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2020-04-04Merge tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyrings fixes from David Howells: "Here's a couple of patches that fix a circular dependency between holding key->sem and mm->mmap_sem when reading data from a key. One potential issue is that a filesystem looking to use a key inside, say, ->readpages() could deadlock if the key being read is the key that's required and the buffer the key is being read into is on a page that needs to be fetched. The case actually detected is a bit more involved - with a filesystem calling request_key() and locking the target keyring for write - which could be being read" * tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
2020-04-03Merge tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH: "Here are three SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1. One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as needed. Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your current tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by two things, one file deleted.) All three of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no reported issues other than the merge conflict" * tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx: ASoC: MT6660: make spdxcheck.py happy .gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier .gitignore: remove too obvious comments
2020-04-02Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Just a couple of updates for linux-5.7: - A new Kconfig option to enable IMA architecture specific runtime policy rules needed for secure and/or trusted boot, as requested. - Some message cleanup (eg. pr_fmt, additional error messages)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
2020-03-31Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-nextLinus Torvalds
Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Highlights: 1) Fix the iwlwifi regression, from Johannes Berg. 2) Support BSS coloring and 802.11 encapsulation offloading in hardware, from John Crispin. 3) Fix some potential Spectre issues in qtnfmac, from Sergey Matyukevich. 4) Add TTL decrement action to openvswitch, from Matteo Croce. 5) Allow paralleization through flow_action setup by not taking the RTNL mutex, from Vlad Buslov. 6) A lot of zero-length array to flexible-array conversions, from Gustavo A. R. Silva. 7) Align XDP statistics names across several drivers for consistency, from Lorenzo Bianconi. 8) Add various pieces of infrastructure for offloading conntrack, and make use of it in mlx5 driver, from Paul Blakey. 9) Allow using listening sockets in BPF sockmap, from Jakub Sitnicki. 10) Lots of parallelization improvements during configuration changes in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel. 11) Add support to devlink for generic packet traps, which report packets dropped during ACL processing. And use them in mlxsw driver. From Jiri Pirko. 12) Support bcmgenet on ACPI, from Jeremy Linton. 13) Make BPF compatible with RT, from Thomas Gleixnet, Alexei Starovoitov, and your's truly. 14) Support XDP meta-data in virtio_net, from Yuya Kusakabe. 15) Fix sysfs permissions when network devices change namespaces, from Christian Brauner. 16) Add a flags element to ethtool_ops so that drivers can more simply indicate which coalescing parameters they actually support, and therefore the generic layer can validate the user's ethtool request. Use this in all drivers, from Jakub Kicinski. 17) Offload FIFO qdisc in mlxsw, from Petr Machata. 18) Support UDP sockets in sockmap, from Lorenz Bauer. 19) Fix stretch ACK bugs in several TCP congestion control modules, from Pengcheng Yang. 20) Support virtual functiosn in octeontx2 driver, from Tomasz Duszynski. 21) Add region operations for devlink and use it in ice driver to dump NVM contents, from Jacob Keller. 22) Add support for hw offload of MACSEC, from Antoine Tenart. 23) Add support for BPF programs that can be attached to LSM hooks, from KP Singh. 24) Support for multiple paths, path managers, and counters in MPTCP. From Peter Krystad, Paolo Abeni, Florian Westphal, Davide Caratti, and others. 25) More progress on adding the netlink interface to ethtool, from Michal Kubecek" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2121 commits) net: ipv6: rpl_iptunnel: Fix potential memory leak in rpl_do_srh_inline cxgb4/chcr: nic-tls stats in ethtool net: dsa: fix oops while probing Marvell DSA switches net/bpfilter: remove superfluous testing message net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node net: dsa: ksz: Select KSZ protocol tag netdevsim: dev: Fix memory leak in nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write net: stmmac: add EHL 2.5Gbps PCI info and PCI ID net: stmmac: add EHL PSE0 & PSE1 1Gbps PCI info and PCI ID net: stmmac: create dwmac-intel.c to contain all Intel platform net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Support specifying VLAN tag egress rule net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for matching VLAN TCI net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Move writing of CFP_DATA(5) into slicing functions net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Check earlier for FLOW_EXT and FLOW_MAC_EXT net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Disable learning for ASP port net: dsa: b53: Deny enslaving port 7 for 7278 into a bridge net: dsa: b53: Prevent tagged VLAN on port 7 for 7278 net: dsa: b53: Restore VLAN entries upon (re)configuration net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks hv_netvsc: Remove unnecessary round_up for recv_completion_cnt ...
