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path: root/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
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2019-01-08SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blobCasey Schaufler
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-15Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "There are 16 patches in here but really only one that is of any significance. That one patch is by nixiaoming and fixes a few places where we were not properly cleaning up dentry and inode objects in the selinuxfs error handling code. The rest are either printk->pr_* conversions, constification tweaks, and a minor tweak to MAINTAINERS. Everything passes the selinux-testsuite and looks to merge cleanly against your master branch" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfs selinux: constify write_op[] selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netnode selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avc selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netif selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netport selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtab selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlink selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfs selinux: Cleanup printk logging in services selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtab selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hooks selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydb selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmap selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional MAINTAINERS: update the LSM and SELinux subsystems
2018-08-07selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfsnixiaoming
If the resource requested by d_alloc_name is not added to the linked list through d_add, then dput needs to be called to release the subsequent abnormal branch to avoid resource leakage. Add missing dput to selinuxfs.c Signed-off-by: nixiaoming <nixiaoming@huawei.com> [PM: tweak the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-07-17selinux: constify write_op[]Eric Biggers
write_op[] is never modified, so make it 'const'. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-30Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One fairly straightforward patch to fix a longstanding issue where a process could stall while accessing files in selinuxfs and block everyone else due to a held mutex. The patch passes all our tests and looks to apply cleanly to your current tree" * tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions
2018-06-28selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regionsJann Horn
If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfspeter enderborg
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-06Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches in total. The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the audit subsystem. The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers, but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would be good to get them in now. The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging; starting with this patchset the changes in /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the standard kernel logging and audit. As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to merge cleanly with your tree" [ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that also came in from Paul - Linus ] * tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID audit: use existing session info function audit: normalize loginuid read access audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged audit: use inline function to set audit context audit: use inline function to get audit context audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
2018-05-14audit: use inline function to get audit contextRichard Guy Briggs
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-04-17audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD recordRichard Guy Briggs
The audit MAC_POLICY_LOAD record had redundant dangling keywords and was missing information about which LSM was responsible and its completion status. While this record is only issued on success, the parser expects the res= field to be present. Old record: type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1479299795.404:43): policy loaded auid=0 ses=1 Delete the redundant dangling keywords, add the lsm= field and the res= field. New record: type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1523293846.204:894): auid=0 ses=1 lsm=selinux res=1 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/47 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-04-17audit: normalize MAC_STATUS recordRichard Guy Briggs
There were two formats of the audit MAC_STATUS record, one of which was more standard than the other. One listed enforcing status changes and the other listed enabled status changes with a non-standard label. In addition, the record was missing information about which LSM was responsible and the operation's completion status. While this record is only issued on success, the parser expects the res= field to be present. old enforcing/permissive: type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523312831.378:24514): enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=0 ses=1 old enable/disable: type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523312831.378:24514): selinux=0 auid=0 ses=1 List both sets of status and old values and add the lsm= field and the res= field. Here is the new format: type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523293828.657:891): enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=0 ses=1 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=selinux res=1 This record already accompanied a SYSCALL record. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/46 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: 80-char fixes, merge fuzz, use new SELinux state functions] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-04-16security: selinux: Change return type to vm_fault_tSouptick Joarder
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler in struct vm_operations_struct. Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-04-09selinux: fix missing dput() before selinuxfs unmountStephen Smalley
Commit 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") triggers a BUG when SELinux is runtime-disabled (i.e. systemd or equivalent disables SELinux before initial policy load via /sys/fs/selinux/disable based on /etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled). This does not manifest if SELinux is disabled via kernel command line argument or if SELinux is enabled (permissive or enforcing). Before: SELinux: Disabled at runtime. BUG: Dentry 000000006d77e5c7{i=17,n=null} still in use (1) [unmount of selinuxfs selinuxfs] After: SELinux: Disabled at runtime. Fixes: 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-03-20selinux: wrap AVC stateStephen Smalley
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced from the selinux_state. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-20selinux: wrap selinuxfs stateStephen Smalley
Move global selinuxfs state to a per-instance structure (selinux_fs_info), and include a pointer to the selinux_state in this structure. Pass this selinux_state to all security server operations, thereby ensuring that each selinuxfs instance presents a view of and acts as an interface to a particular selinux_state instance. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps the selinuxfs global state, links it to a particular selinux_state (currently always the single global selinux_state) and uses that state for all operations. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-02selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functionsPaul Moore
Rename is_enforcing() to enforcing_enabled() and enforcing_set() to set_enforcing(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-01selinux: wrap global selinux stateStephen Smalley
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server functions. The public portion of the structure contains state that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode. The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose definition is private to the security server and contains security server specific state such as the policy database and SID table. This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs (userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it explicitly as needed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-07-05Merge branch 'work.memdup_user' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull memdup_user() conversions from Al Viro: "A fairly self-contained series - hunting down open-coded memdup_user() and memdup_user_nul() instances" * 'work.memdup_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: bpf: don't open-code memdup_user() kimage_file_prepare_segments(): don't open-code memdup_user() ethtool: don't open-code memdup_user() do_ip_setsockopt(): don't open-code memdup_user() do_ipv6_setsockopt(): don't open-code memdup_user() irda: don't open-code memdup_user() xfrm_user_policy(): don't open-code memdup_user() ima_write_policy(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul() sel_write_validatetrans(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
2017-05-25sel_write_validatetrans(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-05-23selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification systemDaniel Jurgens
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loadedStephen Smalley
