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The sctp_sf_eat_auth() function is supposed to enum sctp_disposition
values and returning a kernel error code will cause issues in the
caller. Change -ENOMEM to SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch deletes the flexible-array hmac[] from the structure
sctp_authhdr to avoid some sparse warnings:
# make C=2 CF="-Wflexible-array-nested" M=./net/sctp/
net/sctp/auth.c: note: in included file (through include/net/sctp/structs.h, include/net/sctp/sctp.h):
./include/linux/sctp.h:735:29: warning: nested flexible array
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch deletes the flexible-array peer_init[] from the structure
sctp_cookie to avoid some sparse warnings:
# make C=2 CF="-Wflexible-array-nested" M=./net/sctp/
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c: note: in included file (through include/net/sctp/sctp.h):
./include/net/sctp/structs.h:1588:28: warning: nested flexible array
./include/net/sctp/structs.h:343:28: warning: nested flexible array
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch deletes the flexible-array variable[] from the structure
sctp_sackhdr and sctp_errhdr to avoid some sparse warnings:
# make C=2 CF="-Wflexible-array-nested" M=./net/sctp/
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c: note: in included file (through include/net/sctp/structs.h, include/net/sctp/sctp.h):
./include/linux/sctp.h:451:28: warning: nested flexible array
./include/linux/sctp.h:393:29: warning: nested flexible array
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch deletes the flexible-array params[] from the structure
sctp_inithdr, sctp_addiphdr and sctp_reconf_chunk to avoid some
sparse warnings:
# make C=2 CF="-Wflexible-array-nested" M=./net/sctp/
net/sctp/input.c: note: in included file (through include/net/sctp/structs.h, include/net/sctp/sctp.h):
./include/linux/sctp.h:278:29: warning: nested flexible array
./include/linux/sctp.h:675:30: warning: nested flexible array
This warning is reported if a structure having a flexible array
member is included by other structures.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The subh.addip_hdr pointer is also of type (struct sctp_addiphdr *), so
it does not require a cast.
Signed-off-by: Li zeming <zeming@nfschina.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221115020705.3220-1-zeming@nfschina.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Currently, tcp_memory_allocated can hit tcp_mem[] limits quite fast.
Each TCP socket can forward allocate up to 2 MB of memory, even after
flow became less active.
10,000 sockets can have reserved 20 GB of memory,
and we have no shrinker in place to reclaim that.
Instead of trying to reclaim the extra allocations in some places,
just keep sk->sk_forward_alloc values as small as possible.
This should not impact performance too much now we have per-cpu
reserves: Changes to tcp_memory_allocated should not be too frequent.
For sockets not using SO_RESERVE_MEM:
- idle sockets (no packets in tx/rx queues) have zero forward alloc.
- non idle sockets have a forward alloc smaller than one page.
Note:
- Removal of SK_RECLAIM_CHUNK and SK_RECLAIM_THRESHOLD
is left to MPTCP maintainers as a follow up.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Yi Chen reported an unexpected sctp connection abort, and it occurred when
COOKIE_ECHO is bundled with DATA Fragment by SCTP HW GSO. As the IP header
is included in chunk->head_skb instead of chunk->skb, it failed to check
IP header version in security_sctp_assoc_request().
According to Ondrej, SELinux only looks at IP header (address and IPsec
options) and XFRM state data, and these are all included in head_skb for
SCTP HW GSO packets. So fix it by using head_skb when calling
security_sctp_assoc_request() in processing COOKIE_ECHO.
v1->v2:
- As Ondrej noticed, chunk->head_skb should also be used for
security_sctp_assoc_established() in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca().
Fixes: e215dab1c490 ("security: call security_sctp_assoc_request in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce")
Reported-by: Yi Chen <yiche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/71becb489e51284edf0c11fc15246f4ed4cef5b6.1649337862.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, the probe timer is reused as the raise timer when PLPMTUD is in
the Search Complete state. raise_count was introduced to count how many
times the probe timer has timed out. When raise_count reaches to 30, the
raise timer handler will be triggered.