2020-03-31Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the highlights are below: - Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1. This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from 1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final step of rejecting 1. - Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability. - Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting in some significant improvements to policy load times. - Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general SELinux performance improvements as well. - Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle initial SIDs. - Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem. - Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a temporary unlabeled condition. - Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota access controls. - Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position index correctly in selinuxfs. - We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions. - A number of list to array conversions. - Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode MAINTAINERS: Update my email address selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init() selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes selinux: Add xfs quota command types selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read() security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node() selinux: convert cond_expr to array selinux: convert cond_av_list to array selinux: convert cond_list to array selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node() Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1 selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
2020-03-30selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statementColin Ian King
The assignment of e->type_names is indented one level too deep, clean this up by removing the extraneous tab. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-03-30Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar: "The EFI changes in this cycle are much larger than usual, for two (positive) reasons: - The GRUB project is showing signs of life again, resulting in the introduction of the generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol, instead of x86 specific hacks which are increasingly difficult to maintain. There's hope that all future extensions will now go through that boot protocol. - Preparatory work for RISC-V EFI support. The main changes are: - Boot time GDT handling changes - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O, memory allocation, etc. - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or device tree. - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode is a superset of another) - Clean up the contents of 'struct efi', and move out everything that doesn't need to be stored there. - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported via a configuration table. - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor on 32-bit ARM. - Changes to load device firmware from EFI boot service memory regions - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups and fixes" * 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits) efi/libstub/arm: Fix spurious message that an initrd was loaded efi/libstub/arm64: Avoid image_base value from efi_loaded_image partitions/efi: Fix partition name parsing in GUID partition entry efi/x86: Fix cast of image argument efi/libstub/x86: Use ULONG_MAX as upper bound for all allocations efi: Fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin() efi/libstub: Avoid linking libstub/lib-ksyms.o into vmlinux efi/x86: Preserve %ebx correctly in efi_set_virtual_address_map() efi/x86: Ignore the memory attributes table on i386 efi/x86: Don't relocate the kernel unless necessary efi/x86: Remove extra headroom for setup block efi/x86: Add kernel preferred address to PE header efi/x86: Decompress at start of PE image load address x86/boot/compressed/32: Save the output address instead of recalculating it efi/libstub/x86: Deal with exit() boot service returning x86/boot: Use unsigned comparison for addresses efi/x86: Avoid using code32_start efi/x86: Make efi32_pe_entry() more readable efi/x86: Respect 32-bit ABI in efi32_pe_entry() efi/x86: Annotate the LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID with SYM_DATA ...
