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2018-10-31kernel/panic.c: filter out a potential trailing newlineBorislav Petkov
If a call to panic() terminates the string with a \n , the result puts the closing brace ']---' on a newline because panic() itself adds \n too. Now, if one goes and removes the newline chars from all panic() invocations - and the stats right now look like this: ~300 calls with a \n ~500 calls without a \n one is destined to a neverending game of whack-a-mole because the usual thing to do is add a newline at the end of a string a function is supposed to print. Therefore, simply zap any \n at the end of the panic string to avoid touching so many places in the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181009205019.2786-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-31kernel/panic.c: do not append newline to the stack protector panic stringBorislav Petkov
... because panic() itself already does this. Otherwise you have line-broken trailer: [ 1.836965] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: pgd_alloc+0x29e/0x2a0 [ 1.836965] ]--- Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008202901.7894-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variablesLinus Torvalds
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11taint: add taint for randstructKees Cook
Since the randstruct plugin can intentionally produce extremely unusual kernel structure layouts (even performance pathological ones), some maintainers want to be able to trivially determine if an Oops is coming from a randstruct-built kernel, so as to keep their sanity when debugging. This adds the new flag and initializes taint_mask immediately when built with randstruct. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11taint: consolidate documentationKees Cook
This consolidates the taint bit documentation into a single place with both numeric and letter values. Additionally adds the missing TAINT_AUX documentation. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11taint: convert to indexed initializationKees Cook
This converts to using indexed initializers instead of comments, adds a comment on why the taint flags can't be an enum, and make sure that no one forgets to update the taint_flags when adding new bits. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10Merge tag 'trace-v4.17' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt: "New features: - Tom Zanussi's extended histogram work. This adds the synthetic events to have histograms from multiple event data Adds triggers "onmatch" and "onmax" to call the synthetic events Several updates to the histogram code from this - Allow way to nest ring buffer calls in the same context - Allow absolute time stamps in ring buffer - Rewrite of filter code parsing based on Al Viro's suggestions - Setting of trace_clock to global if TSC is unstable (on boot) - Better OOM handling when allocating large ring buffers - Added initcall tracepoints (consolidated initcall_debug code with them) And other various fixes and clean ups" * tag 'trace-v4.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (68 commits) init: Have initcall_debug still work without CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS init, tracing: Have printk come through the trace events for initcall_debug init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events init, tracing: Add initcall trace events tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for test func that touches filter->prog tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for filter->prog tracing: Fixup logic inversion on setting trace_global_clock defaults tracing: Hide global trace clock from lockdep ring-buffer: Add set/clear_current_oom_origin() during allocations ring-buffer: Check if memory is available before allocation lockdep: Add print_irqtrace_events() to __warn vsprintf: Do not preprocess non-dereferenced pointers for bprintf (%px and %pK) tracing: Uninitialized variable in create_tracing_map_fields() tracing: Make sure variable string fields are NULL-terminated tracing: Add action comparisons when testing matching hist triggers tracing: Don't add flag strings when displaying variable references tracing: Fix display of hist trigger expressions containing timestamps ftrace: Drop a VLA in module_exists() tracing: Mention trace_clock=global when warning about unstable clocks tracing: Default to using trace_global_clock if sched_clock is unstable ...