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded. For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy capability index, since this is the only information presently available in the policy. Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined that is not known to the kernel: SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1 SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1 SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1 SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0 SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0 SELinux: unknown policy capability 5 Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-09Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this pile, sorry" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs/affs: add rename exchange fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx() fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu() fs: completely ignore unknown open flags fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS fs: remove _submit_bh() fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super() fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks fs/affs: remove node generation check fs/affs: import amigaffs.h fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
2017-04-26fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()Eric Biggers
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection. This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also constifies tree_descr.name. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-03-29selinuxfs: Use seq_puts() in sel_avc_stats_seq_show()Markus Elfring
A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-02selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capabilityStephen Smalley
commit 1ea0ce40690dff38935538e8dab7b12683ded0d3 ("selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program, which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon(). When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security contexts. However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission denial. Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability. This preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables this capability. Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-24mm, fs: reduce fault, page_mkwrite, and pfn_mkwrite to take only vmfDave Jiang
->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf. Remove the vma parameter to simplify things. [arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-01-09selinux: default to security isid in sel_make_bools() if no sid is foundGary Tierney
Use SECINITSID_SECURITY as the default SID for booleans which don't have a matching SID returned from security_genfs_sid(), also update the error message to a warning which matches this. This prevents the policy failing to load (and consequently the system failing to boot) when there is no default genfscon statement matched for the selinuxfs in the new policy. Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-09selinux: log errors when loading new policyGary Tierney
Adds error logging to the code paths which can fail when loading a new policy in sel_write_load(). If the policy fails to be loaded from userspace then a warning message is printed, whereas if a failure occurs after loading policy from userspace an error message will be printed with details on where policy loading failed (recreating one of /classes/, /policy_capabilities/, /booleans/ in the SELinux fs). Also, if sel_make_bools() fails to obtain an SID for an entry in /booleans/* an error will be printed indicating the path of the boolean. Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-09selinux: clean up cred usage and simplifyStephen Smalley
SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a single avc_has_perm() call. Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write() and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only serve to confuse things. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-09selinux: support distinctions among all network address familiesStephen Smalley
Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic socket class and are indistinguishable in policy. This has come up previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets, and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG sockets. Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel. Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets. Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH, AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE. Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older policies will behave as before. The legacy redhat1 policy capability that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy. Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-11-20selinux: normalize input to /sys/fs/selinux/enforceStephen Smalley
At present, one can write any signed integer value to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored, e.g. echo -1 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero, but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered to be a security issue, but it should be fixed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-11-14selinux: Minor cleanupsAndreas Gruenbacher
Fix the comment for function __inode_security_revalidate, which returns an integer. Use the LABEL_* constants consistently for isec->initialized. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-09-27fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestampsDeepa Dinamani
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps. Use current_time() instead. CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe. This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also, current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be y2038 safe. Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they share the same time granularity. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-06-15selinux: fix type mismatchHeinrich Schuchardt
avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int. Do not use a signed new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value). Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> [PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-01-22wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-17Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
2016-01-04selinuxfs: switch to memdup_user_nul()Al Viro
Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it just parses its contents. So the use of get_zeroed_page() doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(), which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-24selinux: export validatetrans decisionsAndrew Perepechko
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs. "/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose. This functionality is needed by file system servers implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS layer. Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext" to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition is allowed and -EPERM otherwise. Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru> CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sidRasmus Villemoes
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test for scontext_len being zero hint at that). Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen() call and fix all callers. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-09-10mm: mark most vm_operations_struct constKirill A. Shutemov
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct structs should be constant. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-01sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_pointEric W. Biederman
This allows for better documentation in the code and it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of fs_fully_visible to be written. The mount points converted and their filesystems are: /sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs /sys/kernel/config/ configfs /sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs /sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl /sys/fs/pstore/ pstore /sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs /sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup /sys/kernel/security/ securityfs /sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs /sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-15VFS: security/: d_inode() annotationsDavid Howells
... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than working with dentries given to it. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-27Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into for-linus
2015-03-25selinux: fix sel_write_enforce broken return valueJoe Perches
Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: tweaked subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-01-25selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-03move d_rcu from overlapping d_child to overlapping d_aliasAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-03Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux evm: enable key retention service automatically ima: skip memory allocation for empty files evm: EVM does not use MD5 ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails integrity: fix checkpatch errors ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr security: integrity: Use a more current logging style MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm() fs: move i_readcount ima: use static const char array definitions security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error ima: new helper: file_inode(file) kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c capability: Use current logging styles ...
2014-03-10selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-02-06security: replace strict_strto*() with kstrto*()Jingoo Han
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be used. Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-07-25Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.Chris PeBenito
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules were maliciously flushed. Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or labeled IPSEC configuration. Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct. The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel change fell on the floor. Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>