2020-03-30bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooksKP Singh
* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-30security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooksKP Singh
The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key readWaiman Long
By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have enough memory to hold the actual key data. Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of pages), a warning message will also be printed. To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (PAGE_SIZE) over which we do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request. To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of pages available for allocation. In the extremely unlikely scenario that the key keeps on being changed and made longer (still <= buflen) in between 2 __keyctl_read_key() calls, the __keyctl_read_key() calling loop in keyctl_read_key() may have to be iterated a large number of times, but definitely not infinite. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-03-29KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphoreWaiman Long
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-03-25.gitignore: add SPDX License IdentifierMasahiro Yamada
Add SPDX License Identifier to all .gitignore files. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-25.gitignore: remove too obvious commentsMasahiro Yamada
Some .gitignore files have comments like "Generated files", "Ignore generated files" at the header part, but they are too obvious. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-15KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctlyYang Xu
Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below: add_key() key_create_or_update() key_alloc() __key_instantiate_and_link generic_key_instantiate key_payload_reserve ...... Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"), we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we can keep consistent with key_alloc. Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key(). Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-03-12ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policiesNayna Jain
Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing the different architectures to select it. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> (s390) Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-03-05selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return voidPaul Moore
The avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() functions always return zero so mark them as returning void and update the callers not to check for a return value. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-03-05selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()Ondrej Mosnacek
Commit e0ac568de1fa ("selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes") moved symtab initialization out of policydb_init(), but left the cleanup of symtabs from the error path. This patch fixes the oversight. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-28integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitionsTushar Sugandhi
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the files under security/integrity. This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under security/integrity. With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed with 'integrity'. security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c security/integrity/iint.c e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n" And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'. security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n" For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no change in the message format. Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-28IMA: Add log statements for failure conditionsTushar Sugandhi
process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure conditions. This change adds a log statement in the above function. Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-28IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to imaTushar Sugandhi
The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y) lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1]. The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined into ima.o. This change fixes the above issue. [1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-27selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handlingStephen Smalley
Remove initial SIDs that have never been used or are no longer used by the kernel from its string table, which is also used to generate the SECINITSID_* symbols referenced in code. Update the code to gracefully handle the fact that these can now be NULL. Stop treating it as an error if a policy defines additional initial SIDs unknown to the kernel. Do not load unused initial SID contexts into the sidtab. Fix the incorrect usage of the name from the ocontext in error messages when loading initial SIDs since these are not presently written to the kernel policy and are therefore always NULL. After this change, it is possible to safely reclaim and reuse some of the unused initial SIDs without compatibility issues. Specifically, unused initial SIDs that were being assigned the same context as the unlabeled initial SID in policies can be reclaimed and reused for another purpose, with existing policies still treating them as having the unlabeled context and future policies having the option of mapping them to a more specific context. For example, this could have been used when the infiniband labeling support was introduced to define initial SIDs for the default pkey and endport SIDs similar to the handling of port/netif/node SIDs rather than always using SECINITSID_UNLABELED as the default. The set of safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs across all known policies is igmp_packet (13), icmp_socket (14), tcp_socket (15), kmod (24), policy (25), and scmp_packet (26); these initial SIDs were assigned the same context as unlabeled in all known policies including mls. If only considering non-mls policies (i.e. assuming that mls users always upgrade policy with their kernels), the set of safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs further includes file_labels (6), init (7), sysctl_modprobe (16), and sysctl_fs (18) through sysctl_dev (23). Adding new initial SIDs beyond SECINITSID_NUM to policy unfortunately became a fatal error in commit 24ed7fdae669 ("selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup") and even before that it could cause problems on a policy reload (collision between the new initial SID and one allocated at runtime) ever since commit 42596eafdd75 ("selinux: load the initial SIDs upon every policy load") so we cannot safely start adding new initial SIDs to policies beyond SECINITSID_NUM (27) until such a time as all such kernels do not need to be supported and only those that include this commit are relevant. That is not a big deal since we haven't added a new initial SID since 2004 (v2.6.7) and we have plenty of unused ones we can reclaim if we truly need one. If we want to avoid the wasted storage in initial_sid_to_string[] and/or sidtab->isids[] for the unused initial SIDs, we could introduce an indirection between the kernel initial SID values and the policy initial SID values and just map the policy SID values in the ocontexts to the kernel values during policy_load_isids(). Originally I thought we'd do this by preserving the initial SID names in the kernel policy and creating a mapping at load time like we do for the security classes and permissions but that would require a new kernel policy