2018-04-06lockdep: Add print_irqtrace_events() to __warnSteven Rostedt (VMware)
Running a test on a x86_32 kernel I triggered a bug that an interrupt disable/enable isn't being catched by lockdep. At least knowing where the last one was found would be helpful, but the warnings that are produced do not show this information. Even without debugging lockdep, having the WARN() display the last place hard and soft irqs were enabled or disabled is valuable. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2018-04-02Merge branch 'core-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull misc core updates from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes: - add membarriers to Documentation/features/ - fix a minor nit in panic printk formatting" * 'core-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: panic: Add closing panic marker parenthesis Documentation/features, membarriers: Document membarrier-sync-core architecture support Documentation/features: Allow comments in arch features files
2018-03-09bug: use %pB in BUG and stack protector failureKees Cook
The BUG and stack protector reports were still using a raw %p. This changes it to %pB for more meaningful output. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180301225704.GA34198@beast Fixes: ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>, Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-03-08panic: Add closing panic marker parenthesisBorislav Petkov
Otherwise it looks unbalanced. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306094920.16917-2-bp@alien8.de
2017-11-17kernel/panic.c: add TAINT_AUXBorislav Petkov
This is the gist of a patch which we've been forward-porting in our kernels for a long time now and it probably would make a good sense to have such TAINT_AUX flag upstream which can be used by each distro etc, how they see fit. This way, we won't need to forward-port a distro-only version indefinitely. Add an auxiliary taint flag to be used by distros and others. This obviates the need to forward-port whatever internal solutions people have in favor of a single flag which they can map arbitrarily to a definition of their pleasing. The "X" mnemonic could also mean eXternal, which would be taint from a distro or something else but not the upstream kernel. We will use it to mark modules for which we don't provide support. I.e., a really eXternal module. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170911134533.dp5mtyku5bongx4c@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17bug: fix "cut here" location for __WARN_TAINT architecturesKees Cook
Prior to v4.11, x86 used warn_slowpath_fmt() for handling WARN()s. After WARN() was moved to using UD0 on x86, the warning text started appearing _before_ the "cut here" line. This appears to have been a long-standing bug on architectures that used __WARN_TAINT, but it didn't get fixed. v4.11 and earlier on x86: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2956 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:65 lkdtm_WARNING+0x21/0x30 This is a warning message Modules linked in: v4.12 and later on x86: This is a warning message ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2982 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:68 lkdtm_WARNING+0x15/0x20 Modules linked in: With this fix: ------------[ cut here ]------------ This is a warning message WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3009 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:67 lkdtm_WARNING+0x15/0x20 Since the __FILE__ reporting happens as part of the UD0 handler, it isn't trivial to move the message to after the WARNING line, but at least we can fix the position of the "cut here" line so all the various logging tools will start including the actual runtime warning message again, when they follow the instruction and "cut here". Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510100869-73751-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 9a93848fe787 ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17bug: define the "cut here" string in a single placeKees Cook
The "cut here" string is used in a few paths. Define it in a single place. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510100869-73751-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17kernel debug: support resetting WARN_ONCE for all architecturesAndi Kleen
Some architectures store the WARN_ONCE state in the flags field of the bug_entry. Clear that one too when resetting once state through /sys/kernel/debug/clear_warn_once Pointed out by Michael Ellerman Improves the earlier patch that add clear_warn_once. [ak@linux.intel.com: add a missing ifdef CONFIG_MODULES] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020170633.9593-1-andi@firstfloor.org [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: Use 0200 for clear_warn_once file, per mpe] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: clear BUGFLAG_DONE in clear_once_table(), per mpe] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171019204642.7404-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17kernel debug: support resetting WARN*_ONCEAndi Kleen
I like _ONCE warnings because it's guaranteed that they don't flood the log. During testing I find it useful to reset the state of the once warnings, so that I can rerun tests and see if they trigger again, or can guarantee that a test run always hits the same warnings. This patch adds a debugfs interface to reset all the _ONCE warnings so that they appear again: echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/clear_warn_once This is implemented by putting all the warning booleans into a special section, and clearing it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171017221455.6740-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-08-17locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protectionKees Cook
