If the loop iteration is restarted from an earlier (initial) point, the
loop is repeated with the same conditions and it would live-lock.
Introduce an arch-specific probe_subpage_writeable() and call it from
the newly added fault_in_subpage_writeable() function. The arch code
with sub-page faults will have to implement the specific probing
functionality.
Note that no other fault_in_subpage_*() functions are added since they
have no callers currently susceptible to a live-lock.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220423100751.1870771-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"There are three sets of updates for 5.18 in the asm-generic tree:
- The set_fs()/get_fs() infrastructure gets removed for good.
This was already gone from all major architectures, but now we can
finally remove it everywhere, which loses some particularly tricky
and error-prone code. There is a small merge conflict against a
parisc cleanup, the solution is to use their new version.
- The nds32 architecture ends its tenure in the Linux kernel.
The hardware is still used and the code is in reasonable shape, but
the mainline port is not actively maintained any more, as all
remaining users are thought to run vendor kernels that would never
be updated to a future release.
- A series from Masahiro Yamada cleans up some of the uapi header
files to pass the compile-time checks"
* tag 'asm-generic-5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: (27 commits)
nds32: Remove the architecture
uaccess: remove CONFIG_SET_FS
ia64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sh: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces
uaccess: generalize access_ok()
uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok()
arm64: simplify access_ok()
m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire
MIPS: use simpler access_ok()
MIPS: Handle address errors for accesses above CPU max virtual user address
uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user()
x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
x86: remove __range_not_ok()
sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nofault()
nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user
uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8()
sparc64: fix building assembly files
...
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Users of usercopy_warn() were removed by commit 53944f171a89 ("mm:
remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK")
Remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f26643fc70b05f8455b60b99c30c17d635fa640.1644231910.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Reviewed-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There are no remaining callers of set_fs(), so CONFIG_SET_FS
can be removed globally, along with the thread_info field and
any references to it.
This turns access_ok() into a cheaper check against TASK_SIZE_MAX.
As CONFIG_SET_FS is now gone, drop all remaining references to
set_fs()/get_fs(), mm_segment_t, user_addr_max() and uaccess_kernel().
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> # for sparc32 changes
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@synopsys.com> # for arc changes
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> # [openrisc, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
of uaccess_kernel() sections.
For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Nine architectures are still missing __{get,put}_kernel_nofault:
alpha, ia64, microblaze, nds32, nios2, openrisc, sh, sparc32, xtensa.
Add a generic version that lets everything use the normal
copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault() code based on these, removing the last
use of get_fs()/set_fs() from architecture-independent code.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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All users of compat_alloc_user_space() and copy_in_user() have been
removed from the kernel, only a few functions in sparc remain that can be
changed to calling arch_copy_in_user() instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-7-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In the same way as commit 14026b94ccfe ("signal: Add
unsafe_put_compat_sigset()"), this time add
unsafe_get_compat_sigset() macro which is the 'unsafe'
version of get_compat_sigset()
For the bigendian, use unsafe_get_user() directly
to avoid intermediate copy through the stack.
For the littleendian, use a straight unsafe_copy_from_user().
This commit adds the generic fallback for unsafe_copy_from_user().
Architectures wanting to use unsafe_get_compat_sigset() have to
make sure they have their own unsafe_copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b05bf434ee13c76bc9df5f02653a10db5e7b54e5.1616151715.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull more RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
"Just a single patch set: the remainder of Christoph's work to remove
set_fs, including the RISC-V portion"
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
riscv: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault
riscv: refactor __get_user and __put_user
riscv: use memcpy based uaccess for nommu again
asm-generic: make the set_fs implementation optional
asm-generic: add nommu implementations of __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
asm-generic: improve the nommu {get,put}_user handling
uaccess: provide a generic TASK_SIZE_MAX definition
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull initial set_fs() removal from Al Viro:
"Christoph's set_fs base series + fixups"
* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_read
fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_write
powerpc: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines
x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
x86: make TASK_SIZE_MAX usable from assembly code
x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE & friends to page_{32,64}_types.h
lkdtm: remove set_fs-based tests
test_bitmap: remove user bitmap tests
uaccess: add infrastructure for kernel builds with set_fs()
fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops
fs: don't allow kernel reads and writes without iter ops
sysctl: Convert to iter interfaces
proc: add a read_iter method to proc proc_ops
proc: cleanup the compat vs no compat file ops
proc: remove a level of indentation in proc_get_inode
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To test fault-tolerance of user memory access functions, introduce fault
injection to usercopy functions.
