| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent
negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we
may as well be safe.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Fix a spelling error in smakcfs.
Signed-off-by: Tóth János <gomba007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smatch reports
security/keys/sysctl.c:12:18: warning: symbol
'key_sysctls' was not declared. Should it be static?
This variable is only used in its defining file, so it should be static.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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kexec_mutex is replaced by an atomic variable
in 05c6257433b (panic, kexec: make __crash_kexec() NMI safe).
But there are still two comments that referenced kexec_mutex,
replace them by kexec_lock.
Signed-off-by: Wenyu Liu <liuwenyu7@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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`strncpy` is deprecated for use on NUL-terminated destination strings [1].
A suitable replacement is `strscpy` [2] due to the fact that it
guarantees NUL-termination on its destination buffer argument which is
_not_ the case for `strncpy`!
It should be noted that the destination buffer is zero-initialized and
had a max length of `sizeof(dest) - 1`. There is likely _not_ a bug
present in the current implementation. However, by switching to
`strscpy` we get the benefit of no longer needing the `- 1`'s from the
string copy invocations on top of `strscpy` being a safer interface all
together.
[1]: www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strncpy-on-nul-terminated-strings
[2]: https://manpages.debian.org/testing/linux-manual-4.8/strscpy.9.en.html
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
member.
Declare the read-only class string parameter of
security_get_permissions() const.
Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
destination.
Use the type identical to the source for local variables.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: cleanup extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use u32 for ebitmap bits and sensitivity levels, char for the default
range of a class.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: description tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the identical type u32 for the loop iterator.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: remove extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
net/dsa/port.c
9945c1fb03a3 ("net: dsa: fix older DSA drivers using phylink")
a88dd7538461 ("net: dsa: remove legacy_pre_march2020 detection")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230731102254.2c9868ca@canb.auug.org.au/
net/xdp/xsk.c
3c5b4d69c358 ("net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_mark")
b7f72a30e9ac ("xsk: introduce wrappers and helpers for supporting multi-buffer in Tx path")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230731102631.39988412@canb.auug.org.au/
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
37b61cda9c16 ("bnxt: don't handle XDP in netpoll")
2b56b3d99241 ("eth: bnxt: handle invalid Tx completions more gracefully")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230801101708.1dc7faac@canb.auug.org.au/
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_accel/ipsec_fs.c
62da08331f1a ("net/mlx5e: Set proper IPsec source port in L4 selector")
fbd517549c32 ("net/mlx5e: Add function to get IPsec offload namespace")
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/selftest.c
55c1528f9b97 ("sfc: fix field-spanning memcpy in selftest")
ae9d445cd41f ("sfc: Miscellaneous comment removals")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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With commit 099f26f22f58 ("integrity: machine keyring CA
configuration"), users are able to add custom IMA CA keys via
MOK. This allows users to sign their own IMA polices without
recompiling the kernel. For the sake of security, mandate signed IMA
policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled.
Note this change may affect existing users/tests i.e users won't be able
to load an unsigned IMA policy when the IMA architecture specific policy
is configured and UEFI secure boot is enabled.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Commit 273df864cf746 ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with
modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist
keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature
validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures.
An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do
revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the
revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now
enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been
deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only
authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be
achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING".
Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook has no comment block. Add a comment
block with a brief description of LSM hook and its function parameters.
Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>
[PM: minor double-space fix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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avtab_hash_eval() and hashtab_stat() are only used in policydb.c when
the configuration SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG is enabled.
Move the function definitions under that configuration as well and
provide empty definitions in case SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG is disabled, to
avoid using #ifdef in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
`capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
actually privileged.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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In case virtual memory is being marked as executable by default, SELinux
checks regarding explicit potential dangerous use are disabled.
Inform the user about it.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for
inode_init_security hook") unified the !initxattrs and initxattrs cases. By
doing that, security_inode_init_security() cannot return -EOPNOTSUPP
anymore, as it is always replaced with zero at the end of the function.
Also, mentioning -ENOMEM as the only possible error is not correct. For
example, evm_inode_init_security() could return -ENOKEY.
Fix these issues in the documentation of security_inode_init_security().
Fixes: 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In later patches, we're going to change how the inode's ctime field is
used. Switch to using accessor functions instead of raw accesses of
inode->i_ctime.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230705190309.579783-89-jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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In later patches, we're going to change how the inode's ctime field is
used. Switch to using accessor functions instead of raw accesses of
inode->i_ctime.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230705190309.579783-88-jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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In later patches, we're going to change how the inode's ctime field is
used. Switch to using accessor functions instead of raw accesses of
inode->i_ctime.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230705190309.579783-87-jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Format attributes on functions taking format string can help compilers
detect argument type or count mismatches.