During the whole processing above, the timer keeps timing out every probe_
interval. It is a waste for the Search Complete state, as the raise timer
only needs to time out after 30 * probe_interval.
Since the raise timer and probe timer are never used at the same time, it
is no need to keep probe timer 'alive' in the Search Complete state. This
patch to introduce sctp_transport_reset_raise_timer() to start the timer
as the raise timer when entering the Search Complete state. When entering
the other states, sctp_transport_reset_probe_timer() will still be called
to reset the timer to the probe timer.
raise_count can be removed from sctp_transport as no need to count probe
timer timeout for raise timer timeout. last_rtx_chunks can be removed as
sctp_transport_reset_probe_timer() can be called in the place where asoc
rtx_data_chunks is changed.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/edb0e48988ea85997488478b705b11ddc1ba724a.1637781974.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c94024c
("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and
7c2ef0240e6a ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which
create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a
SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged
without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from
Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that
were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections
from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches.
Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the
reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review,
but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready
for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping
objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially
a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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sctp_sf_violation_chunk() is not called with asoc argument equal to NULL,
but if that happens it would lead to NULL pointer dereference
in sctp_vtag_verify().
The patch removes code that handles NULL asoc in sctp_sf_violation_chunk().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Proposed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
v1->v2:
- fix the return value of security_sctp_assoc_established() in
security.h, found by kernel test robot and Ondrej.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The asoc created when receives the INIT chunk is a temporary one, it
will be deleted after INIT_ACK chunk is replied. So for the real asoc
created in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() when the COOKIE_ECHO chunk is received,
security_sctp_assoc_request() should also be called.
v1->v2:
- fix some typo and grammar errors, noticed by Ondrej.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.
Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
v1->v2:
- fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
- fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sctp_sf_ootb() is called when processing DATA chunk in closed state,
and many other places are also using it.
The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.
When fails to verify the vtag from the chunk, this patch sets asoc
to NULL, so that the abort will be made with the vtag from the
received chunk later.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa() is called when processing SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk
in cookie_wait and cookie_echoed state.
The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.
Note that when fails to verify the vtag from SHUTDOWN-ACK chunk,
SHUTDOWN COMPLETE message will still be sent back to peer, but
with the vtag from SHUTDOWN-ACK chunk, as said in 5) of
rfc4960#section-8.4.
While at it, also remove the unnecessary chunk length check from
sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(), as it's already done in both places where
it calls sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk
in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it.
The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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1. In closed state: in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce():
When asoc is NULL, making packet for abort will use chunk's vtag
in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). But when asoc exists, vtag from the chunk
should be verified before using peer.i.init_tag to make packet
for abort in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(), and just discard it if vtag is
not correct.
2. In the other states: in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook():
asoc always exists, but duplicate cookie_echo's vtag will be
handled by sctp_tietags_compare() and then take actions, so before
that we only verify the vtag for the abort sent for invalid chunk
length.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently INIT_ACK chunk in non-cookie_echoed state is processed in
sctp_sf_discard_chunk() to send an abort with the existent asoc's
vtag if the chunk length is not valid. But the vtag in the chunk's
sctphdr is not verified, which may be exploited by one to cook a
malicious chunk to terminal a SCTP asoc.
sctp_sf_discard_chunk() also is called in many other places to send
an abort, and most of those have this problem. This patch is to fix
it by sending abort with the existent asoc's vtag only if the vtag
from the chunk's sctphdr is verified in sctp_sf_discard_chunk().
Note on sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort() and sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort(),
the chunk length has been verified before sctp_sf_discard_chunk(),
so replace it with sctp_sf_discard(). On sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack() and
sctp_sf_do_asconf(), move the sctp_chunk_length_valid check ahead of
sctp_sf_discard_chunk(), then replace it with sctp_sf_discard().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This patch fixes the problems below:
1. In non-shutdown_ack_sent states: in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and
sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit():
chunk length check should be done before any checks that may cause
to send abort, as making packet for abort will access the init_tag
from init_hdr in sctp_ootb_pkt_new().
