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The ctx->mech_used.data allocated by kmemdup is not freed in neither
gss_import_v2_context nor it only caller gss_krb5_import_sec_context,
which frees ctx on error.
Thus, this patch reform the last call of gss_import_v2_context to the
gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2, preventing the memleak while keepping the return
formation.
Fixes: 47d848077629 ("gss_krb5: handle new context format from gssd")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to Sun RPC modules.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108181610.2697017-6-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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All supported encryption types now use the same context import
function.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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This code is now always on, so the ifdef can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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We no longer support importing v1 contexts.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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None of this code can be enabled any more.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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These enctypes can no longer be enabled via CONFIG.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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I plan to add KUnit tests that will need enctype profile
information. Export the enctype profile lookup function.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add the RFC 6803 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The Camellia enctypes use the KDF_FEEDBACK_CMAC Key Derivation
Function defined in RFC 6803 Section 3.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 6803 defines two encryption types that use Camellia ciphers (RFC
3713) and CMAC digests. Implement support for those in SunRPC's GSS
Kerberos 5 mechanism.
There has not been an explicit request to support these enctypes.
However, this new set of enctypes provides a good alternative to the
AES-SHA1 enctypes that are to be deprecated at some point.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add the RFC 8009 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Link: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=400
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 8009 enctypes use different crypt formulae than previous
Kerberos 5 encryption types. Section 1 of RFC 8009 explains the
reason for this change:
> The new types conform to the framework specified in [RFC3961],
> but do not use the simplified profile, as the simplified profile
> is not compliant with modern cryptographic best practices such as
> calculating Message Authentication Codes (MACs) over ciphertext
> rather than plaintext.
Add new .encrypt and .decrypt functions to handle this variation.
The new approach described above is referred to as Encrypt-then-MAC
(or EtM). Hence the names of the new functions added here are
prefixed with "krb5_etm_".
A critical second difference with previous crypt formulae is that
the cipher state is included in the computed HMAC. Note however that
for RPCSEC, the initial cipher state is easy to compute on both
initiator and acceptor because it is always all zeroes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The RFC 8009 encryption types use a different key derivation
function than the RFC 3962 encryption types. The new key derivation
function is defined in Section 3 of RFC 8009.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Fill in entries in the supported_gss_krb5_enctypes array for the
encryption types defined in RFC 8009. These new enctypes use the
SHA-256 and SHA-384 message digest algorithms (as defined in
FIPS-180) instead of the deprecated SHA-1 algorithm, and are thus
more secure.
Note that NIST has scheduled SHA-1 for deprecation:
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm
Thus these new encryption types are placed under a separate CONFIG
option to enable distributors to separately introduce support for
the AES-SHA2 enctypes and deprecate support for the current set of
AES-SHA1 encryption types as their user space allows.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits. Add new fields to struct
gss_krb5_enctype that specify the key lengths individually, and
where needed, use the correct new field instead of ->keylength.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Although the Kerberos specs have always listed separate subkey
lengths, the Linux kernel's SunRPC GSS Kerberos enctype profiles
assume the base key and the derived keys have identical lengths.
The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits.
To support that enctype, parametrize context_v2_alloc_cipher() so
that each of its call sites can pass in its desired key length. For
now it will be the same length as before (gk5e->keylength), but a
subsequent patch will change this.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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De-duplicate some common code.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Each Kerberos enctype can have a different KDF. Refactor the key
derivation path to support different KDFs for the enctypes
introduced in subsequent patches.
In particular, expose the key derivation function in struct
gss_krb5_enctype instead of the enctype's preferred random-to-key
function. The latter is usually the identity function and is only
ever called during key derivation, so have each KDF call it
directly.
A couple of extra clean-ups:
- Deduplicate the set_cdata() helper
- Have ->derive_key return negative errnos, in accordance with usual
kernel coding conventions
This patch is a little bigger than I'd like, but these are all
mechanical changes and they are all to the same areas of code. No
behavior change is intended.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Clean up: there is now only one encrypt and only one decrypt method,
thus there is no longer a need for the v2-suffixed method names.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Clean up: ->encrypt is set to only one value. Replace the two
remaining call sites with direct calls to krb5_encrypt().
There have never been any call sites for the ->decrypt() method.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Because the DES block cipher has been deprecated by Internet
standard, highly secure configurations might require that DES
support be blacklisted or not installed. NFS Kerberos should still
be able to work correctly with only the AES-based enctypes in that
situation.
Also note that MIT Kerberos has begun a deprecation process for DES
encryption types. Their README for 1.19.3 states:
> Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued
> if initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1
> encryption type. In future releases, this encryption type will
> be disabled by default and eventually removed.
>
> Beginning with the krb5-1.18 release, single-DES encryption
> types have been removed.
Aside from the CONFIG option name change, there are two important
policy changes:
1. The 'insecure enctype' group is now disabled by default.
Distributors have to take action to enable support for deprecated
enctypes. Implementation of these enctypes will be removed in a
future kernel release.