format version and associated changes to libsepol/checkpolicy and I'm not sure it is justified. Simpler approach is just to create a fixed mapping table in the kernel from the existing fixed policy values to the kernel values. Less flexible but probably sufficient. A separate selinux userspace change was applied in https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/8677ce5e8f592950ae6f14cea1b68a20ddc1ac25 to enable removal of most of the unused initial SID contexts from policies, but there is no dependency between that change and this one. That change permits removing all of the unused initial SID contexts from policy except for the fs and sysctl SID contexts. The initial SID declarations themselves would remain in policy to preserve the values of subsequent ones but the contexts can be dropped. If/when the kernel decides to reuse one of them, future policies can change the name and start assigning a context again without breaking compatibility. Here is how I would envision staging changes to the initial SIDs in a compatible manner after this commit is applied: 1. At any time after this commit is applied, the kernel could choose to reclaim one of the safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs listed above for a new purpose (i.e. replace its NULL entry in the initial_sid_to_string[] table with a new name and start using the newly generated SECINITSID_name symbol in code), and refpolicy could at that time rename its declaration of that initial SID to reflect its new purpose and start assigning it a context going forward. Existing/old policies would map the reclaimed initial SID to the unlabeled context, so that would be the initial default behavior until policies are updated. This doesn't depend on the selinux userspace change; it will work with existing policies and userspace. 2. In 6 months or so we'll have another SELinux userspace release that will include the libsepol/checkpolicy support for omitting unused initial SID contexts. 3. At any time after that release, refpolicy can make that release its minimum build requirement and drop the sid context statements (but not the sid declarations) for all of the unused initial SIDs except for fs and sysctl, which must remain for compatibility on policy reload with old kernels and for compatibility with kernels that were still using SECINITSID_SYSCTL (< 2.6.39). This doesn't depend on this kernel commit; it will work with previous kernels as well. 4. After N years for some value of N, refpolicy decides that it no longer cares about policy reload compatibility for kernels that predate this kernel commit, and refpolicy drops the fs and sysctl SID contexts from policy too (but retains the declarations). 5. After M years for some value of M, the kernel decides that it no longer cares about compatibility with refpolicies that predate step 4 (dropping the fs and sysctl SIDs), and those two SIDs also become safely reclaimable. This step is optional and need not ever occur unless we decide that the need to reclaim those two SIDs outweighs the compatibility cost. 6. After O years for some value of O, refpolicy decides that it no longer cares about policy load (not just reload) compatibility for kernels that predate this kernel commit, and both kernel and refpolicy can then start adding and using new initial SIDs beyond 27. This does not depend on the previous change (step 5) and can occur independent of it. Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/12 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-27selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizesOndrej Mosnacek
Instead allocate hash tables with just the right size based on the actual number of elements (which is almost always known beforehand, we just need to defer the hashtab allocation to the right time). The only case when we don't know the size (with the current policy format) is the new filename transitions hashtable. Here I just left the existing value. After this patch, the time to load Fedora policy on x86_64 decreases from 790 ms to 167 ms. If the unconfined module is removed, it decreases from 750 ms to 122 ms. It is also likely that other operations are going to be faster, mainly string_to_context_struct() or mls_compute_sid(), but I didn't try to quantify that. The memory usage of all hash table arrays increases from ~58 KB to ~163 KB (with Fedora policy on x86_64). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-26Merge tag 'efi-next' of ↵Ingo Molnar
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel: This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than usual. The main reasons are: - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to making drastic changes, - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot, based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead, we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol. Summary of changes: - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind) - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O, memory allocation, etc. - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or device tree. - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode is a superset of another) - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that doesn't need to be stored there. - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported via a configuration table. - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich) - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-23integrity: Check properly whether EFI GetVariable() is availableArd Biesheuvel
Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service individually. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2020-02-22selinux: Add xfs quota command typesRichard Haines
Add Q_XQUOTAOFF, Q_XQUOTAON and Q_XSETQLIM to trigger filesystem quotamod permission check. Add Q_XGETQUOTA, Q_XGETQSTAT, Q_XGETQSTATV and Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA to trigger filesystem quotaget permission check. Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-22selinux: optimize storage of filename transitionsOndrej Mosnacek
In these rules, each rule with the same (target type, target class, filename) values is (in practice) always mapped to the same result type. Therefore, it is much more efficient to group the rules by (ttype, tclass, filename). Thus, this patch drops the stype field from the key and changes the datum to be a linked list of one or more structures that contain a result type and an ebitmap of source types that map the given target to the given result type under the given filename. The size of the hash table is also incremented to 2048 to be more optimal for Fedora policy (which currently has ~2500 unique (ttype, tclass, filename) tuples, regardless of whether the 'unconfined' module is enabled). Not only does this dramtically reduce memory usage when the policy contains a lot of unconfined domains (ergo a lot of filename based transitions), but it also slightly reduces memory usage of strongly confined policies (modeled on Fedora policy with 'unconfined' module disabled) and significantly reduces lookup times of these rules on Fedora (roughly matches the performance of the rhashtable conversion patch [1] posted recently to selinux@vger.kernel.org). An obvious next step is to change binary policy format to match this layout, so that disk space is also saved. However, since that requires more work (including matching userspace changes) and this patch is already beneficial on its own, I'm posting it separately. Performance/memory usage comparison: Kernel | Policy load | Policy load | Mem usage | Mem usage | openbench | | (-unconfined) | | (-unconfined) | (createfiles) -----------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-------------- reference | 1,30s | 0,91s | 90MB | 77MB | 55 us/file rhashtable patch | 0.98s | 0,85s | 85MB | 75MB | 38 us/file this patch | 0,95s | 0,87s | 75MB | 75MB | 40 us/file (Memory usage is measured after boot. With SELinux disabled the memory usage was ~60MB on the same system.) [1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200116213937.77795-1-dev@lynxeye.de/T/ Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-20Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar: "Two bug fixes and an associated change for each. The one that adds SM3 to the IMA list of supported hash algorithms is a simple change, but could be considered a new feature" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration list crypto: rename sm3-256 to sm3 in hash_algo_name efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found x86/ima: use correct identifier for SetupMode variable
