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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
having any substantive changes.
These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
explosion in the diffstat).
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"
[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
lsm_audit: update my email address
selinux: update my email address
MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
credits: update Paul Moore's info
selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook:
"This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit
when running set*id processes.
To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the
bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be
determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the
resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of
an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special
handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that
was a wash"
* tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
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nf_hook_ops are not supposed to change at runtime. nf_register_net_hooks
and nf_unregister_net_hooks are working with const nf_hook_ops.
So mark the non-const nf_hook_ops structs as const.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line and merge tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services,
it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services
and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose
unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services
whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with
running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a
CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=,
SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=,
PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=,
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5)
man page.
The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and
SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these
options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For
users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on
at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep
SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections
because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for
that service provides the same protections in all cases.
commit 7b0d0b40cd78 ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under
NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in
order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However,
defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains
is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us
to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant
domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain
of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from
descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would
be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking
permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could
weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants
(e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of
its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file,
then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a
symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...).
SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this
manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections
and least privilege.
We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid
mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between
retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on
files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs
in security.
Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to
make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on
a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid)
between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support
for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in
policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of
its children.
With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream.
SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any
of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to
be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the
new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate.
NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential
for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp
filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts
opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from
an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use
with care.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The SELinux bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
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The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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We no longer place these on a list so they can be const.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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For PF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW is synonymous with SOCK_DGRAM (cf.
net/unix/af_unix.c). This is a tad obscure, but libpcap uses it.
Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
- a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:
* several bug fixes and cleanups
* the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
securityfs symlinks
* it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.
* This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
of this.
- Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
permission. From Paul:
"While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.
Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
capabilities on policy load"
There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.
- Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
cap_capable call in privilege check.
- TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.
- Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.
- IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
the boot command line.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
integrity: Small code improvements
ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
ima: use memdup_user_nul
ima: fix up #endif comments
IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
...
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In kernel version 4.1, tracefs was separated from debugfs into its
own filesystem. Prior to this split, files in
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing could be labeled during filesystem
creation using genfscon or later from userspace using setxattr. This
change re-enables support for genfscon labeling.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch
from Tetsuo Handa:
* https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2
The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the
security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory
on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later
attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem.
In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call
security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory
directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly,
regardless of what the caller may do.
Fixes: e0007529893c1c06 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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labeling behavior
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
store PKey SIDs.
This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept
originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore
<paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and
security/selinux/netport.c for more information)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.
Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.
Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
building with clang:
security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
is not needed and will not be emitted
[-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel
(COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of
an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will
generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to
the same permission bit in socket vs file classes.
open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless
and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and
can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when
operating on a socket.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped
access (since it has different implications for revocation). When a file
is opened and then read or written via syscalls like read(2)/write(2),
we revalidate access on each read/write operation via
selinux_file_permission() and therefore can revoke access if the
process context, the file context, or the policy changes in such a
manner that access is no longer allowed. When a file is opened and then
memory mapped via mmap(2) and then subsequently read or written directly
in memory, we presently have no way to revalidate or revoke access.
The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit
policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need
to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for
scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order
to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline
without data copying).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw,
uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security
policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base
capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other
modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do
not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
since it may have different implications for their security model.
Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the
capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because
task_alloc hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived.
Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for
fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in
Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that
permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore,
a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that
the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to
check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux
can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not
yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using
the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization
steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in
copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation.
Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind():
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
inter: 0
CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc6+ #1916
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48
ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff825759c8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818bdee6>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008
[<ffffffff818bf0fb>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[<ffffffff822dae71>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288
[<ffffffff8229357c>] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240
[<ffffffff84265d98>] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb
[<ffffffff810bb7a7>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337
[<ffffffff818bd2b8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530
[<ffffffff818bf033>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84265b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=======================================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct sockaddr addr;
int size = 0;
if (argc > 1) {
size = atoi(argv[1]);
}
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP);
bind(fd, &addr, size);
return 0;
}
=======================================================
(for different values of |size| other error reports are printed).
This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of
|addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then
security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the
uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to
sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[PM: fixed some whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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commit 79bcf325e6b32b3c ("prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook
for prlimit") introduced a security hook for prlimit() and implemented it
for SELinux. However, if prlimit() is called with NULL arguments for both
the new limit and the old limit, then the hook is called with 0 for the
read/write flags, since the prlimit() will neither read nor write the
process' limits. This would in turn lead to calling avc_has_perm() with 0
for the requested permissions, which triggers a BUG_ON() in
avc_has_perm_noaudit() since the kernel should never be invoking
avc_has_perm() with no permissions. Fix this in the SELinux hook by
returning immediately if the flags are 0. Arguably prlimit64() itself
ought to return immediately if both old_rlim and new_rlim are NULL since
it is effectively a no-op in that case.
Reported by the lkp-robot based on trinity testing.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
"The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
<linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
have a cleaner header structure.
After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed
size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.
Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.
I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.
I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"
* 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h>
sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h>
sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h>
sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h>
...