2. In shutdown_ack_sent state: in sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack():
The same checks as does in sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit() is needed
for sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently Linux SCTP uses the verification tag of the existing SCTP
asoc when failing to process and sending the packet with the ABORT
chunk. This will result in the peer accepting the ABORT chunk and
removing the SCTP asoc. One could exploit this to terminate a SCTP
asoc.
This patch is to fix it by always using the initiate tag of the
received INIT chunk for the ABORT chunk to be sent.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This patch does 3 things:
- make sctp_transport_pl_send() and sctp_transport_pl_recv()
return bool type to decide if more probe is needed to send.
- pr_debug() only when probe is really needed to send.
- count pl.raise_count in sctp_transport_pl_send() instead of
sctp_transport_pl_recv(), and it's only incremented for the
1st probe for the same size.
These are preparations for the next patch to make probes happen
only when there's packet loss in Search Complete state.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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These is no need to wait for 'interval' period for the next probe
if the last probe is already acked in search state. The 'interval'
period waiting should be only for probe failure timeout and the
current pmtu check when it's in search complete state.
This change will shorten the probe time a lot in search state, and
also fix the document accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As described in rfc8899#section-5.2, when a probe succeeds, there might
be the following state transitions:
- Base -> Search, occurs when probe succeeds with BASE_PLPMTU,
pl.pmtu is not changing,
pl.probe_size increases by SCTP_PL_BIG_STEP,
- Error -> Search, occurs when probe succeeds with BASE_PLPMTU,
pl.pmtu is changed from SCTP_MIN_PLPMTU to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU,
pl.probe_size increases by SCTP_PL_BIG_STEP.
- Search -> Search Complete, occurs when probe succeeds with the probe
size SCTP_MAX_PLPMTU less than pl.probe_high,
pl.pmtu is not changing, but update *pathmtu* with it,
pl.probe_size is set back to pl.pmtu to double check it.
- Search Complete -> Search, occurs when probe succeeds with the probe
size equal to pl.pmtu,
pl.pmtu is not changing,
pl.probe_size increases by SCTP_PL_MIN_STEP.
So search process can be described as:
1. When it just enters 'Search' state, *pathmtu* is not updated with
pl.pmtu, and probe_size increases by a big step (SCTP_PL_BIG_STEP)
each round.
2. Until pl.probe_high is set when a probe fails, and probe_size
decreases back to pl.pmtu, as described in the last patch.
3. When the probe with the new size succeeds, probe_size changes to
increase by a small step (SCTP_PL_MIN_STEP) due to pl.probe_high
is set.
4. Until probe_size is next to pl.probe_high, the searching finishes and
it goes to 'Complete' state and updates *pathmtu* with pl.pmtu, and
then probe_size is set to pl.pmtu to confirm by once more probe.
5. This probe occurs after "30 * probe_inteval", a much longer time than
that in Search state. Once it is done it goes to 'Search' state again
with probe_size increased by SCTP_PL_MIN_STEP.
As we can see above, during the searching, pl.pmtu changes while *pathmtu*
doesn't. *pathmtu* is only updated when the search finishes by which it
gets an optimal value for it. A big step is used at the beginning until
it gets close to the optimal value, then it changes to a small step until
it has this optimal value.
The small step is also used in 'Complete' until it goes to 'Search' state
again and the probe with 'pmtu + the small step' succeeds, which means a
higher size could be used. Then probe_size changes to increase by a big
step again until it gets close to the next optimal value.
