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2023-11-27gcc-plugins: randstruct: Update code comment in relayout_struct()Gustavo A. R. Silva
Update code comment to clarify that the only element whose layout is not randomized is a proper C99 flexible-array member. This update is complementary to commit 1ee60356c2dc ("gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays") Signed-off-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZWJr2MWDjXLHE8ap@work Fixes: 1ee60356c2dc ("gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-11-08gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arraysKees Cook
The randstruct GCC plugin tried to discover "fake" flexible arrays to issue warnings about them in randomized structs. In the future LSM overhead reduction series, it would be legal to have a randomized struct with a 1-element array, and this should _not_ be treated as a flexible array, especially since commit df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3"). Disable the 0-sized and 1-element array discovery logic in the plugin, but keep the "true" flexible array check. Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") Reviewed-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> Acked-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104204334.work.160-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2023-10-08randstruct: Fix gcc-plugin performance mode to stay in groupKees Cook
The performance mode of the gcc-plugin randstruct was shuffling struct members outside of the cache-line groups. Limit the range to the specified group indexes. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Lukas Loidolt <e1634039@student.tuwien.ac.at> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f3ca77f0-e414-4065-83a5-ae4c4d25545d@student.tuwien.ac.at Fixes: 313dd1b62921 ("gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-24gcc-plugins: use KERNELVERSION for plugin versionMasahiro Yamada
Commit 61f60bac8c05 ("gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernel") broke parallel builds. Instead of adding the dependency between GCC plugins and utsrelease.h, let's use KERNELVERSION, which does not require any build artifact. Another reason why I want to avoid utsrelease.h is because it depends on CONFIG_LOCALVERSION(_AUTO) and localversion* files. (include/generated/utsrelease.h depends on include/config/kernel.release, which is generated by scripts/setlocalversion) I want to keep host tools independent of the kernel configuration. There is no good reason to rebuild GCC plugins just because of CONFIG_LOCALVERSION being changed. We just want to associate the plugin versions with the kernel source version. KERNELVERSION should be enough for our purpose. Fixes: 61f60bac8c05 ("gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernel") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202205230239.EZxeZ3Fv-lkp@intel.com Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524135541.1453693-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
2022-05-16gcc-plugins: randstruct: Remove cast exception handlingKees Cook
With all randstruct exceptions removed, remove all the exception handling code. Any future warnings are likely to be shared between this plugin and Clang randstruct, and will need to be addressed in a more wholistic fashion. Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-16af_unix: Silence randstruct GCC plugin warningKees Cook
While preparing for Clang randstruct support (which duplicated many of the warnings the randstruct GCC plugin warned about), one strange one remained only for the randstruct GCC plugin. Eliminating this rids the plugin of the last exception. It seems the plugin is happy to dereference individual members of a cross-struct cast, but it is upset about casting to a whole object pointer. This only manifests in one place in the kernel, so just replace the variable with individual member accesses. There is no change in executable instruction output. Drop the last exception from the randstruct GCC plugin. Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511022217.58586-1-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511151542.4cb3ff17@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-16niu: Silence randstruct warningsKees Cook
Clang randstruct gets upset when it sees struct addresspace (which is randomized) being assigned to a struct page (which is not randomized): drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c:3385:12: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct address_space *' to 'struct page *' *link = (struct page *) page->mapping; ^ It looks like niu.c is looking for an in-line place to chain its allocated pages together and is overloading the "mapping" member, as it is unused. This is very non-standard, and is expected to be cleaned up in the future[1], but there is no "correct" way to handle it today. No meaningful machine code changes result after this change, and source readability is improved. Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type assignment. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YnqgjVoMDu5v9PNG@casper.infradead.org/ Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220511151647.7290adbe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-16big_keys: Use struct for internal payloadKees Cook
The randstruct GCC plugin gets upset when it sees struct path (which is randomized) being assigned from a "void *" (which it cannot type-check). There's no need for these casts, as the entire internal payload use is following a normal struct layout. Convert the enum-based void * offset dereferencing to the new big_key_payload struct. No meaningful machine code changes result after this change, and source readability is improved. Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type assignment. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-05-10gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernelKees Cook
It's not meaningful for the GCC plugins to track their versions separately from the rest of the kernel. Switch all versions to the kernel version. Fix mismatched indenting while we're at it. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-04-13security: don't treat structure as an array of struct hlist_headBill Wendling
The initialization of "security_hook_heads" is done by casting it to another structure pointer type, and treating it as an array of "struct hlist_head" objects. This requires an exception be made in "randstruct", because otherwise it will emit an error, reducing the effectiveness of the hardening technique. Instead of using a cast, initialize the individual struct hlist_head elements in security_hook_heads explicitly. This removes the need for the cast and randstruct exception. Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407175930.471870-1-morbo@google.com
2020-12-04gcc-plugins: remove code for GCC versions older than 4.9Masahiro Yamada
Documentation/process/changes.rst says the minimal GCC version is 4.9. Hence, BUILDING_GCC_VERSION is greater than or equal to 4009. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202134929.99883-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
2019-07-31randstruct: Check member structs in is_pure_ops_struct()Joonwon Kang
While no uses in the kernel triggered this case, it was possible to have a false negative where a struct contains other structs which contain only function pointers because of unreachable code in is_pure_ops_struct(). Signed-off-by: Joonwon Kang <kjw1627@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727155841.GA13586@host Fixes: 313dd1b62921 ("gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-03-31security: convert security hooks to use hlistSargun Dhillon
This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-02-05gcc-plugins: Use dynamic initializersKees Cook
GCC 8 changed the order of some fields and is very picky about ordering in static initializers, so instead just move to dynamic initializers, and drop the redundant already-zero field assignments. Suggested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-08-01randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detectionKees Cook
This enables the automatic structure selection logic in the randstruct GCC plugin. The selection logic randomizes all structures that contain only function pointers, unless marked with __no_randomize_layout. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-22randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloadingKees Cook
The NIU ethernet driver intentionally stores a page struct pointer on top of the "mapping" field. Whitelist this case: drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c: In function ‘niu_rx_pkt_ignore’: drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c:3402:10: note: found mismatched ssa struct pointer types: ‘struct page’ and ‘struct address_space’ *link = (struct page *) page->mapping; ~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-22randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloadingKees Cook
The big_key payload structure intentionally stores a struct path in two void pointers to avoid header soup. Whitelist this case: security/keys/big_key.c: In function ‘big_key_read’: security/keys/big_key.c:293:16: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct path’ and ‘void *’ struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; ^~~~ Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-22randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB castKees Cook
This is another false positive in bad cast detection: net/unix/af_unix.c: In function ‘unix_skb_scm_eq’: net/unix/af_unix.c:1621:31: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct unix_skb_parms’ and ‘char’ const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb); ^ UNIXCB is: #define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb)) And ->cb is: char cb[48] __aligned(8); This is a rather crazy cast, but appears to be safe in the face of randomization, so whitelist it in the plugin. Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-22randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads castKees Cook
The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the plugin: security/security.c: In function ‘security_init’: security/security.c:59:20: note: found mismatched op0 struct pointer types: ‘struct list_head’ and ‘struct security_hook_heads’ struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads; ^ Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-22gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct pluginKees Cook
This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>