2. des3-cbc-sha1 is now considered part of the 'insecure enctype'
group, having been deprecated by RFC 8429, and is thus disabled
by default
After this patch is applied, SunRPC support can be built with
Kerberos 5 support but without CRYPTO_DES enabled in the kernel.
And, when these enctypes are disabled, the Linux kernel's SunRPC
RPCSEC GSS implementation fully complies with BCP 179 / RFC 6649
and BCP 218 / RFC 8429.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Now that all consumers of the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro are
within the SunRPC layer, the macro can be replaced with something
private and more flexible.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Replace another switch on encryption type so that it does not have
to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Replace a number of switches on encryption type so that all of them don't
have to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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There's no need to keep the integrity keys around if we instead
allocate and key a pair of ahashes and keep those. This not only
enables the subkeys to be destroyed immediately after deriving
them, but it makes the Kerberos integrity code path more efficient.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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There's no need to keep the signing keys around if we instead allocate
and key an ahash and keep that. This not only enables the subkeys to
be destroyed immediately after deriving them, but it makes the
Kerberos signing code path more efficient.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The encryption subkeys are not used after the cipher transforms have
been allocated and keyed. There is no need to retain them in struct
krb5_ctx.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Hoist the name of the aux_cipher into struct gss_krb5_enctype to
prepare for obscuring the encryption keys just after they are
derived.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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ctx->Ksess is never used after import has completed. Obscure it
immediately so it cannot be re-used or copied.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Other common Kerberos implementations use a fully random confounder
for encryption. The reason for this is explained in the new comment
added by this patch. The current get_random_bytes() implementation
does not exhaust system entropy.
Since confounder generation is part of Kerberos itself rather than
the GSS-API Kerberos mechanism, the function is renamed and moved.
Note that light top-down analysis shows that the SHA-1 transform
is by far the most CPU-intensive part of encryption. Thus we do not
expect this change to result in a significant performance impact.
However, eventually it might be necessary to generate an independent
stream of confounders for each Kerberos context to help improve I/O
parallelism.
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Now that arcfour-hmac is gone, the confounder length is again the
same as the cipher blocksize for every implemented enctype. The
gss_krb5_enctype::conflen field is no longer necessary.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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It is not clear from documenting comments, specifications, or code
usage what value the gss_krb5_enctype.blocksize field is supposed
to store. The "encryption blocksize" depends only on the cipher
being used, so that value can be derived where it's needed instead
of stored as a constant.
RFC 3961 Section 5.2 says:
> cipher block size, c
> This is the block size of the block cipher underlying the
> encryption and decryption functions indicated above, used for key
> derivation and for the size of the message confounder and initial
> vector. (If a block cipher is not in use, some comparable
> parameter should be determined.) It must be at least 5 octets.
>
> This is not actually an independent parameter; rather, it is a
> property of the functions E and D. It is listed here to clarify
> the distinction between it and the message block size, m.
In the Linux kernel's implemenation of the SunRPC RPCSEC GSS
Kerberos 5 mechanism, the cipher block size, which is dependent on
the encryption and decryption transforms, is used only in
krb5_derive_key(), so it is straightforward to replace it.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Remove duplicated helper functions to parse opaque XDR objects
and place inside new file net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h.
In the new file carry the license and copyright from the source file
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c. Finally, update the comment inside
include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h since lockd is not the only user of
struct xdr_netobj.
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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The RC4-HMAC-MD5 KerberosV algorithm is based on RFC 4757 [0], which
was specifically issued for interoperability with Windows 2000, but was
never intended to receive the same level of support. The RFC says
The IETF Kerberos community supports publishing this specification as
an informational document in order to describe this widely
implemented technology. However, while these encryption types
provide the operations necessary to implement the base Kerberos
specification [RFC4120], they do not provide all the required
operations in the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961]. As a
result, it is not generally possible to implement potential
extensions to Kerberos using these encryption types. The Kerberos
encryption type negotiation mechanism [RFC4537] provides one approach
for using such extensions even when a Kerberos infrastructure uses
long-term RC4 keys. Because this specification does not implement
operations required by RFC 3961 and because of security concerns with
the use of RC4 and MD4 discussed in Section 8, this specification is
not appropriate for publication on the standards track.
The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing
Windows NT environments, provide strong cryptography (128-bit key
lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government
export restriction requirements) encryption. This document describes
the implementation of those encryption types.
Furthermore, this RFC was re-classified as 'historic' by RFC 8429 [1] in
2018, stating that 'none of the encryption types it specifies should be
used'
Note that other outdated algorithms are left in place (some of which are
guarded by CONFIG_SUNRPC_DISABLE_INSECURE_ENCTYPES), so this should only
adversely affect interoperability with Windows NT/2000 systems that have
not received any updates since 2008 (but are connected to a network
nonetheless)
[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4757
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8429
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Using signed 32-bit types for UTC time leads to the y2038 overflow,
which is what happens in the sunrpc code at the moment.