Please the compiler when building with W=1:
security/tomoyo/audit.c: In function ‘tomoyo_init_log’:
security/tomoyo/audit.c:290:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_init_log’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format]
290 | vsnprintf(buf + pos, len - pos, fmt, args);
| ^~~~~~~~~
security/tomoyo/audit.c: In function ‘tomoyo_write_log2’:
security/tomoyo/audit.c:376:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_write_log2’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format]
376 | buf = tomoyo_init_log(r, len, fmt, args);
| ^~~
security/tomoyo/common.c: In function ‘tomoyo_addprintf’:
security/tomoyo/common.c:193:9: error: function ‘tomoyo_addprintf’ might be a candidate for ‘gnu_printf’ format attribute [-Werror=suggest-attribute=format]
193 | vsnprintf(buffer + pos, len - pos - 1, fmt, args);
| ^~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Use a NULL instead of a zero to resolve a int/pointer mismatch.
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202307210332.4AqFZfzI-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: dd51fcd42fd6 ("selinux: introduce and use lsm_ad_net_init*() helpers")
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The policy database code contains several debug output statements
related to hashtable utilization. Those are guarded by the macro
DEBUG_HASHES, which is neither documented nor set anywhere.
Introduce a new Kconfig configuration guarding this and potential
other future debugging related code. Disable the setting by default.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: fixed line lengths in the help text]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Perf traces of network-related workload shows a measurable overhead
inside the network-related selinux hooks while zeroing the
lsm_network_audit struct.
In most cases we can delay the initialization of such structure to the
usage point, avoiding such overhead in a few cases.
Additionally, the audit code accesses the IP address information only
for AF_INET* families, and selinux_parse_skb() will fill-out the
relevant fields in such cases. When the family field is zeroed or the
initialization is followed by the mentioned parsing, the zeroing can be
limited to the sk, family and netif fields.
By factoring out the audit-data initialization to new helpers, this
patch removes some duplicate code and gives small but measurable
performance gain under UDP flood.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The kernel print statements do not append an implicit newline to format
strings.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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avtab_search() shares the same logic with avtab_search_node(), except
that it returns, if found, a pointer to the struct avtab_node member
datum instead of the node itself. Since the member is an embedded
struct, and not a pointer, the returned value of avtab_search() and
avtab_search_node() will always in unison either be NULL or non-NULL.
Drop avtab_search() and replace its calls by avtab_search_node() to
deduplicate logic and adopt the only caller caring for the type of
the returned value accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and
comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to
help maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a wide
community of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of the
mainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has received
contributions from many individuals and organizations.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the type bool as parameter type in
selinux_status_update_setenforce(). The related function
enforcing_enabled() returns the type bool, while the struct
selinux_kernel_status member enforcing uses an u32.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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hashtab_init() takes an u32 as size parameter type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The specifier for avtab keys is always supplied with a type of u16,
either as a macro to security_compute_sid() or the member specified of
the struct avtab_key.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the identical types in assignments of local variables for the
destination.
Merge tail calls into return statements.
Avoid using leading underscores for function local variable.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use a consistent type of u32 for sequence numbers.
Use a non-negative and input parameter matching type for the hash
result.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the identical type sel_netif_hashfn() returns.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Align the type with the one used in selinux_notify_policy_change() and
the sequence member of struct selinux_kernel_status.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Prevent inserting more than the supported U32_MAX number of entries.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The function is always inlined and most of the time both relevant
arguments are compile time constants, allowing compilers to elide the
check. Also the function is part of outputting the policy, which is not
performance critical.
Also convert the type of the third parameter into a size_t, since it
should always be a non-negative number of elements.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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No functional modification involved.
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:203: warning: expecting prototype for tpm_buf_append_auth(). Prototype was for tpm2_buf_append_auth() instead.
Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5524
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request
code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the
assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by
a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in
a crash.
Example report:
[2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652!
[2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3
[2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs]
[2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40
[2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f
[2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005
[2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28
[2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740
[2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[2158499.700702] Call Trace:
[2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0
[2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730
[2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver]
[2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver]
[2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs]
[2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90
[2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs]
[2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs]
[2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0
[2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0
[2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0
[2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130
[2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The situation occurs as follows:
* Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for
example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver
cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to
request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link().
* Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context
object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to
type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to
dns_resolver_cmp().
* Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes
search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not
found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() ->
construct_alloc_key().
* Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for
"abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache.
* Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs
__key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to
insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is,
using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is
not yet present in the destination keyring.
* Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is
already present on some keyring by again calling
search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using
dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key
"abcdef.".
* The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling
__key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit
operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates
a duplicity because the same index key is already present.
Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in
construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into
the destination keyring is determined.
[jarkko@kernel.org: added a fixes tag and cc to stable]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: df593ee23e05 ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument.
Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a
const struct sock *.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, SELinux doesn't allow distinguishing between kernel threads
and userspace processes that are started before the policy is first
loaded - both get the label corresponding to the kernel SID. The only
way a process that persists from early boot can get a meaningful label
is by doing a voluntary dyntransition or re-executing itself.
Reusing the kernel label for userspace processes is problematic for
several reasons:
1. The kernel is considered to be a privileged domain and generally
needs to have a wide range of permissions allowed to work correctly,
which prevents the policy writer from effectively hardening against
early boot processes that might remain running unintentionally after
the policy is loaded (they represent a potential extra attack surface
that should be mitigated).
