summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/keys
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2019-04-08KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warningndesaulniers@google.com
Fixes the warning reported by Clang: security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that undergoes default argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs] va_start(argp, h3); ^ security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned char' is declared here unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) ^ Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4) standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior: The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a type that is not compatible with the type that results after application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is undefined. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41 Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-04-08KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPMJarkko Sakkinen
Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit also adds checks to the exported functions to fail when a TPM is not available. Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...") Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-03-10Merge branch 'next-tpm' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull tpm updates from James Morris: - Clean up the transmission flow Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored out. Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel patches by James Bottomley). - PPI 1.3 support TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one. The PPI request file will show output like this then: # echo "23 16" > request # cat request 23 16 # echo "5" > request # cat request 5 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static list of hash algorithms. This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and secure. - TPM 2.0 selftests Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits) tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3 tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3 tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1 tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm() tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend() KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip() tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit() tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit() tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop() tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c. tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit() tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit() tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow ...
2019-03-10Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
2019-03-07Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This work is from Casey and Kees. - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits) keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break tomoyo: Bump version. LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs() LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines. tomoyo: Coding style fix. tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security. security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall through capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through ...
2019-03-04keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERYBen Dooks
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning for this: security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces) security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident> security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident> Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-22KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_lenEric Biggers
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the length of the key description was never calculated. The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings(). But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens. Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the description is set, like we already do in some places. The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting. #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(void) { int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE); setreuid(5000, 5000); request_key("user", "desc", "", id); } Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15keys: Timestamp new keysDavid Howells
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset. Fixes: 31d5a79d7f3d ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth keyDavid Howells
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned. Fix this by the following changes: (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead. (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/. (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name. Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked. Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactlyEric Biggers
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for 'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page, Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached). Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly. Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-13tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()Roberto Sassu
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest. This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR bank currently allocated in the TPM. tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided, as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed. Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified. Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at initialization time. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0) Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-02-13KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()Roberto Sassu
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be passed to tpm_pcr_extend(). This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-02-04encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1Mimi Zohar
Properly start the enumeration associated with match_table_t at zero, making Opt_err/Opt_error the last enumeration value. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-01-22security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughsMathieu Malaterre
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up. This commit remove the following warnings: security/keys/request_key.c:293:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/keys/request_key.c:298:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/keys/request_key.c:307:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-22security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughsMathieu Malaterre
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up. This commit remove the following warning: security/keys/process_keys.c:380:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/keys/process_keys.c:404:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/keys/process_keys.c:424:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-22security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughMathieu Malaterre
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and this place in the code produced a warning (W=1). This commit remove the following warning: security/keys/keyring.c:248:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-01KEYS: fix parsing invalid pkey info stringEric Biggers
We need to check the return value of match_token() for Opt_err before doing anything with it. [ Not only did the old "-1" value for Opt_err cause problems for the __test_and_set_bit(), as fixed in commit 94c13f66e13c ("security: don't use a negative Opt_err token index"), but accessing "args[0].from" is invalid for the Opt_err case, as pointed out by Eric later. - Linus ] Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.20 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams: "The vast bulk of this update is the new support for the security capabilities of some nvdimms. The userspace tooling for this capability is still a work in progress, but the changes survive the existing libnvdimm unit tests. The changes also pass manual checkout on hardware and the new nfit_test emulation of the security capability. The touches of the security/keys/ files have received the necessary acks from Mimi and David. Those changes were necessary to allow for a new generic encrypted-key type, and allow the nvdimm sub-system to lookup key material referenced by the libnvdimm-sysfs interface. Summary: - Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The security model supports locking access to the media at device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and secure-erase (crypto-scramble). Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm security implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations at OS runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys facility to provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key material. The usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is driven via libnvdimm sysfs. - Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes" * tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits) libnvdimm/security: Quiet security operations libnvdimm/security: Add documentation for nvdimm security support tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test tools/testing/nvdimm: Add test support for Intel nvdimm security DSMs acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add enable/update passphrase support for Intel nvdimms acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add disable passphrase support to Intel nvdimm. acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add freeze security support to Intel nvdimm acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Store dimm id as a member to struct nvdimm libnvdimm, namespace: Replace kmemdup() with kstrndup() libnvdimm, label: Switch to bitmap_zalloc() ACPI/nfit: Adjust annotation for why return 0 if fail to find NFIT at start libnvdimm, bus: Check id immediately following ida_simple_get ...