This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely. Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable: http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016 This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent. On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated). On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine. Example assembly comparison: refcount_inc() before: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) refcount_inc() after: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3 ... .text.unlikely: ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad) These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast): 2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s: cycles protections atomic_t 82249267387 none refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar
<linux/sched/debug.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/debug.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-23sparc64: Send break twice from console to return to boot promVijay Kumar
Now we can also jump to boot prom from sunhv console by sending break twice on console for both running and panicked kernel cases. Signed-off-by: Vijay Kumar <vijay.ac.kumar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-22Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk Pull printk updates from Petr Mladek: - Add Petr Mladek, Sergey Senozhatsky as printk maintainers, and Steven Rostedt as the printk reviewer. This idea came up after the discussion about printk issues at Kernel Summit. It was formulated and discussed at lkml[1]. - Extend a lock-less NMI per-cpu buffers idea to handle recursive printk() calls by Sergey Senozhatsky[2]. It is the first step in sanitizing printk as discussed at Kernel Summit. The change allows to see messages that would normally get ignored or would cause a deadlock. Also it allows to enable lockdep in printk(). This already paid off. The testing in linux-next helped to discover two old problems that were hidden before[3][4]. - Remove unused parameter by Sergey Senozhatsky. Clean up after a past change. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481798878-31898-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161227141611.940-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com [3] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170215044332.30449-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com [4] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217015932.11898-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk: printk: drop call_console_drivers() unused param printk: convert the rest to printk-safe printk: remove zap_locks() function printk: use printk_safe buffers in printk printk: report lost messages in printk safe/nmi contexts printk: always use deferred printk when flush printk_safe lines printk: introduce per-cpu safe_print seq buffer printk: rename nmi.c and exported api printk: use vprintk_func in vprintk() MAINTAINERS: Add printk maintainers
2017-02-08printk: rename nmi.c and exported apiSergey Senozhatsky
A preparation patch for printk_safe work. No functional change. - rename nmi.c to print_safe.c - add `printk_safe' prefix to some (which used both by printk-safe and printk-nmi) of the exported functions. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161227141611.940-3-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2017-01-24kernel/panic.c: add missing \nJiri Slaby
When a system panics, the "Rebooting in X seconds.." message is never printed because it lacks a new line. Fix it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170119114751.2724-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-01-17taint/module: Fix problems when out-of-kernel driver defines true or falseLarry Finger
Commit 7fd8329ba502 ("taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling") used the key words true and false as character members of a new struct. These names cause problems when out-of-kernel modules such as VirtualBox include their own definitions of true and false. Fixes: 7fd8329ba502 ("taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling") Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-11-26taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handlingPetr Mladek
The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-10-11x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic pathHidehiro Kawai
Daniel Walker reported problems which happens when crash_kexec_post_notifiers kernel option is enabled (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/24/44). In that case, smp_send_stop() is called before entering kdump routines which assume other CPUs are still online. As the result, for x86, kdump routines fail to save other CPUs' registers and disable virtualization extensions. To fix this problem, call a new kdump friendly function, crash_smp_send_stop(), instead of the smp_send_stop() when crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. crash_smp_send_stop() is a weak function, and it just call smp_send_stop(). Architecture codes should override it so that kdump can work appropriately. This patch only provides x86-specific version. For Xen's PV kernel, just keep the current behavior. NOTES: - Right solution would be to place crash_smp_send_stop() before __crash_kexec() invocation in all cases and remove smp_send_stop(), but we can't do that until all architectures implement own crash_smp_send_stop() - crash_smp_send_stop()-like work is still needed by machine_crash_shutdown() because crash_kexec() can be called without entering panic() Fixes: f06e5153f4ae (kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810080948.11028.15344.stgit@sysi4-13.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reported-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: "Steven J. Hill" <steven.hill@cavium.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02kexec: use core_param for crash_kexec_post_notifiers boot optionHidehiro Kawai
