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* sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handlerChristoph Hellwig2020-04-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit safer. As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers a lot of the changes are mechnical. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextLinus Torvalds2020-03-311-3/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Highlights: 1) Fix the iwlwifi regression, from Johannes Berg. 2) Support BSS coloring and 802.11 encapsulation offloading in hardware, from John Crispin. 3) Fix some potential Spectre issues in qtnfmac, from Sergey Matyukevich. 4) Add TTL decrement action to openvswitch, from Matteo Croce. 5) Allow paralleization through flow_action setup by not taking the RTNL mutex, from Vlad Buslov. 6) A lot of zero-length array to flexible-array conversions, from Gustavo A. R. Silva. 7) Align XDP statistics names across several drivers for consistency, from Lorenzo Bianconi. 8) Add various pieces of infrastructure for offloading conntrack, and make use of it in mlx5 driver, from Paul Blakey. 9) Allow using listening sockets in BPF sockmap, from Jakub Sitnicki. 10) Lots of parallelization improvements during configuration changes in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel. 11) Add support to devlink for generic packet traps, which report packets dropped during ACL processing. And use them in mlxsw driver. From Jiri Pirko. 12) Support bcmgenet on ACPI, from Jeremy Linton. 13) Make BPF compatible with RT, from Thomas Gleixnet, Alexei Starovoitov, and your's truly. 14) Support XDP meta-data in virtio_net, from Yuya Kusakabe. 15) Fix sysfs permissions when network devices change namespaces, from Christian Brauner. 16) Add a flags element to ethtool_ops so that drivers can more simply indicate which coalescing parameters they actually support, and therefore the generic layer can validate the user's ethtool request. Use this in all drivers, from Jakub Kicinski. 17) Offload FIFO qdisc in mlxsw, from Petr Machata. 18) Support UDP sockets in sockmap, from Lorenz Bauer. 19) Fix stretch ACK bugs in several TCP congestion control modules, from Pengcheng Yang. 20) Support virtual functiosn in octeontx2 driver, from Tomasz Duszynski. 21) Add region operations for devlink and use it in ice driver to dump NVM contents, from Jacob Keller. 22) Add support for hw offload of MACSEC, from Antoine Tenart. 23) Add support for BPF programs that can be attached to LSM hooks, from KP Singh. 24) Support for multiple paths, path managers, and counters in MPTCP. From Peter Krystad, Paolo Abeni, Florian Westphal, Davide Caratti, and others. 25) More progress on adding the netlink interface to ethtool, from Michal Kubecek" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2121 commits) net: ipv6: rpl_iptunnel: Fix potential memory leak in rpl_do_srh_inline cxgb4/chcr: nic-tls stats in ethtool net: dsa: fix oops while probing Marvell DSA switches net/bpfilter: remove superfluous testing message net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node net: dsa: ksz: Select KSZ protocol tag netdevsim: dev: Fix memory leak in nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write net: stmmac: add EHL 2.5Gbps PCI info and PCI ID net: stmmac: add EHL PSE0 & PSE1 1Gbps PCI info and PCI ID net: stmmac: create dwmac-intel.c to contain all Intel platform net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Support specifying VLAN tag egress rule net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for matching VLAN TCI net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Move writing of CFP_DATA(5) into slicing functions net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Check earlier for FLOW_EXT and FLOW_MAC_EXT net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Disable learning for ASP port net: dsa: b53: Deny enslaving port 7 for 7278 into a bridge net: dsa: b53: Prevent tagged VLAN on port 7 for 7278 net: dsa: b53: Restore VLAN entries upon (re)configuration net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks hv_netvsc: Remove unnecessary round_up for recv_completion_cnt ...
