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Rename generic_report.c to report_generic.c and tags_report.c to
report_sw_tags.c, as their content is more relevant to report.c file.
Also rename tags.c to sw_tags.c to better reflect that this file contains
code for software tag-based mode.
No functional changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6105d416da97d389580015afed66c4c3cfd4c08.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept
of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte
for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for
hardware tag-based mode.
Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and
KASAN_SHADOW_MASK to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.
Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.
No functional changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939b5754e47f528a6e6a6f28ffc5815d8d128033.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64", v11.
This patchset adds a new hardware tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. The new
mode is similar to the existing software tag-based KASAN, but relies on
arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer
tagging (instead of shadow memory and compiler instrumentation).
This patchset is co-developed and tested by
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>.
This patchset is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-mte-v11
For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:
1. QEMU built from master [4] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments
to run).
2. GCC version 10.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux for-next/mte
[4] https://github.com/qemu/qemu
====== Overview
The underlying ideas of the approach used by hardware tag-based KASAN are:
1. By relying on the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, pointer tags
are stored in the top byte of each kernel pointer.
2. With the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) arm64 CPU feature, memory tags
for kernel memory allocations are stored in a dedicated memory not
accessible via normal instuctions.
3. On each memory allocation, a random tag is generated, embedded it into
the returned pointer, and the corresponding memory is tagged with the
same tag value.
4. With MTE the CPU performs a check on each memory access to make sure
that the pointer tag matches the memory tag.
5. On a tag mismatch the CPU generates a tag fault, and a KASAN report is
printed.
Same as other KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN is intended as a
debugging feature at this point.
====== Rationale
There are two main reasons for this new hardware tag-based mode:
1. Previously implemented software tag-based KASAN is being successfully
used on dogfood testing devices due to its low memory overhead (as
initially planned). The new hardware mode keeps the same low memory
overhead, and is expected to have significantly lower performance
impact, due to the tag checks being performed by the hardware.
Therefore the new mode can be used as a better alternative in dogfood
testing for hardware that supports MTE.
2. The new mode lays the groundwork for the planned in-kernel MTE-based
memory corruption mitigation to be used in production.
====== Technical details
Considering the implementation perspective, hardware tag-based KASAN is
almost identical to the software mode. The key difference is using MTE
for assigning and checking tags.
Compared to the software mode, the hardware mode uses 4 bits per tag, as
dictated by MTE. Pointer tags are stored in bits [56:60), the top 4 bits
have the normal value 0xF. Having less distict tags increases the
probablity of false negatives (from ~1/256 to ~1/16) in certain cases.
Only synchronous exceptions are set up and used by hardware tag-based KASAN.
====== Benchmarks
Note: all measurements have been performed with software emulation of Memory
Tagging Extension, performance numbers for hardware tag-based KASAN on the
actual hardware are expected to be better.
Boot time [1]:
* 2.8 sec for clean kernel
* 5.7 sec for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 11.8 sec for software tag-based KASAN
* 11.6 sec for generic KASAN
Slab memory usage after boot [2]:
* 7.0 kb for clean kernel
* 9.7 kb for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 9.7 kb for software tag-based KASAN
* 41.3 kb for generic KASAN
Measurements have been performed with:
* defconfig-based configs
* Manually built QEMU master
* QEMU arguments: -machine virt,mte=on -cpu max
* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE disabled
* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
* clang-10 as the compiler and gcc-10 as the assembler
[1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized.
[2] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`.
====== Notes
The cover letter for software tag-based KASAN patchset can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0116523cfffa62aeb5aa3b85ce7419f3dae0c1b8
===== Tags
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
This patch (of 41):
Don't mention "GNU General Public License version 2" text explicitly, as
it's already covered by the SPDX-License-Identifier.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6ea9f5f4aa9dbbffa0d0c0a780b37699a4531034.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4.
The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in
memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an
undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.
[1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/
This patch (of 2):
KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(),
and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected
by KASAN.
If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as
out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed
turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
KASAN report is shown below:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72
CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
show_stack+0x14/0x20
dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
__kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
kasan_report+0xc/0x18
check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
memmove+0x34/0x88
kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
[peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based
mode. The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound"
error instead of "invalid-access" error. This will make it easier for
programmers to see the memory corruption problem.
We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace,
we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good
guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's
"use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch adds a "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0" mark to all source
files under mm/kasan.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bce2d1e618afa5142e81961ab8fa4b4165337380.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This commit adds rountines, that print tag-based KASAN error reports.
Those are quite similar to generic KASAN, the difference is:
1. The way tag-based KASAN finds the first bad shadow cell (with a
mismatching tag). Tag-based KASAN compares memory tags from the shadow
memory to the pointer tag.
2. Tag-based KASAN reports all bugs with the "KASAN: invalid-access"
header.
Also simplify generic KASAN find_first_bad_addr.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee6897b1bd077732a315fd84c6b4f234dbfdfcb.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Move generic KASAN specific error reporting routines to generic_report.c
without any functional changes, leaving common error reporting code in
report.c to be later reused by tag-based KASAN.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ba48c32f8e5aefedee78998ccff0413bee9e0f5b.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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