crash_kexec_post_notifiers ia a boot option which controls whether the 1st kernel calls panic notifiers or not before booting the 2nd kernel. However, there is no need to limit it to being modifiable only at boot time. So, use core_param instead of early_param. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160705113327.5864.43139.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20printk/nmi: flush NMI messages on the system panicPetr Mladek
In NMI context, printk() messages are stored into per-CPU buffers to avoid a possible deadlock. They are normally flushed to the main ring buffer via an IRQ work. But the work is never called when the system calls panic() in the very same NMI handler. This patch tries to flush NMI buffers before the crash dump is generated. In this case it does not risk a double release and bails out when the logbuf_lock is already taken. The aim is to get the messages into the main ring buffer when possible. It makes them better accessible in the vmcore. Then the patch tries to flush the buffers second time when other CPUs are down. It might be more aggressive and reset logbuf_lock. The aim is to get the messages available for the consequent kmsg_dump() and console_flush_on_panic() calls. The patch causes vprintk_emit() to be called even in NMI context again. But it is done via printk_deferred() so that the console handling is skipped. Consoles use internal locks and we could not prevent a deadlock easily. They are explicitly called later when the crash dump is not generated, see console_flush_on_panic(). Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22panic: change nmi_panic from macro to functionHidehiro Kawai
Commit 1717f2096b54 ("panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI") and commit 58c5661f2144 ("panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI context") introduced nmi_panic() which prevents concurrent/recursive execution of panic(). It also saves registers for the crash dump on x86. However, there are some cases where NMI handlers still use panic(). This patch set partially replaces them with nmi_panic() in those cases. Even this patchset is applied, some NMI or similar handlers (e.g. MCE handler) continue to use panic(). This is because I can't test them well and actual problems won't happen. For example, the possibility that normal panic and panic on MCE happen simultaneously is very low. This patch (of 3): Convert nmi_panic() to a proper function and export it instead of exporting internal implementation details to modules, for obvious reasons. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-17lib/bug.c: use common WARN helperJosh Poimboeuf
The traceoff_on_warning option doesn't have any effect on s390, powerpc, arm64, parisc, and sh because there are two different types of WARN implementations: 1) The above mentioned architectures treat WARN() as a special case of a BUG() exception. They handle warnings in report_bug() in lib/bug.c. 2) All other architectures just call warn_slowpath_*() directly. Their warnings are handled in warn_slowpath_common() in kernel/panic.c. Support traceoff_on_warning on all architectures and prevent any future divergence by using a single common function to emit the warning. Also remove the '()' from '%pS()', because the parentheses look funky: [ 45.607629] WARNING: at /root/warn_mod/warn_mod.c:17 .init_dummy+0x20/0x40 [warn_mod]() Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Tested-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-16printk: do cond_resched() between lines while outputting to consolesTejun Heo
@console_may_schedule tracks whether console_sem was acquired through lock or trylock. If the former, we're inside a sleepable context and console_conditional_schedule() performs cond_resched(). This allows console drivers which use console_lock for synchronization to yield while performing time-consuming operations such as scrolling. However, the actual console outputting is performed while holding irq-safe logbuf_lock, so console_unlock() clears @console_may_schedule before starting outputting lines. Also, only a few drivers call console_conditional_schedule() to begin with. This means that when a lot of lines need to be output by console_unlock(), for example on a console registration, the task doing console_unlock() may not yield for a long time on a non-preemptible kernel. If this happens with a slow console devices, for example a serial console, the outputting task may occupy the cpu for a very long time. Long enough to trigger softlockup and/or RCU stall warnings, which in turn pile more messages, sometimes enough to trigger the next cycle of warnings incapacitating the system. Fix it by making console_unlock() insert cond_resched() between lines if @console_may_schedule. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-12-19kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec()Hidehiro Kawai
Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-19panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI contextHidehiro Kawai
Currently, kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus(), a subroutine of crash_kexec(), sends an NMI IPI to CPUs which haven't called panic() to stop them, save their register information and do some cleanups for crash dumping. However, if such a CPU is infinitely looping in NMI context, we fail to save its register information into the crash dump. For example, this can happen when unknown NMIs are broadcast to all CPUs as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 =========================== ========================== receive an unknown NMI unknown_nmi_error() panic() receive an unknown NMI spin_trylock(&panic_lock) unknown_nmi_error() crash_kexec() panic() spin_trylock(&panic_lock) panic_smp_self_stop() infinite loop kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() issue NMI IPI -----------> blocked until IRET infinite loop... Here, since CPU 1 is in NMI context, the second NMI from CPU 0 is blocked until CPU 1 executes IRET. However, CPU 1 never executes IRET, so the NMI is not handled and the callback function to save registers is never called. In practice, this can happen on some servers which broadcast NMIs to all CPUs when the NMI button is pushed. To save registers in this case, we need to: a) Return from NMI handler instead of looping infinitely or b) Call the callback function directly from the infinite loop Inherently, a) is risky because NMI is also used to prevent corrupted data from being propagated to devices. So, we chose b). This patch does the following: 1. Move the infinite looping of CPUs which haven't called panic() in NMI context (actually done by panic_smp_self_stop()) outside of panic() to enable us to refer pt_regs. Please note that panic_smp_self_stop() is still used for normal context. 