| * bpf: Use bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() at simple call sites.David Miller2020-02-241-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All of these cases are strictly of the form: preempt_disable(); BPF_PROG_RUN(...); preempt_enable(); Replace this with bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() which wraps BPF_PROG_RUN() with: migrate_disable(); BPF_PROG_RUN(...); migrate_enable(); On non RT enabled kernels this maps to preempt_disable/enable() and on RT enabled kernels this solely prevents migration, which is sufficient as there is no requirement to prevent reentrancy to any BPF program from a preempting task. The only requirement is that the program stays on the same CPU. Therefore, this is a trivially correct transformation. The seccomp loop does not need protection over the loop. It only needs protection per BPF filter program [ tglx: Converted to bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() ] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200224145643.691493094@linutronix.de
* | seccomp: Add missing compat_ioctl for notifySven Schnelle2020-03-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Executing the seccomp_bpf testsuite under a 64-bit kernel with 32-bit userland (both s390 and x86) doesn't work because there's no compat_ioctl handler defined. Add the handler. Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310123332.42255-1-svens@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | seccomp: allow TSYNC and USER_NOTIF togetherTycho Andersen2020-03-041-4/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The restriction introduced in 7a0df7fbc145 ("seccomp: Make NEW_LISTENER and TSYNC flags exclusive") is mostly artificial: there is enough information in a seccomp user notification to tell which thread triggered a notification. The reason it was introduced is because TSYNC makes the syscall return a thread-id on failure, and NEW_LISTENER returns an fd, and there's no way to distinguish between these two cases (well, I suppose the caller could check all fds it has, then do the syscall, and if the return value was an fd that already existed, then it must be a thread id, but bleh). Matthew would like to use these two flags together in the Chrome sandbox which wants to use TSYNC for video drivers and NEW_LISTENER to proxy syscalls. So, let's fix this ugliness by adding another flag, TSYNC_ESRCH, which tells the kernel to just return -ESRCH on a TSYNC error. This way, NEW_LISTENER (and any subsequent seccomp() commands that want to return positive values) don't conflict with each other. Suggested-by: Matthew Denton <mpdenton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304180517.23867-1-tycho@tycho.ws Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: Check that seccomp_notif is zeroed out by the userSargun Dhillon2020-01-021-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch is a small change in enforcement of the uapi for SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV ioctl. Specifically, the datastructure which is passed (seccomp_notif) must be zeroed out. Previously any of its members could be set to nonsense values, and we would ignore it. This ensures all fields are set to their zero value. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191229062451.9467-2-sargun@sargun.me Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: add SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUEChristian Brauner2019-10-101-6/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the seccomp notifier to continue a syscall. A positive discussion about this feature was triggered by a post to the ksummit-discuss mailing list (cf. [3]) and took place during KSummit (cf. [1]) and again at the containers/checkpoint-restore micro-conference at Linux Plumbers. Recently we landed seccomp support for SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (cf. [4]) which enables a process (watchee) to retrieve an fd for its seccomp filter. This fd can then be handed to another (usually more privileged) process (watcher). The watcher will then be able to receive seccomp messages about the syscalls having been performed by the watchee. This feature is heavily used in some userspace workloads. For example, it is currently used to intercept mknod() syscalls in user namespaces aka in containers. The mknod() syscall can be easily filtered based on dev_t. This allows us to only intercept a very specific subset of mknod() syscalls. Furthermore, mknod() is not possible in user namespaces toto coelo and so intercepting and denying syscalls that are not in the whitelist on accident is not a big deal. The watchee won't notice a difference. In contrast to mknod(), a lot of other syscall we intercept (e.g. setxattr()) cannot be easily filtered like mknod() because they have pointer arguments. Additionally, some of them might actually succeed in user namespaces (e.g. setxattr() for all "user.*" xattrs). Since we currently cannot tell seccomp to continue from a user notifier we are stuck with performing all of the syscalls in lieu of the container. This is a huge security liability since it is extremely difficult to correctly assume all of the necessary privileges of the calling task such that the syscall can be successfully emulated without escaping other additional security restrictions (think missing CAP_MKNOD for mknod(), or MS_NODEV on a filesystem etc.). This can be solved by telling seccomp to resume the syscall. One thing that came up in the discussion was the problem that another thread could change the memory after userspace has decided to let the syscall continue which is a well known TOCTOU with seccomp which is present in other ways already. The discussion showed that this feature is already very useful for any syscall without pointer arguments. For any accidentally intercepted non-pointer syscall it is safe to continue. For syscalls with pointer arguments there is a race but for any cautious userspace and the main usec cases the race doesn't matter. The notifier is intended to be used in a scenario where a more privileged watcher supervises the syscalls of lesser privileged watchee to allow it to get around kernel-enforced limitations by performing the syscall for it whenever deemed save by the watcher. Hence, if a user tricks the watcher into allowing a syscall they will either get a deny based on kernel-enforced restrictions later or they will have changed the arguments in such a way that they manage to perform a syscall with arguments that they would've been allowed to do anyway. In general, it is good to point out again, that the notifier fd was not intended to allow userspace to implement a security policy but rather to