This changes the sunrpc code over to use time64_t where possible.
The one exception is the gss_import_v{1,2}_context() function for
kerberos5, which uses 32-bit timestamps in the protocol. Here,
we can at least treat the numbers as 'unsigned', which extends the
range from 2038 to 2106.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Files under net/sunrpc/auth_gss/ do not yet have SPDX ID tags.
This directory is somewhat complicated because most of these files
have license boilerplate that is not strictly GPL 2.0.
In this patch I add ID tags where there is an obvious match. The
less recognizable licenses are still under research.
For reference, SPDX IDs added in this patch correspond to the
following license text:
GPL-2.0 https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0.html
GPL-2.0+ https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0+.html
BSD-3-Clause https://spdx.org/licenses/BSD-3-Clause.html
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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Enable distributions to enforce the rejection of ancient and
insecure Kerberos enctypes in the kernel's RPCSEC_GSS
implementation. These are the single-DES encryption types that
were deprecated in 2012 by RFC 6649.
Enctypes that were deprecated more recently (by RFC 8429) remain
fully supported for now because they are still likely to be widely
used.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
Bugfix:
- Fix build issues on architectures that don't provide 64-bit cmpxchg
Cleanups:
- Fix a spelling mistake"
* tag 'nfs-for-4.20-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
NFS: fix spelling mistake, EACCESS -> EACCES
SUNRPC: Use atomic(64)_t for seq_send(64)
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The seq_send & seq_send64 fields in struct krb5_ctx are used as
atomically incrementing counters. This is implemented using cmpxchg() &
cmpxchg64() to implement what amount to custom versions of
atomic_fetch_inc() & atomic64_fetch_inc().
Besides the duplication, using cmpxchg64() has another major drawback in
that some 32 bit architectures don't provide it. As such commit
571ed1fd2390 ("SUNRPC: Replace krb5_seq_lock with a lockless scheme")
resulted in build failures for some architectures.
Change seq_send to be an atomic_t and seq_send64 to be an atomic64_t,
then use atomic(64)_* functions to manipulate the values. The atomic64_t
type & associated functions are provided even on architectures which
lack real 64 bit atomic memory access via CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 which
uses spinlocks to serialize access. This fixes the build failures for
architectures lacking cmpxchg64().
A potential alternative that was raised would be to provide cmpxchg64()
on the 32 bit architectures that currently lack it, using spinlocks.
However this would provide a version of cmpxchg64() with semantics a
little different to the implementations on architectures with real 64
bit atomics - the spinlock-based implementation would only work if all
access to the memory used with cmpxchg64() is *always* performed using
cmpxchg64(). That is not currently a requirement for users of
cmpxchg64(), and making it one seems questionable. As such avoiding
cmpxchg64() outside of architecture-specific code seems best,
particularly in cases where atomic64_t seems like a better fit anyway.
The CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 implementation of atomic64_* functions will
use spinlocks & so faces the same issue, but with the key difference
that the memory backing an atomic64_t ought to always be accessed via
the atomic64_* functions anyway making the issue moot.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Fixes: 571ed1fd2390 ("SUNRPC: Replace krb5_seq_lock with a lockless scheme")
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Writes may depend on the auth_gss crypto code, so we shouldn't be
allocating with GFP_KERNEL there.
This still leaves some crypto_alloc_* calls which end up doing
GFP_KERNEL allocations in the crypto code. Those could probably done at
crypto import time.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Direct data placement is not allowed when using flavors that
guarantee integrity or privacy. When such security flavors are in
effect, don't allow the use of Read and Write chunks for moving
individual data items. All messages larger than the inline threshold
are sent via Long Call or Long Reply.
On my systems (CX-3 Pro on FDR), for small I/O operations, the use
of Long messages adds only around 5 usecs of latency in each
direction.
Note that when integrity or encryption is used, the host CPU touches
every byte in these messages. Even if it could be used, data
movement offload doesn't buy much in this case.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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The skcpiher/shash conversion introduced a number of bugs in the
sunrpc code:
1) Missing calls to skcipher_request_set_tfm lead to crashes.
2) The allocation size of shash_desc is too small which leads to
memory corruption.
Fixes: 3b5cf20cf439 ("sunrpc: Use skcipher and ahash/shash")
Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher and the long
obsolete hash interface with either shash (for non-SG users) and
ahash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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It's always set to whatever CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG is, so just use that.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
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for-3.10
Note conflict: Chuck's patches modified (and made static)
gss_mech_get_by_OID, which is still needed by gss-proxy patches.
The conflict resolution is a bit minimal; we may want some more cleanup.
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We expose this parameter for a future caller.
It will be used to extract the endtime from the gss-proxy upcall mechanism,
in order to set the rsc cache expiration time.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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