Note that anytime when black hole is detected, it goes directly to 'Base'
state with pl.pmtu set to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU, as described in the last patch.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The state transition is described in rfc8899#section-5.2,
PROBE_COUNT == MAX_PROBES means the probe fails for MAX times, and the
state transition includes:
- Base -> Error, occurs when BASE_PLPMTU Confirmation Fails,
pl.pmtu is set to SCTP_MIN_PLPMTU,
probe_size is still SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU;
- Search -> Base, occurs when Black Hole Detected,
pl.pmtu is set to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU,
probe_size is set back to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU;
- Search Complete -> Base, occurs when Black Hole Detected
pl.pmtu is set to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU,
probe_size is set back to SCTP_BASE_PLPMTU;
Note a black hole is encountered when a sender is unaware that packets
are not being delivered to the destination endpoint. So it includes the
probe failures with equal probe_size to pl.pmtu, and definitely not
include that with greater probe_size than pl.pmtu. The later one is the
normal probe failure where probe_size should decrease back to pl.pmtu
and pl.probe_high is set. pl.probe_high would be used on HB ACK recv
path in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch does exactly what rfc8899#section-6.2.1.2 says:
The SCTP sender needs to be able to determine the total size of a
probe packet. The HEARTBEAT chunk could carry a Heartbeat
Information parameter that includes, besides the information
suggested in [RFC4960], the probe size to help an implementation
associate a HEARTBEAT ACK with the size of probe that was sent. The
sender could also use other methods, such as sending a nonce and
verifying the information returned also contains the corresponding
nonce. The length of the PAD chunk is computed by reducing the
probing size by the size of the SCTP common header and the HEARTBEAT
chunk.
Note that HB ACK chunk will carry back whatever HB chunk carried, including
the probe_size we put it in; We also check hbinfo->probe_size in the HB ACK
against link->pl.probe_size to validate this HB ACK chunk.
v1->v2:
- Remove the unused 'sp' and add static for sctp_packet_bundle_pad().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There are 3 timers described in rfc8899#section-5.1.1:
PROBE_TIMER, PMTU_RAISE_TIMER, CONFIRMATION_TIMER
This patches adds a 'probe_timer' in transport, and it works as either
PROBE_TIMER or PMTU_RAISE_TIMER. At most time, it works as PROBE_TIMER
and expires every a 'probe_interval' time to send the HB probe packet.
When transport pl enters COMPLETE state, it works as PMTU_RAISE_TIMER
and expires in 'probe_interval * 30' time to go back to SEARCH state
and do searching again.
SCTP HB is an acknowledged packet, CONFIRMATION_TIMER is not needed.
The timer will start when transport pl enters BASE state and stop
when it enters DISABLED state.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Fix some spelling mistakes in comments:
genereate ==> generate
correclty ==> correctly
boundries ==> boundaries
failes ==> fails
isses ==> issues
assocition ==> association
signe ==> sign
assocaition ==> association
managemement ==> management
restransmissions ==> retransmission
sideffect ==> sideeffect
bomming ==> booming
chukns ==> chunks
SHUDOWN ==> SHUTDOWN
violationg ==> violating
explcitly ==> explicitly
CHunk ==> Chunk
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210601020801.3625358-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Normally SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB is always incremented once asoc enter into
ESTABLISHED from the state < ESTABLISHED and decremented when the asoc
is being deleted.
However, in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(), the asoc's state can be changed to
ESTABLISHED from the state >= ESTABLISHED where it shouldn't increment
SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB. Otherwise, one asoc may increment MIB_CURRESTAB
multiple times but only decrement once at the end.
I was able to reproduce it by using scapy to do the 4-way shakehands,
after that I replayed the COOKIE-ECHO chunk with 'peer_vtag' field
changed to different values, and SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB was incremented
multiple times and never went back to 0 even when the asoc was freed.
This patch is to fix it by only incrementing SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB when
the state < ESTABLISHED in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 7e9269a5acec6d841d22e12770a0b02db4f5d8f2.
As Jere notice, commit 35b4f24415c8 ("sctp: do asoc update earlier
in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a") only keeps the SHUTDOWN and COOKIE-ACK
with the same asoc, not transport. So we have to bring this patch
back.
