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2014-08-09Merge branch 'stable-3.17' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinuxLinus Torvalds
Pull SElinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Two small patches to fix a couple of build warnings in SELinux and NetLabel. The patches are obvious enough that I don't think any additional explanation is necessary, but it basically boils down to the usual: I was stupid, and these patches fix some of the stupid. Both patches were posted earlier this week to the SELinux list, and that is where they sat as I didn't think there were noteworthy enough to go upstream at this point in time, but DaveM would rather see them upstream now so who am I to argue. As the patches are both very small" * 'stable-3.17' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: remove unused variabled in the netport, netnode, and netif caches netlabel: fix the netlbl_catmap_setlong() dummy function
2014-08-07selinux: remove unused variabled in the netport, netnode, and netif cachesPaul Moore
This patch removes the unused return code variable in the netport, netnode, and netif initialization functions. Reported-by: fengguang.wu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-08-02Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris
2014-08-01netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structsPaul Moore
Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*" which improves things greatly. There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-08-01netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functionsPaul Moore
The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we probably shouldn't allow. At some point this "worked", but that was likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted by yours truly). This patch corrects these problems by basically gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code. Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it replaces. One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap. NetLabel will automatically allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2014-07-30Merge branch 'stable-3.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into next
2014-07-28Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"Paul Moore
This reverts commit 4da6daf4d3df5a977e4623963f141a627fd2efce. Unfortunately, the commit in question caused problems with Bluetooth devices, specifically it caused them to get caught in the newly created BUG_ON() check. The AF_ALG problem still exists, but will be addressed in a future patch. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-07-19Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris
2014-07-17Merge branch 'stable-3.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into next
2014-07-10selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()Paul Moore
The sock_graft() hook has special handling for AF_INET, AF_INET, and AF_UNIX sockets as those address families have special hooks which label the sock before it is attached its associated socket. Unfortunately, the sock_graft() hook was missing a default approach to labeling sockets which meant that any other address family which made use of connections or the accept() syscall would find the returned socket to be in an "unlabeled" state. This was recently demonstrated by the kcrypto/AF_ALG subsystem and the newly released cryptsetup package (cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later). This patch preserves the special handling in selinux_sock_graft(), but adds a default behavior - setting the sock's label equal to the associated socket - which resolves the problem with AF_ALG and presumably any other address family which makes use of accept(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
2014-06-26selinux: reduce the number of calls to synchronize_net() when flushing cachesPaul Moore
When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases. This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache flush. Reported-by: Jaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-23selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()Waiman Long
With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between. With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was reported: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E --------------------------------------------- load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock: (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>] security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170 but task is already holding lock: (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>] security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(policy_rwlock); lock(policy_rwlock); This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid() which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-19selinux: fix a possible memory leak in cond_read_node()Namhyung Kim
The cond_read_node() should free the given node on error path as it's not linked to p->cond_list yet. This is done via cond_node_destroy() but it's not called when next_entry() fails before the expr loop. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-19selinux: simple cleanup for cond_read_node()Namhyung Kim
The node->cur_state and len can be read in a single call of next_entry(). And setting len before reading is a dead write so can be eliminated. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> (Minor tweak to the length parameter in the call to next_entry()) Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-18security: Used macros from compiler.h instead of __attribute__((...))Gideon Israel Dsouza
To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs. Eg: __packed for __attribute__((packed)). This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc specific attributes and use the the macros instead. Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-18selinux: introduce str_read() helperNamhyung Kim
There're some code duplication for reading a string value during policydb_read(). Add str_read() helper to fix it. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-17SELinux: use ARRAY_SIZEHimangi Saraogi
ARRAY_SIZE is more concise to use when the size of an array is divided by the size of its type or the size of its first element. The Coccinelle semantic patch that makes this change is as follows: // <smpl> @@ type T; T[] E; @@ - (sizeof(E)/sizeof(E[...])) + ARRAY_SIZE(E) // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-17Merge tag 'v3.15' into nextPaul Moore
Linux 3.15
2014-06-12Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov. 2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J Benniston. 3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn Mork. 4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez. 5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel Borkmann. 6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee. 7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia. 8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy. 9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli. 10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu. 11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses, from Lorenzo Colitti. 12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal Cardwell. 13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman. 14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru. 15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich. 16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits) rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0 tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery net: fec: Add software TSO support net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number net: fec: Factorize feature setting net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem net/core: Add VF link state control policy net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving ...