2. Call a callback of kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() directly to save registers and do some cleanups after setting waiting_for_crash_ipi which is used for counting down the number of CPUs which handled the callback Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014628.25437.75256.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-19panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMIHidehiro Kawai
If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-11-20kernel/panic.c: turn off locks debug before releasing console lockVitaly Kuznetsov
Commit 08d78658f393 ("panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out") introduced an unwanted bad unlock balance report when panic() is called directly and not from OOPS (e.g. from out_of_memory()). The difference is that in case of OOPS we disable locks debug in oops_enter() and on direct panic call nobody does that. Fixes: 08d78658f393 ("panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out") Reported-by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed outVitaly Kuznetsov
In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-30kernel/panic/kexec: fix "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option issue in oops pathHATAYAMA Daisuke
Commit f06e5153f4ae2e ("kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option for kdump after panic_notifers") introduced "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" kernel boot option, which toggles wheather panic() calls crash_kexec() before panic_notifiers and dump kmsg or after. The problem is that the commit overlooks panic_on_oops kernel boot option. If it is enabled, crash_kexec() is called directly without going through panic() in oops path. To fix this issue, this patch adds a check to "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" in the condition of kexec_should_crash(). Also, put a comment in kexec_should_crash() to explain not obvious things on this patch. Signed-off-by: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-30kernel/panic: call the 2nd crash_kexec() only if crash_kexec_post_notifiers ↵HATAYAMA Daisuke
is enabled For compatibility with the behaviour before the commit f06e5153f4ae2e ("kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option for kdump after panic_notifers"), the 2nd crash_kexec() should be called only if crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. Note that crash_kexec() returns immediately if kdump crash kernel is not loaded, so in this case, this patch makes no functionality change, but the point is to make it explicit, from the caller panic() side, that the 2nd crash_kexec() does nothing. Signed-off-by: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-22livepatch: kernel: add TAINT_LIVEPATCHSeth Jennings
This adds a new taint flag to indicate when the kernel or a kernel module has been live patched. This will provide a clean indication in bug reports that live patching was used. Additionally, if the crash occurs in a live patched function, the live patch module will appear beside the patched function in the backtrace. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2014-12-10kernel: add panic_on_warnPrarit Bhargava
There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-13kernel/panic.c: update comments for print_taintedXie XiuQi
Commit 69361eef9056 ("panic: add TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP") added the 'L' flag, but failed to update the comments for print_tainted(). So, update the comments. Signed-off-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-08panic: add TAINT_SOFTLOCKUPJosh Hunt
This taint flag will be set if the system has ever entered a softlockup state. Similar to TAINT_WARN it is useful to know whether or not the system has been in a softlockup state when debugging. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: apply the taint before calling panic()] Signed-off-by: Josh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option for kdump after ↵Masami Hiramatsu
panic_notifers Add a "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" boot option to run kdump after running panic_notifiers and dump kmsg. This can help rare situations where kdump fails because of unstable crashed kernel or hardware failure (memory corruption on critical data/code), or the 2nd kernel is already broken by the 1st kernel (it's a broken behavior, but who can guarantee that the "crashed" kernel works correctly?). Usage: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" to kernel boot option. Note that this actually increases risks of the failure of kdump. This option should be set only if you worry about the rare case of kdump failure rather than increasing the chance of success. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Motohiro Kosaki <Motohiro.Kosaki@us.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Yoshihiro YUNOMAE <yoshihiro.yunomae.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Satoru MORIYA <satoru.moriya.br@hitachi.com> Cc: Tomoki Sekiyama <tomoki.sekiyama@hds.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-07kernel/panic.c: display reason at end + pr_emergFabian Frederick