Reported-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The same thing should be done for sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b().
Meanwhile, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC cmd can be removed.
v1->v2:
- Fix the return value in sctp_sf_do_assoc_update().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This can be reverted as shutdown and cookie_ack chunk are using the
same asoc since the last patch.
This reverts commit 145cb2f7177d94bc54563ed26027e952ee0ae03c.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below:
[] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp]
[] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp]
[] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp]
[] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp]
This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a
duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK
and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc.
However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send
them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport
that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually
belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc
T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed
would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire().
Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue.
To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate
the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This
would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out
with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this.
Fixes: 145cb2f7177d ("sctp: Fix bundling of SHUTDOWN with COOKIE-ACK")
Reported-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bbe538efd1046586f587@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Michal Tesar <mtesar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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s/simulataneous/simultaneous/ ....in three dirrent places.
s/tempory/temporary/
s/interpeter/interpreter/
Signed-off-by: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This is from Section 4 of draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-udp-encaps-cons-03,
and it requires responding with an abort chunk with an error cause
when the udp source port of the received init chunk doesn't match the
encap port of the transport.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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As rfc6951#section-5.4 says:
"After finding the SCTP association (which
includes checking the verification tag), the UDP source port MUST be
stored as the encapsulation port for the destination address the SCTP
packet is received from (see Section 5.1).
When a non-encapsulated SCTP packet is received by the SCTP stack,
the encapsulation of outgoing packets belonging to the same
association and the corresponding destination address MUST be
disabled."
transport encap_port should be updated by a validated incoming packet's
udp src port.
We save the udp src port in sctp_input_cb->encap_port, and then update
the transport in two places:
1. right after vtag is verified, which is required by RFC, and this
allows the existent transports to be updated by the chunks that
can only be processed on an asoc.
2. right before processing the 'init' where the transports are added,
and this allows building a sctp over udp connection by client with
the server not knowing the remote encap port.
3. when processing ootb_pkt and creating the temporary transport for
the reply pkt.
Note that sctp_input_cb->header is removed, as it's not used any more
in sctp.
v1->v2:
- Change encap_port as __be16 for sctp_input_cb.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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socket is closed
Commit bdf6fa52f01b ("sctp: handle association restarts when the
socket is closed.") starts shutdown when an association is restarted,
if in SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and the socket is closed. However, the
rationale stated in that commit applies also when in SHUTDOWN-SENT
state - we don't want to move an association to ESTABLISHED state when
the socket has been closed, because that results in an association
that is unreachable from user space.
The problem scenario:
1. Client crashes and/or restarts.
2. Server (using one-to-one socket) calls close(). SHUTDOWN is lost.
3. Client reconnects using the same addresses and ports.
4. Server's association is restarted. The association and the socket
move to ESTABLISHED state, even though the server process has
closed its descriptor.
Also, after step 4 when the server process exits, some resources are
leaked in an attempt to release the underlying inet sock structure in
ESTABLISHED state:
IPv4: Attempt to release TCP socket in state 1 00000000377288c7
Fix by acting the same way as in SHUTDOWN-PENDING state. That is, if
an association is restarted in SHUTDOWN-SENT state and the socket is
closed, then start shutdown and don't move the association or the
socket to ESTABLISHED state.
Fixes: bdf6fa52f01b ("sctp: handle association restarts when the socket is closed.")
Signed-off-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When we start shutdown in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), we want to bundle
the SHUTDOWN with the COOKIE-ACK to ensure that the peer receives them
at the same time and in the correct order. This bundling was broken by
commit 4ff40b86262b ("sctp: set chunk transport correctly when it's a
new asoc"), which assigns a transport for the COOKIE-ACK, but not for
the SHUTDOWN.
Fix this by passing a reference to the COOKIE-ACK chunk as an argument
to sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown() and onward to
sctp_make_shutdown(). This way the SHUTDOWN chunk is assigned the same
transport as the COOKIE-ACK chunk, which allows them to be bundled.
In sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(), the void *arg parameter was
previously unused. Now that we're taking it into use, it must be a
valid pointer to a chunk, or NULL. There is only one call site where
it's not, in sctp_sf_autoclose_timer_expire(). Fix that too.
Fixes: 4ff40b86262b ("sctp: set chunk transport correctly when it's a new asoc")
Signed-off-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When T2 timer is to be stopped, the asoc should also be deleted,
otherwise, there will be no chance to call sctp_association_free
and the asoc could last in memory forever.
However, in sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort(), after adding the cmd
SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP for T2 timer, it may return error due to the
format error from __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort() and miss adding
SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED where the asoc will be deleted.
This patch is to fix it by moving the format error check out of
__sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(), and do it before adding the cmd
SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP for T2 timer.
Thanks Hangbin for reporting this issue by the fuzz testing.
v1->v2:
- improve the comment in the code as Marcelo's suggestion.
Fixes: 96ca468b86b0 ("sctp: check invalid value of length parameter in error cause")
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The function sctp_sf_eat_sack_6_2 now performs the Verification
Tag validation, Chunk length validation, Bogu check, and also
the detection of out-of-order SACK based on the RFC2960
Section 6.2 at the beginning, and finally performs the further
processing of SACK. The trace_sctp_probe now triggered before
the above necessary validation and check.
this patch is to do the trace_sctp_probe after the chunk sanity
tests, but keep doing trace if the SACK received is out of order,
for the out-of-order SACK is valuable to congestion control
debugging.
v1->v2:
- keep doing SCTP trace if the SACK is out of order as Marcelo's
suggestion.
v2->v3:
- regenerate the patch as v2 generated on top of v1, and add
'net-next' tag to the new one as Marcelo's comments.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Kou <qdkevin.kou@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 312434617cb1 ("sctp: cache netns in sctp_ep_common") set netns
in asoc and ep base since they're created, and it will never change.
It's a better way to get netns from asoc and ep base, comparing to
calling sock_net().
This patch is to replace them.
v1->v2:
- no change.
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In the implementation of sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() the allocated
new_asoc is leaked if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails. Release it
via sctp_association_free().
Fixes: 2277c7cd75e3 ("sctp: Add LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
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asconf chunks should be dropped when the asoc doesn't support
asconf feature.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this sctp implementation is free software you can redistribute it
and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license
as published by the free software foundation either version 2 or at
your option any later version this sctp implementation is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with gnu cc see the file copying if not see
http www gnu org licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 42 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091649.683323110@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Three trivial overlapping conflicts.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffffa4375904>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[<ffffffffa436fcaf>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72
[<ffffffffa437b93a>] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00
[<ffffffffa3cd5326>] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30
[<ffffffffa437bc4a>] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffffa3e22be8>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200
[<ffffffffa423512d>] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0
[<ffffffffc0995320>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc098510e>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc098646c>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc0977338>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc099443d>] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc0977384>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc097b3a4>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc09840f1>] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp]
[<ffffffffc099732b>] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]
As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX
softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later,
and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides,
sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.
Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693404c ("sctp: Fix
oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command
SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still
used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will
be called in this command again.
To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF
not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st
sctp_do_sm() directly.
Reported-by: Ying Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sk_forward_alloc's updating is also done on rx path, but to be consistent
we change to use sk_mem_charge() in sctp_skb_set_owner_r().
In sctp_eat_data(), it's not enough to check sctp_memory_pressure only,
which doesn't work for mem_cgroup_sockets_enabled, so we change to use
sk_under_memory_pressure().
When it's under memory pressure, sk_mem_reclaim() and sk_rmem_schedule()
should be called on both RENEGE or CHUNK DELIVERY path exit the memory
pressure status as soon as possible.
Note that sk_rmem_schedule() is using datalen to make things easy there.
Reported-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.
The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.
This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.
While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
do the delayed authentication.
v1->v2:
fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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