If a failure is expected return either -EFAULT or the total amount of
bytes that were not copied.
Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-3-alinde@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time.
Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out min()/max()
et al. helpers.
At the same time convert users in header and lib folder to use new header.
Though for time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid
twisted indirected includes for other existing users.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910164152.GA1891694@smile.fi.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In reaction to a proposal to introduce a memcpy_mcsafe_fast()
implementation Linus points out that memcpy_mcsafe() is poorly named
relative to communicating the scope of the interface. Specifically what
addresses are valid to pass as source, destination, and what faults /
exceptions are handled.
Of particular concern is that even though x86 might be able to handle
the semantics of copy_mc_to_user() with its common copy_user_generic()
implementation other archs likely need / want an explicit path for this
case:
On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 11:28 AM Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 6:21 PM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > However now I see that copy_user_generic() works for the wrong reason.
> > It works because the exception on the source address due to poison
> > looks no different than a write fault on the user address to the
> > caller, it's still just a short copy. So it makes copy_to_user() work
> > for the wrong reason relative to the name.
>
> Right.
>
> And it won't work that way on other architectures. On x86, we have a
> generic function that can take faults on either side, and we use it
> for both cases (and for the "in_user" case too), but that's an
> artifact of the architecture oddity.
>
> In fact, it's probably wrong even on x86 - because it can hide bugs -
> but writing those things is painful enough that everybody prefers
> having just one function.
Replace a single top-level memcpy_mcsafe() with either
copy_mc_to_user(), or copy_mc_to_kernel().
Introduce an x86 copy_mc_fragile() name as the rename for the
low-level x86 implementation formerly named memcpy_mcsafe(). It is used
as the slow / careful backend that is supplanted by a fast
copy_mc_generic() in a follow-on patch.
One side-effect of this reorganization is that separating copy_mc_64.S
to its own file means that perf no longer needs to track dependencies
for its memcpy_64.S benchmarks.
[ bp: Massage a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjSqtXAqfUJxFtWNwmguFASTgB0dz1dT3V-78Quiezqbg@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160195561680.2163339.11574962055305783722.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Define TASK_SIZE_MAX as TASK_SIZE if not otherwise defined.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
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Add a CONFIG_SET_FS option that is selected by architecturess that
implement set_fs, which is all of them initially. If the option is not
set stubs for routines related to overriding the address space are
provided so that architectures can start to opt out of providing set_fs.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Add helpers to wrap the get_fs/set_fs magic for undoing any damange done
by set_fs(KERNEL_DS). There is no real functional benefit, but this
documents the intent of these calls better, and will allow stubbing the
functions out easily for kernels builds that do not allow address space
overrides in the future.
[hch@lst.de: drop two incorrect hunks, fix a commit log typo]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200714105505.935079-6-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-6-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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segment_eq is only used to implement uaccess_kernel. Just open code
uaccess_kernel in the arch uaccess headers and remove one layer of
indirection.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Now that we've renamed probe_kernel_address() to get_kernel_nofault()
and made it look and behave more in line with get_user(), some of the
subtle type behavior differences end up being more obvious and possibly
dangerous.
When you do
get_user(val, user_ptr);
the type of the access comes from the "user_ptr" part, and the above
basically acts as
val = *user_ptr;
by design (except, of course, for the fact that the actual dereference
is done with a user access).
Note how in the above case, the type of the end result comes from the
pointer argument, and then the value is cast to the type of 'val' as
part of the assignment.
So the type of the pointer is ultimately the more important type both
for the access itself.
But 'get_kernel_nofault()' may now _look_ similar, but it behaves very
differently. When you do
get_kernel_nofault(val, kernel_ptr);
it behaves like
val = *(typeof(val) *)kernel_ptr;
except, of course, for the fact that the actual dereference is done with
exception handling so that a faulting access is suppressed and returned
as the error code.
But note how different the casting behavior of the two superficially
similar accesses are: one does the actual access in the size of the type
the pointer points to, while the other does the access in the size of
the target, and ignores the pointer type entirely.
Actually changing get_kernel_nofault() to act like get_user() is almost
certainly the right thing to do eventually, but in the meantime this
patch adds logit to at least verify that the pointer type is compatible
with the type of the result.
In many cases, this involves just casting the pointer to 'void *' to
make it obvious that the type of the pointer is not the important part.
It's not how 'get_user()' acts, but at least the behavioral difference
is now obvious and explicit.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Better describe what this helper does, and match the naming of
copy_from_kernel_nofault.
Also switch the argument order around, so that it acts and looks
like get_user().