work around kernel security mechanisms in cases where the watcher knows that a given action is safe to perform. /* References */ [1]: https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/560 [2]: https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/477 [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190719093538.dhyopljyr5ns33qx@brauner.io [4]: commit 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190920083007.11475-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* signal: Remove the signal number and task parameters from force_sig_infoEric W. Biederman2019-05-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | force_sig_info always delivers to the current task and the signal parameter always matches info.si_signo. So remove those parameters to make it a simpler less error prone interface, and to make it clear that none of the callers are doing anything clever. This guarantees that force_sig_info will not grow any new buggy callers that attempt to call force_sig on a non-current task, or that pass an signal number that does not match info.si_signo. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190507' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-071-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "We've got a reasonably broad set of audit patches for the v5.2 merge window, the highlights are below: - The biggest change, and the source of all the arch/* changes, is the patchset from Dmitry to help enable some of the work he is doing around PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO. To be honest, including this in the audit tree is a bit of a stretch, but it does help move audit a little further along towards proper syscall auditing for all arches, and everyone else seemed to agree that audit was a "good" spot for this to land (or maybe they just didn't want to merge it? dunno.). - We can now audit time/NTP adjustments. - We continue the work to connect associated audit records into a single event" * tag 'audit-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: (21 commits) audit: fix a memory leak bug ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments audit: purge unnecessary list_empty calls audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event syscall_get_arch: add "struct task_struct *" argument unicore32: define syscall_get_arch() Move EM_UNICORE to uapi/linux/elf-em.h nios2: define syscall_get_arch() nds32: define syscall_get_arch() Move EM_NDS32 to uapi/linux/elf-em.h m68k: define syscall_get_arch() hexagon: define syscall_get_arch() Move EM_HEXAGON to uapi/linux/elf-em.h h8300: define syscall_get_arch() c6x: define syscall_get_arch() arc: define syscall_get_arch() Move EM_ARCOMPACT and EM_ARCV2 to uapi/linux/elf-em.h audit: Make audit_log_cap and audit_copy_inode static audit: connect LOGIN record to its syscall record ...
| * syscall_get_arch: add "struct task_struct *" argumentDmitry V. Levin2019-03-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This argument is required to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request: syscall_get_arch() is going to be called from ptrace_request() along with syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions with a tracee as their argument. The primary intent is that the triple (audit_arch, syscall_nr, arg1..arg6) should describe what system call is being called and what its arguments are. Reverts: 5e937a9ae913 ("syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments") Reverts: 1002d94d3076 ("syscall.h: fix doc text for syscall_get_arch()") Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> # for x86 Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> # MIPS parts Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # seccomp parts Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> # for the c6x bit Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-071-1/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Just a few bugfixes and documentation updates" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: seccomp: fix up grammar in comment Revert "security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file" Yama: mark function as static security: inode: fix a missing check for securityfs_create_file keys: safe concurrent user->{session,uid}_keyring access security: don't use RCU accessors for cred->session_keyring Yama: mark local symbols as static LSM: lsm_hooks.h: fix documentation format LSM: fix documentation for the shm_* hooks LSM: fix documentation for the sem_* hooks LSM: fix documentation for the msg_queue_* hooks LSM: fix documentation for the audit_* hooks LSM: fix documentation for the path_chmod hook LSM: fix documentation for the socket_getpeersec_dgram hook LSM: fix documentation for the task_setscheduler hook LSM: fix documentation for the socket_post_create hook LSM: fix documentation for the syslog hook LSM: fix documentation for sb_copy_data hook
| * | seccomp: fix up grammar in commentTycho Andersen2019-04-231-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This sentence is kind of a train wreck anyway, but at least dropping the extra pronoun helps somewhat. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.1-rc8' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-04-291-2/+15
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull seccomp fixes from Kees Cook: "Syzbot found a use-after-free bug in seccomp due to flags that should not be allowed to be used together. Tycho fixed this, I updated the self-tests, and the syzkaller PoC has been running for several days without triggering KASan (before this fix, it would reproduce). These patches have also been in -next for almost a week, just to be sure. - Add logic for making some seccomp flags exclusive (Tycho) - Update selftests for exclusivity testing (Kees)" * tag 'seccomp-v5.1-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: seccomp: Make NEW_LISTENER and TSYNC flags exclusive selftests/seccomp: Prepare for exclusive seccomp flags
| * | seccomp: Make NEW_LISTENER and TSYNC flags exclusiveTycho Andersen2019-04-251-2/+15