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<linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/signal.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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commit 1ea0ce40690dff38935538e8dab7b12683ded0d3 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts. However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial. Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability. This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support TX_RING in AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 mode, from Sowmini
Varadhan.
2) Simplify classifier state on sk_buff in order to shrink it a bit.
From Willem de Bruijn.
3) Introduce SIPHASH and it's usage for secure sequence numbers and
syncookies. From Jason A. Donenfeld.
4) Reduce CPU usage for ICMP replies we are going to limit or
suppress, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
5) Introduce Shared Memory Communications socket layer, from Ursula
Braun.
6) Add RACK loss detection and allow it to actually trigger fast
recovery instead of just assisting after other algorithms have
triggered it. From Yuchung Cheng.
7) Add xmit_more and BQL support to mvneta driver, from Simon Guinot.
8) skb_cow_data avoidance in esp4 and esp6, from Steffen Klassert.
9) Export MPLS packet stats via netlink, from Robert Shearman.
10) Significantly improve inet port bind conflict handling, especially
when an application is restarted and changes it's setting of
reuseport. From Josef Bacik.
11) Implement TX batching in vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
12) Extend the dummy device so that VF (virtual function) features,
such as configuration, can be more easily tested. From Phil
Sutter.
13) Avoid two atomic ops per page on x86 in bnx2x driver, from Eric
Dumazet.
14) Add new bpf MAP, implementing a longest prefix match trie. From
Daniel Mack.
15) Packet sample offloading support in mlxsw driver, from Yotam Gigi.
16) Add new aquantia driver, from David VomLehn.
17) Add bpf tracepoints, from Daniel Borkmann.
18) Add support for port mirroring to b53 and bcm_sf2 drivers, from
Florian Fainelli.
19) Remove custom busy polling in many drivers, it is done in the core
networking since 4.5 times. From Eric Dumazet.
20) Support XDP adjust_head in virtio_net, from John Fastabend.
21) Fix several major holes in neighbour entry confirmation, from
Julian Anastasov.
22) Add XDP support to bnxt_en driver, from Michael Chan.
23) VXLAN offloads for enic driver, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan.
24) Add IPVTAP driver (IP-VLAN based tap driver) from Sainath Grandhi.
25) Support GRO in IPSEC protocols, from Steffen Klassert"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1764 commits)
Revert "ath10k: Search SMBIOS for OEM board file extension"
net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error
bnxt_en: use eth_hw_addr_random()
bpf: fix unlocking of jited image when module ronx not set
arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config
net: napi_watchdog() can use napi_schedule_irqoff()
tcp: Revert "tcp: tcp_probe: use spin_lock_bh()"
net/hsr: use eth_hw_addr_random()
net: mvpp2: enable building on 64-bit platforms
net: mvpp2: switch to build_skb() in the RX path
net: mvpp2: simplify MVPP2_PRS_RI_* definitions
net: mvpp2: fix indentation of MVPP2_EXT_GLOBAL_CTRL_DEFAULT
net: mvpp2: remove unused register definitions
net: mvpp2: simplify mvpp2_bm_bufs_add()
net: mvpp2: drop useless fields in mvpp2_bm_pool and related code
net: mvpp2: remove unused 'tx_skb' field of 'struct mvpp2_tx_queue'
net: mvpp2: release reference to txq_cpu[] entry after unmapping
net: mvpp2: handle too large value in mvpp2_rx_time_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: handle too large value handling in mvpp2_rx_pkts_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: remove useless arguments in mvpp2_rx_{pkts, time}_coal_set
...
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into next
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SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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into next
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This patch allows changing labels for cgroup mounts. Previously, running
chcon on cgroupfs would throw an "Operation not supported". This patch
specifically whitelist cgroupfs.
The patch could also allow containers to write only to the systemd cgroup
for instance, while the other cgroups are kept with cgroup_t label.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl
that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To
disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for
overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may
not overlap.
The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind
to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify
their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by
ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user
namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager
to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing
control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Several of the extended socket classes introduced by
commit da69a5306ab92e07 ("selinux: support distinctions
among all network address families") are never used because
sockets can never be created with the associated address family.
Remove these unused socket security classes. The removed classes
are bridge_socket for PF_BRIDGE, ib_socket for PF_IB, and mpls_socket
for PF_MPLS.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.
Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for
unprivileged mounts from user namespaces") prohibited any use of context
mount options within non-init user namespaces. However, this breaks
use of context mount options for tmpfs mounts within user namespaces,
which are being used by Docker/runc. There is no reason to block such
usage for tmpfs, ramfs or devpts. Exempt these filesystem types
from this restriction.
Before:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
mount: tmpfs is write-protected, mounting read-only
mount: cannot mount tmpfs read-only
After:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
sh# ls -Zd /tmp
unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 /tmp
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit 79c8b348f215 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network
address families") mapped datagram ICMP sockets to the new icmp_socket
security class, but left ICMPv6 sockets unchanged. This change fixes
that oversight to handle both kinds of sockets consistently.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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