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2019-06-05treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 282Thomas Gleixner
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141900.642774971@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-08LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-10-18LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"Kees Cook
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening (for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from its enforcement). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-18LoadPin: Report friendly block device nameKees Cook
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device name, at least as seen by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-07-16module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_moduleMimi Zohar
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-02-22get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.hAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-03-06security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_initJames Morris
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the __lsm_ro_after_init macro). Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-01-19LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsmCasey Schaufler
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-17LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIGKees Cook
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected, provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains available. Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsKees Cook
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>