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Better describe what these functions do.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Better describe what these functions do.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge the state of the locking kcsan branch before the read/write_once()
and the atomics modifications got merged.
Squash the fallout of the rebase on top of the read/write once and atomic
fallback work into the merge. The history of the original branch is
preserved in tag locking-kcsan-2020-06-02.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Except for historical confusion in the kprobes/uprobes and bpf tracers,
which has been fixed now, there is no good reason to ever allow user
memory accesses from probe_kernel_read. Switch probe_kernel_read to only
read from kernel memory.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update it for "mm, dump_page(): do not crash with invalid mapping pointer"]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-17-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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All users are gone now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-16-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently architectures have to override every routine that probes
kernel memory, which includes a pure read and strcpy, both in strict
and not strict variants. Just provide a single arch hooks instead to
make sure all architectures cover all the cases.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix !CONFIG_X86_64 build]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This matches the naming of strnlen_user, and also makes it more clear
what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-9-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This matches the naming of strncpy_from_user_nofault, and also makes it
more clear what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-8-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This matches the naming of strncpy_from_user, and also makes it more
clear what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-7-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Many of the maccess routines have a copy of the kerneldoc comment
in the header. Remove it as it is not useful and will get out of
sync sooner or later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-4-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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maccess tends to define lots of underscore prefixed symbols that then
have other weak aliases. But except for two cases they are never
actually used, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Some architectures like powerpc64 have the capability to separate
read access and write access protection.
For get_user() and copy_from_user(), powerpc64 only open read access.
For put_user() and copy_to_user(), powerpc64 only open write access.
But when using unsafe_get_user() or unsafe_put_user(),
user_access_begin open both read and write.
Other architectures like powerpc book3s 32 bits only allow write
access protection. And on this architecture protection is an heavy
operation as it requires locking/unlocking per segment of 256Mbytes.
On those architecture it is therefore desirable to do the unlocking
only for write access. (Note that book3s/32 ranges from very old
powermac from the 90's with powerpc 601 processor, till modern
ADSL boxes with PowerQuicc II processors for instance so it
is still worth considering.)
In order to avoid any risk based of hacking some variable parameters
passed to user_access_begin/end that would allow hacking and
leaving user access open or opening too much, it is preferable to
use dedicated static functions that can't be overridden.
Add a user_read_access_begin and user_read_access_end to only open
read access.
Add a user_write_access_begin and user_write_access_end to only open
write access.
By default, when undefined, those new access helpers default on the
existing user_access_begin and user_access_end.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36e43241c7f043a24b5069e78c6a7edd11043be5.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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This replaces the KASAN instrumentation with generic instrumentation,
implicitly adding KCSAN instrumentation support.
For KASAN no functional change is intended.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict()
helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the
__strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs
which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user
space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user
memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:
4-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff
5-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff
The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read()
and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added
helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.
Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also
explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from
00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address
dereferences").
For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
left as-is.
[0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
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Commit 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions")
missed to add probe write function, therefore factor out a probe_write_common()
helper with most logic of probe_kernel_write() except setting KERNEL_DS, and
add a new probe_user_write() helper so it can be used from BPF side.
Again, on some archs, the user address space and kernel address space can
co-exist and be overlapping, so in such case, setting KERNEL_DS would mean
that the given address is treated as being in kernel address space.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9df2542e68141bfa3addde631441ee45503856a8.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
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In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a
struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields
result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and
kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases).
While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only
one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for
(userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to
userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an
error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very
syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls
(a good example of this problem is [1]).
Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented
the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls
implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future
patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of
copy_struct_from_user().
Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and
various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage.
[1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and
robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code")
[2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do
similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2)
always rejects differently-sized struct arguments.
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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The usercopy implementation comments describe that callers of the
copy_*_user() family of functions must always have their return values
checked. This can be enforced at compile time with __must_check, so add
it where needed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251609.ADAD5CAAC1@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Declare a prototype of non-static __probe_user_read() as
same as __probe_kernel_read() at uaccess.h.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and
strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space
in IRQ context.
Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
not available for user-space memory, because it sets
KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address
space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others
can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given
address is treated as a kernel address space.
Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since
it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.
To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need
these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing
the data.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() assumes that the access_ok() and following
user memory access can sleep. But this assumption is not
always correct; when the pagefault is disabled, following
memory access will just returns -EFAULT and never sleep.
Add pagefault_disabled() check in WARN_ON_ONCE() so that
it can ignore the case we call it with disabling pagefault.
For this purpose, this modified pagefault_disabled() as
an inline function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789868664.26965.7932665824135793317.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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