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the comment notes, the return codes for TSYNC and NEW_LISTENER conflict, because they both return positive values, one in the case of success and one in the case of error. So, let's disallow both of these flags together. While this is technically a userspace break, all the users I know of are still waiting on me to land this feature in libseccomp, so I think it'll be safe. Also, at present my use case doesn't require TSYNC at all, so this isn't a big deal to disallow. If someone wanted to support this, a path forward would be to add a new flag like TSYNC_AND_LISTENER_YES_I_UNDERSTAND_THAT_TSYNC_WILL_JUST_RETURN_EAGAIN, but the use cases are so different I don't see it really happening. Finally, it's worth noting that this does actually fix a UAF issue: at the end of seccomp_set_mode_filter(), we have: if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) { if (ret < 0) { listener_f->private_data = NULL; fput(listener_f); put_unused_fd(listener); } else { fd_install(listener, listener_f); ret = listener; } } out_free: seccomp_filter_free(prepared); But if ret > 0 because TSYNC raced, we'll install the listener fd and then free the filter out from underneath it, causing a UAF when the task closes it or dies. This patch also switches the condition to be simply if (ret), so that if someone does add the flag mentioned above, they won't have to remember to fix this too. Reported-by: syzbot+b562969adb2e04af3442@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | syscalls: Remove start and number from syscall_get_arguments() argsSteven Rostedt (Red Hat)2019-04-051-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At Linux Plumbers, Andy Lutomirski approached me and pointed out that the function call syscall_get_arguments() implemented in x86 was horribly written and not optimized for the standard case of passing in 0 and 6 for the starting index and the number of system calls to get. When looking at all the users of this function, I discovered that all instances pass in only 0 and 6 for these arguments. Instead of having this function handle different cases that are never used, simply rewrite it to return the first 6 arguments of a system call. This should help out the performance of tracing system calls by ptrace, ftrace and perf. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161107213233.754809394@goodmis.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> # MIPS parts Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> # For xtensa changes Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> # For the arm64 bits Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> # for x86 Reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
* Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-03-071-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This work is from Casey and Kees. - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits) keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break tomoyo: Bump version. LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs() LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines. tomoyo: Coding style fix. tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security. security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall through capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through ...
| * Merge tag 'v5.0-rc3' into next-generalJames Morris2019-01-221-0/+4
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | Sync to Linux 5.0-rc3 to pull in the VFS changes which impacted a lot of the LSM code.
| * | LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capableMicah Morton2019-01-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | | seccomp, bpf: disable preemption before calling into bpf progAlexei Starovoitov2019-02-221-0/+2
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All BPF programs must be called with preemption disabled. Fixes: 568f196756ad ("bpf: check that BPF programs run with preemption disabled") Reported-by: syzbot+8bf19ee2aa580de7a2a7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* | seccomp: fix UAF in user-trap codeTycho Andersen2019-01-151-0/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On the failure path, we do an fput() of the listener fd if the filter fails to install (e.g. because of a TSYNC race that's lost, or if the thread is killed, etc.). fput() doesn't actually release the fd, it just ads it to a work queue. Then the thread proceeds to free the filter, even though the listener struct file has a reference to it. To fix this, on the failure path let's set the private data to null, so we know in ->release() to ignore the filter. Reported-by: syzbot+981c26489b2d1c6316ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* seccomp: fix poor type promotionTycho Andersen2018-12-131-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sparse complains, kernel/seccomp.c:1172:13: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) kernel/seccomp.c:1172:13: expected restricted __poll_t [usertype] ret kernel/seccomp.c:1172:13: got int kernel/seccomp.c:1173:13: warning: restricted __poll_t degrades to integer Instead of assigning this to ret, since we don't use this anywhere, let's just test it against 0 directly. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reported-by: 0day robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspaceTycho Andersen2018-12-111-2/+446
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify some other task that a particular filter has been triggered. The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example, if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module the container is trying to load and load it on the host. As another example, containers cannot mount() in general since various filesystems assume a trusted image. However, if an orchestrator knows that e.g. a particular block device has not been exposed to a container for writing, it want to allow the container to mount that block device (that is, handle the mount for it). This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL. Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP. Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace, since upstart itself uses ptrace to monitor services while starting. The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the synchronization right was/is slightly complex. Finally, it's worth noting that the classic seccomp TOCTOU of reading memory data from the task still applies here, but can be avoided with careful design of the userspace handler: if the userspace handler reads all of the task memory that is necessary before applying its security policy, the tracee's subsequent memory edits will not be read by the tracer. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: switch system call argument type to void *Tycho Andersen2018-12-111-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The const qualifier causes problems for any code that wants to write to the third argument of the seccomp syscall, as we will do in a future patch in this series. The third argument to the seccomp syscall is documented as void *, so rather than just dropping the const, let's switch everything to use void * as well. I believe this is safe because of 1. the documentation above, 2. there's no real type information exported about syscalls anywhere besides the man pages. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: hoist struct seccomp_data recalculation higherTycho Andersen2018-12-111-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the next patch, we're going to use the sd pointer passed to __seccomp_filter() as the data to pass to userspace. Except that in some cases (__seccomp_filter(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE), emulate_vsyscall(), every time seccomp is inovked on power, etc.) the sd pointer will be NULL in order to force seccomp to recompute the register data. Previously this recomputation happened one level lower, in seccomp_run_filters(); this patch just moves it up a level higher to __seccomp_filter(). Thanks Oleg for spotting this. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-10-241-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on their own)" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info LSM: Remove initcall tracing LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization security: fix LSM description location keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely() security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
| * seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()Igor Stoppa2018-09-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | WARN_ON() already contains an unlikely(), so it's not necessary to wrap it into another. Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfoEric W. Biederman2018-10-031-3/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying around in the kernel. The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in the kernel that embed struct siginfo. So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to 128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo. The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have the same field offsets. To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-06-061-36/+90
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches in total. The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the audit subsystem. The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers, but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would be good to get them in now. The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging; starting with this patchset the changes in /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the standard kernel logging and audit. As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to merge cleanly with your tree" [ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that also came in from Paul - Linus ] * tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID audit: use existing session info function audit: normalize loginuid read access audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged audit: use inline function to set audit context audit: use inline function to get audit context audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
| * seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when loggingTyler Hicks2018-05-081-10/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action not in actions_logged: do not log else if action == RET_KILL: log else if action == RET_LOG: log else if filter-requests-logging: log else: do not log Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctlTyler Hicks2018-05-081-9/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch. Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled. This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to 1. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 0. Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not part of the sysctl's write handler. Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the actions_logged sysctl. Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log", emits this audit record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392371.454:120): op=seccomp-logging actions=? old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=0 If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392401.645:126): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write "log log errno trace kill_process kill_thread", which is unordered and contains the log action twice, it results in the same actions value as the previous record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392436.354:132): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write an empty string to the sysctl, this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392494.413:138): op=seccomp-logging actions=(none) old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl. Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged stringTyler Hicks2018-05-081-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The function that converts a bitmask of seccomp actions that are allowed to be logged is currently only used for constructing the display string for the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl. That string wants a space character to be used for the separator between actions. A future patch will make use of the same function for building a string that will be sent to the audit subsystem for tracking modifications to the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl. That string will need to use a comma as a separator. This patch allows the separator character to be configurable to meet both needs. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctlTyler Hicks2018-05-081-22/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Break the read and write paths of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl into separate functions to maintain readability. An upcoming change will need to audit writes, but not reads, of this sysctl which would introduce too many conditional code paths on whether or not the 'write' parameter evaluates to true. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch codeThomas Gleixner2018-05-051-13/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require even more workarounds. Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide which mitigations are relevant for seccomp. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigationKees Cook2018-05-051-8/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when adding filters. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLEThomas Gleixner2018-05-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE in seccomp() because seccomp does not allow to widen restrictions. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigationsKees Cook2018-05-031-0/+17