2020-02-18ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration listTianjia Zhang
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2 can support sm3 well. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-18efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are foundJavier Martinez Canillas
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings. But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim is used. So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following: [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-13selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read()Ondrej Mosnacek
It simplifies cleanup in the error path. This will be extra useful in later patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-11security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffsConnor O'Brien
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of bpffs files. This allows for separate permissions for different pinned bpf objects, which may be completely unrelated to each other. Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Moreland <smoreland@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-11selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node()Ondrej Mosnacek
Both callers iterate the cond_list and call it for each node - turn it into evaluate_cond_nodes(), which does the iteration for them. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-11selinux: convert cond_expr to arrayOndrej Mosnacek
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand, using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-11selinux: convert cond_av_list to arrayOndrej Mosnacek
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand, using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-11selinux: convert cond_list to arrayOndrej Mosnacek
Since it is fixed-size after allocation and we know the size beforehand, using a plain old array is simpler and more efficient. While there, also fix signedness of some related variables/parameters. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-10Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Two small fixes: one fixes a locking problem in the recently merged label translation code, the other fixes an embarrassing 'binderfs' / 'binder' filesystem name check" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking selinux: fix typo in filesystem name
2020-02-10selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position indexVasily Averin
If seq_file .next function does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output. $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees 817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037 1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683 1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s $# read after lseek to midle of last line $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 056 9115 <<<< end of last line 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<< whole last line once again 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s $# read after lseek beyond end of of file $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<<< generates whole last line 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283 Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-10selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory contextChristian Göttsche
Currently symlinks on kernel filesystems, like sysfs, are labeled on creation with the parent filesystem root sid. Allow symlinks to inherit the parent directory context, so fine-grained kernfs labeling can be applied to symlinks too and checking contexts doesn't complain about them. For backward-compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability: genfs_seclabel_symlinks Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-10selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node()Ondrej Mosnacek
It never fails, so it can just return void. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-10Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1Stephen Smalley
Deprecate setting the SELinux checkreqprot tunable to 1 via kernel parameter or /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot. Setting it to 0 is left intact for compatibility since Android and some Linux distributions do so for security and treat an inability to set it as a fatal error. Eventually setting it to 0 will become a no-op and the kernel will stop using checkreqprot's value internally altogether. checkreqprot was originally introduced as a compatibility mechanism for legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. However, if set to 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be made executable without authorization by policy. The default value for the SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE config option was changed from 1 to 0 in commit 2a35d196c160e3 ("selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and both Android and Linux distributions began explicitly setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 0 some time ago. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-10selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ssOndrej Mosnacek
It fits more naturally in selinux_state, since it reflects also global state (the enforcing and policyload fields). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-08Merge branch 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro: "Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case every time something got added to that system-wide registry. New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW, they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself. And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts - things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM. Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it" * 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits) tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc() cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al. procfs: switch to use of invalfc() hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc() cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al. gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al. fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al. ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends turn fs_param_is_... into functions fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field add prefix to fs_context->log ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log new primitive: __fs_parse() switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions get rid of cg_invalf() ...