2018-12-27Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec - Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes - Support incremental algorithm dumps Algorithms: - Add xchacha12/20 - Add nhpoly1305 - Add adiantum - Add streebog hash - Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed Drivers: - Improve performance of arm64/chacha20 - Improve performance of x86/chacha20 - Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305 - Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305 - Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305 - Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX - Add SG support in gcmaes AVX - ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr - Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree - Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree - Add SM4 support in ccree - Add SM3 support in ccree - Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2 - Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr - Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2 - Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits) crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt() crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin() crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64 crypto: api - document missing stats member crypto: user - remove unused dump functions crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len' crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro ..
2018-12-27Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris: "The main changes here are Paul Gortmaker's removal of unneccesary module.h infrastructure" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: integrity: partial revert of make ima_main explicitly non-modular security: fs: make inode explicitly non-modular security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h security: integrity: make evm_main explicitly non-modular keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly non-modular tomoyo: fix small typo
2018-12-17security: don't use a negative Opt_err token indexLinus Torvalds
The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case. There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg -EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense. There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the token array index. Mimi is sending that separately. Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Fixes: 5208cc83423d ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options") Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-13keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keysDave Jiang
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size of the key to 32bytes. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-13keys: Export lookup_user_key to external usersDave Jiang
Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase update to retrieve user injected keys. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-12security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.hPaul Gortmaker
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using. Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-12-12keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_formatPaul Gortmaker
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c" and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here. Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit use of string.h - so that is added as well. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-11-20crypto: drop mask=CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC from 'shash' tfm allocationsEric Biggers
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is somewhat counterintuitive. Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-26KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]Denis Kenzior
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]Denis Kenzior
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands. Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm key subtype and a module dependency is introduced. In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]David Howells
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys. (*) Query an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved, struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct: __u32 supported_ops; A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of: KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} __u32 key_size; The size in bits of the key. __u16 max_data_size; __u16 max_sig_size; __u16 max_enc_size; __u16 max_dec_size; The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted. reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, EOPNOTSUPP is returned. (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, const void *in2); Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a blob of data. The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer values: __s32 key_id; __u32 in_len; __u32 out_len; __u32 in2_len; For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows: Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len ======================= =============== =============== =========== KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary information. The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases required to unlock a key. If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-09-25Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct ↵Lubomir Rintel
member name" This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell: ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute': ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'? struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private, ^~~~~~~ dh_private This reverts commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8. Fixes: 8a2336e549d3 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name") Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-04uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member nameRandy Dunlap
Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones. However, the header uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private" instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace. Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org Fixes: ddbb41148724 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-03Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linuxHerbert Xu
Merge mainline to pick up c7513c2a2714 ("crypto/arm64: aes-ce-gcm - add missing kernel_neon_begin/end pair").
2018-07-09crypto: remove redundant type flags from tfm allocationEric Biggers
Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But, that's redundant since the crypto API will override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones. So, remove the unneeded flags. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-06-26dh key: fix rounding up KDF output lengthEric Biggers
Commit 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer. Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs. Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-12treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()Kees Cook
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-06Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security system updates from James Morris: - incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux and Smack modules. From David Herrmann: "The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket. Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating process." - remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon). - remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho Andersen) * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes dh key: get rid of stack allocated array big key: get rid of stack array allocation smack: provide socketpair callback selinux: provide socketpair callback net: hook socketpair() into LSM security: add hook for socketpair() security: remove security_settime
2018-05-16proc: introduce proc_create_seq{,_data}Christoph Hellwig
Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers. All trivial callers converted over. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-05-11dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroesTycho Andersen
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621 This case is interesting, since we really just need an array of bytes that are zero. The loop already ensures that if the array isn't exactly the right size that enough zero bytes will be copied in. So, instead of choosing this value to be the size of the hash, let's just choose it to be 32, since that is a common size, is not too big, and will not result in too many extra iterations of the loop. v2: split out from other patch, just hardcode array size instead of dynamically allocating something the right size v3: fix typo of 256 -> 32 Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11dh key: get rid of stack allocated arrayTycho Andersen
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621 This particular vla is used as a temporary output buffer in case there is too much hash output for the destination buffer. Instead, let's just allocate a buffer that's big enough initially, but only copy back to userspace the amount that was originally asked for. v2: allocate enough in the original output buffer vs creating a temporary output buffer Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11big key: get rid of stack array allocationTycho Andersen
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the kernel [1]. This patch simply hardcodes the iv length to match that of the hardcoded cipher. [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621 v2: hardcode the length of the nonce to be the GCM AES IV length, and do a sanity check in init(), Eric Biggers v3: * remember to free big_key_aead when sanity check fails * define a constant for big key IV size so it can be changed along side the algorithm in the code Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-04-05headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.hRandy Dunlap
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source files that do not use it. This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes. Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures for which patches are included here (in v2). [ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't combine all of those. ] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures] Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures] Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-22KEYS: Use individual pages in big_key for crypto buffersDavid Howells
kmalloc() can't always allocate large enough buffers for big_key to use for crypto (1MB + some metadata) so we cannot use that to allocate the buffer. Further, vmalloc'd pages can't be passed to sg_init_one() and the aead crypto accessors cannot be called progressively and must be passed all the data in one go (which means we can't pass the data in one block at a time). Fix this by allocating the buffer pages individually and passing them through a multientry scatterlist to the crypto layer. This has the bonus advantage that we don't have to allocate a contiguous series of pages. We then vmap() the page list and pass that through to the VFS read/write routines. This can trigger a warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60912 at mm/page_alloc.c:3883 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xb7c/0x15f8 ([<00000000002acbb6>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1ee/0x15f8) [<00000000002dd356>] kmalloc_order+0x46/0x90 [<00000000002dd3e0>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x40/0x1f8 [<0000000000326a10>] __kmalloc+0x430/0x4c0 [<00000000004343e4>] big_key_preparse+0x7c/0x210 [<000000000042c040>] key_create_or_update+0x128/0x420 [<000000000042e52c>] SyS_add_key+0x124/0x220 [<00000000007bba2c>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0 from the keyctl/padd/useradd test of the keyutils testsuite on s390x. Note that it might be better to shovel data through in page-sized lumps instead as there's no particular need to use a monolithic buffer unless the kernel itself wants to access the data. Fixes: 13100a72f40f ("Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted") Reported-by: Paul Bunyan <pbunyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
2018-01-31Merge branch 'next-tpm' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull tpm updates from James Morris: - reduce polling delays in tpm_tis - support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before ExitBootServices - replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each TPM device - TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space more sound. - CLKRUN fixes: * Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow * Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it is disabled * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: tpm: remove unused variables tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init() tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd() tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get() tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices tpm: add event log format version tpm: rename event log provider files tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
2018-01-08tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()Jarkko Sakkinen
Device number (the character device index) is not a stable identifier for a TPM chip. That is the reason why every call site passes TPM_ANY_NUM to tpm_chip_find_get(). This commit changes the API in a way that instead a struct tpm_chip instance is given and NULL means the default chip. In addition, this commit refines the documentation to be up to date with the implementation. Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> (@chip_num -> @chip part) Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Tested-by: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@gmail.com>
2018-01-03Merge branch 'for-mingo' of ↵Ingo Molnar
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu Pull RCU updates from Paul E. McKenney: - Updates to use cond_resched() instead of cond_resched_rcu_qs() where feasible (currently everywhere except in kernel/rcu and in kernel/torture.c). Also a couple of fixes to avoid sending IPIs to offline CPUs. - Updates to simplify RCU's dyntick-idle handling. - Updates to remove almost all uses of smp_read_barrier_depends() and read_barrier_depends(). - Miscellaneous fixes. - Torture-test updates. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-08KEYS: reject NULL restriction string when type is specifiedEric Biggers
keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the "type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the restriction string. But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 97d3aa0f3134 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08security: keys: remove redundant assignment to key_refColin Ian King
Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read; key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later. Hence this assignment is redundant and can be removed. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-08KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destinationEric Biggers
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08KEYS: remove unnecessary get/put of explicit dest_keyringEric Biggers
In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards. This is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring. This change is useful because we'll be making construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't want to have to handle that error here for no reason. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-04keyring: Remove now-redundant smp_read_barrier_depends()Paul E. McKenney
Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains, the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c are no longer needed. This commit therefore removes them. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>