|/ | | | | | | | | | When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.16-rc3' of ↵James Morris2018-02-221-2/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into fixes-v4.16-rc3 - Fix seccomp GET_METADATA to deal with field sizes correctly (Tycho Andersen) - Add selftest to make sure GET_METADATA doesn't regress (Tycho Andersen)
| * ptrace, seccomp: tweak get_metadata behavior slightlyTycho Andersen2018-02-211-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously if users passed a small size for the input structure size, they would get get odd behavior. It doesn't make sense to pass a structure smaller than at least filter_off size, so let's just give -EINVAL in this case. This changes userspace visible behavior, but was only introduced in commit 26500475ac1b ("ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadata") in 4.16-rc2, so should be safe to change if merged before then. Reported-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Merge branch 'next-seccomp' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-01-311-30/+76
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull seccomp updates from James Morris: "Add support for retrieving seccomp metadata" * 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadata seccomp: hoist out filter resolving logic
| * ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadataTycho Andersen2017-11-281-0/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, we need to be able to extract these flags for checkpoint restore, since they describe the state of a filter. So, let's add PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, similar to ..._GET_FILTER, which returns the metadata of the nth filter (right now, just the flags). Hopefully this will be future proof, and new per-filter metadata can be added to this struct. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * seccomp: hoist out filter resolving logicTycho Andersen2017-11-281-32/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Hoist out the nth filter resolving logic that ptrace uses into a new function. We'll use this in the next patch to implement the new PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FLAGS command. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | signal: Replace memset(info,...) with clear_siginfo for clarityEric W. Biederman2018-01-221-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | The function clear_siginfo is just a nice wrapper around memset so this results in no functional change. This change makes mistakes a little more difficult and it makes it clearer what is going on. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflictsIngo Molnar2017-11-071-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: include/linux/compiler-clang.h include/linux/compiler-gcc.h include/linux/compiler-intel.h include/uapi/linux/stddef.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-11-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()Will Deacon2017-10-241-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in semantics. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* seccomp: make function __get_seccomp_filter staticColin Ian King2017-10-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The function __get_seccomp_filter is local to the source and does not need to be in global scope, so make it static. Cleans up sparse warning: symbol '__get_seccomp_filter' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Fixes: 66a733ea6b61 ("seccomp: fix the usage of get/put_seccomp_filter() in seccomp_get_filter()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: fix the usage of get/put_seccomp_filter() in seccomp_get_filter()Oleg Nesterov2017-09-271-7/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end up using different filters. Once we drop ->siglock it is possible for task->seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC. Fixes: f8e529ed941b ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters") Reported-by: Chris Salls <chrissalls5@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # needs s/refcount_/atomic_/ for v4.12 and earlier Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> [tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()] Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS actionKees Cook2017-08-141-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (neé SECCOMP_RET_KILL) kills the current thread. There have been a few requests for this to kill the entire process (the thread group). This cannot be just changed (discovered when adding coredump support since coredumping kills the entire process) because there are userspace programs depending on the thread-kill behavior. Instead, implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, which is 0x80000000, and can be processed as "-1" by the kernel, below the existing RET_KILL that is ABI-set to "0". For userspace, SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL is added to expand the mask to the signed bit. Old userspace using the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION mask will see SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as 0 still, but this would only be visible when examining the siginfo in a core dump from a RET_KILL_*, where it will think it was thread-killed instead of process-killed. Attempts to introduce this behavior via other ways (filter flags, seccomp struct flags, masked RET_DATA bits) all come with weird side-effects and baggage. This change preserves the central behavioral expectations of the seccomp filter engine without putting too great a burden on changes needed in userspace to use the new action. The new action is discoverable by userspace through either the new actions_avail sysctl or through the SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL seccomp operation. If used without checking for availability, old kernels will treat RET_KILL_PROCESS as RET_KILL_THREAD (since the old mask will produce RET_KILL_THREAD). Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Fabricio Voznika <fvoznika@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESSKees Cook2017-08-141-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | This introduces the BPF return value for SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS to kill an entire process. This cannot yet be reached by seccomp, but it changes the default-kill behavior (for unknown return values) from kill-thread to kill-process. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREADKees Cook2017-08-141-18/+21
| | | | | | | | | | In preparation for adding SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to the more accurate SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD. The existing selftest values are intentionally left as SECCOMP_RET_KILL just to be sure we're exercising the alias. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>