2. Despite the kernel being treated as a privileged domain, the policy
writer may want to impose certain special limitations on kernel
threads that may conflict with the requirements of intentional early
boot processes. For example, it is a good hardening practice to limit
what executables the kernel can execute as usermode helpers and to
confine the resulting usermode helper processes. However, a
(legitimate) process surviving from early boot may need to execute a
different set of executables.
3. As currently implemented, overlayfs remembers the security context of
the process that created an overlayfs mount and uses it to bound
subsequent operations on files using this context. If an overlayfs
mount is created before the SELinux policy is loaded, these "mounter"
checks are made against the kernel context, which may clash with
restrictions on the kernel domain (see 2.).
To resolve this, introduce a new initial SID (reusing the slot of the
former "init" initial SID) that will be assigned to any userspace
process started before the policy is first loaded. This is easy to do,
as we can simply label any process that goes through the
bprm_creds_for_exec LSM hook with the new init-SID instead of
propagating the kernel SID from the parent.
To provide backwards compatibility for existing policies that are
unaware of this new semantic of the "init" initial SID, introduce a new
policy capability "userspace_initial_context" and set the "init" SID to
the same context as the "kernel" SID unless this capability is set by
the policy.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In the process of reverting back to directly accessing the global
selinux_state pointer we left behind some artifacts in the
selinux_policycap_XXX() helper functions. This patch cleans up
some of that left-behind cruft.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, evm_inode_init_security() processes a single LSM xattr from the
array passed by security_inode_init_security(), and calculates the HMAC on
it and other inode metadata.
As the LSM infrastructure now can pass to EVM an array with multiple
xattrs, scan them until the terminator (xattr name NULL), and calculate the
HMAC on all of them.
Also, double check that the xattrs array terminator is the first non-filled
slot (obtained with lsm_get_xattr_slot()). Consumers of the xattrs array,
such as the initxattrs() callbacks, rely on the terminator.
Finally, change the name of the lsm_xattr parameter of evm_init_hmac() to
xattrs, to reflect the new type of information passed.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM
infrastructure. Keep the existing behavior of including in the HMAC
calculation only the first xattr provided by LSMs.
Changing the evm_inode_init_security() definition requires passing the
xattr array allocated by security_inode_init_security(), and the number of
xattrs filled by previously invoked LSMs.
Use the newly introduced lsm_get_xattr_slot() to position EVM correctly in
the xattrs array, like a regular LSM, and to increment the number of filled
slots. For now, the LSM infrastructure allocates enough xattrs slots to
store the EVM xattr, without using the reservation mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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With the newly added ability of LSMs to supply multiple xattrs, set
SMACK64TRASMUTE in smack_inode_init_security(), instead of d_instantiate().
Do it by incrementing SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS to 2 and by calling
lsm_get_xattr_slot() a second time, if the transmuting conditions are met.
The LSM infrastructure passes all xattrs provided by LSMs to the
filesystems through the initxattrs() callback, so that filesystems can
store xattrs in the disk.
After the change, the SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE inode flag is always set by
d_instantiate() after fetching SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the disk. Before it
was done by smack_inode_post_setxattr() as result of the __vfs_setxattr()
call.
Removing __vfs_setxattr() also prevents invalidating the EVM HMAC, by
adding a new xattr without checking and updating the existing HMAC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr
and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata.
Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security
blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the
lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it
needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should
allocate.
Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full
xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current
number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter
would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by
other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM
requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized).
Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the
number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes
structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of
filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr
slot to fill.
Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and
initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the
former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the
description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the
inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and
fill the reserved slots in the xattr array.
Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is
done only in case of successful memory allocation.
Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook
from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook
conventions.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In the description of function definition security_file_lock(),
the line "@cmd: fnctl command" has a typo where "fnctl" should be
"fcntl". This patch fixes the typo.
Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com>
[PM: commit message cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In general, when updating the mtime on an inode, one must also update
the ctime. Add the missing ctime updates.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230705190309.579783-5-jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
- fix missing error check for rhashtable_insert_fast
- add missing failure check in compute_xmatch_perms
- fix policy_compat permission remap with extended permissions
- fix profile verification and enable it
- fix kzalloc perms tables for shared dfas
- Fix kernel-doc header for verify_dfa_accept_index
- aa_buffer: Convert 1-element array to flexible array
- Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in two functions
- fix use of strcpy in policy_unpack_test
- fix kernel-doc complaints
- Fix some kernel-doc comments
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2023-07-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: Fix kernel-doc header for verify_dfa_accept_index
apparmor: fix: kzalloc perms tables for shared dfas
apparmor: fix profile verification and enable it
apparmor: fix policy_compat permission remap with extended permissions
apparmor: aa_buffer: Convert 1-element array to flexible array
apparmor: add missing failure check in compute_xmatch_perms
apparmor: fix missing error check for rhashtable_insert_fast
apparmor: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in two functions
AppArmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments
apparmor: fix use of strcpy in policy_unpack_test
apparmor: fix kernel-doc complaints
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