2014-06-10Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn: "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi" * 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security: ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages. Warning in scanf string typing Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3 security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr bugfix patch for SMACK Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme() Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount' smack: fix key permission verification KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
2014-06-03selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policyDave Jones
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-03selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading ↵Dave Jones
selinux policy On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector gets triggered. The backtrace looks like this.. > BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045] > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20 > [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80 > [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0 > [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460 > [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240 > [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80 > [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50 > [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe > [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 > [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f > [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0 > [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe > [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770 > [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200 > [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0 > [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200 > [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0 > [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0 > [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 Stephen Smalley suggested: > Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() > loop in mls_convert_context()? That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-06-03selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCESPaul Moore
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-06-03selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.Stephen Smalley
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode. Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-05-15selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policyDave Jones
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-05-15selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading ↵Dave Jones
selinux policy On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector gets triggered. The backtrace looks like this.. > BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045] > Call Trace: > [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20 > [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80 > [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0 > [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460 > [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240 > [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80 > [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50 > [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50 > [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100 > [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe > [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 > [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f > [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0 > [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe > [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770 > [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200 > [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0 > [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200 > [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0 > [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0 > [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 Stephen Smalley suggested: > Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() > loop in mls_convert_context()? That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-05-15selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCESPaul Moore
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-12Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c net/netlink/af_netlink.c net/sched/cls_api.c net/sched/sch_api.c The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations in non-init namespaces. These were simple transformations from netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable. The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some void pointer cast cleanups in net-next. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-01selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.Stephen Smalley
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode. Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-04-22audit: add netlink audit protocol bind to check capabilities on multicast joinRichard Guy Briggs
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-22locks: rename file-private locks to "open file description locks"Jeff Layton
File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now* people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new file-private locks suck. ...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck. We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them. The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as "open file description locks". The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier to spot this difference when reading code. This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before v3.15 ships: 1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest. 2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK" Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2014-04-14Merge tag 'keys-20140314' of ↵James Morris
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
2014-04-14Merge commit 'v3.14' into nextJames Morris
2014-04-04Merge branch 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linuxLinus Torvalds
Pull file locking updates from Jeff Layton: "Highlights: - maintainership change for fs/locks.c. Willy's not interested in maintaining it these days, and is OK with Bruce and I taking it. - fix for open vs setlease race that Al ID'ed - cleanup and consolidation of file locking code - eliminate unneeded BUG() call - merge of file-private lock implementation" * 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linux: locks: make locks_mandatory_area check for file-private locks locks: fix locks_mandatory_locked to respect file-private locks locks: require that flock->l_pid be set to 0 for file-private locks locks: add new fcntl cmd values for handling file private locks locks: skip deadlock detection on FL_FILE_PVT locks locks: pass the cmd value to fcntl_getlk/getlk64 locks: report l_pid as -1 for FL_FILE_PVT locks locks: make /proc/locks show IS_FILE_PVT locks as type "FLPVT" locks: rename locks_remove_flock to locks_remove_file locks: consolidate checks for compatible filp->f_mode values in setlk handlers locks: fix posix lock range overflow handling locks: eliminate BUG() call when there's an unexpected lock on file close locks: add __acquires and __releases annotations to locks_start and locks_stop locks: remove "inline" qualifier from fl_link manipulation functions locks: clean up comment typo locks: close potential race between setlease and open MAINTAINERS: update entry for fs/locks.c
2014-04-03Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits) selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux evm: enable key retention service automatically ima: skip memory allocation for empty files evm: EVM does not use MD5 ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails integrity: fix checkpatch errors ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr security: integrity: Use a more current logging style MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm() fs: move i_readcount ima: use static const char array definitions security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error ima: new helper: file_inode(file) kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c capability: Use current logging styles ...
2014-03-31Merge tag 'v3.14' into nextPaul Moore
Linux 3.14
2014-03-31locks: add new fcntl cmd values for handling file private locksJeff Layton
Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor associated with the inode. This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished. Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads. This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance and behavior on close. This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired. Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the last reference to a filp is put. These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by the same process or on the same file descriptor. The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl() syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to "classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't see any need for it. Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2014-03-25Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt net/core/netpoll.c The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'. In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-19selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-03-19selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controlsPaul Moore
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO). Example: # cat mmap_test.c #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/mman.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int rc; void *mem; mem = mmap(0x0, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (mem == MAP_FAILED) return errno; printf("mem = %p\n", mem); munmap(mem, 4096); return 0; } # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c # ./mmap_test mem = (nil) # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero } for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=memprotect This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-14KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.hDavid Howells
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the permissions mask flags used in key->perm. Whilst we're at it: (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h. (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related directly to that. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
2014-03-10selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-03-05Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
Conflicts: drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c net/ipv6/sit.c The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this. The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-05selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-02-28selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controlsPaul Moore
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO). Example: # cat mmap_test.c #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/mman.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int rc; void *mem; mem = mmap(0x0, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (mem == MAP_FAILED) return errno; printf("mem = %p\n", mem); munmap(mem, 4096); return 0; } # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c # ./mmap_test mem = (nil) # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero } for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=memprotect This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24Merge branch 'stable-3.14' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into for-linus
2014-02-20SELinux: bigendian problems with filename trans rulesEric Paris
When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian. On x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from le32_to_cpu. So the values are all screwed up. Write the values in le format like it should have been to start. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-02-12flowcache: Make flow cache name space awareFan Du
Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation. Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should also be made in per net style. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-02-10Merge branch 'stable-3.14' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into for-linus
2014-02-06security: replace strict_strto*() with kstrto*()Jingoo Han
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be used. Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>