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token/obj_priv_implicit_token_envvar test may fail in an environment
where the process executing tests can not write to the root path.
Example:
https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/actions/runs/11844507007/job/33007897936
Change default path used by the test to /tmp/bpf-token-fs, and make it
runtime configurable via an environment variable.
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@pm.me>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241115003853.864397-1-ihor.solodrai@pm.me
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Hi, fix some spelling errors in selftest, the details are as follows:
-in the codes:
test_bpf_sk_stoarge_map_iter_fd(void)
->test_bpf_sk_storage_map_iter_fd(void)
load BTF from btf_data.o->load BTF from btf_data.bpf.o
-in the code comments:
preample->preamble
multi-contollers->multi-controllers
errono->errno
unsighed/unsinged->unsigned
egree->egress
shoud->should
regsiter->register
assummed->assumed
conditiona->conditional
rougly->roughly
timetamp->timestamp
ingores->ignores
null-termainted->null-terminated
slepable->sleepable
implemenation->implementation
veriables->variables
timetamps->timestamps
substitue a costant->substitute a constant
secton->section
unreferened->unreferenced
verifer->verifier
libppf->libbpf
...
Signed-off-by: Lin Yikai <yikai.lin@vivo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240905110354.3274546-1-yikai.lin@vivo.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add tests for LSM interactions (both bpf_token_capable and bpf_token_cmd
LSM hooks) with BPF token in bpf() subsystem. Now child process passes
back token FD for parent to be able to do tests with token originating
in "wrong" userns. But we also create token in initns and check that
token LSMs don't accidentally reject BPF operations when capable()
checks pass without BPF token.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-31-andrii@kernel.org
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Add new subtest validating LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar semantics.
Extend existing test to validate that LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH allows to
disable implicit BPF token creation by setting envvar to empty string.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-30-andrii@kernel.org
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Add a test to validate libbpf's implicit BPF token creation from default
BPF FS location (/sys/fs/bpf). Also validate that disabling this
implicit BPF token creation works.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-28-andrii@kernel.org
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Add a few tests that attempt to load BPF object containing privileged
map, program, and the one requiring mandatory BTF uploading into the
kernel (to validate token FD propagation to BPF_BTF_LOAD command).
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-27-andrii@kernel.org
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Use both hex-based and string-based way to specify delegate mount
options for BPF FS.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-21-andrii@kernel.org
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Add a selftest that attempts to conceptually replicate intended BPF
token use cases inside user namespaced container.
Child process is forked. It is then put into its own userns and mountns.
Child creates BPF FS context object. This ensures child userns is
captured as the owning userns for this instance of BPF FS. Given setting
delegation mount options is privileged operation, we ensure that child
cannot set them.
This context is passed back to privileged parent process through Unix
socket, where parent sets up delegation options, creates, and mounts it
as a detached mount. This mount FD is passed back to the child to be
used for BPF token creation, which allows otherwise privileged BPF
operations to succeed inside userns.
We validate that all of token-enabled privileged commands (BPF_BTF_LOAD,
BPF_MAP_CREATE, and BPF_PROG_LOAD) work as intended. They should only
succeed inside the userns if a) BPF token is provided with proper
allowed sets of commands and types; and b) namespaces CAP_BPF and other
privileges are set. Lacking a) or b) should lead to -EPERM failures.
Based on suggested workflow by Christian Brauner ([0]).
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-17-andrii@kernel.org
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