2020-02-07fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_specAl Viro
The former contains nothing but a pointer to an array of the latter... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name fieldEric Sandeen
Unused now. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-06Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds
Pull smack fix from Casey Schaufler: "One fix for an obscure error found using an old version of ping(1) that did not use IPv6 sockets in the documented way" * tag 'Smack-for-5.6' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster
2020-02-05selinux: fix sidtab string cache lockingOndrej Mosnacek
Avoiding taking a lock in an IRQ context is not enough to prevent deadlocks, as discovered by syzbot: === WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz-executor.0/8927 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] ffff888027c94098 (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: sidtab_sid2str_put.part.0+0x36/0x880 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c:533 and this task is already holding: ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] ffffffff898639b0 (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.}, at: nf_conntrack_lock+0x17/0x70 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:91 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} -> (&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock){+.-.} [...] other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock); lock(&(&s->cache_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&nf_conntrack_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** [...] === Fix this by simply locking with irqsave/irqrestore and stop giving up on !in_task(). It makes the locking a bit slower, but it shouldn't make a big difference in real workloads. Under the scenario from [1] (only cache hits) it only increased the runtime overhead from the security_secid_to_secctx() function from ~2% to ~3% (it was ~5-65% before introducing the cache). [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259 Fixes: d97bd23c2d7d ("selinux: cache the SID -> context string translation") Reported-by: syzbot+61cba5033e2072d61806@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-05selinux: fix typo in filesystem nameHridya Valsaraju
Correct the filesystem name to "binder" to enable genfscon per-file labelling for binderfs. Fixes: 7a4b5194747 ("selinux: allow per-file labelling for binderfs") Signed-off-by: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: slight style changes to the subj/description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-05broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian busterCasey Schaufler
I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian buster. Easiest example to reproduce is: $ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1 connect: Invalid argument $ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1 PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes 64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms git bisect traced the failure to commit b9ef5513c99b ("smack: Check address length before reading address family") Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does): $ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1 connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC, sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
2020-01-29Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest Pull Kselftest kunit updates from Shuah Khan: "This kunit update consists of: - Support for building kunit as a module from Alan Maguire - AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack from Mike Salvatore" * tag 'linux-kselftest-5.6-rc1-kunit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest: kunit: building kunit as a module breaks allmodconfig kunit: update documentation to describe module-based build kunit: allow kunit to be loaded as a module kunit: remove timeout dependence on sysctl_hung_task_timeout_seconds kunit: allow kunit tests to be loaded as a module kunit: hide unexported try-catch interface in try-catch-impl.h kunit: move string-stream.h to lib/kunit apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack
2020-01-29Merge branch 'work.openat2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull openat2 support from Al Viro: "This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai. I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any review during that... Oh, well. Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of review and public testing, so here it comes" From Aleksa's description of the series: "For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags are present[1]. This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to being added to openat(2). Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as others I felt were useful. In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However, instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The following new LOOKUP_* flags are added: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are permitted). LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change the name. It should be noted that this is different to the scope of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However, you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link. In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required. LOOKUP_BENEATH: Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute paths in openat(2) are also disallowed. Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional to protect against various races that would allow escape using "..". Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion. In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as long as no parent path had a symlink component. LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that chroot(2) is not. If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT. The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening paths in a potentially malicious container. There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101, CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a few). In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution. It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready. Future work would include implementing things like RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)" * 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags selftests: add openat2(2) selftests open: introduce openat2(2) syscall namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution namei: allow set_root() to produce errors namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()