Currently, booting without initrd specified on 80x25 screen gives a call trace followed by atkbd : Spurious ACK. Original message ("VFS: Unable to mount root fs") is not available. Of course this could happen in other situations... This patch displays panic reason after call trace which could help lot of people even if it's not the very last line on screen. Also, convert all panic.c printk(KERN_EMERG to pr_emerg( [akpm@linux-foundation.org: missed a couple of pr_ conversions] Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-06Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux Pull module updates from Rusty Russell: "Nothing major: the stricter permissions checking for sysfs broke a staging driver; fix included. Greg KH said he'd take the patch but hadn't as the merge window opened, so it's included here to avoid breaking build" * tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: staging: fix up speakup kobject mode Use 'E' instead of 'X' for unsigned module taint flag. VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS: stricter checking for sysfs perms. kallsyms: fix percpu vars on x86-64 with relocation. kallsyms: generalize address range checking module: LLVMLinux: Remove unused function warning from __param_check macro Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE module: remove MODULE_GENERIC_TABLE module: allow multiple calls to MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() per module module: use pr_cont
2014-03-31Merge branch 'x86-asmlinkage-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 LTO changes from Peter Anvin: "More infrastructure work in preparation for link-time optimization (LTO). Most of these changes is to make sure symbols accessed from assembly code are properly marked as visible so the linker doesn't remove them. My understanding is that the changes to support LTO are still not upstream in binutils, but are on the way there. This patchset should conclude the x86-specific changes, and remaining patches to actually enable LTO will be fed through the Kbuild tree (other than keeping up with changes to the x86 code base, of course), although not necessarily in this merge window" * 'x86-asmlinkage-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits) Kbuild, lto: Handle basic LTO in modpost Kbuild, lto: Disable LTO for asm-offsets.c Kbuild, lto: Add a gcc-ld script to let run gcc as ld Kbuild, lto: add ld-version and ld-ifversion macros Kbuild, lto: Drop .number postfixes in modpost Kbuild, lto, workaround: Don't warn for initcall_reference in modpost lto: Disable LTO for sys_ni lto: Handle LTO common symbols in module loader lto, workaround: Add workaround for initcall reordering lto: Make asmlinkage __visible x86, lto: Disable LTO for the x86 VDSO initconst, x86: Fix initconst mistake in ts5500 code initconst: Fix initconst mistake in dcdbas asmlinkage: Make trace_hardirqs_on/off_caller visible asmlinkage, x86: Fix 32bit memcpy for LTO asmlinkage Make __stack_chk_failed and memcmp visible asmlinkage: Mark rwsem functions that can be called from assembler asmlinkage asmlinkage: Make main_extable_sort_needed visible asmlinkage, mutex: Mark __visible asmlinkage: Make trace_hardirq visible ...
2014-03-31Use 'E' instead of 'X' for unsigned module taint flag.Rusty Russell
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> says: > The letter 'X' has been already used for SUSE kernels for very long > time, to indicate the external supported modules. Can the new flag be > changed to another letter for avoiding conflict...? > (BTW, we also use 'N' for "no support", too.) Note: this code should be cleaned up, so we don't have such maps in three places! Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2014-03-20Rename TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP to TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPECDave Jones
Rename TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP to TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, so we can repurpose the flag to encompass a wider range of pushing the CPU beyond its warrany. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140226154949.GA770@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2014-03-13Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULEMathieu Desnoyers
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature. This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y. Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules. With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module. Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt). Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2014-02-13asmlinkage Make __stack_chk_failed and memcmp visibleAndi Kleen
In LTO symbols implicitely referenced by the compiler need to be visible. Earlier these symbols were visible implicitely from being exported, but we disabled implicit visibility fo EXPORTs when modules are disabled to improve code size. So now these symbols have to be marked visible explicitely. Do this for __stack_chk_fail (with stack protector) and memcmp. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1391845930-28580-10-git-send-email-ak@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2013-11-26panic: Make panic_timeout configurableJason Baron
The panic_timeout value can be set via the command line option 'panic=x', or via /proc/sys/kernel/panic, however that is not sufficient when the panic occurs before we are able to set up these values. Thus, add a CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT so that we can set the desired value from the .config. The default panic_timeout value continues to be 0 - wait forever. Also adds set_arch_panic_timeout(new_timeout, arch_default_timeout), which is intended to be used by arches in arch_setup(). The idea being that the new_timeout is only set if the user hasn't changed from the arch_default_timeout. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: felipe.contreras@gmail.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1a1674daec27c534df409697025ac568ebcee91e.1385418410.git.jbaron@akamai.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>